INTELLIGENCE ALERT MEMORANDUM: PORTUGAL: A NEW CRISIS OF AUTHORITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-206-3-18-0
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: October 10, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/05/18 : LOC-HAK-206-3-18-0
,,
THE DfRECT~R OF CENTRAL iNTELLiGENCE
WA5HlNGTON, q, C. 80505
l~ October 1975
MEI~iORANDUM F'OR: The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
(National Security Affairs)
SUBJECT Intelligence Alert Memorandum:.
Portugal: A New Crisis of Authority
1. The Azevedo government is under sharp challenge,
especially from the far left, and the increasing politici-
zation and breakdown of discipline in the Armed Forces. raise
serious questions about the regime's viability, even in the
short run. It is certainly too early to taunt Azevedo and
'the moderates out, but their position is shakier.
2. The attached memorandum assesses the implicati.vns
and possible outcomes of this situation. It was prepared
by a working group from CIA, DIA, and State/INR, chaired by
the Assistant National Intelligence Officer for western
Europe..
3. The Intelligence Community is keeping the situa-
tion under close watch; collectors in the field, already
alert to the pressing need for timely reporting in the
present circumstances, have been told of the growing concern
at this end.
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003204876
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,. ~, E. Colby
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l0 October 1975
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT; .Portugal: A New Crisis of Authority
1. The Azevedo government is caught. in a cra.sis
of authority which threatens its continued viability.
It would be premature to count out Azevedo and .the
moderates, but they face same critical challenges.
Growing political instaba.lity stems from several
sources:
--- the subversive activities and demonstrations
~raf the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and
far-left groups;
--- worsening economic and social problems, which
are exacerbated by the influx of Angolan refugees;
-- and, most critical, politicization and break-
. dow:z of discipline in the armed forces on a far
-~ more serious scale than ever before.
Breakdown of Disci line a..d Factionalization of the
Armed Farces
2. The chance of widespread violence is enhanced
by the inability of the Lisbon government to impose order.
'Our information on the loyalties of specific units is
not complete, but many of the army units in Lisbon --
with the exception of the commandos -- appear to sympa-
thize with various leftist groups. North of Lisbon,
the army tends to support the government, but even them
dissident far-left organizations, such as Soldiers United
Will Overcome, have been able to subvert the orders of
commanders in some units. The southern mi~.itary region
is divided and probably would not play a major role in
a conflict.
3. The closely-knit Navy generally follows a left-
ist line. Only the Marines, whose political sympathies
are divided, have the capacity to respond to a challenge
to the government. The air farce generally is considered
the most conservative of the services, but a few leftist
sergeants with access to aircraft could sabotage a ser-
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vase response to civil violence or a coup attempt.
Neither the police nor the National Guard, even though
.they may support the government, can effectively main-.
twin order in a crisis since both groups are under-armed.
Government efforts to establish a new security force to
replace the radical. infiltrated Cont.i.nental. Operations
Command (COPCON) have so far enjoyed scant success.
The PCP and Far-Left Groups
~. Despite the PCP's recent setback with the ouster
of its a11y former Prime Minister Gonsalves and its re-
dused role in the new government, it continues to be a
powerful force and maintains a disproportionately strong
inf7.uen_ce in the media in Lisbon and within organized
labor. .Although the Communists are still nominally par-
ticipating in the government, they are at the same time
supporting demonstrations against it and fomenting un-
rest in the military. It is the far left, however,
that has been most active in staging protests and forc-
ing confrontations that have led in some cases to vio-
lence. An exacerbating factor is the ample supply of
arms which communa.sts and far-left groups have at their
disposal.
Returning Refugees
5. About 175,000 Angolan refugees have already
returned to Portugal.. Most are politically conserva-
tive and hostile to leftist military and civila.an lead-
ers who they believe sold out thea.r interests in Africa.
Many .have small. arms. Their frustration will deepen
as the government is unable to handle their problems
and they may fee], they have little to lose in chal-
lenging the government. The refugees, many of whom
have roots in the north, could, along with other con-
servative northerners, form an explosive force far
conflict with leftist elements. Right-wing Portuguese
exile groups in Spain are enlisting support from re-
turned refugees.
6. The present volatile situation could lead in
any of several directions. At present reading, the
first alternative appears more likely, at least for the
near term.
- The present government, or one like it,
could survive. To consola.date its posi-
tion, however, it would have to gain
greater control over the Armed Forces.
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~7L' U~..G 1
Thxs poses a dilemma: if it tries harsher
measures, as its recent statements suggest,
i.t may encounter added resistance and in-
discipline.. Tf it seeks to conciliate by
relaxing military discipline, it would
legitimize dissidence in the Armed Forces,
maka.ng for further violence and instability
in the longer term.
-- There could be the return of a more radi-
cal government, either of a pro-communist
nature such as the Gonsalves regime, or
of the far-].eft with leaders such as a
COPCON chief Gen. Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho
or Adm. Antonio Rosa Coutinho. The com-
munists would support either government
and would certainly regain considerable
influence. Such a regime would probably
face renewed anti-communist violence in
the north and separatism in Atlantic is-
land possessions. Economic aid would not
be forthcoming from the West.
Large-scale civil disorder, involving
segments of the civilian population and
opposing military units may occur, fueled.
by the widespread arming of civilians of
all political persuasions, and the dis-
unity of the military. Although this
violence could E:ventua~.ly deteriora-~e.
into a civil war, it would be more Likely
to evolve to the point where a leftist
government is nominally in power in Lisbon
with a state of anarchy in other parts of
the country.
-- An attempted rightist takeover by forces
within Portugal andfor by expatriates
based primarily in Spain is possible.
The chances that this Could be success-
ful are extremely limited due to a lack
of arms, personnel, funds, and popular
support in Portugal.
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vi:.vi~.L. ~.
7. The Portuguese talent for last-minute accommo-
dation to avoa_d final showdowns may once again reassert
itse~,f, and, head off any decisive resolution of these
uncertai.nta.es a.t least for a time. The Azevedo gov-
ernment, and the moderate elements in the Armed Forces
and political parties still have assets ~-- including
a majority of popular support. But the tendencies
toward disintegration of institutions -- especially
"the Arrned Forces and the government's control over
them --.make the outlook more uncertain than ever.
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