EIGHTH ADD 2 (THIEU SPEECH TEXT)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-248-1-19-5
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: December 12, 1972
• Content Type: CABLE

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/08/06: LOC-HAK-248-1-19-5
ZCZCWHP246
F!t THE SITUATION ROOM
TO WINSTON
ZEM
TORAK 137
LORD FOR DR. KISSINGER
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
IMMEDIATELY
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
SITUATION THAT WOULD.ARISE IN.'THE REP BLIC OF VIETIO IN
ADD 2 (T QI Ltd SPEECH TEXT-)
(TEXT) IN -1976, AS I RECALL, I. DISCUSSED AND ANALYZED'
1972 AND 1-973, AND I ANTICIPATED THAT.. -IR1 , 1972 U.S, TROOPS !MIGHT
TOTALLY WITHDRAWN AID THAT THE RVN ARMED FORCES VOULD
ASSUME FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR GROUND C0 AT OPERATIONS.
I ALSO AMTICIPATED THAT BECAUSE #972 IS *.U.S. ELECTION. YEAR
AND 1973. WILL BE A POSTELEE?IOH YEAR IT WAS HIGHLY LIKELY
THAT THE COMMUNISTS WOULD FIBS A FINAL BATTLE. THEREFORE
I REQUESTED THAT U.S. STRATEGIG'AAiD TACTICAL AIR
EIGHTH
SUPPORT BE MAINTAIIRE1 UNTIL LATE 1973.. . IN THIS SPIRIT, I ALSO.
REQUESTED THAT. Rt)K TROOPS- REPAIR UNTIL LATE' .1973. WXAT. 1, PORES
HAS NOW COME TRUE.
IN A BROADER PERSPECTIVE, OUR` REPI$LIC OF VIETWA
BE PROUD or THE. FACT THAT IT IS PLAYING THE FOLD
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OF AN OUT No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/08/06: LOC-HAK-248-1-19-5
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A;3 FAMENII LI IL RLLT JqJpL ivu an a "n" It
A SOLUTION WHEREBY INDOCHINA WOULD BECOME A BUFFER ZONE,,. THEY CONTEND
THAT OF THE TWO COMMUNIST COUNTRIES-~TME USSR AND REB CNINA--
THE USSR IS NOT TO BE, FEARED BECAUSE IT IS A EUROPEAN COMMUNIST
COUNTRY FAR FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA, WHEREAS RED CHINA
BECAUSE IT IS AN ASIAN COMMUNIST COUNTRY C ,OSE TO
IS TO 'BE, FEARED
US. THESE
THEORIES CALL FOR TURNI NO INDOCHINA INTO A BUFFER ZONE, WHERE
THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE--WHO HA,VETRADITIONALLY HATED
CHINA- W0ULD BE CAPABLE OF OP SING RED.CHI'NAI* ACCORDING
THESE THEORISTS, TO INSURE THAT THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE _ SUCCESSFULLY
PERFORM THIS TASK, SOUTH AND NORTH VIETNAM MUSTBE REUNIFIED
,T ,TROOP STRENBTH. THESE
SO AS TO HAVE SUFFICIENT MANPOWER AND
THEORISTS VISUALIZE THAT ONLY.-HANOI IS CAPABLE OF LEADING
INDOOCHI;NAI IN PERFORMING THIS TASK--THAT OF TURNING INDOCHINA
INTO A BUFFER ZONE, UNDER SOVIET INFLUENCE, TO CONTAIN. RED CHINA.
REGARDING THIS THEORY;; I HOLD THAT THE USSR
AND RED_
CHINA POSE A COMMON DANGER, THAT EVEN A REUNIFIED VIETNAM
WOULD NOT BE A Yt OSLAWIA, THAT THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (AS,
WARD) WOULD BY 00 MEANS BE ABLE .TO PLAY THE ROLE OF A YUGOSLAVIA
VIS A VIS THE, USSR AND RED CHINA, THAT VIETNAM (AS HEARD) .
WOULD BY' N0, MEANS BE ABLE TO..PLAY THE ROLE OF A YUGOSLAVIA
VIS -A WIH. THE USSR., AND THATA SO-CALLED, ?YUGOSLA VIA.. OF INDOCHINA
WOULD CONSIST . SOLELY OF. COMMMTI!I ST PARTY MEMBERS AFFILIATED..:
WITH RED MINA. THEREFORE,. THIS THEORY I S UNTENABLE*
WHY NOT TURN NORTH VIETNAM-, AND NORTH VIETNAM ALONE, INTO A
BUFFER ZONE AND MAINTAIN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AS A FREE
NATION? NORTq VIETNAM ALONE, AS A BUFFER ZONE, WOULD -BE ABLE.
TO KEEP RED CHINA PERHAPS MORE EFFECTIVELY FROM SPREADING TO
SOUTHEAST ASIA. WE REALIZE THEN-THAT THIS THEORY
WAS PROMOTED BY NORTH VIETNAM. THE
NORTH VIETNAMESE COME NIS'TS CLAIM THAT VIETNAM
AND THAT T Mnnr_MTNA- f M T!~T5 OF DULY THREE NATIONS. .
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/08/06 : LOC-HAK-248-1-19-5
 AEANWF No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/08/06: LOC-HAK-248-1-19-5 L
OF NORTH VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST TROOPS FROM SOUTH VIETNAM,
CAMBODIA AND LAOS. WE. CAN ASSUME THEN 'THAT THE PRESENT
PEACE SOLUTION ADVANCED BY THE COMMUNISTS, WHICH WOULD LEAVE
380,000 NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN THE SOUTH, AND A FORMULA FOR
A THREE-SEGMENT GOVERNMENT, A DISGUISED COALITION GOVERNMENT,
REPRESENT MERELY A TRANSITIONAL STAGE CONDUCIVE TO REUNIFICATION
.OF THE SOUTH AND THE NORTH UNDER THE HANOI COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT
AND TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS THEORY.
WHAT ROLE IS OUR REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM PLAYING? THE REPUBLIC
.OF VIE'T'NAM, AS I HAVE SAID, ON.ONE HAND IS PROTECTING ITS
INDEPENDENCE, TERRITORY AND FREEDOM AND ON THE OTHER HAND IS
PLAYING THE ROLE OF AN OUTPOST CONTAINING THE RED TIDE AND
KEEPING IT FROM SPREADING ALL OVER SOUTHEAST ASIA IF THE
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, 'WHICH I HAVE OFTEN LIKENED TO A STANDARD
BE FALLS., . I CAN. FIND NO OTHER SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRY
CAPABLE OF STANDING FIRM.. POLITICIANS AROUND US ALSO` 'REALIZE
THAT SHOULD THE REPUBLIC OF. VIETNAM FAIL TO STAND FIRM THE
SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGION WOULD GRADUALLY FALL INTO COMMUNIST HANDS.
THEREFORE, WHEN.. WE FOUND OURSELVES IN A SITUATION WHERE WE HAD
TO CONTINUE FIGHTING WITH THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE''S OWN BLOOD AND
BONES, WE AT ONCE CONFIRMED OUR ASPIRATIONS TO THE U.S.. ALLY.
I WAS THE FIRST TO WELCOME THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND THE ?VIETNAMIZATION
PROGRAM BECAUSE I BELIEVED THAT THIS WAR IS THE LONGEST FOR
THE UNITED STATES, AND THAT,THEREFORE THE QUESTION OF TOTAL
U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL WOULD SOONER OR: LATER ARISE. I BELIEVED A
PHASED U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL--WHILE ' THE RVN ARMED FORCES GRADUALLY
MATURE AND ARE GRADUALLY MODERNIZED .TO REPLACE U.S. TROOPS
AND THEREBY AVOID A VACUUM,--WOULD BE. .EVE$ MORE ADVANTAGEOUS
AND LESS DETRIMENTAL TO THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM THAN THE I'NSISTENCE
THAT ONE-HALF MILLION U.S. TROOPS REMAIN I-M THE SOUTH UNTIL,
FOR POLITICAL OR HUMANITARIAN REASONS, WE WOULD. HAVE TO AGREE
TO LET ALL THESE. 500,0@0 U.S.. TROOPS LEAVE SUMMARILY AND WITHIN
A VERY SHORT PERIOD OF TINE. HAD WE DONE SO, THE:-HEPIFLIC'OF
..,,VIETNAM WOULD CERTAINLY. NOT HAVE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/08/06 : LOC-HAK-248-1-19-5