VIETNAM ALTERNATIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-252-4-6-1
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: June 27, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/05/25: LOC-HAK-252-4-6-1
MEMORANDUM
SECRET - SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: Morton H. Halperin
SUBJECT: Vietnam Alternatives
June 27, 1969
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
This memorandum summarizes the major options now open in Vietnam.
Annexes will spell out for each option the assumptions, arguments for
and against, and consequences of failure.
I. Where We Are
The events since January 20 have probably reinforced Hanoi in
the view that, if it continues to wait us out and appear somewhat
reasonable, U. S. public opinion will eventually force the U. S. simply
to withdraw from Vietnam or to accept a face-saving agreement.
Political opposition in the U. S.' will almost certainly become more
vocal over the next months, reinforcing Hanoi in this belief. We still
do not have any precise understanding of the extent to which the GVN
is making progress in increasing its control of the countryside. In
response to NSSM 19 on Internal Security, the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, supported by State and CIA, reported that. pacification is
making very little progress and would not unless there were radical changes
in the .program. JCS and, MAC_V_.dis_sented, .,arguing. that there was sub-
stantial progress. We know that the enemy is suffering heavy casualties
but there is a consensus that Hanoi is prepared to accept these costs for
some time. Moreover, the enemy controls the level of casualties and
can reduce his costs if necessary.
Thus, even if it is true that time is on our side in South Vietnam,
progress will be painfully slow--far too slow for our domestic critics.
II. Alternative Strategies
xn light 0-f--this' situation, three options are examined: (1) current
strategy, (2) Vietnannization, and (3) accelerated political'negotiations.
A. Current Strategy
Our current strategy continues to aim at keeping two options
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equally open: (1) negotiation of a political settlement in Paris; and
(2) gradual Vietnamization of the war to permit U. S. disengagement
in the absence of settlement. We could continue to go down these two
roads. There has been some movement in Hanoi's negotiating position
and a number of signs point to an intention on its part to negotiate
seriously in the late summer or early fall. (Both enemy internal
propaganda and the empty pipeline support this hypothesis.) The
gradual process of Vietnamization that we have started puts pressure
on both Saigon and Hanoi to negotiate.
However, our emphasis on free elections is simply not
attractive enough to the other side. Every election held in Vietnam
has been won by the people conducting it. Hanoi assumes this will
continue to be true even if there is a mixed election commission or
international supervision.
Another fundamental problem with this strategy is time. Even
if the NLF and Saigon were to begin negotiating in good faith, it will
-take some period for them to come to a settlement unless the outside
pressure on both to reach a quick agreement were enormous. Our
Vietnamization program and our veiled threats of escalation are simply
not sufficient to bring that pressure.
Beyond the problem of time, unless we now choose decisively
one of the two forks in the road our policy will become increasingly
Pc oiitradictory. -If-We-..are-really depending on Vietnamization and do
not expect a settlement, we should not be pressing Thieu to make a
conciliatory political offer and to broaden his government to include
neutralist elements. Such action creates a belief in South Vietnam that
the Thieu Government will have to go, and makes it less likely that the
anti-Communist opposition groups will rally to the GVN. By alienating
-conservative elements and creating distrust in the Army the negotiating
process reduces the probability of effective Vietnamization which must
be based largely on the conservative anti-Communist elements in the
South. Conversely, if we are focusing on a negotiated settlement we
should be pressing Thieu harder on a broadening of the government to
include neutralists and not waste our capital on issues connected with
Vietnamization (e. g. officer promotions), and not increase the independent
military capability of ARVN.
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SECRET - SENSITIVE
In the end, we may find the following two alternatives
sufficiently unattractive that we will continue down the current road
but, if we do so, we should proceed with full recognition of the
inherent contradiction and the likelihood that we may find time running
out.
B. Vietnamization On Fixed Timetable and Reduced-Emphasis
on Negotiations.
Under this approach, we would tell Thieu that we are not
asking him to make any further concessions publicly or privately
regarding a political settlement. Nor would we give him any advice
on political or, indeed, military problems in the South. Rather, we
would give Thieu a timetable first for the withdrawal of U. S. ground
combat forces in two years and then for the withdrawal of much of the
remaining U. S. military forces over a second two-year period. We
would tell Thieu that, within reason, we would provide him with any
military or economic assistance he may request. Publicly, we would
say that the President's May 14 speech represented the most forth-
coming position we could put forward without any meaningful response
on their part and a willingness to negotiate seriously. The enemy has
refused to negotiate on that basis and thus we see little prospect of a
negotiated political settlement. We have, therefore, developed a time-
phased plan to turn the war over to the South Vietnamese. We could
point out that we will see to it that the SouthVietnamese are better
equipped and trained than their opponents and indicate that there is
no reason why South Vietnam should not be able to defend itself even
against North Vietnamese aggression. This strategy has the great
advantage that the initiative is largely in our own hands. The princip al
weaknesses are as follows:
(1) The Saigon government might collapse rather quickly
when our policy is made known.
(2) Hanoi might concentrate its military efforts on
keeping U. S. casualties high even as we withdraw our troops and
occasionally decimate a South Vietnamese unit. If such events occurred
we would be under great pressure either to accelerate our withdrawal
or to end it and bring some troops back.
SECRET - SENSITIVE
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SECRET SENSITIVE
(3) Some would charge that we had abandoned our objective
of permitting the people of South Vietnam to freely choose their own
political future.
(4) If we are forced to suspend our withdrawals after 12..18
months, Saigon may be sufficiently strengthened as to refuse to negotiate.
C. Accelerated Political Negotiations
Under this approach we would not announce any further with-
drawals but would seek to accelerate the process of politicalnegoti-
ations. To do so we would have to abandon two elements of our current
posture:
(1) The current GVN must remain in power nominally over
all of South Vietnam until after free elections or until it freely negotiates
the formation of a coalition government.
(2) We should not discuss the elements of a political settle-
ment with the other side in the absence of the GVN.
If we are prepared to abandon the first point but continue to
refuse to accept the enemy demand for a peace cabinet, we could seek
a form of territorial accommodation. Under this approach, the situation
which has existed for many years in South Vietnam would be given a
measure of legal status. Many villages in South Vietnam have never been
under GVN control; the NLF has controlled some of these. The NLF also
has some measure of influence and recruitment and tax power in other
villages. Territorial accommodation would invoke implicit acceptance of
the status quo and would seek to rule out efforts to change it by force. The
NLF would be recognized as being in control of the territory and popu-
lation in South Vietnarn it now controls while the GVN would retain control
over the areas it now controls. Power would be shared in contested areas,
The most effective way to get such an accommodation might be to negotiate
a ceasefire in place.
With regard to negotiating procedures, if we abandon our current
stance we could either accept the DRV invitation to negotiate or we could
try to negotiate with the Soviets either bilaterally or in the context of a
reconvened Geneva Conference.
T, Te4TTT'T TT
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SECRET -. SENSITIVE
A successful pursuit of this strategy aimed at producing
a settlement by the end of the year, aside from requiring willingness
on our part to relax our terms would also require the development of
leverage which will at last force the Soviet Union to bring effective
pressure to bear on Hanoi. This will require increasing Soviet concern
about the possibility that we will start dealing with the Chinese, making
clear to the Russians that in the absence of a Vietnam settlement we
will vigorously resist their efforts to organize a Collective Security
arrangement in Asia and perhaps ultimately instituting a blockade of
North Vietnam. We would use our influence in Saigon to get its agree-
ment to our negotiating a political settlement. In the end we would have to
be prepared to use all of our leverage to get the GVN to buy the agreement.
We would not use up any leverage on Vietnamization issues.
The fundamental difficulties with this strategy are:
(1) Hanoi may not in fact be prepared to accept any settle-
ment which does not meet all of its current terms.
(2) We may not be able to find a way to bring the Russians
actively into the process; and
(3) Thieu may find a way to resist and to undermine the negoti-
ations by making clear his refusal to cooperate or he might be removed
from effective power in a right wing military coup.
(4) Even if the negotiations are moving rapidly, pressure
to accelerate our own troop withdrawal would mount.
(5) If we succeed, the situation can easily go sour in a few
years and we would have to accept full blame for what occurred.
(6) If we fail, Saigon is likely to get the blame and public support
for our position will be weakened. Moreover, support in South Vietnam
for Thieu will have declined and US-GVN relations will have worsened.
Both these developments would make it much less likely that Vietnamization
would work if we then turned to that option.
-CF`C.R VPr _ CFNgTTTVF.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/05/25: LOC-HAK-252-4-6-1