VIETNAM TALKING POINTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-23-5-9-1
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2009
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: May 19, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/11/17: LOC-HAK-23-5-9-1 L1 a y y
MEMORANDUM - o
NATIONAL .SECURITY COUNCIL
May 19, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL HAIG
THROUGH: JOHN HOLDRIDGE
FROM: SVEN KRAEMER Si
SUBJECT: Vietnam Talking Points
Our office has recently informally discussed the Communist offensive and
Allied responses with a variety of doubting Administration officials, Congres-
sional and media representatives and academic, church and other private
groups. Included were presentations last week to several Congressional
offices, to the entire Republican National Committee staff (350 people)
and to the senior staff (150 people, including John Mitchell) of the Committee
to Re-elect Richard Nixon.
Attached for your information, at Tab A, is a copy of one of the informal
summaries which we prepared for use as background on the current situation
and which has been very favc-ably received by the above groups. The summary
has also been sent by USIA to all U. S. diplomatic posts. In addition, at Tab
B, is a "key points" paper we prepared with Colson/Clawsen's office for
White House use. At Tab C, are revealing official statements from Hanoi
on wide- spread opposition inside North Vietnam.
In the current situation, the following points have proved particularly
effective in providing understanding and in :_liciting support for the U. S.
position. I recommend their further utilization by Administration
spokesmen at home and abroad.
-- U. S. Restraint. North Vietnam's invasion marks its response
to U. S. restraint. The three-and-one-half year old bombing halt under-
standing, the withdrawal of over 85% of all U. S. forces from Vietnam, the
substantial cut-back in U. S. air sorties, the intensive Allied negotiation
efforts, and the generous Allied peace proposals have all been totally
rejected by Hanoi's leaders.
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
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INF ORMATION
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V
-- Hanoi's Aggression Across International Frontiers. Hanoi's
regular army divisions masssively violated the international borders of
neutral Laos and Cambodia and the Demilitarized Zone established by the
1954 Geneva Accords. The DMZ has international legal status as an
inviolable frontier similar to the provisional demarcation lines separating
East and West Germany and North and South Korea. South Vietnam is
recognized as a sovereign state by over 50 countries; in 1957 the Soviet
Union proposed the admission of North and South Vietnam to the United
Nations as separate states.
-- Hanoi's Violation of the Bombing Understanding. Hanoi has totally
failed to meet the conditions of the bombing halt understanding of 1968 as
spelled out in 1968 by Averell Harriman, Clark Clifford et. al. The under-
standing clearly provided for the inviolability of the DMZ, the end of shelling
of South Vietnam's cities, productive negotiations and the continuation of
U. S. aerial reconnaissance over North Vietnam.
-- Hanoi's Risky Gamble. Hanoi's all-out offensive is a very risky
gamble for the Communists. It demonstrates Hanoi's lack of faith in its
own propaganda, in its remaining southern guerrilla forces and in its two
super-power allies. It also reflects a bad misjudgment of the U. S. response.
In violation of the precepts of "peoples war, " Hanoi's home army has been
recklessly thrown into a conventional invasion. It is now dependent on mas-
sive employment and uninterrupted resupply of sophisticated Soviet armor,
artillery and anti-air weapons. It is committed to the indiscriminate shelling
of South Vietnam's population centers and it clearly cannot rely on southern
Viet Gong forces to carry the brunt of the battle.
Hanoi' s clock has ben running rapidly as its fears have increased concerning
the growing progress of Vietnamization, the Peking and Moscow summits,
the relative stabilization of the American political scene and the expected
re-election of President Nixon. In its fears, however, Hanoi has miscalculated
several major factors including: its own military strength, the military
and political strength of the South. Vietnamese, the U. S. response and the
reactions of Moscow and Peking.
-- The Situation in Vietnam. Far from producing pro-Communist
"peoples uprisings" or mass desertions and surrenders among the South
Vietnamese, Hanoi's invasion has produced political unity and strong
resistance even among traditional opposition groups including the Buddhists
and the students. A few miles of border territory, some fire-bases and
some Communist gains in three to four provinces have been achieved after
six weeks of all-out offensive, but at the cost of alienating the population and
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at the cost of enormous casualties and equipment losses. The unexpectedly
firm and effective U. S. response to Hanoi' s gross violations has badly
disrupted Hanoi' s battle time tables and its essential logistics routes and
supply stocks. The mild Chinese and Soviet reactions have brought additional
sobering insights to the North Vietnamese.
-- Hanoi's Credibility. The bland insistence of Hanoi's spokesmen
that none of their troops are fighting abroad further deeply corrodes Hanoi's
credibility in the U. S. and the world and among the North' s own long-
suffering people. Le Duc Tho's crude lies about the NVA troops, North
Vietnam's alleged air defense capability, the U. S. "war criminals" POWs
and an allegedly non-Communist future for Vietnam, are fooling few people
and are causing credibility problems for Hanoi's nominal supporters.
The platform of the People's Revolutionary Party (the Marxist-Leninist "core"
party of the NLF), the Hue bloodbath of Tet 1968, the fate of the 1946 and
1954 "coalitions" and the current "North Vietnamization" of the war are clear
previews of Hanoi' s actual intentions in South Vietnam. Similarly, Hanoi
has been unable to substantiate its claims about extensive Northern civilian
casualties attributable to U. S. bombing, whereas its own misfiring SAMs
have caused many random casualties throughout North Vietnam and whereas
the indiscriminate shelling of its invading forces have killed many civilians
in South Vietnam.
-- Hanoi's Problems in North Vietnam. Having miscalculated badly
on its strength in South Vietnam and vis-a-vis the possibility of U. S. bombing
and mining in the North, the Hanoi leadership is facing increasingly wide-
spread dissent in its own society. Senior DRV figures and an increasing
volume of DRV publications and radio broadcasts are attacking the "counter
revolutionaries, " "defeatists," "' romantics," and "corrupt elements" in
North Vietnam. While Hanoi's Stalinist regime still appears firmly com-
mitted to a "people's dictatorship" and to continuing its wars in Indochina,
Ho's successors must deal with increasingly angry questioning and opposition.
The summit meetings, Hanoi's current losses and lack of military and
political success in the South and.the unexpected U. S. air and mining response
are likely to exacerbate such opposition to the Party's costly war policies.
A significant indication of pre-offensive problems is found in the recent
article (attached at Tab C) by Hanoi' s Minister of State Sgffirity, who
explicitly warns the cadres that the current anti-war and /Party mood in
North Vietnam recalls the bad experiences of Hungary in 1956 ("rightist
deviation") and Czechoslovakia in 1968 ("peaceful evolution") and that it must
be repressed with violence at all costs.
-- The U. S. Response. The U. S. response, while restrained, has
been militarily, psychologically, and diplomatically effective. Both its
military and its negotiations components are designed to foster the chances
of an early settlement and return of the POWs and deserve unified support
of the American people.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/11/17: LOC-HAK-23-5-9-1