GVN CEASEFIRE PLANNING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-26-6-1-5
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 8, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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P P P/7 , -
MEMORANDUM 6634-X
INFORMATION
SECRET /SENSITIVE
September 8, 1972
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
State Dept. review
completed
MR. KISSINGER
JOHN H. HOLDRII?
GVN Ceasefire Planning
A recent report ](Tab A) indicates
that the GVN is continuing urgent but somewhat unfocused ceasefire contingency
planning. The report -- which details a conversation with President Thieu's
special assistant for Security Affairs, Lt. General Quang -- suggests that
the GVN's thinking about ceasefire has progressed little since our last
memorandum to you on this subject, dated August 9 (Tab B).
General Quang reportedly told his listeners, several ARVN officers, that
a ceasefire is certain to occur. He noted that President Thieu believes
current GVN contingency- planning is too vague and has asked that new studies
be more detailed. Quang emphasized that further ceasefire planning should
specifically address subjects such as proposals for action on the "Paris
front," a scenario for reach;.ng a final total solution after a ceasefire, and
separating the NLF from the North Vietnamese (e. g., what to do with the
NLF army and how to separate NVA fillers from NLF units).
While planning for a post-ceasefire victory and for measures at the Paris
talks represent new elements in the GVN's thinking, there is little evidence
that the GVN has otherwise conceptually advanced its strategy in dealing
with overall ceasefire questions. For example, much of the reported con-
versation dealt with rather legalistic, non-essential issues such as com-
position of an International Control Commission and of the GVN's own
ceasefire research committee. General Quang's guidance on new contingency
planning also apparantly continues important gaps which similarly marked
earlier ARVN ceasefire planning. Quang's remarks, for example, still do
not focus on really crucial ceasefire issues of civilian population control
(e. g. , what to do about returning refugees or releasing civilian prisoners),
the integrity of ARVN (e. g., demobilization, desertion), the necessarily
expanded role of the civil police, and modalities of civilian and military
transportation and communications within GVN-held areas or through areas
occupied by the enemy.
SECRET /SENSITIVE CLASSIFY. By CIA
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
WARNING NOTICE -- SENSITIVI; SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORD1 t 11652
WA
INTI'LLIGENCE SOUIaCES AND MIi,TIIODs INVOI.VFD EXi MPT1ON CATEGORY 5B(2)-
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SECRET /SENSITIVE 2
Although the military aspects of the GVI`d's ceasefire planning appear to be
falling behind extensive enemy preparations and remain distracted by some
non-essential issues, President Thieu has moved more boldly in the political
sphere to prepare South Vietnam for an end of the fighting. Thieu has used
his emergency powers to tighten controls across the board in an effort to
increase central government powers and to better protect himself from any
internal opposition to a ceasefire accord. Recently he issued decree laws
which toughen press regulations and disciplinary procedures for GVN em-
ployees. He has abolished hamlet elections and streamlined local admin-
istration, increasing province-level controls. He has also significantly
increased penalties for corruption by state cadre and for common crimes,
thus giving himself a better public image while also enhancing his political
hold over civil and military personnel whose disloyalty could be rewarded
with prosecution for corruption. Finally, there are persistent reports
that Thieu plans -- at some later date -- to tighten political party regulations
to better order the almost anarchic political party situation. Despite Thieu's
pre-ceasefire measures in the political field, the report at Tab A indicates
that the GVN's military planning remains rudimentary and requires immediate
and forceful guidance from the President on critical issues such as those
outlined above.
SECRET /SENSITIVE
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SOLUTION.- QUANG NOTED THAT IT WAS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT
THE SITUATION COULD EVOLVE INTO SOMETHING LIKE THAT
WHICH EXISTED BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL, WHERE THERE
WAS NO REAL SOLUTION TO THE WAR AT ALL, BUT NONETHE.-
LESS THERE WAS A CEASEFIRE. IN LIGHT OF THIS POSSIBILITY,
QUANG FELT TIlE PLANS SHOULD INCLUDE A SCENARIO FOR
REACHING A FINAL TOTAL SOLUTION AFTER A CEASEFIRE
HAD GONE INTO EFFECT.
4. QUANG AGREED WITH THE OFFICERS THAT THERE
WERE MANY UNKNOWN FACTORS WHICH WOULD HAVE A
BEARING ON THE SPECIFIC PLANS FOR ACTION'UNDER A CEASE-
FIRE. FOR ONE THING, IT WAS NOT KNOWN WHAT THE MILI-
TARY SITUATION WOULD BE LIKE IN SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN) AT
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THE TIME A CEASEFIRE WAS PUT INTO EFFECT. IT WAS
HOPED, OF COURSE, THAT THE SITUATION WOULD BE AS
FAVORABLE AS POSSIBLE TO THE GVN. IN THIS RESPECT,
QUANG COMMENTED THAT THE GOAL BEHIND PRESIDENT
THIEU'S THREE MONTH CAMPAIGN TO "BUILD VICTORY ON
VICTORY" WAS TO RESTORE THE SITUATION TO THAT WHICH
EXISTED PRIOR TO 29 MARCH 1972. ONE OF THE OFFICERS
EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THE MOST BENEFICIAL SITUA-
TION WOULD BE A RETURN TO THE SAME STATUS AS HAD
EXISTED AT THE TIME OF THE 1954 GENEVA ACCORDS. HE
THEN ASKED RHETORICALLY, IF THAT HAPPENED WOULD
NORTH VIETNAM BE OBLIGED TO RETURN TO THE NORTH
SINCE THEY HAD COMMITTED AGGRESSION? AND WOULD
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THERE BE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF A CEASEFIRE?
SPEAKING FURTHER ABOUT INTERNATIONAL CONTROL, THE
OFFICER THEN CRITICIZED THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL
CONTROL COMMISSION (ICC) FOR ITS LACK OF IMPARTIALITY
AND LACK OF ABILITY TO TAKE PUNITIVE ACTION. QUANG
J ALSO FELT THAT THE ICC SHOULD HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO
TAKE DISCIPLINARY ACTION WHEN THERE WERE VIOLATIONS
OF A CEASEFIRE. THE OFFICER STA TED THAT IN HIS OPINION
THERE SHOULD BE A NEW ICC, WHICH WOULD CONSIST OF ASIAN.
NATIONS, SUCH AS JAPAN, PAKISTAN, OR MALAYSIA, WHICH
HAD RELATIVELY CLEAR. POSTURES AND WERE RELATIVELY
UNPREJUDICED. OR, PERHAPS IT COULD CONSIST OF TWO
ASIAN NATIONS, WITH A WESTERN COUNTRY, SUCH AS FRANCE,
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a
ENGLAND, POLAND (SIC), OR CANADA, ADDED TO IT.
5. QUANG MENTIONED THAT, IN PREPARING THE CEASE-
FIRE PLANS, ONE OF THE MAIN POINTS ON WHICH THE GVN
SHOULD CONCENTRATE WAS SEPARATING THE NATIONAL
LIBERATION FRONT (NLF) FROM THE NORTH VIETNAMESE.
QUANG FELT THAT THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEM THE GVN
WOULD ENCOUNTER WOULD BE WHAT TO DO WITH THE NLF
VARMY, AND HOW TO SEPARATE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
FILLERS FROM THE NLF UNITS. HE ALSO REMARKED THAT
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WANTED TO TALK TO THE AMERICANS
ABOUT ACHIEVING "LEGAL STATUS" FOR THE NLF AS A POLIT-
ICAL PARTY IN SVN.
6. ONE OF THE OFFICERS NOTED THAT ANOTHER POINT
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 WHICH. MUST BE KEPT IN MIND. IN PREPARING` FOR A CEA E-.
FIRE WAS THAT ONCE IT WAS IMPLEMENTED, THE ARMY
WOULD BE CUT BACK ANTS' WOULD NO -LONGER HAVE.MUCH
TO DO; HOWEVER., THE ROLE OF THE POLICE W OULD'BE STRONG.
,IN ADDITION: TO THEIR RE ULAR DUTIES UNDER.!A CEASE 1
FIRE, THE: POLICE, WOULD .BE-RESPONSIBLE FOI't SECURITY'',
PUBLIC ORDER., AND EXECUTING THE INSTRUCTIONS OF
:CEASEFIRE.
THERE:. WAS A GENERAL AGREEMENT AMt?NG :QUANGr
AND THE OFFICERS PRESENT THAT MUCH MORE WORK NEEDED
TO BE DONE ON THE CEASEFIRE PLANS. QUANU. RAISED THE
'POSSIBILITY OF.APPOINTING A "SPECIAL RESEARCH COMMITTEE"
TO LOOK. MORE DEEPLY INTO THE PROBLEMS 'INVOLVED* THE
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OFFICERS AGREED THAT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA AND
SUGGESTED THAT IT BE COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE COLLEGE, OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, JOINT GENERAL STAFF, PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR-
FARE DIRECTORATE, MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE AND INTERIOR,
PACIFICATION CENTER, AND FOREIGN MINISTRY. SINCE AN
EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE ALL OF
INDOCHINA, NOT JUST VIETNAM, CONSULTATIONS, WOULD
HAVE TO BE HELD WITH CAMBODIAN AND LAOTIAN SPECIAL-
ISTS. QUANG NOTED THAT THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL
WARFARE WAS EQUALLY AS IMPORTANT AS MILITARY
PROBLEMS; THE "SPECIAL RESEARCH COMMITTEE" WOULD
THEREFORE HAVE TO INCLUDE MEMBERS EXPERIENCED IN
Lek, ; c r ~ ~ "" ~ ??
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POLITICA I.-, AS WELL AS MILITARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE
MATTERS. WITH REGARD TO MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES
ON THE COMMITTEE, QUANG FELT THAT A GENERAL SHOULD
BE APPOINTED THEIR SPOKESMAN BECAUSE "THOSE LITTLE
GUYS LIKE THE CHIEF OF J-2 WERE NOT IMPORTANT AND,
THEY LACKED AUTHORITY TO COORDINATE MATTERS AT A
HIGH LEVEL. " QUANG REMINDED HIS GUESTS THAT THE PLANS
. WOULD-HAVE TO BE COMPLETED ON AN URGENT BASIS. IN
THIS CONTEXT, HE NOTED THAT IT WAS KNOWN FROM
CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS THAT THE COMMUNISTS WERE
STUDYING AND PREPARING FOR A CEASEFIRE. ONE OF THE
OFFICERS ADMITTED THAT IF THERE WAS A CEASEFIRE
RIGHT NOW, THE GVN WOULD NOT HAVE ANY PLAN FOR IT.
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8. ON 2$ AUGUST, QUANG REPORTED THE RESULTS OF
THE ABOVE MEETING TO PRESIDENT THIEU. QUANG STATED
THAT, WITH THE PRESIDENT'S APPROVAL, A "SPECIAL
RESEARCH COMMITTEE" WOULD BE ESTABLISHED TO STUDY
THE PROBLEMS IN DEPTH; THE COMMITTEE WOULD CONSIST
OF THREE PANELS - MILITARY, POLITICAL WARFARE.AND
DIPLOMATIC - EACH OF, WHICH WOULD RESEARCH MATTERS
RELATED TO ITS PARTICULAR SPHERE. THIEU APPROVED
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMITTEE, BUT WHEN QUANG
MENTIONED THAT THEY MIGHT SEEK THE ADVICE OF MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS POLITICAL EXPERTS ON SOME POINTS,
THIEU DISCOURAGED THAT, AND STATED HE WOULD RATHER
WAIT FOR SOME TIME "BEFORE INVITING POLITICIANS" TO
05- E OR
ET IS, 5 IT IV E
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PARTICIPATE IN THE PLANNING. IN LINE WITH QUANG`S
SUGGESTION, THIEU NOTED THAT THE MILITARY REGION
COMMANDERS AND THEIR DEPUTIES MIGHT BE INVITED TO
SAIGON TO BE BRIEFED ON THE PLANS, FOLLOWING WHICH A
SEMINAR WOULD BE HELD TO DISCUSS THE PLANS WITH
PROVINCE CHIEFS.
CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E. 0. 11652 EXEMPTION
CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF
AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.
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1P W
ME MIORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/SENSITIVE
FROM: JOHN D. NEGROPONT?
MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER
SUBJECT:
INFORMATION
August 12, 197k.
GVN Ceasefire Preparations and Political Develop-
South Vietnamese President Thieu recently promulgated a decree under his
new emergency power which substantially tightens controls on the local press.
Thieu also is reportedly considering a similar decree to increase require-
ments for registrations of legal political parties. In line with these measures,
justified on grounds of national security, Thieu has ordered detailed contingenc
planning for a ceasefire.
The Department of State is concerned that Thieu's use of his emergency power;
together with. accelerated recruiting for his own prospective Democratic
Party and strong warning to his critics indicate a trend towards an authoritari4
one-party stall akin to the government of late President Ngo Dinh Diem. The
Department has submitted for our clearance a cable which instructs Ambassadi
Bunker to express official distress ai this development and urge restraint on
Thieu. (This cable will be staffed separately.) In a related area, Ambassador
Bunker, himself, is worried that public disclosure of Thieu's ceasefire plans
(which provide for "assassinations" of enemy cadre in the pre-ceasefire
period and some post ceasefire military actions) may severely damage the
GVN's image, and provide the enemy with a pretext to itself violate a ceasefire
While we agree that disclosure to the ceasefire plans would be unfortunate and
that Thieu obviously intends a more authoritarian regime, we are not alarmed
by these developments. We believe that State's concern misses the main
issue: how best can the GVN prepare itself for a prospective ceasefire and
a political struggle with the enemy. The Department, in our view, once again
is overreacting to the situation, imposing its own concern for niceties on South
Vietnam and second guessing both Thieu and the American electorate.
Political Developments
Press law: On August 8, President Thieu promulgated a decree law which
represents a major departure in regulating the press and generally tightens
restrictions on newspapers. The most prominent feature of the decree law
SECRET /sENSTTTVF
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SECRET/STCNS VE W 2
is a provision requiring the deposit of $46, 511 by newspapers ($23, 255 if
armed by a political party) to guarantee payment of fines and court costs
in the event of a violation of the law. A second feature of the decree declares
that newspapers confiscated a second time for having printed articles detri-
mental to security or public order may be ordered to suspend publication at
a final court judgment.
Most observers expect that the law's high deposit requirement will force the
closure of most of Saigon's 40-odd newspapers and that of the remaining half
dozen publications, probably 4 will be pro-government. The embassy reports
that reaction to the decree so far has been muted, although two prominent
political moderates have strongly criticized the move in private conversa-
tions with our diplomats. Saigon publishers reportedly plan protest strikes
but Administration supporters doubt the decree will be revised and belittle
the prospects of serious, long-lasting opposition. Pro-Thieu spokesmen
insist that the press law is justified by the need to protect national security
in the face of Saigon's notoriously irresponsible publishers and the enemy's
current offensive, 25X1
We believe that the new press restrictions deal with almost universal previous
complaints in Vietnam about the near anarchic state of Saigon's newspapers,
and the fear of NLIF exploitations of the permissive regulations which governec
it. The new law, if fairly implemented, will compel a sensible consolidation
of newspapers and will not necessarily eliminate a responsible opposition. We
also believe it highly unlikely that the measure will raise a significant
controversy in, Vietnann, in any way threaten Thieu, or 'seriously -erode domesti
support or our Vietnam policy.
parties into a two or three party system, but claim that the matter is not
urgent and expect no immediate actions. The law, again if fairly implemented,
would probably permit an opposition grouping. It should not affect Vietnam's
two largest parties, one pro-Thieu and the other moderately opposition and
is justified by its supporters on grounds of national security.
Thieu have confirmed that he is interested in rationalizing Vietnam's 30
parties which in any event are mostly fractional units.
members) and result in the elimination of all but a handful of Vietnam's
tighten up requirements far the registration of political parties. The prospecti
decree probably will double presently loose requirements (10 provincial
chapters of at least 500 members or 5 chapters plus 10 National Assembly
President Thieu is contemplating a decree law which would
Planned Political Part Statute:
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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SECRET.'/SENSITIVE
Critics of the prospective decree are concerned that the new provisions will
favor the "Democracy Party" now being organized by President Thieu, and
fear it will lead to a one party state. They complain of heavy-handed recruit
ment by party cadre and some speculate that Thieu intends to destroy all
parties but his own. While Thieu's party, once formally established, will
doubtless cut into old line national groupings, there are no indications the
President intends to monopolize politics. As with the press code, Thieu is
taking the onus of reforming a much maligned and overly permissive structur.
in order to build a more rational system better able to withstand enemy ex-
ploitations. Thieu himself, has often warned that permissive laws regulating
the press and political parties are the two avenues through which the enemy
can most easily prevail in a political struggle.
Comment: In our view, Thieu's use of the emergency powers is more than
justified by the need to induce more order in Vietnam's public life at the time
when the country faces its greatest test ever. Thieu clearly is telling his
countrymen that today's critical situation and ceasefire prospects require an
end to the economic and political self-indulgence of past years. If Vietnam
is to succeed in the face of a reducing American presence, then it must
accept greater discipline.
That Vietnam will turn gradually to a more authoritarian form of government
is inevitable and has long been predicted. It also is sensible considering the
enemy threat and the practice of nearby nations such as Malaysia, Singapore
and Indonesia which support far more authoritarian governments at peace.
Most thoughtful Vietnamese would agree that their past permissiveness now is
an unaffordable luxury. In any event, we do not anticipate a major opposition
to the development of a tougher central government, or a serious threat to
Thieu's own position. Considering the alternatives to Thieu (none except, the
NLF) and the current enemy threat, we believe that GVN loyalists will
accept the decree measures despite initial dissent. As Thieu's critics
themselves admit, they have no choice.
Thieu, of course, would promptly shelve any U. S. demarche on how he
should run his government and doubtless will think us fools for cautioning
him against tightening up the system. We have long lectured the Vietnamese
on the need for political consolidation and public order. We would look silly
if we now told Thieu to ease off froma course of action designed to accomplish
this objective.
Thieu, lastly, is no tyrant and does not share Ngo Dinh Diem's credo of "if
you're not with me you're against me. " Far more flexible than Diem, Thieu
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
maintains a third ground of allowing moderate-opposition to his regime. We
expect that he will continue this course.
Thieu now is desperately trying to cope with the military situations and cease-
fire prospects and has performed reasonably well so far. Rather than harass
him with instructions on how to run his country, we should conserve our
leverage for bigger issues such as negotiations.
25X1
ARVN Ceasefire Planning
Thieu's recent use of the emergency powers supplements ceasefire contingency
planning which ARVN has been conductin since April 1972. Our Saigon
Embassy recently has obtained- h-copies of
very generalized ceasefire plans for JGS (Tab Al Corps (Tab B) and province
levels (Tab C). These plans, while more horatory than specific, are remark-
able for their hard-headed assumptions and the very fact of their existence,
which is unprecedented.
The JGS plan, at Tab A, for instance, assumes a sudden, in-place ceasefire
-under which. allied forces would be completely withdrawn and North Vietnamese
units would remain in the South. The plan also assumes that enemy forces
will violate the ceasefire, that a vigorous political struggle will continue
against the Saigon government, and that international supervision will not
necessarily occur. A parallel regional ceasefire plan (Tab B) makes the
further assumption that unoccupied areas will exist at the outset,of the cease-
fire, while a province level document (Tab C) foresees a major enemy offen-
sive to seize territory before a ceasefire.
To deal with this situation, all plans require efforts to extend GVN control
"as fast and as far as possible" in the pre-ceasefire period (Phase I). They
openly provide for the "assassination of important enemy cadre" in this period
and urge that GVN forces be indoctrinated not to believe a ceasefire means
the end of the war. During the actual ceasefire period (Phase II) GV.N.forces
are to "occupy as many different positions as possible", "check all VC
attempts to display their presence" and "make every effort to hold the people
and territory", to "avoid leaving any tell tale marks or any violations of the
ceasefire order". Annexes to the JGS plan provide for the continuation of the
Phoenix: program during tyre ceasefire, and instruct that efforts be made to
proselytize enemy POWS.
One of President Thieu's closest advisers, Lt. General Dang Van Quang, has
expressed dissatisfaction with the vagueness of the GVN ceasefire papers. He
has requested,! for example, that further study be made of readying the general
SECRET/SENSTTIVE
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SECRET/SENSWE 5
reserves and strengthening the government's position prior to a ceasefire and
of scenarios implementing the ceasefire. In d-iscussing ceasefire problems,
Quang also raised difficult questions on how to deal with the NLF main force
and local guerrilla, and expressed concern ovar how .regrouping of NVA
forces might be effected.
While we believe that these plans contain a realistic and comprehensive, if
vague ceasefire approach, Ambassador Bunker has expressed strong regret
that they envisage GVN assassination and land grab programs following an end
of hostilities. He fears public disclosure will place the onus for the break-
down of peace arrangements on the GVN and believes it "extremely important
that the GVN take no steps which the Communists could use in justification of
their own ceasefire violations".
The Embassy concerns, we believe, miss the main point in the GVN's ceasefir
planning--namely that it is compatible with our own assumptions but needs
further refinement in its details. Instead of critizing the documents for their
candor and realism, our Mission in Saigon should encourage this effort and
perhaps even work with the GVN in joint planning sessions to achieve as
workable and comprehensive a program as possible.
The GVN's plans contain important gaps, and should be remedied. They, for
example, do not discuss disposition of enemy forces, facilities or powers of
control commissions, or the possibility that forms of civilian population
control such as road checks, curfews, and travel restrictions will also be
lifted. The document also does not treat with the fate bf civilian prisoners or
of refugees who may wish to return home and omits the whole subject of
implementing a political settlement. While the GVN ceasefire plans doubtless
are more comprehensive than whatever we have prepared, they do reveal the
tremendous complexity of the issues and how little detailed staffing has actuall;
been done in this area.
In answer to the Emba sy's concern, we clearly must accept that both sides
will seek to maximize their positions in a ceasefire. There will be political
violence on both sides. This we cannot avoid. Indeed COSVN's mid-July
assessment openly urges ceasefire violations and continued eliminations
despite the presence of a control commission at national or regional levels.
We frankly would look more than silly in advising Thieu to play by the Marquis,
of Queensburry rules in dealixig with a ceasefire situation. After all, an in-
place ceasefire is more our idea than his, and he has gone some distance to
accommodate our views on the matter.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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SEC.RFT ,SETNTSITIVE 6
While the GVN plans so far adhere to the 8-point allied proposal of January 26,
and are premised on enemy acceptance of this proposal, Thicu's public position
remains somewhat ambiguous on an in-place ceasefire. Although Foreign
Minister Lam and his ministry spokesman have publically indicated that the
GVN might require NVA troop withdrawals as a ceasefire prerequisite,
President Thieu did not raise this point in a major 'speech on August 4. In
discussing ceasefire conditions, Thieu merely repeated earlier demands that
the ceasefire be Indochina-wide, supervised and internationally guaranteed.
Thieu, however, has previously expressed strong distaste in public for an in-
place ceasefire which would leave the enemy with administrative /political
control of areas in South Vietnam. He maintains that enemy controlled areas
should be defined as military regroupment points only with the GVN in charge
of administration. Such a "leopard-spot" ceasefire could be construed as an
indirect partition of GVN territory into Saigon and NLF portions and thus
contravenes Thieu often repeated "four noes" policy (no cessation of territory,
no coalition, no legal Communist party, no "Communist style" neutralism).
While we don't suggest that Thieu would balkata full in-place ceasefire, we do
perceive grounds on which he and his military leaders could object, especially
if the NVA remain in possessipg'Vthe territories they now occupy.
Instead of focusing on the public relations aspects of ceasefire and internal
political preparations, we should use our "leverage" to keep the GVN on
board our negotiations track and to better prepare it for a ceasefire contingenc
SECRET/SENSITi.V'E
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/24: LOC-HAK-26-6-1-5