MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-188-2-10-0
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 3, 2010
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: October 7, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Tuesday
7 October 1975
Vol V No 195
Annex No 59
FBIS
DG]dV NNP@MV
IDDLE EAST &
NORTH AFRICA
The information printed on these Annex pages preceding
and following the standard Daily Report cover bears the
caveat FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Users may detach the
outer pages and treat the Daily Report as unclassified
and unrestricted.
FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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V. 7 Oct 75 IUDDIE EAST & N
A N N E X C O TENT S
Syrian Minister Discusses October War.... rt ..ne
Paper Imports New Cabinet To Be Pbrmed
Arlpifa'i Visit to Damascus seen as l' diction
Kuwaiti Support to Egypt Termed Financia Aid
.0
Damascus )ENA in Arabic ~o I.ENA Cairo 0836 GNT
(Text) Damascus, 5 Octok}er--MJ Gen Mustara Tallas, deputy commander in chic
army, the armed forces a Syrian defense minis
October war plan was implemented on the Egyptia
political command contrived a different plan t
Implement.
He said. We aimed at ii erating the occupied A
political contend aimed t crossing the canal
with a view to revive t issue at world level,
added: Planning the bat Is for liberating the
drawn up by the Syrian A b army under the dire
The strategic planning f r coordination between
political, information, eception and other pla
Joint Syrian-Egyptian pl nning.
This was contained in an interview 1.Jor Genera
AL-BA'TH and ATH-TRAWRAH, which the papers pubs
papers say that while our Arab people are mark
war of liberation--the r which restored the e
in their 'capabilities a armed strength--lead
distort the feats about his glorious war. The
Arab citizen and to disc dit our country's ate
historical Arab struggle.
The two papers say that view of all this it
Arab masses who are now oing a critical time
agreement. ]h his intern ew which dealt with t
about Syria's role in plc ing and preparing to
this respect, he said: sing this question ra
because Syria was a main jartner in the October
fog and the instigation a distortion attempts
well-known sources entitl the masses of our pe
and to protect them agai t the overt and con
lies to mislead them.
He added: We can precise say that plane and
in Syria following the raeli aggression on t
front has proved that tt:e E
b territories while the E
maining on its banks without
thvit leading to our present al
Ion was 100 percent Syrian A
t supervision of President Ha
the Syrian and Egyptian front
which accompanied this were
Talas has given to Syrian no
dvancing
tarp. He
rab,
fiz al-Asad.
s and the
the only
the second anniversary of t
nfidenoe to the masses of our
re of Arab Egypt are attempti
are even attempting to oonfu
a necessary to give the facts
a a result of the Egyptian-Is
October war, MJor General
his war. Answering a quest
ses at once astonishment and
war of liberation. However,
which we are facing day and
)pie to put them in the true p
flow of incitements, decepti
parations for the October wa
Arab nation on 5 June 1967.
the two
October
g to
and its
all
'alas spoke
on in
urpris e
he dense
ght from
cture
and
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V. 7 Oct 75 3 MIDDLE ' u NORTH AFRICA
ANNEX
Since that date, proceeding from our party and our masses rejection of the reality of
the setback, President Hafiz al-Asad, who was t the time a member of the party regional
command and defense minister, assumed with the staff in his command in the army and
the armed forces, a scientific and careful analysis study of the political, military
and economic aspects of the situation. He reached the natural conclusion that the
reality of the setback which affected the Arab nation can only be overcome by following
two ways;
1. To consolidate the military energies of all the Arab states, particularly the frontline
states and to raise their combat standard.
2. To consolidate Arab solidarity to provide a suitable climate for massing the resources
for the sake of the primary issue, namely liberation. This is because the steadfastness
against the Zionist-imperialist invasion of the Arab homeland and the liberation of the
occupied territories can only be achieved by the united efforts of the Arab nation, more
precisely by achieving the pan-Arabism of the battle.
In the domestic field, Major General Talas said that President al-Arad was aware that
the high objective aspired by the people can only be achieved by the follcwing two courses:
1. To rally all groups of the people in the Syrian Arab region around the liberation
objective.
2. To rebuild the armed forces, consolidate their arms and training and raise their
morale and combat capabilities.
These convictions by President Hafiz al-Asad have guided his stops toward the corrective
movement.
He said that President Hafiz al-Asad ordered the formation of a permanent committee
under his direct supervision to define the practical steps for rebuilding the armed
forces, training and armament. The committee began its work by reviewing; the structure
of the army and defining- its size in the light of the armyts task, namely liberation.
In view of Egypt's position in the military operations arena and the role its armed
forces could play in the expected war of liberation, steps were taken to establish
close military relations with the Arab Republic of !Egypt and the unified military command.
between the gyptian and Syrian armies was consolidated under the command of the commander
in chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces.
Talcs added: All this took place by the initiative of Syria and its leader President
Hafiz al-Asad. BY 1972 our armed forces were prepared to wage the war of liberation.
:Tans were drawn up here in Syria. We began the scientific training of our forces tinder
the slogan of training plans. Major General Talas said that in the spring of 1573 a
meeting was held between Presidents Hafiz al-Asad and Ani?:ar as-.ladat in Rurj al-'Arab
in Alexandria. They decided that the battle should begin that yeah and the forces should
be ready to assume any combat tasks effective the middle of May provided that a specific
date and other details shall be determined in following political and. military meetings.
fie said: Once again we reviewed the operational plans, previously drawn up, in the light
of experience and ;.now-how. The Egyptian forces also drew up their operational plans
for the Egyptian front.
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The coordination of the two plans took place at joint meetings of the Egyptian
Syrian commands under the chairmanship of Commander in Chief Field Marshal Ahm
Ismail, may God have merely on him. The political, information and deception
were drawn up in complete coordination between the two fronts. Major General
said that the military plans were based on the following mainlines:
1 . To achieve the elemerht of surprise against the Zionist enemy.
2. To begin the offensive simultaneously on the Syrian and the Egyptian from
curb the enemy's air and .and effort and disperse his forces.
3. To penetrate deep into enemy defensives in Sinai and the Golan after Gros
Suez Canal and assaulting the engineering barriers and fortifications in the
to maintain a high frequency of advance on both fronts to force the enemy to
his forces throughout the battle and to prevent him from dealing separately w
the two fronts.
When we:were working out;the plan, coordinating it and agreeing on it, we t
following considerations into account:
1. In view of the difficulty and complexity of crossing the canal as an eng
barrier facing the attacking forces on the Egyptian front, the Syrian forces
to break through the engineering barriers confronting them with thrust: and p
whatever the sacrifices,ito force the enemy into concentrating its main effo
his air force, in defending this front.
2. Since the Golan front is near populated areas in Palestine, the enemy we
compelled to continually} bring in his reserves in an attempt to halt the th
Syrian forces, which would create the ideal conditions for the Egyptian Arm
the canal with the least possible losses. This is what actually happened.
3. Once the Egyptian A?ny crossed the canal and occupied the line of forti
the eastern bank of the canal, called the Bar-Lev line, the Egyptian Army w
armored divisions to further the attack and move with thrust and persistonc
the passes in order to Force the Israeli army into redeploying his forces.
would ease on the Syriah front which would by then have waged ferocious bat,
most of the pressure or the Israeli army and inflicted upon it grave losses
and men. The Syrian forces would then move to recover the occupied Syrian
and consolidate their foothold on the eastern bank of the Jordan River.
be briefly said that the planning for the Golan liberation battle was a Sy
which was totally worked out by the Syrian Army command under President ha
direct supervision and followup. The strategic plans for coordination beti
fronts and the concomitant political, information and camouflage plans wer
Egyptian plans.
Major General Talas then referred to two exciting events that occurred pri
to issuo orders to the! forces to start the battle. The first was when the
the enormity of the concentrations on the Syrian front despite all the mea
camouf.ar.,o and toce,ption taken to conceal the concentrations because the e
observation posts completely commanded the cease-fire line.
nee ring
would have
rsistence,
t, paxticula.rl
icati.ons on
uld push its
to occupy
Thus, pressure
es, sustained
in equipment
erritcries
, it can
ian Arab plan
is al-Asad's
een the two
joint Syrian-
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MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA
ANNEX
Ho said that the second incident, which made us live in tension and anxiety for days--
and at the time we were going through the countdown stage--was one day when a high-
ranking Egyptian official surprised us by making a statement saying that the hour of
liberation had drawn near. In those moments, this statement was too much to believe
because it was contrary to the agreed strategic camouflage plan and would warn the enemy
if it was taken in conjunction with the other evidence he had, and could have led Israel
into launching the attack before us. When Field Marshal Ahead Ismail, may God have
mercy on him, came to Syria a few days before the date of the attack, we expressed our
surprise and anger over the statement. He shared our view and expressed his surprise
as well.
Major General Talas then discussed the standard of the implementation of the October
war military plans. He said that the standard of implementation on the Syrian front
was consistent with the plan and extremely faithful. At the set hour, our forces moved
and implemented the plan despite all the unfavorable circumstanceu dictated by the need
to bring; about the success of the Egyptian army's crossing of the canal with the least
losses. Our soldiers and officers paid the price of this in blood. President Anwar
as-Sadat recognized this when he told President Hafiz al-Asad: Egypt is nationally
indebted to Syria. Perhaps other circumstances made it necessary to launch the attack
at 1500, because from 1400 to 1500 the artillery and the air force were preparing the
way for the attack, instead of at the first hour of daylight--a matter which made our
forces break through the enemy's defenses and fortifications in the worst conditions
as the sun was about to set in the west and made it very difficult for our forces to
see, also making the storming of the enemy's fortified support points take place in
[words indistinct] when it was dark and the concomitant complications.
galas said: We made this sacrifice so that the general plan would succeed and out of
consideration for the situation on the Egyptian front which was (?useful) through the
crossing of the canal at night [words indistinct], the pure souls of our martyrs who
died content in the knowledge that they were giving their lives so that their comrades
on the canal front would succeed in crossing that gigantic barrier. He added: As to
execution of the plan, I refer you to what Moshe Mayan said in his press conference on
the fourth day of the battle when our tanks were storming across the Golan and our
forces overlooking the Hulah -plain. Moshe Sayan said: "le must stop this pestilence
which is storming the Golan and threatening the heart of Israel. In Sinai we are sure
to repel them, for the distances that separate us there will enable us to do so at any
time."
What happened on the Egyptian front was that when the fraternal Egyptian army crossed
the canal and stormed the Bar-Lev Line it spent many days -repelling' the tactical counter-
attacks [word indistinct] the canal, in implementation of the orders of its political
command, which enabled the Israeli command to expose the intentions of the Egyptian
command and transfer its reserves to the northern front. The ETjptian command continued
n this manner for a whole week, until 14 October 1973, without considering marshaling
in its other forces and following up the attack, despite our continued insistence that
OWthe plan should be followed.
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V. 7 Oct 75 6
MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA
ANNEX
When on 14 October Egyptian command thought of [words indistinct] Israel had ceived,
via the American atrbridge, a supply of U.S. antitank missiles, which enabled it to
inflict heavy tank losses on the Egyptian armored divisions and thwart their Be in
the battle, although had they been thrown in Immediately after the crossing o the
canal the Egyptian Army would have been able to liberate the [Jidda and Mitla passes
and continue their advance toward the total liberation of the Sinai Peninsula
He added: The way the plan was implemented on the Egyptian front proved that the
Egyptian political command contrived a different plan than what we had agreed upon
and pledged to implement. We aimed at liberating the occupied Arab territori s
while the Egyptian politipal command was to cross the canal and remain on its bank
without advancing in ordel' to revive the issue at world level, thus leading t the
our present stage.
Major General Talas spoke about the cease-fire decision. He said that it had the
effect of lightning on the Syrian Army as every soldier in the Syrian Armed 1orees was
confident that the salient of the enemy forces in the northern sector of the front
would become a graveyard 'for these forces in a few days. Everybody could Be the
preparations which we made to liquidate this salient.
Answering a question on President as-Sadatts speech in which he attacked and
the counteroffensive which the Syrian Arab region was planning, Major Genera
said, It is sad that President as-Sadat ridiculed the counteroffensive whit
Syrian Arab region was planning. I do not wish to comment on this. As for t
counteroffensive, any officer in any army in the world who has reasonable mi
training would be astonished that President as-Sadat has scoffed at and ridi
the possibility of executing such offensive.
Since 15 October, following fierce battles and counteroffensives between our
and the enemy on the Syrian front, the situation was as follows: On the sou
front, following fierce battles in which the enemy forces sustained grave lo
our forces established their positions along the cease-fire line after enemy
failed to cause any wedge. In the central sector, all enemy attempts to pen
our lines failed. In the northern sector, where the division commander and
commander were martyred in battles for honor and manhood, the enemy succeeder
penetrating along a narrow strip. After violent battles and series of count,
it was obvious to the enemy that he was involved in a salient not more than
deep. Four enemy brigades were encircled by one infantry and two armored dii
This was in addition to a reconnaissance group and two Jordanian armored bri
arrived on 21 October 1973. Orders were given to be prepared for counteroff
to out off, capture or destroy the enemy force, As these preparations mere
be completed, a cable was received from President as-Sadat accepting the cea
It was a painful tragedy to all the Arabs who had hoped for a protracted bat
the Zionist enemy.
ridiculed
Ta la s
the
e said
itary
u led
forces
hern
,ses,
attacks
trate
brigade
in
rattacks,
.0 km
isions.
ades which
naive
bout to
e-fire.
le against
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V. 7 Oct 75 7 MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA
ANNEX
Answering a question about repeated statements by president as..Sadat and his information
media that he had only revealed one quarter of facts about the October war, Major General
Talas said., We wish to hear the other three-quarters because under President al>Asad's
guidance we did nothing either secretly or publicly to be ashamed of.
Concluding his Interview, Major General Tales lauded the results of the October war at
the level of the enemy society, the Arab and the internatioral levels.
Damascus MwNA in Arabic to MENA Cairo 1050 OMT 3 Oct 75 NC??aFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
(Text) Kuwait, 3 October--The Kuwaiti newspaper AR-RA'Y AL.'AMM today quotes reliable
sources as saying that a new Egyptian Government will be formed after the Al-Fitr
holidays, which ',Jill be more liberal with the policy Egypt has adopted after signing
the Sinai agreement with Israel. AR..RA'Y AL.'AMM says that well-informed sources said
that Isma'ii Phhmi, deputy prime minister for foreign affairs, will form he new
government replacing Mamduh Salim, the present prime minister. The paper says that
several matters relating to the economic and investment sectors will be announced in
Cairo after the Al-Fitr holidays.
Damascus MENA in Arabic to MENA Cairo 0817 GMi' 3 Oct 75 NC--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[Excerpt] Damascus, 3 October..-The Syrian newspaper AL-BA'TH today stresses that
Israel and the United States are not seeking a real peace in the area but an Americana.
Israeli peace which would only be at the expense of the Arab cause and struggle.
The paper asks that attempts to emerge from the Middle East crisis are not only
proceeding along a blocked road but also along a way full of schemes, delusions and
deceptive solutions. The paper notes that Syria's stand, which Foreign Minister
'Abd al-Halim Khaddam proclaimed at the United Nations, has produced different reactions.
However, the public reaction was regrettably confined to the Egyptian delegation and the
Israeli foreign minister who from among the 141 member states were the only delegates
to voice their objection. The paper adds: an all previous occasions it was Israel
which sought to answer Arab officials. What has happened so that the world has changed
to this extent?
An-RIFA'I VISIT TO DAMASCUS SEEN AS MEDIATION
Damascus MENA in Arabic to MENA Cairo 1008 GMT 2 Oct 75 NC--FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
(Text) Amman, 2 October..-Diplomatic quarters in Amman may that the visit of Jordanian
Prime Minister Zayd ar-Rita'i to Syria yesterday aimed at the possible mediation of
Jordan to soften the dispute between Syria and Egypt at the request of Saudi Arabia.
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V. 7 Oct,75
These quarters add that the (forts being made now
AmmAn, Cairo and At..Ta'if a expected to result I
of these capitals to face t requirements of the
achieve the aims of Arab sol darity.
The Jordanian paper AD-DUSTU reports that the vis
Damascus indicate that there is an Arab move which
and solidarity among those w are responsible for
The paper adds: This initia ive has come right on
effective response from all he Arab parties which
passing clouds clouding the atmosphere between Ca
It further says: The foreseen and unforeseen pose
the Arabs to overcome all th marginal differences
confronting the main contrail etion represented in
KO AITI SUPPORT TO EGYPT TEP$D FINANCIAL AID
(Text) 1 await, 3 October-Deputy Habib Jawhar HR
Assembly's financial and economic committee has st
view, the economic support w ch Kuwait has under
Egypt was conditional on the stoppage of work in t
as compensation to Egypt for the loss of the canal
In a statement to the paper L-QABAS, the deputy a
of navigation in the canal, he financial comsitte
material Support to Egypt a turn it into a finan
state's general budget unde the aid clause.
meetings between senior offi
is of Zayd ar-Rita'i to Riyadh and
the same fateful issue.
would cooperate to dispel the
and Damascus.
bilities in the Arab arena be cove
and concentrate their capaeit es on
he Zionist aggression on the rab lands.
t, member of the Kuwaiti N'ati nal
ted that from the legal point of
ken to extend to the Arab Rep blic of
Suez Canal and that it was onsidered
dad that following the resumption
has decided to amend the law on
ial aid which will be includ in the
Hayat also said that members of the assembly's f
last meeting that it was nec ssary to continue to
because of the difficult fi ncial conditions of t
ive financial support to Egyp
fraternal country.
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