ITEM IN YESTERDAY'S WSAG

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-243-3-6-2
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 28, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

ILI
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-243-3-6-2 Ch rey -
MEyIORANDUM q 'V o j 1910-X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INFORMATION
'-'_ET JENSITIVE/EYES ONLY March 28, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
rr A/
SECRE
RY KISSINGER
W. R. CYSE
e
Item in Yesterday's WSAG
I was taken aback at yesterday's meeting by Colby's suggestion to
return U. S. advisors to Vietnam.
I am not sure whether Colby meant military or civilian advisors.
Either way, I think it is a bad idea.
From the point of view of the efficiency of the Vietnamese, our
advisors have never been as useful as they have been touted to be.
The military advisors were mainly useful because they could call
in U. S. air and artillery, which has now left the country. The
civilian advisors were almost all people of limited competence who
did not generally understand what was going on. The only ones who
made a really positive contribution were the technicians, many of
whom still remain and whose number could perhaps be modestly
increased to some advantage.
From the standpoint of American opinion, any big fuss about sending
advisors back gets us the worst of both worlds: we will be accused
of reinvolvement but we will not get the benefits of reinvolvement.
The President will be sliced on both ends, for recommitting us and
for inefficient results. The American people will be confused and
will rightly wonder what kind of tricks are being played.
I think we have two clear options: either (1) to forget completely
about reinvolvement and to ask urgently for more money on the
basis of non-involvement, or (2) to choose an involvement, if we
think we must have one, that at least has a positive effect and that
does not jeopardize as many of our people as the advisor notion.
That sort of thing would be use of B--52's against troop concentrations
or re-mining of North Vietnamese ports. If we choose those means,
we will be making the kind of contribution that could spell a material
NSITIVE/EYES ONLY - XGDS
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/03/22 : LOC-HAK-243-3-6-2
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-243-3-6-2
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
difference and that would justify the explanations that would have
to be given at home.
Of the two essential options, I clearly prefer non-involvement but
I can see circumstances under which reinvolvement may make
some sense if it becomes clear to all concerned that our Congress
will not sustain the aid which is an essential part of the non-
involvement concept. Even then, I am not sure it would be worth
the price here.
Let me sum it up in these terms: I am concerned that the fall of
Vietnam can have a traumatic effect in this country (I might note,
in passing, that its prospect is already having a deep impact on
Asia.) By the same token, reinvolvement of Americans will have
a major and perhaps traumatic effect in this country. If we want
to avoid the effect of losing Vietnam, and if -- in order to do so --
we choose to suffer the effect of reinvolvement, we must let that
reinvolvement be in areas where it has the greatest chance of having
an effect and where it most benefits from our special skills and
capacities. I do not want you to end up paying a price twice over.
If we choose to askthe United States to pay the price of reinvolvement,
it should only be under conditions in which we can be confident that
we will spare them the price of loss of Vietnam.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY - XGDS
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/03/22 : LOC-HAK-243-3-6-2