VSSG STUDY ON HANOI INTENTIONS AND US/GVN ACTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-19-6-2-2
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 5, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/08: LOC-HAK-19-6-2-
MZM01tANI
NATIONAL. SECURITY COUNCIL
SEA
30111
URGENT I VFORMATI:O
January 5, 1972
M'EMOItANDM.FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM:. Phil Odeen Q
SUBJECT: VSSG Study on Hanoi Intentions and US/GVN
Actions
Vietnam..'' You. agreed and suggested a meeting within two days of
VSSG effort to "pull together all. the intelligence information, making
a clean assessment and laying out options for the next few months in
On the basis of Tom Latimer's memo on the possibility of a major
multi-front enemy offensive, Dick Kennedy suggested an urgent
your, return.
CIA draft on the enemy strategy and threat is due Friday, January 7,
and the DOD draft paper on the friendly situation will follow next week.
I believe these studies will provide the background to determine the
steps we need to take.
and potential for this dry season, as well as a study of control and main
force situation and progress with RVNAF force improvements. The
On December 16, I initiated a VSSG assessment of enemy intentions
is the more important aspect. Once the VSSG Working Group has
completed its vauer. by mid-January. the VSSG principals can me.e
We will prepare a summary of the CIA conclusions for you as soon as
they are received. This assessment of the threat is an essential first
step,but actions that we should take and/or encourage the GVN to take
to discuss what actions should be taken. RELEASE vv
An Assessment of the Threat
infiltration is somewhat above levels of last year (Table 1) but well
below the levels prior to Tet 68. Supply infiltration is the lowest in
On the basis of evidence to date, we do not fully share Tom's concern
that Hanoi may mount a major multi-front campaign in 1972. Personnel
several years.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/08: LOC-HAK-19-6-2-2
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/08: LOC-HAK-19-6-2-2
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NVNInfiltration Starts
(Oct - Dec Total)
1.967-68 150, 000 (est. ) '/
1968-69 40,.000
1969-70 20,000
.1970-71 50,000
1971-72 60,000'
a/ Note: Comparable data for 1967-68' are not available, but
the infiltration total of 240, 000 is at least double the level
of any year since.
Within SVN the major threat area appears to be: MR-II and especially
the Central Highlands area. This year's infiltration pattern for other
areas is about like last year's. The clear exception is the VC/NVA
B-3 Front, the headquarters that controls the Central Highland area.
About one-third of all of the troops moving south (19, 200 of the 60, 000)
are ticketed for the B-3 Front. This. includes the 320th NVA division
which is moving there from NVN. Only 5, 000 to 10, 000 troops annually
have been sent to the B-3 Front over the past three years.
We have just received a CIA study of the situation in the MR-II Central
Highlands. In addition the senior U. S. advisor in that 25X1
area, is presently in Washington. I met with him briefly yesterday,
and he is scheduled to spend axe hour with us on Thursday. Based on
his comments and the CIA study, we will provide you with a brief
assessment of the situation in MR-II.
In summary, a major VC/NVA push in the Central Highlands is clearly
in' the cards. But there is no hard evidence indicating that anything like
Tet 1968 will occur in other areas. In fact, the evidence is to the con-
trary. I expect the CIA. study being prepared for the VSSG will give us
a more systematic and analytic assessment of prospects.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/08: LOC-HAK-19-6-2-2