THE CYPRUS SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-20-4-15-8
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: February 10, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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URITY COUNCIL INFORMATION
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
SUBJECT: The Cyprus Sita~tio
to move more quickly;. the following should-bring you up to date.
Cyprus. We promised you a fuller picture. The situation is beginning
You have been reading in your brief of new elements of tension ins -,~
.7
The talks
~jL /7 -,tiZ/ it
could begin before the month is out unless present tensions prevent that. .-
vl _;2 (
The new talks would have a UN representative, a mainland Greek and a
mainland Turk constitutional law expert join the Greek and Turk Cypriots.
As you may recall, the genesis of this was in the meeting between the
Greek (Palarnas) and Turk (then Olcay) foreign ministers at the UNGA last
fall. They agreed to add the mainland representatives, thereby creating
a four-party format. U Thant insisted on the inclusion of a UN person in
order to make the format sellable to Makarios, who sees protection in a
UN role. It is this five-party arrangement that has bounced around for
several months.
The new and expanded intercommunal talks have been held up by haggling
over their format. Turkey's final assent is expected soon, and talks 'L7
The Greeks accepted outright and have said they will go along with any
arrangement which would launch new talks. Makarios agonized at the
thought of being pressured in new talks by mainland representatives; he
sought assurances that the UN would indeed be involved and then stole the
thunder from Turkey by promptly accepting. Turkey was left as the
chief hold-out.
Turkey's problem is the inclusion of the UN representative. They feel
this will undercut new pressure on Makarios injected by the mainland
representatives. Recalling their problems with past special UN mediators,
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Turkey has insisted on clarifications from the Secretary General's
special advisor on Cyprus that any UN representative not be a "mediator"
per se but be on hand with his "good offices" and that the mainland
representatives be actively involved. Turkish Foreign Minister Bayulken
said this week that Turk needs on this score were on the point of being met
and opined that talks could begin by the month's end. Matters stand there.
This p.rocedur l -.ddbate:,.has b.een.lengthy, but even if talks now begin,
there will be a long debate over the agenda, On the one hand, Makarios
has made it clear he does not believe mainland representatives belong in
talks between the local parties on the constitutional questions at stake, on
which he believes he has already made maximum concessions to the Turk
Cypriots. He is lobbying for broad discussion including the international
aspects of the problem-such as withdrawal of Turk mainland support. The
Turks, on the other hand, are adamant that new talks zero in precisely on
the constitutional stalemate; they want none of the past treaties (London-
Zurich accords) or constitutional points already agreed upon undercut.
Assuming progress at that level, they could envisage broadening the agenda
at a later date.
The UN special representative who will be involved has been-turning over
possible new approaches to the talks beyond the simple reliance on the
trading of position papers between the two locals which characterized the
last phase. He is thinking of (a) trying to consolidate areas of common
agreement from past talks and (b) talking about interim or permanent
measures which would help the communities live together without confron-
tation in the current situation of de facto separation. State has also been
developing some ideas on deconfrontation--mutual withdrawal by the-two
communities from lines of confrontation around the island--if there came
a. time when they might help the UN representative. Interest by the parties
in deconfrontation has been evident but Ambassador Popper now feels the
issue.has been dealt a blow by the reports of Makarios' new Czech arms.
Grivas
The clandestine re-appearance of General Grivas on Cyprus and the
resulting war of nerves between him and Makarios has added a new element
of tension.
To put this in perspective, Grivas was the famous pro-enosist and fanatical
anti-communist Greek Cypriot who fought against the British in the mid-
50s, almost hand in glove with Makarios' struggle on the political level.
With independence and the guarantees given to the Turk Cypriots he
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pressed on for enosis and became heavily involved in the terrorism of
the sixties which twice brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war.
Those events convinced Makarios and Greece to drop their campaign
for enosis and turn to intercommunal talks. Grivas, anathema to the
Turk Cypriots and to Makarios by then as a political rival, was moved
to confinement in Greece where he remained until his "escape" last fall.
Anumber offactors have. made Makarios certain if not all but sure that
Greece is behind the plot. We do not really know.
For one thing, Grivas' escape came shortly after Ma.karios' resistance
to Greek pressure last summer to be more forthcoming in the talks,
immediately before the Olcay/Palamas talks in New York. These facts
against a backdrop of increasing Greco-Turk consultation on the Cyprus
problem have led the Archbishop to suspect a plot against him unless he
reaches a compromise, presumably satisfactory to the Turk Cypriots.
The alternative would be to risk confrontation with Grivas leading to
enosis and, again assuming Greco-Turk dialogue, satisfactory. results for
the Turk. Cypriots, i. e. double enosis or partition.
In reaction, Makarios has stiffened in the face of a threat. As you know,
he has clandestinely imported sizeable quantities of Czech arms almost
certainly for the arming of a private police force outside the Greek-
controlled National Guard.
The introduction of these new arms has sparked reactions in Turkey and
Greece. Whether these flow from the fact that they have been involved in
the Grivas episode with the idea of precipitating double enosis or whether
they view it as a further eroding factor for the new talks, the issue is that
our' allies are once again concerned enough about Cyprus perhaps to be
moving toward some drastic step which would confront us with difficult
choices.
Greek-Turk Relations and the New Situation
On the one hand, Greece and Turkey have recently embarked upon a new
period of cooperation over Cyprus. Both sides have privately and publicly
insisted that Cyprus not become an issue between them and both shared
the initiative in reviving the intercommunal talks as the best framework
for solution. It has been their reasonableness which has kept negotiations
over procedures for the talks from breaking down. The US has encouraged
these efforts.
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On top of this cooperation, we have had reports that officials on both
sides continue to talk about a so-called ''dynamic" solution ending in
double enosis (partition) as the best way out. Ambassador Popper hears
this not only from Turks and Turk Cypriots but also from mainland Greeks
and elements of the Greek-Cypriot establishment.
Makarios' recent importation of arms has upset both Greece and Turkey
and.reopened the possibility of a solution imposed on Cyprus by.the two
of them.
--The Turks have gone on record to express their grave concern
and to indicate privately that they may have to ship new arms to
their community. The Greeks are aware of this. We also have a
reliable report that in its dialogue with Greece, Turkey has
indicated that Makarios must go.
--Palamas has told Tasca Greece is urging Turkey to keep cool
while it tries to deal with the situation. He also implied that
Makarios was the obstacle. Tasca gained the impression Greece
would like to see him replaced. Greece plans on the following steps:
--Makarios will be told tomorrow that he must turn the Czech
arms over to UNFICYP control and that he must form a govern-
ment of "national unity" (presumably involvement of the Turk
Cypriots) in Cyprus.
--If Makarios refuses, the tOG will make its demands public
and will also inform the UN and UK.
--Greece does not want violence nor will it make use of Grivas
but if Makarios resists, the GOG will take its case directly to
the Greek Cypriot people.
--If Makarios refuses to form a government acceptable to Greece
and is backed by Greek Cypriots, then Greece may withdraw from
the island.
Ambassador Tasca, who has already expressed hope to the GOG that they
are not entertaining the thought of a "dynamic" solution, has now told
Palaxnas he,believes that the GOG plan is highly dangerous given the support
.Makarios has among Greek Cypriots.
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To buy time, State--with our clearance- -has instructed Tasca to make
the following points to Papadopoulos: TheGOG scenario may have the
effect of consolidating support behind Makarios and impelling him towards
Soviet support. All diplomatic options to resolve the Czech arms problem
should be exhausted. One course could be a GOG-GOT demarche to the
UNSYG which the US is prepared to support and would ask the UK, Canada
and others to make parallel approaches to the UN. At a minimum, the
US hopes that Greece will hold off with its scenario to permit discussions
among the NATO allies.
Meanwhile, a Greek Cypriot official has told Ambassador Popper that
Makarios had acquired the arms because of overwhelming evidence of i
Greek complicity in Grivas' movement to precipitate double enosis. He
maintained that Makarios had every right to defend himself and his regime
and urged the US to help stop Greece from talking about apolitical settle-
ment on the one hand while conspiring with Grivas on the other. He did
suggest that there could be a trade-off of the Czech arms for a return of
Grivas to Greece and urged the US t,-, play a role in working this out. But
he also said it "is obvious to Cyprus that the Greeks are using the arms
pretext as a first step toward partition .in collusion with Turkey; he
believes it would never work and would only set Greece and Turkey against
each other.
The Situations the US May Face
We have traditionally maintained that the intercommunal talks best address
the US interest in defusing tensions on Cyprus and hence tensions between
Greece and Turkey. We have taken a position of supporting Cypriot
independence, and we have cultivated a relationship with Makarios in that
context.
The situation we now face is one of apparent increased Greek and Turkish
interest in imposing a solution regardless of the fate of Makarios, or
possibly even regardless of the independence of Cyprus. At the very least
it seems that Greece and Turkey may have agreed that (a) Makarios must
settle this problem in a way satisfactory to the Turks and Greeks (a
national unity government which could mean either Turk Cypriot parti-
cipation in it or, a step further, partition) or (b) Makarios must go. In
short, if Greece and Turkey are determined to force a situation which
would violate Makarios' view of a unitary independent state, or, further,
partition Cyprus, the US will face difficult choices between the wishes of
our allies and our established opposition to dismemberment of UN members.
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The following are the situations we may face and the principal implications:
Situation 1: There remains a chance simply to diffuse the tensions
created by the arms issue. This could come about if we could focus
attention on the tensions raised by the arms problem and get everyone
back on the track towards resuming talks and forgetting any dynamic
overall solution now. Our instructions to Ambassador Tasca to urge
the GOG to hold off on its ultimatum to Makarios and concentrate
instead on exhausting diplomatic options to resolve the arms problem
are one step in this direction. The suggestion has also been made on
Cyprus that a trade-off to diffuse tensions be arranged by returning
Grivas to Greece in exchange for Czech arms being turned over to
UNFICYP. The Cypriots have asked us to become involved in working
this out with the Greeks.
Implications: The US definitely has an interest in isolation of the
arms issue and getting on with the talks. However, ''it is much
less clear that we want to be in the middle in a dispute within the
Greek-Greek Cypriot community. If we tried to negotiate the
return of Grivas to Greece, we would have to take into account that
Greece may well be taking advantage of Grivas' presence on Cyprus
to pressure Makarios and may not want such a trade-off.
the Greeks may ever have Grivas in one of the
Greek Cypriot National Guard camps--for release at the proper
moment. ] Athens has already tried privately to force Makarios on
the arms question and has now surfaced its proposal to issue an
ultimatum to him. We would have a question whether
--we want to pressure Athens off a course it may have already
decided on;
--we want to line up with an initiative on trade-off that essentially
meets Makarios needs but may not do much to produce his
flexibility in the talks;
--we want at all costs to see the talks resumed even though Greece
and Turkey are fed up with Makarios.
The argument for involving ourselves is that this may be far
easier than dealing with either of the two situations that follow.
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Situation 2: The Greeks go-ahead and issue their ultimatum to Makarios
to conform of step downi he resists, rallies his j2 against
external pressure and perhaps takes his case to the UN. The
assumption here is that the Greeks take a strong stand hoping Makarios
will acquiesce but waver before following their strategy through to
the conclusion of quickly deposing Makarios.
The main implication here would be that the US would be caught
between Makarios' call for support in the face of external pressure
and Athens' defense that it is attempting to solve a problem as it
sees fit. Makarios would get Soviet and perhaps Chinese support
(their position is that the local parties solve their own problem)
at the UN. The US would be allied with Greek and Turkish intervention.
This situation would be the worst of two worlds. It would not involve
decisive enough action to solve the problem and it would generate
worldwide pressure on us to pull the Greeks and Turks off. Whereas
there is a theoretical option of acquiescing in a decisive Greek move,
the proposed Greek action of issuing an ultimatum and waiting for
reaction seems doomed to failure.
Situation 3: Greece and Turkey have already decided to coo erate in a
dynamic solution to impose a solution or partition Cyprus. They
are beyond backing off from, this course, actively engaged in deposing
Makarios and installing a new Cypriot government.
This would put us squarely between our interests in having Greece
and Turkey resolve the issue to the benefit of good relations between
them and in, not seeing intervention in or dismemberment of Cyprus
by our two NATO allies. The US in the least would be faced with
weathering the storm of intervention on Cyprus by NATO allies who
would justify their moves as guarantor powers of the London- Zurich
accords or worse, face a situation of partition or double enosis in
opposition to our principle of not endorsing the dismemberment of
UN nations. If there is to be action, however, this would be better
than some indecisive intermediate step. The additional argument
against acquiescing in any such move is that it stands a good chance
of failing.
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In Conclusion
This memo is intended simply to provide background on steps
taken to date and a framework within which to think about where events
might go from here. If this heats up anymore, it nay be necessary
to call a WSAG meeting.
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