THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ATTRITION RATIOS DURING THE FIRST TEN DAYS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-185-7-54-0
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 54
• Publication Date: October 16, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/02: LOC-HAK-185-7-54-0
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE' HOUSE
WASHINGTON i,, b"
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
INFORMATION
October 16, 1973
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
BUD McFARLANE
The Significance of Attrition Ratios
During the First Ten Days
Notwithstanding its superior combat effectiveness, the disparity in
absolute force strength between Israel and the combined Arab armies
(Egypt, Syria, and Iraq) has lead Israel to execute a strategy calling
for the quick decisive destruction of Arab fire power. In the current
conflict, the viability of this strategy was compromised to some extent
at the outset, initiation of combat. Nevertheless, it has AIIAM 4-e% Ale Arab been the view that superior Israeli 25X1
combat effectiveness would be able to turn the tide and reverse initial
setbacks. Spot reports since the outbreak of fighting have tended to
confirm the assumed Israeli superiority. After ten days, however, an
analysis of the cumulative losses on both sides, reflects that these spot
.reports were at least incomplete and perhaps erroneous in reporting
comparitive losses. Some statistical comparisons illustrate the point.
At the commencementof hostilities, the ratio of Arab to Israeli
hterattack ircraft was 2.45 to 1. After ten da s fi ntin It
to 2.79 to I.
tanks was 2. 52 to 1. During the first ten days., it has worsened
t the commencement of hostilities, the ratio of Arab to Israeli
is 2. 37, to 1 only marginally im roved.
Such a superficial analysis does not by any means refute the assumption
of Israeli unit superiority, but may suggest that when absolute strengths
become greatly disparate, the Israeli advantage becomes less relevant.
Stated in other terms, an Israeli tanker up against two Syrian tanks may
be capable of destroying 1.75 tanks. However, when placed against
three Syrian tanks, his kill ratio drops to . 90.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/02 : LOC-HAK-185-7-54-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/02: LOC-HAK-185-7-54-0
SECRET 1P
A corollary proposition concerns the impact of US resupply efforts. For
so long as replacement items only restore the armament balance, we
cannot expect an Israeli reversal of the worsening trend. To the contrary,
restoring the pre-war balance would delay, but not reverse the deteriora-
tion of the Israeli position.
With respect to troop losses, statistics tend to confirm the assumption
of Israeli superiority (Arab losses to date more than four times those of
Israel), but as well place in relief the inability of Israel to sustain a war
of attrition (original troop strength ratio 1.59 to 1; current ratio 1.57
to 1). The impact of Arab advantage over time will become more apparent
in the days ahead as Israeli forces that have been in combat for ten days
begin to face fresh Iraqi, and reasonably fresh Egyptian forces.
The significance of the above is understood by the Israeli leadership and
may, in fact, be reflected in some of their recent operations. Faced
with the diminishing prospect for defeating the Arab forces, there are
signs that the Israeli forces may seek to establish strong points offering
political bargaining strength. The thrust across the canal last evening
would seem to support this thesis.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/02: LOC-HAK-185-7-54-0