PEKING BRIEFS ITS CADRES ON FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-26-5-17-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: September 7, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/24: LOC-HAK-26-5-17-9v589_x
MEMORANDUM
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MORI C05075312
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY -
a,f 4_0
INFORMATION
September 7, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER 25X1
FROM:
SUBJECT:
JOHN H. liOLDRIDGE
Peking Briefs its Cadres on Foreign Policy
Developments
Following is a synopsis of the major points in the briefing and documentary
materials:
? According to Chairman Mao, China's current foreign policy line
is designed to exploit contradictions and cause dissension between the U. S.
and the USSR. China's main danger continues to come from the Soviets,
while the U. S. is seeking to ease pressures on itself and to stabilize its
foothold in Asia.
-- Without doubt the Soviets have arrived at some sort of a secret
agreement with the U. S. on the Indochina situation. Reflecting this, the
Russians turned down a request from Hanoi to have the Soviets sweep the
'mines from their harbors with the excuse that they lacked the technical
capability to do so. [Comment: The recent appearance of a Chinese mine-
sweeper in the port of Haiphong would appear to be an effort by Peking to
"exploit the contradiction" between Moscow and Hanoi to its own advantage.
This observation also shows the depth of Chinese sensitivity to U.S. -Soviet
contacts and suspicions as to what might be involved.]
25X1
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? The U. S. will certainly withdraw its forces from Indochina: it
cannot afford not to withdraw. China has advised its Vietnamese comrades
that it would not be too late to solve the question of reuniting Vietnam once
the U.S. has withdrawn its troops. [Comment: This observation is about
as concrete a sign as we have seen that the Chinese are urging Hanoi to get
the U. S. out of Vietnam now via negotiations and then deal with the re-
unification issue by means of protracted revolutionary warfare if political
struggle will not succeed in reuniting the country under Hanoi's leadership.
It may be noteworthy that the Chinese view ignores the exact shape of an
interim political settlement, perhaps because Peking would like to see Hanoi
negotiate with the U. S. solely in terms of a military withdrawal, or even in
terms which are closer to the U. S. position than to Hanoi's.]
-- China is apprehensive about Soviet influence in Burma, where the
Russians have been in secret diplomatic contact with the Ne Win government.
China should "start to work on" the Burmese leaders at once, although this
will be complicated by the continuing support of the PRC for insurgent groups
opposed to Ne Win. \
-- China's entry into the U.N. has been a great victory and has led to
a tremendous increase in PRC influence among the medium and small
countries. Nonetheless the Chinese have made some mistakes, as at the
Stockholm Environmental Conference. Such mistakes should be minimized
in the future by having PRC U. N. delegates report directly to the central
leadership for their instructions.
-- China will support the 200-mile territorial water limit claimed by
Latin American countries, but on the basis that limits should be set variably
according to each country's particular situation. The seabed is a treasure
house of natural resources, and in the future all countries will contend for
control over seabed resources.
25X1
cc: Mr. Sonnenfeldt
SECRET/ SENSITIVE
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