COMMUNIST MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID TO NORTH VIETNAM, 1970-1974*

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-243-2-2-7
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 4, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/29: LOC-HAK-243-2-2-7
1. The IntetUgeoce Community has been roquelitod t
~ an ti.-
c
mats the amounts of Communist aid dalilvered to North Vietnam iri
i
the years 1970-1974, using current US dollar costs of th mater
al
.and services provided (sea' Table I) . It in important to ecog-- 1
nice that the Intc lligorice Communit a.a eatimatel on this e?urb ect
propriatiota for militaxy and ooonomio acid to South Viet yam, for
the following reasona';
(a) On the matter of accuracy, o^ar' information on N rth
Vietnam has always been incomplete, t'tho,ugh, cover~a a on9ciLvilian
imports is auba t+ 11tiFali better than for i, l itary aid. ',he draw-
down. of the US prese,nco in Southeast,Asia has further lirdted in-
telligence collection capabli.itiesl in the area, no that current
information on North Vietnam is less'' omprehena''ive' than it was -
forrrerly, In particular,, on the question of Communiot ?militaLv
aid, out information'baae, is vary spotty. . Hence we know we are
treeing only part of the 'picture on military aid', ano our anti-
mates for the part we! cannot Pee have a' wide margin of 'error.
(b? Military aid to North' Viotnairt its focused on materiel
requirec for' the type; of military Action undertaken by the Com-
redoubt areas at time'o and places of their choice. U$ military
cid to South Vietnam' supports a different military mission -??
i.. e. , de fence of scat rred communt'tie;#, large agricultural
areas, and linen of communication, PV is reaction and reinforce-
spent of local forces after conxmuniat ,attack. As the total
T c~ti mvmo~ ~~t um aa! eo> prepared ,j,aint,Zy by the Cantrat rn-
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/29 : LOC-HAK-243-2-2-7
SUBJECT. Communist Military and Coonamio
coiourrod in by the eura',au of Intattigonoa and lraoaarol'g, Do-
 forces for the different missions differ in -wise, so do.their
nam' as forces have boon roughly twice the aizc of North Vietnam's
requirements for assistance. Throughout the war, south Viet-
Vietnam`s forces ---protectingpopulation and holding terri-
tory -- have required a much larger and,widely dispersed mill.:
tary structure.
(c) The GVN has' therefore ciao. roquired a, oombat air -force
and an ability to redcploy forces rapidly by ground and air
tranrapor t. Thud, the types of equipment supplied to South Viet-.
nanti .by the US have been more sophisticated and ;therefore more
expensive than those required b Hanoi. - South Vietnam also re-
t
quires considerably more logiet
o support.
(c3) In.addit3,on, shipping, overhoac , and other support
costa of military aid to the GVN arat substantially more than .
Support costa of Communist aid to North Vietnam because of the
greetor distance involved and other factors.- (See Table tt at ahrtex.
2. Several Conolusi.ona may r netheleca be drawn with.re
apect to levels of military and ecOL Opt a ass stance to North
Vietnam from 1970 through, 1974.
(a) Toted Cornmun .st military and economic aid to North
Vietnam in 1974 ,was ' higher (in current dollars) than in any
previous year.
(b) The suspension ofiiS air bombardment in North Vietnam
at the beginning of 1973 brought about a large decrease in as-.
eistance for d?fen,se against. such hombardment-or'to replace.
losses caused by it, (e.g., aird an equipment, rnissi~lcaa~
trucks, etc.).
(c) The Us disengagement from combat and 'the -reduction Ln
the level of hostilities in South Vietnam in 1973' were keflec ted
in a substantial decrease in the, amount of ammunition and grand
force equipment ,received by North Vietnam, compared with 1972.
(d) In 1974, the oieiivoey of a?,nmunition ,to 11 anoi markedly
'
increased over 1973, and areachod
a l.3vol as high as that, of
1972*, although deliveries of ground force equipment continued
Tea o Lar figure a own pt 010 ta1
5to for ammi4nj tiof da tivartoe
uv, rWa.a1:.. v!JLy LOW J.evete.
trc 1874 iv ponol.derab ly highor t11,2PI t iat for ?29?2,' tiut *tort-
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/29: LOC-HAK-243-2-2-7
nagas wars -about the same. I1rfxat?60n of C mmun1 tj.on pp6'vos -
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/29: LOC-HAK-243-2-2-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/29: LOC-HAK-243-2-2-7
~.. ?f~ . F? . ? A
(A) Economic aid was reduced in 1972 with the closure of
North Viatnamese ports, but with 'their. reopening rose sharply
in 1973 and reached 'a r oord level in 1974. The economic aid
increase in 1.974 was fuither spurred by typhoons -which damaged
of dollar values in 1974, and the increased pace of reconntruo-
tion during 1974;
3. The figures leading to the above concluuions are
shown-in Table X. They give a rough order of magnitude of
Communist military 'assistance to' Noi"Lh Vietnam and a nomewhtst:
more precise indication of economic aid. Within the 'category 1
of military assistance, the estimates of deliveries of equip-.
meat and mat;eriol ($'275 million in 1)74) , as well as the anti i
mate for transportation equipment ($25 million in 1974) , Are
fairly good. 1ven a more complete. data base would produce
estimates of the 'same relative magnitude.. This is not true,
however, for those items listed under the "other military
"
related support
heading, whore the lack of hard-data makes
our estimates subject to wider margi is 'of error.
4. it should also ,be noted that ? in the final analysis
what is significant is not so much the level of military as
sistance but the relative balance' of forces on the, battlefield
'
in South Vietnam,, North Vietnamese forces in'-
South-Vietnam,
d rongor today, than'' they have over be cn. The Conunu.nia to are
expected `to sharply increase the tempo of the fighting in the
South, the GVN's forces will not be e.3ecisiveldefeated during
the current dry season. At current1;~ appropriated levels df
US military assistance, however, the level of Combat that we
anticipate in the next few months, will place thc3 Communists
in a position of significant advantaegc over the South Viet-- '
nameae forces in subsequent fighting.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/29: LOC-HAK-243-2-2-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/29: LOC-HAK-243-2-2-7
TABLE I
EcTTTMS,TrED COMMUNIST MILITARY AND ECONOMIC
M
ASSISTANCE TO NV3'DH VIETNA
SZLLTARY 20S 15 7 4 1330 400 I
;~~~ ? ? ~~?~ -
?
riol 140 ?Z4Q 565.
Military Equipment and Mato
Other - :;
Ground Forces gwuinms n 70 60 130 S5 17O9/
unitl.4R .4 15 15 5 ,
Military Transportation Equipment ;O 15 0
tey
r
anspor
(Trucksr holicopter8, t
Other eli.litary-related Support 41
(Delivery and packaging costa,,
.Spare parts POL for tho mili
t1ryy. Technical Aaaietance and
Training# t4edical Supp1i 5D.)
Other
Machinery. ?Ttansipoxk LgUJ.pmef-kt
& Meta]. Products 3l0 385 145 155 300
petroleum 240 175 125 165 .:345
Fertilizer 10 10; 5 15 : 55
Commodity Shipmentu (
69 60 AO 170, 420 1
Food 1 AS 5 g 25'
635 645 360 540 1.145
65
coHOMIC 7 35 E 4
r
-
TOTAL OF ESTXMATZD COMMUNIST
GOODS AND SERVICES PROVI1M D
TO NORTH VIETNAM . '
1.00 110 105 130 150
4w.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/29: LOC-HAK-243-2-2-7
Technical Assistance -
(includes cost of foreign
,technicians in NVN and NVN
' trainees abroad)
 TOTAL OF ESTIMATED COMMt1 940.'
KIST GOODS AND PERVICES
PROVIDED TO NORTIR VIETNAM'
(ropeatcd,,,from Last page)
LESS. NORTH vxnTNAtt 8r., EX