MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-183-1-19-7
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: October 7, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/12: LOC-HAK-183-1-19-7
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
THE WHITE HOUSE
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security. Affairs
DATE & TIME: Monday - October 7, 1974
PLACE: The Oval Office
Kissinger: I have been telling the Israelis that if they didn't move with
Jordan, things would get tougher and tougher with the PLO. Now there
is a resolution to have Arafat speak at the UN as representative of the
Palestinians. If we vote against it, we get an explosion in the Arab
world and we would have five countries with us; if we abstain, Israel
may refuse to negotiate. On balance, I recommend to vote against, but
we will pay a heavy price.
President: Where will you be on the 14th?
Kissinger: Algeria. It will be murder either way.
President: What is the best way to get the negotiations going? If we vote
for...
Kissinger: You can't vote for. The choice is between abstention and a
negative. If we abstain, we will have a strong Israeli reaction.
President: What will we gain with the Arabs?
Kissinger: It'll be a slight plus with the Arabs, because it means tacit
acquiescence. If we vote against, the Soviets will make the most of it.
Our idiot Ambassador in Cairo...
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President: The land transfer in Egypt...
Kissinger: No, he did this right. This has been under way for a year.
It's a straight swap of land.
President: They are paying with PL 480?
Kissinger: No, that is the $10 million for charity. It is totally useless
in Egypt. It was for Children's hospitals. It is a vicious attack.
President: Wayne Hays can be an SOB or a help. Why don't I get him to
defend it?
Kissinger: He has known about it for months. This was in our submission
to Congress. [He describes the inaccuracies in the Post article.)
President: I can call Wayne. He can get on the floor. He likes to tackle
the press.
Kissinger: He can say he has known about it all along and has an open
mind on the subject. But it may start a campaign.
President: But he could set the record straight if someone raises it.
Kissinger: No, what Eilts did is to plan to attend an Egyptian victory
parade. I have told Eilts to get the Palestinian vote moved to past our
elections. If they don't, this gives us an excuse to vote against it. I
could explain our situation on my trip and then I could offer private diplomatic
talks with the PLO. That would raise hell if Israel found out.
[The President talks to Wayne Hays.]
President: On the PLO, if we abstain and that keeps Israel frozen, that
would be wrong. That is top priority.
Kissinger: The Arabs shouldn't have made us vote now and they must know
the limits of our policy. So I am inclined to vote no. I will tell Sadat and
Hassan we will have political contact in New York.
Dita,itz said you had said you were with him on long-term aid.
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President: I didn't say that at all. We were just milling around there.
Kissinger: I told him that. They also said it was promised after the
first of the year in talks witi Rabin.
President: I said it depended on the negotiations.
Kissinger: In the context of a settlement you can put in our authorization.
In the absence of that, they must go on an annual basis.
President: There was no commitment in the absence of progress.
Kissinger: Dinitz said you did say that Saturday night. Nixon gave the
impression he would give Golda a letter that we wouldn't push them off
the. Golan. They want such a letter now. I agree with that position, but
I am afraid of a letter like that. I think it is better to break the commit-
ment. With Golda you could trust. They will blame me, not you for the
broken commitment.
President: I will make that decision. No.
Kissinger: Maybe after another move with Syria you could do it. I showed
Dinitz some paper language of a general commitment. He said that was not
good enough.
I will take along the protocol of what you promised. I support import
restriction, not by dollar amount.
President: The economic people think an arbitrary cutback would hamper
our economic recovery. What we will say is we attempt a billion barrels
a day voluntary effort. If that doesn't work, we will go mandatory. They
said the French had given up their program.
Kissinger: That is fine. But if it's mandatory, dollars are better than
quantity because it creates an incentive for lower prices.
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President: Let's do it.
Kissinger; I must be candid. Colby is a cautious bureaucrat and the
estimators are liberal democrats. Portugal, Diego Garcia, South
Vietnam -- they are changing on all of them. Schlesinger agrees.
25X1
Schlesinger is preparing contingency plans for the Middle East. He says
it would take two months and Diego Garcia.
The briefing was a disgrace.
President: T agree. We are doing virtually nothing.
Kissinger: It may be too late in Portugal.
President Do we have people there?
President: Are they good there?
Kissinger: Yes,
President: Let's do it.
Kissinger We could tell
President: I lived near
Kissinger:
`President: Is this Catholic priest a problem?
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25X1
He was very liberal and I told Betty...
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Kissinger: It wouldn't have developed had Thieu not been in trouble. He
is in trouble because the aid is going down. It is a vicious cycle. We
attack our allias for repression and cut aid; the aid cut leads to a decline
in morale.
Scowcroft: NSC representation.
President: Not Art Hartman. Rumsfeld is okay.
Kissinger: Could we have Sonnenfeldt as a notetaker? He will be demoral-
iied if he' a not. I worked out something with Rurnsfeld on leaks.
President: There is another story in the New York Times on the Rabin
thing.
[The AID people come, and then leave. ]
Kissinger: I am having a press conference. I thought I would be tough on
Chile. Turkish aid will come up. There is conflicting advice on eligibility
and on extent of ineligibility. We presented this to the Leadership.
President; And they told us to go this way.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/12 : LOC-HAK-183-1-19-7