SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM ON SALT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-25-6-20-5
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: August 10, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/24: LOC-HAK-25-6-20-5
DIA review(s)
completed.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIE
SECRET
- 4A
FROM: ~4Phil Odeen/Helmut Sonnenfeldt
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
OSD review SUBJECT: Supplemental Memorandum on SALT
completed
This memo discusses the SALT papers which were late in receipt,
i.e., Qualitative Limits, Bombers, and Reductions. Additionally,
there is an intelligence issue which you should know about.
Qualitative Missile Limitations (Tab G)
This paper covers a wide selection of qualitative restrictions:
- - Limits on the development of new or modified ICBMs/
SLBMs involving a ban or limits on flight testing.
-- Limits which constrain the types and numbers of RVs
including a ban on production, deployment and testing; a ban on
testing and deployment of land-based MIRVs; limits on the types
of missiles which can be MIRVed.
-- Limits on guidance /accuracy improvements.
-- Limits on missile modernization.
-- Limits on the size of SLBMs.
Finally, there is a large section on qualitative limits on Hard-Site
Defense inserted by OSD to demonstrate how we could have HSD in
SALT without worrying about population defense.
This paper is far from complete. The verification sections are
almost totally missing and are to be provided separately by CIA.
They are not yet completed. We have had only limited time to
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digest the contents of this paper and, therefore, will. touch only the
key issues.
1. Flight Test Limits
-- A total ban on flight testing of new or modified ICBMs
and SLBMs would obviously stop progress on boosters, RVs, MIRVs,
etc. Such a ban would also limit us, e. g. , prevent our continuing with
Trident. The draft paper does not yet include the verification section,
a key aspect of qualitative limits,
A total ban is probably unrealistic and unacceptable to either side
since it would close off all missile development. You may want to
make clear that we are not interested in such a ban.
- - Quota limits on flight tests (e. g. , 10-20 per year) might
delay developmental programs and be somewhat more realistic. It
is difficult to assess the degree that any program would be slowed.
Any appreciable level of testing (e. g. , 40-50 tests) can be demonstrated
as providing opportunity for making qualitative progress although
requiring changes in current test practices. It is argued, however, that
reduced confidence at low test levels would make a first-strike ques-
tionable. The U. S. conducts about 100 tests in developing and fielding
a new ballistic missile -- there are about 20 tests/year thereafter-for
reliability.
We probably want to keep some test constraints in play, but only those
that could be verified and have some defineable strategic objectives.
2. MIRV Limits
The paper is generally quite negative on MIRV limits. It argues that:
-- A MIRV ban preserves Minuteman in the short run, but
not over time as accuracy improves. This is an over-simplification
and, at least, ignores that a near one-for-one trade may not be a bad
arrangement since numbers of missiles are limited under SALT.
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-- A MIRV ban makes us more sensitive to Soviet ABM cheating,
i. e., SAM upgrade. While true, the fear of SAM upgrade is far less
-than in 1969 before we had available an arsenal of MIRVs which could
be redeployed in response to Soviet cheating.
The Measures Considered:
a) Ban on Production, Deployment and Testing of all MIRVs.
The key to negotiating such a ban is Soviet acceptance of a ban on
testing and the consequent continuing U. S. advantage. From our
point of view there is the issue of whether we can have confidence in
a test ban and whether we can accept a ban on unverifiable activities
such as production and deployment,
Tuning could -be a -key factor in our,approach.-to MIRY bans:
-- Some would argue that if we are to have confidence in
any ban, then it must become effective before the Soviets do any
significant testing; otherwise the Soviets could go into production and
deployment without knowledge. OSD will probably argue this point
and press for trying to stop the Soviets in the next round of SALT.
-- Others argue that it is already too late to ban MIRVs,
since the Soviets fully intend to acquire them, and the new missiles
are designed for MIRVs.
-- A variation of this argument, however, is that we would
be able to more effectively design a verifiable ban, if we had some
notion of what the Soviet MIRV (not their MRV) actually was.
-- This last argument ties into with what may be the only
realistic alternative: to concentrate on banning MIRVs beyond the
first generation.
The paper does not discuss this aspect, but at the meeting you should
emphasize that this (the 2nd generation case) is one of the more
realistic alternatives.
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b) Ban on Flight-Test and Deployment of land-based MIRVs.
The issues are generally the same as a total ban. The issue
is whether we can distinguish between land and sea based warhead
testing.
c) Limits on missiles which can be MIRVed, e. g., SS-9s.
At the meeting you should explore the verification issue in detail
making clear that future papers must explain and justify claims for
verification.
3. Limits on Guidance /Accuracy
We believe that accuracy limits are unlikely to be useful measures.
At the meeting you may seek to drop these limits.
4. Limits On Modernization
These limits include:
-- A limit on rate of modernization or replacement;
-- A ban on changing the external configuration of deployed
missiles and launchers;
-- A commitment not to seek to achieve a counterforce
capability.
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A general pledge by both sides not to develop a counter-
force capability, however, might be a useful outcome in SALT. Given
the unlikely prospect of Soviet agreement to qualitative constraints this
might be an important general undertaking -- it might even be a useful
outcome from the Soviet visit next year.
We think the general commitment not to seek a counterforce capability
might be important and useful and the idea should be kept in play.
Bombers (Tab E)
The bomber reductions paper is a cut and paste piece of work which
does not warrant your time -- much more work is needed.
The key issue is likely to be if bombers are included in an agreement,
how do we keep bomber armaments (e. g. , stand-off missiles) out
of the agreement?
We had an understanding in SALT I not to negotiate bomber armaments,
but the Soviets are likely to make a major point of bomber armaments
since we are so far advanced in this field. If so our approach would
likely be to insist that air defenses must be limited if bomber armaments
are. Depending on how we handle FBS.we might insist on limits on
air defense in any case.
There are other issues, some of which were resolved earlier in
SALT but which must be reviewed:
-- How do we define heavy bombers -- are the Backfire
or F-111 included?
-- Do we limit bombers within overall totals or as a separate
category ?
-- Do we want qualitative limits on bombers?
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Reductions (Tab F)
The interagency paper suggests four conceptual approaches:
1. Token Reductions. For example, we could reduce 54 Titans,.
174 B-52s of older models and 148 B-5Zs in storage. The Soviets
could reduce 209 SS-7/8s (foregoing a trade for Y-class) and 100
G/H class SLBMs. The resultant strategic totals would be:
U. S.
USSR
SLBM
656
740
ICBM
1,000
1,400
Bomber
300
150
1,956
2,290
This accomplishes little but maybe the Soviets will forego their
950 SLBMs.
2. Reductions to Preserve Minuteman. While reductions alone
will not preserve Minuteman forever they do extend the period of
relative invulnerability. The key, however, is to reduce SS-9s
we could trade Minuteman for SS-9s and improve survivability (although
SS-11 improvements will eventually threaten the force).
We could also trade bombers for Soviet missiles and if we did not
degrade the alert force, do so with negligible affects on strategic
capabilities .
3. Reductions to Diminish Reliance on Minuteman. This approach
simply keeps enough Minuteman (300 or so) to provide a hedge and
complicate the attackers problem. It is suggested that reduction of
this force would decrease the possibility of Soviet first strike in a
crisis. What return we would ask from the Soviets in return for
such a reduction is not clear in the paper.
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4. Reductions to a Minimum Force Level. Suggests phase-out
of Minuteman and low levels of other forces. This would be a minimal
deterrent posture designed primarily around the sole mission of
destruction of Soviet population.
This paper still needs a good deal of work. It largely examines
various rationales for reducing U. S. forces but lacks suggested
trades and analysis of strategic effects.
25X1
The Intelligence Is sue
In reviewing the range of threats which might be used for a review
of survivability we found that CIA. is dramatically changing the Soviet
threat and is pushing this position in the NIE debates. In essence,
expectations can Soviet MIRVs and accuracy have leapt forward by
several years
It is not clear whether this estimate is well founded or whether it
reflects CIA's concerns that they once again fall behind the devel
n of Soviet threat,
major elements of
the Washington bureaucracy including DIA differ strongly with the
CIA estimates.
If CIA is correct and if our estimates change dramatically we are
going to have a difficult time convincing Scoop Jackson that he has
not been badly deceived. It is important that'CIA tentative estimates
be held close until the issue is finally resolved.
Carl Duckett is prepared to brief on the revised estimate at the
Verification Panel meeting. You should open the meeting by asking
for this briefing.
We recommend that you caution all concerned to be discreet until
this issue is resolved in preparing the NIE. In this connection you
might also strongly encourage CIA to advance the publication of NIE
11-8 which is scheduled for this fall.
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