PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING TO THE SECRETARY BY MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-259-3-59-7
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2009
• Sequence Number: 59
• Publication Date: March 3, 1974
• Content Type: CABLE

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/17: LOC-HAK-259-3-59-7
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S E C- R E T SENSIT IVE EYES ONLY WH40647
TOHAK 80
TO RALPH SIGLER FOR LARRY EAGLEBURGER
HOLD FOR PICKUP-DO NOT ATTEMPT TO DELIVER
DESTROY TAPES; RETAIN NO FILE COPIES
MARCH 3, 1974
TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: Al ASSADOR EILTS, CAIRO 121
1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING TO THE SECRETARY BY MOST
EXPEDITIOUS MEANS:
2. THIS TMORNI I WAS ASKED TO MEET WITH THE PRESIDENT
AT NOON. WITN I ARRIVED, FAHMY WAS ALSO THERE. THE
MEETING TOOK PLACE ON THE LAWN OF HIS GIZA VILLA. SADAT
WAS RELAXED AND DRESSED INFORMALLY. AFTER EXTENDING
FELICITATIONS, HE SAID HE WANTED TO GIVE US A BRIEFING RE
HIS TALKS WITH GROMYKO. SINCE FAHMY WAS TAKING NOTES, I
INFER 'THIS WAS ALSO THE FIRST TIME HE HAD HAD THIS BRIEFING.
SADAT SPOKE FROM MEMORY AND AT TIMES HIS ACCOUNT WAS
REPETITIOUS. I HAVE SOUGHT BELOW TO DISTILL BOTH ITS
ESSENCE AND FLAVOR.
3. BY WAY OF BACKGROUND, SADAT SAID THAT SINCE YOUR
FIRST VISIT A "MISUNDERSTANDING" APPEARS TO HAVE DEVELOPED
BETWEEN HIM AND THE SOVIETS, DUE LARGELY TO THE SOVIETS'
METHOD OF DEALING WITH HIM. SOVIETS HAD MADE A"COMPLETE
SITUDTION" OUT OF IT AND HAD ADOPTED A "NEW POLICY."
GROMYKO SPOKE VERY CANDIDLY AND INSISTED NO ONE ELSE, NOT
EVEN AN INTERPRETER, BE PRESENT AT THE MEETING. ALTHOUGH
GROMYKO' S ENGLISH IS POOR, THEY MANAGED TO COMMUNICATE.
SINCE DEVERSOIR, SADAT CONTINUED, SOVIETS THOUGHT THEY
HAD HIM "IN A FIX." THEY SOUGHT TO EXPLOIT THIS TO THE
UTMOST, THANKS TO YOUR EFFORTS, THIS SOVIET ATTEMPT HAS
FAILED. "WE HAVE ACHIEVED MUCH AND CHANGED THE SITUATION
MORI/CDF
C03344257
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
COMPLETELY." SOVIETS, I N SADAT' S VIEWS HAVE MISCALCULATED.
THEY BELIEVED NOTHING-WOULD COME OF OUR COOPERATION.
THEY HAVE BEEN "DAZED" BY WHAT HAS HAPPENED. AS A RESULT,
THE POLITBURO, OF WHICH GROMYKO IS NOW A MEMBER, HAD
APPARENTLY REACHED THE CONCLUSION THAT GROMYXO BE SgW"TO
EGYPT AS A "VANGUARD."
4. SADAT SAID HIS TALKS WITH GROMYKO HAD BEEN FRA W' "
COMPREHENSIVE. HE HAD TOLD THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER
THAT THE SOVIETS HAD SOUGHT TO EXPLOIT THE POST-DEVERSOIR
SITUATION BY NOT REPLACING THE 'ARMS THAT EGYPT HAD
REQUESTED. IN RESPONSE, GROMYKO MADE TWO POINTS. FIRST,
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/17: LOC-HAK-259-3-59-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/17: LOC-HAK-259-3-59-7
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HE STRESSED THAT EXCLUDING SOVIET UNION FROM MIDDLE EAST
SITUATION IS A "MOST SERIOUS AND DANGEROUS PROBLEM" FOR
THE SOVIETS AND THAT THE SOVIETS CANNOT ACCEPT IT.
SECOND, THE SOVIETS ARE PREPARED TO REDRESS WHATEVER HAD
HAPPENED AFTER DEVERSOIR OR EVEN BEFORE IN .AN EFFORT TO
STRENGTHEN THEIR RELATIONS WITH EGYPT. THE SOVIET "BIG
THREE" ARE PREPARED TO ASSUME THIS RESPONSIBILITY. THEY
WISHED ONLY TO BE ASSURED BY SADAT THAT HE WILL NOT SEEK
TO EXCLUDE THEM FROM MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM.
5. SADAT SAID HE POINTED OUT THAT THE ACHIEVEMENTS TO
DATE HAD BEEN LARGELY THE RESULT OF YOUR INDEFATIGABLE
ENERGY, E.G. THE SIX POINTS, YOUR DECEMBER AND JANUARY
VISITS, ETC. HE HAD ASKED GROMYKO WHAT THE SOVIETS CAN
DO WITH THE ISRAELIS, NOTING THAT USG ALONE HAS ANY
INFLUENCE ON THE LATTER. WHEN GROMYKO GRUDGINGLY AGREED
WITH THIS JUDGEMENT, SADAT HAD ASKED WHY SOVIETS ARE
SO SENSITIVE ABOUT US-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS. GROMYKO RES-
PONDED THAT SOVIETS ARE CONCERNED SADAT IS "DRIFTING
TOWARD THE WEST." SADAT HAD RESPONDED THAT IF THIS BENE-
FITS HIS COUNTRY, HE WILL DO SO. HE REMINDED GROMYKO
OF EVENTS OF 1972 AND STRESSED HIS INDEPENDENCE. IN '729
WHEN SOVIETS HAD THOUGHT "YOU HAD ME," HE HAD EXPELLED ALL
SOVIETS MILITARY ADVISORS. HE SHOULD HAVE DONE SO AGAIN
LAST MONTH, SADAT TOLD GROMYKO, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT
TO THE EGYPTIAN-SOVIET TREATY AND SOVIET FACILITIES ON
THE MEDITERRANEAN, SOVIETS, HE CIrnRGED, HAD CONSTANTLY
SOUGHT TO EXPLOIT THE SITUATION.
F. GROMYKO HAD NOTED NO PUBLIC MENTION HAS RECENTLY
BEEN MADE OF SOVIET EFFORTS. HE REQUESTED THAT SADAT
INC#UDE REFERENCE TO SUCH SOVIET EFFORTS IN HIS PUBLIC
STATEMENTS. SPECIFICALLY, HE ASKED THAT IN THE UPCOMING
EGYPTIAN-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE AT THE END OF HIS VISIT, SOME-
THING BE SAID ON THIS POINT. SADAT HAD IN PRINCIPLE
AGREED AND HAD TOLD HIM TO TALK TO FAHMY.
7. AT THIS POINT FAHMY INTERJECTED THAT GROMYKO HAS
ALREADY DISCUSSED SUBJECT WITH HIM. GROMYKO WANTS AN
EXPLICIT PARAGRAPH THAT EGYPT WILL HANDLE EVERYTHING IN
GENEVA. SADAT INSTRUCTED FAHMY TO CAST ANY REFERENCE TO
SOVIET EFFORTS IN GENERAL TERMS, PERHAPS BY
RECALLING THAT SOVIET UNION IS ONE OF CO-CHAIRMEN OF
GENEVA CONFERENCE. FAHMY, SPEAKING TO ME, ASKED THAT WE
NOT BE CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT APPEARS IN THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE.
HE ASSURED ME THAT WHATEVER HAS TO BE PUT IN WILL BE
CONSISTENT WITH SADAT' S AND HIS UNDERSTANDINGS WITH YOU.
8. GROMYKO HAD ASKED IF EGYPT IS NOW TREATING SOVIETS
AND USG "50-50"7 (THE PRESIDENT POINTEDLY NOTED GROMYKO'S
PHRASE.) SADAT HAD AGAIN #REMINDED GROMYKO THAT EGYPT IS
INDEPENDENT. NO SPECIAL PRIVILEGES ARE GIVEN TO ANY
OUTSIDERS. HOWEVER, SOVIETS HAVE IN FACT HAD PRIVILEGES
SUCH AS EGYPTIAN-SOVIET TREATY, FACILITIES ON THE MEDI-
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/17: LOC-HAK-259-3-59-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/17: LOC-HAK-259-3-59-7
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TERRANEAN, ETC. WHY, HE ASKED, SHOULD HE NOT NOW IMPROVE
HIS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES?
9. GROMYKO HAD RESPONDED THAT SOVIETS HAVE NO OBJECTION
TO THIS, BUT HAD NOT KNOWN THE FACTS. SADAT SAID THIS WAS
THEIR OWN FAULT. SOVIETS HAVE FOR SOME TIME NOT HAD AN
AMBASSADOR HERE AND HE, SADAT, IS NOT PREPARED TO AGREE
TO HAVE VINOGRADOV COME BACK. HE REMINDED GROMYKO THAT
THE PREVIOUS VINOGRADOV HAD BEEN FINE AND THAT THE DIALOGUE
DURING HIS PERIOD HAD BEEN GOOD. GROMYKO AGREED TO DO
WHATEVER SADAT WISHES ON SOVIET REPRESENTATION.
10. SADAT HAD THEN ASKED IF IT IS A CONDITION OF FURTHER
SOVIET AID THAT HE SPEAK PUBLICLY ABOUT SOVIET EFFORTS.
GROMYKO REPLIED IN NEGATIVE. SADAT HAD SAID HE WAS GLAD
TO HEAR THIS, SINCE AS GROMYKO KNEW HE ALWAYS SPOKE
FRANKLY. IF SOVIETS INSISTED, HE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO
EXPLAIN HOW THEY HAD SOUGHT TO BOX HIM IN AFTER DEVERSOIR.
11. ADVERTING TO SADAT'S EARLIER REMARK ABOUT YOUR
ENERGETIC ACTIVITIES, BROMYKO ASKED COULD HE NOT BE
ENERGETIC AS YOU? SADAT RESPONDED THAT HE COULD OF COURSE
BE SO, BUT ISRAEL WOULD NOT HEED. GROMYKO HAD OBSERVED
ISRAELIS HAVE ASKED FOR RESTORATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELA-
TIONS, BUT SOVIETS ARE NOT PREPARED TO AGREE.
12. SADAT HAD THEN TOLD HIM OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S VISIT
IN MAY. WITH THIS REVELATION, HE RELATED WITH OBVIOUS
SATISFACTI_O:B, "I REALLY SHOCKED HIM." HE REMINDED GROMYKO
THAT BREZUKV HAD BEEN INVITED SEVERAL TIMES, BUT HAD
NEVER COME. I N CONTRAST, SADAT SAID, HE HAS VISITED SOVIET
UNION FOUR TIMES, BUT IS NOT PREPARED TO GO AGAIN WITHOUT
SOME SOVIET REPONSE. MOREOVER, HE DID NOT WISH EVERY
VISIT BY YOU OR, BY PRESIDENT NIXON TO BE A CAUSE OF MIS-
UNDERSTANDING ON THE PART OF THE SOVIETS. GROMYKO RES-
PONDED THAT BREZHNEV IS READY TO COME WHEN HE FEELS SADAT
REALLY WANTS TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS.
SADAT SAID HE MEANT WHAT HE SAID ABOUT WANTING GOOD
RELATIONS IN CONTEXT OF RESPECT FOR EGYPT'S INDEPENDENCE.
13. SADAT THEN GAVE ME WHAT HE CALLED HIS "CONCLUSIONS"
AFTER HIS TALK WITH GROMYKO, AS FOLLOWS:
A. SOVIETS FEEL KEENLY THAT HIS EMERGING RELATIONS
WITH YOU ARE UNDERMINING THEM AND ARE TRYING HARD TO
REDRESS SITUATION.
.B. THEY RECOGNIZE THEIR PREVIOUS POLICY WAS IN ERROR
SINCE, DESPITE SADAT'S DEVERSOIR DIFFICULTIES, IT NEITHER
EMBARRASSED NOR HARRASSED HIM. THEY ARE NOW TRYING TO
RECTIFY POLICY.
Co THEY ARE SEEKING TO UNDERMINE "WHAT WE HAVE DONE
TOGETHER," STARTING FROM SIX POINTS TO PRESENT.
HE HAD LEARNED THIS FROM GROMYKO AND SEPARATELY
FROM THE SYRIANS. THUS, GROMYKO HAD POINTEDLY NOTED
THERE IS NO LINK BETWEEN THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT
AND ANY FINAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/17: LOC-HAK-259-3-59-7
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SADAT HAD CORRECTED HIM AND REMINDED HIM THAT THE PRESIDENT
KNOWS WHAT HE WANTS. THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT WAS A
MILITARY AGREEMENT. THROUGH IT NOT ONLY THE OCTOBER LINES
BUT MORE HAD BEEN GOTTEN. OTHER ASPECTS OF A FINAL
SETTLEMENT HAVE NOT YET BEEN DISCUSSED, BUT WILL BE.
(FAHMY INTERJECTED HERE THAT GROMYKO HAD ALSO TAXED HIM ON
THIS POINT. HE HAD RESPONDED THAT HE WAS NOT AWARE OF
ANYONE OFFERING EGYPTIANS ANYTHING BETTER.)
D. SOVIETS ARE DOING UTMOST ENGAGE THEMSELVES IN
SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT TO RESTORE THEIR PRESTIGE.
IN THIS CONNECTION, GROMYKO SOUGHT TO OBTAIN SADAT'S
APPROVAL FOR A 5-MEMBER MISSION AT GENEVA (SOVIETS, US,
EGYPTIANS, SYRIANS, AND ISRAELIS) TO CONDUCT PERTINENT
DISCUSSIONS. WHEN TELLING ME THIS, SADAT EXPRESSED AMUSE-
MENT SINCE ASSAD HAD BY THEN ALREADY AGREED TO SEND SOMEONE
TO WASHINGTON. HE HAD NOT SO INDICATED TO GROMYKO, HOWEVER,
AND CHUCKLED ABOUT WHAT GROMYKO'S REACTION MUST HAVE BEEN
WHEN HE READ THIS NEWS IN THIS MORNING'S PAPERS.
14. SADAT HAD TOLD GROMYKO THAT HE IS ANXIOUS FACILITATE
SYRIAN DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS. HE POINTED OUT THAT ASSAD
DOES NOT WANT A SYRIAN-ISRAELI COMMITTEE, FEARING THAT
SUCH WOULD CAUSE HIM TO BE BRANDED "TRAITOR." SADAT WAS
READY, THEREFORE, TO HAVE SYRIANS PARTICIPATE IN EGYPTIAN-
ISRAELI COMMITTEE AND HAD ALREADY TALKED TO YOU ABOUT
THIS. GROMYKO' S PERSISTENT EFFORTS TO GET A NEW COMMITTEE
OF FIVE ESTABLISHED HAD BEEN REJECTED. (FAHMY INTERJECTED
HERE THAT GROMYKO WANTS TO PUT SOMETHING ABOUT THIS IN THE
FINAL COMMUNIQUE. SADAT CAUTIONED HIM TO SAY NOTHING ABOUT
SYRIA.) HE HAD ALSO TOLD GROMYKO THAT IF SOVIETS AND US
WISH TO JOIN THAT COMMITTEE, HE COULD HAVE NO OBJECTION.
HE HAD POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT ISRAELIS ARE UNLIKELY TO
AGREE TO`SIVIET/US PARTICIPATION.
15. GRO.MYKO HAD THEN ASKED THAT A REFERENCE TO SOVIET AND
US PARTICIPATION IN EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI MILITARY COMMITTEE BE
INCLUDED IN COMMUNIQUE. IN MY PRESENCE, SADAT INSTRUCTED
FAHMY TO "FIND SOMETHING" ANODYNE TO PUT INTO THE COMMUNIQUE,
AND SUGGESTED GROMYXO BE TOLD HE SHOULD SPEAK TO ASSAD
ABOUT THIS.
16. IN CONCLUSION, SADAT ASKED ME TO PASS ON TO YOU THAT
"WE MUST CONTINUE TO COOPERATE ON SAME LINES AS BEFORE.
NOTHING HAS CHANGED FROM MY SIDE. EVERYTHING WE AGREED
UPON WILL BE CARRIED OUT AT PROPER TIME." HE ADDED THAT
HE LOOKS FORWARD TO YOUR VISIT AFTER YOUR MOSCOW TRIP.
17. SADAT AND FAHMY ASKED THE ABOVE BE SENT TO YOU
THROUGH THIS CHANNEL. SOME OTHER SUBJECTS DISCUSSED ARE
REPORTED BY SEPARATE MESSAGES.
BXXXILX
END OF MESSAGE.
BT
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2009/12/17: LOC-HAK-259-3-59-7