CABLE TO GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT FROM SECRETARY HENRY KISSINGER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-259-6-46-8
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: May 7, 1974
• Content Type: CABLE

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/29: LOC-HAK-259-6-46-8
S E C R E T/SENSITIVE 0723552 MAY 74
MAY 7, 1974
HAKTO 55
TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: SECRETARY KISSINGER
PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING TO PRESIDENT BEGIN TEXT$
I SPENT THREE HOURS WITH GRONYKO TODAY (TUESDAY) IN NICOSIA,
ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY DEALING WITH THE MIDDLE EAST.
GROMYKO REITERATED THE STANDARD SOVIET POSITION THAT DISENGAGE-
MENT WILL LEAVE THE AREA IN A STATE OR TENSION UNLESS IT IS CLEARLY
LINKED TO ACHIEVEMENT OF A FINAL SETTLEMENT. HE STRESSED SOVIET
SUPPORT FOR SYRIA'S DEMANDS. HOWEVER, HIS PRESENTATION CONFIRMED
OUR OWN JUDGMENT THAT THE PRINCIPAL ISSUE FOR THE SYRIANS IS
KUNEITRA AND THAT IF THEY GET IT THE NEGOTIATION WITH SYRIA HAS
A CHANCE OF SUCCEEDING. I MADE THE POINT FIRMLY TO HIM SEVERAL
TIMES THAT THE US AND USSR WOULD INFLAME THE SITUATION IF WE TRIED
TO COMPETE WITH EACH OTHER IN BACKING THE MAXIMUM DEMANDS OF THE
TWO SIDES. HE ASSURED ME THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT WANT THE AREA
IN A STATE OF TENSION.
IN SHORT? WHILE I BELIEVE WE PROBABLY CANNOT EXPEXT THE SOVIETS
TO BE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL ON THE SYRIAN NEGOTIATIONS, I DO NOT
SEE SERIOUS SIGNS THAT THEY ARE DETERMINED -- OR ABLE -- TO
DISRUPT THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THIS POINT? THERE WAS NOT A SINGLE CON-
PLAINT THIS TIME ABOUT US UNILATERALISM AND EXCLUSION OF THE SOVIET UNION
H . SEEMED EAGER TO TRY TO FIND OUT FROM ME THE DETAILED SPECIFICS
AND HE WANTS TO ASSURE THE SOVIETS PARTICIPATE IN THE "FINALIZATION"
OF THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT AT GENEVA. MY OWN ASSESSMENT IS
THAT WE WILL HAVE A MURDEROUS TIME IN SYRIA AND THAT WE MAY WELL
FAIL.
ON OTHER SUBJECTS, WE REVIEWED THE STATUS OF A NUMBER OR
BILATERAL US-SOVIET AGREEMENTS FOR THE SUMMIT -- INCLUDING ARMS
CONTROL AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION MATTERS. WE AGREED THEY WERE
ON COURSE. ON SALT, I WOULD TALK TO DOBRYNIM ONCE I GOT BACK
FROM MY TRIP. I REITERATED WHAT OUR CONCERNS WERE.
WE SKETCHED OUT A ROUGH SCENARIO FOR MOVING AHEAD WITH THE
EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE. THE SOVIETS ARE WILLING TO AGREE
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
TO SOME BEEFED-UP LANGUAGE IN THE SECTION OF THE FINAL DECLARATION
REGARDING HUMAN CONTACTS; THIS WOULD 60 FAR TO SATISFYING THE WEST
EUROPEANS. GROMYKO AND I AGREED THAT A THIRD COUNTRY (SUCH AS
FINLAND) SHOULD BE INVITED TO SUBMIT SOME PRE-AGREED LANGUAGE
TO THE CONFERENCE. END TEXT
WARM REGARDS.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/29 : LOC-HAK-259-6-46-8
 No Objection ection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/29: LOC-HAK-259-6-46-8
OIL- Pr
SECRET /SENSITIVE
39z
May 7, 1974
HAKTO cS
TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: SECRETARY KISSINGER
Please pass following to President: BEGIN TEXT:
I spent three hours with Gromyko today (Tuesday) in Nicosia,
almost exclusively dealing with the Middle East.
Gromyko reiterated the standard Soviet position that disengage-
ment will leave the area in a state of tension unless it is clearly
linked to achievement of a final settlement. He stressed Soviet
support for Syria's demands, However, his presentation confirmed
our own judgment that the principal issue for the Syrians is Kuneitra
and that if they get it, the negotiation with Syria has a chance of
succeeding. I made the point firmly to him several times that the
US and USSR would inflame the situation if we tried to compete
with each other in backing the maximum demands of the two sides.
He assured me the Soviet Union did not want the area in a state of
tension.
In short, while I believe we probably cannot expect the Soviets to
be particularly helpful on the Syrian negotiations, I do not see serious
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/29: LOC-HAK-259-6-46-8
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/29: LOC-HAK-259-6-46-8
- i
SECRET /SENSITIVE _Z_
signs that they are determined -- or able --- to disrupt the
negotiations at this point. There was not a single complaint this
time about US unilateralism and exclusion of the Soviet Union. He
seemed eager to try to find out from me the detailed specifics
and he wants to assure the Soviets participate in the"finalization" of
the disengagement agreement at Geneva. My own assessment is
that we will have a murderous time in Syria and that we may well
fail.
On other subjects, we reviewed the status of a number of
bilateral US-Soviet agreements for the Summit -- including arms
control and technical cooperation matters. We agreed they were
on course. On SALT, I would talk to Dobrynin once I got back
from my trip. I reiterated what our concerns were.
We sketched out a rough scenario fooving ahead with the
European Security Conference. The Soviets are willing to agree to
some beefed-up language in the ; ection of the final declaration
regarding human contacts; this would go far to satisfying the West
Europeans. Gromyko and I agreed that a third country (such as
Finland) should be invited to submit some pre-agreed language to the
Conference. END TEXT
Warm regards.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/29: LOC-HAK-259-6-46-8