CUTTING OFF AID TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-18-4-6-1
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 20, 2011
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 22, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM - { k
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INFORMATION
November, 22, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDE S
SUBJECT; Cutting Off Aid to India and Pakistan
The total amount of Development Loan Funds placed in Letters of
that they nave not yet been placed in "irrevocable letters of credit. "
that we would suspend or cancel "letters of con mitment" to the extent
caic.ellang,..i3r"x.evocal1e letters- of credit. In, technical terms this means
The AID paper recommends cutting into the pipeline just short of
purchases would be a matter of imposing an embargo.]
or two which: is identified and could be held. Stopping the flow- of Indian
[The Pak military pipeline has dried up with the exception of a shipment
India or Pakistan,
exactly how one would go about cutting off economic assistance to
Attached are the contingency papers that I have had prepared on
Commitment but not yet tied up in Letters of Credit is
--$1070 6 million- for India and
--$21.0 million for Pakistan.
To these figures would have to be added the amounts of aid that had been
obligated but not yet even put in Letters of Commitment. This would
have symbolic effect. only since nothing is actually in the pipeline yet.
The uncommitted amounts in this category are:
the books, to be drawn against.
--$11. 24 million for India and
--$17.7 million for Pakistan.
These are out of a total in authorized loans of $437.35 million for India
and $192.2 million for Pakistan.. But these totals are just figures on
DOS, USAID, DIA, OSD, NSS,
Reviews completed
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CONFIDENTIAL
The next harsher step Would be to stop shipments financed under
Letters of Credit. We.do not have figures on the status of all
shipments. It is at this point that we get into a very complex process
which involves. deciding on a case-by-case basis whether to take title
and pay cancellation charges. Because of the complexity, stoppage
would not be IM/6 effective initially.
As a final step we could take title to all goods on the high seas.
AID prop uses that, whatever is done on the above PL 480 shipments.
be allowed to continue as humanitarian?
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONENTIAL
A.I.D. ACTIONS DURING FIRST 96 HOURS FOLLOWING DECISION TO TERMINATE AI1)
to terminate assistance up to the point where valid irrevocable Letters
For reasons set forth under the Development Loan Section, A.I.D. Proposes
by suppliers are $94.8 million for India and $38.0 million for Pakistan.
The result of the initiation of the actions set forth below .would be to.
India' and192.2 million for Pakistan. Outstanding Letters of Credit held
There currently are $437.35 million in authorized-development loans for
of Credit have been issued to U.S. suppliers (through Step NQ. Two).
in irrevocable Letters of Credit to be drawn down.
kistan respectively while' allowing the above indicated amounts already
shut off .pl07. b million and X21. Q million of pipeline funds to India and
or t ,icis"Gan or oat
Suspend action on all pending obligations and agreements between
the V~ti?, F~.Ilt1 recipi
Instruct U.S. L/Coma banks not to issue new L/CR=s against
outstanding L/Comm. balances.
Request L/Coma banks on aninforma.l basis not to make dis-
bursements against outstanding L/CR's without first checking
.with A.I.D. Since ships on the high seas carrying loan
financed commodities probably would not enter a "war zone",
decisions concerning diversion of A.I.D. cargoes in transit
probably will not have to be made during the first 96 hours,
following the outbreak of hostilities. Since FL 4-Wo ship-
ments support humanitarian programs, they should b'e allowed
to continue= to the extent that shippers will enter the waters
of either combatant.
NESA/SA:WGBollinger:mar:11/2/71
CONFTDFNTIAL
GP- 3
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1. General announcement that economic assistance to either India
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AMWITTIAT,
DEVELOPMENT LOAM (See Tab 1 for current status of DL pipeline for
India and Pakistan. )
It would be possible to 'interrupt the pipeline flow at, any one of a
number of stages in the loan implementation process:
?
would be in violation of the legislation governing A.I.D. or when an
event occurs which hakes it impossible that the purposes of the loan will
be attained.
Step Two - The next and more.severe step would be to suspend or cancel
Letters of Commitment to the extent that they have not yet been placed
in irrevocable Letters of Credit (L/Cr's). A.T.D. has the legal right
under its loan agreements to initiate such action when any disbursement
Step One -- As
a first step, A.I.D. could decline to place obligated loan,
funds in Letters of Commitment (L/Corm's ). Aside from the symbolic effect
of such an action (or lack of action on A.I.D.'s part), this step would
have little effect of reducing the flow of pipeline commodities to India
and Pakistan since only a relatively small amount of the funds in loan
agreements has not. yet been placed in L/Comet's. The uncommitted amounts
are $11.2. million for India and $17.7 million for Pakistan out of total
loan amounts of $437.35 million and $192.2 million respectively.
To cancel outstanding L/Comm's, the A.I.D. Controller would contact
(telephone) the chairman (Chase Manhattan Bank) of the A.I.D. Banking Sub-
committee in New York, on which all ma. jor U.S. ;banks ,holding L/Corm's
issued by AID are represented. He would also telephone directly all other
participating banks located outside of New York. The-banks would be
requested to hold up on the issuance of new Letters of Credit. This action
would be followed b,,? telegrams from the A.I.D. Controller to the individual
L/Comm banks confirming the verbal instructions from AID/ 1-7.
A potential problem at this point arises from the holding by the National
Bank of Pakistan in New York of about $60 million in Letters of Co a^ t-
ment under the FY 1970 program loan to Pakistan of $99.5 million (Lette:^s
of Commitment for the remainder of the loan are held by U.S.-owned banks).
It is conceivable that the National Bank of Pakistan would stall on the
implementation of an AID request to refrain from issuing new Letters of
Credit against it's unutilized L/Corm balances, pavticula.rly since an
amendment to an L/Corrm initiated by AID has to be accepted by the holding
bank, thereby providing a lag time during which new L/Cr's could be
opened. In dealing with the National Bank of Pakistan, AID would have
to indicate that no disbursements would be trade by the AID Controller
to the National Bank of Pakistan for Letters of Credit opened following
a specific date mentioned in the L/Corrm amendment. With re and to
India,, all Letters of Commitment for development lcx ns to the Govern-
ment of India are held by U. S. -owned banks. The total amount of Development
Gi.'- 3
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M . . w
COM 1'fl tAL
- 2-
Loan Funds,vhich has been placed in Letters of Commitment but not yet
:,;tied up in Letters of Credit is $107.6 million and $21.0 million ?for '
India and Pakistan respecitvely.
(a) Undertake-measures set forth in Steps
l and.2 above.
SSteg Three - A third and harsher step would be to stop shipment from the
where they are' actually offloaded in the country of 'destination. If all
suppliers, or cancel orders for such goods. AID reserves the rigftt in
the case of DL financing to divert and take title of goods up to the point
shipments except those already on the high seas are stopped AID would be
obliged to pay for the goods, including appropriate aarcages, ii any, or.
pay cancellation charges.'
In order to shut-off the flow of commodities to either or both of the
initiate the following actions;
CONTIDTT?TIAL,
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(b) Obtain conformed copies of all active Letters of Credit from
the banks holding AID Letters of Commitment. Although it is
impossible to estimate it--h any ' precision the number of active
Letters of Credit since the financing of loan comrrrodities is
accomplished entirely through private commercial channels, the
numbers could be in the thousands. It should also be noted
that the National Bank of Pakistan could refuse to provide
AID with copies of active Letters of Credit issued against
its Letters of Commitment. If this occurred, U.S. suppliers
could be requested to advise AID directly if they. hold irrevocable
L/Cr?s for Pakistan commodities.
(c) Contact all suppliers holding Letters of Credit to determine
status of manufacture and shipment of commodities. Depending.
on the status of the transaction and the type of commodity
involved, including whether it is a shelf item or made-to-
order, AID would have to decide on a case-by-case basis
whether to take title. to the commodity (with resultant storage
and ultimate disposal problems), pay cancellation charges,
and/or pay cancellation charges and damage claims. The initial
effort of contacting the suppliers could take several weeks
or more to complete.
(d) Concurrent with the preceeding action, AID would issue public
notices in newspapers, AID's Small Business Memorandum, and
other general announcements to-American industry requesting
all. suppliers holding "confirmed" or "advised" Letters of
Credit under AID loans for Pakistan.or India to.contact
be:igerents,excepting those commodities already on the high seas, AID would
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a specified representative in AID/washington. This
procedure would be particularly important in contacting
suppliers holding Letters of Credit issued by the National
Bank of Pakistan should it decide not. to -comp..}r wxtn I J.1J . s
request for copies of its L/Cr `s
(e) Also concurrent with the actions. C and D above, AID would
contact all major shipping companies and request them not to
load AID-financed commodities currently on the docks and
destined for either combatant. AID-funded commodities are
identified by the bill of lading as well as by the clasped-
hands insignia located on all packing crates. There are at
present large amounts of AID-financed commodities stacked up
in U.S. ports as a result of the U.S. dock strikes, and,
conversely, only a relatively small amount of goods on the
high seas. AID would have to take responsibility for any
damage claims asserted against the shipping companies.
In view of the exceedingly large number of private commercial trans-
actions currently being financed under the DL programs for India and
kakistan, step no. three would be a -massive undertaking, which would
be far from 100 percent effective. Not only would it be immensely
costly to the U.S. Government, it would also set off 'a series of events
which could take several years to complete (e.g., litigation re damages
and ultimate disposal of commodities for which the'U.S. took title.). AID
only this past month settled the last outstanding issue which resulted
,.,from our decision to take title to commodities destined for the combatants
in the 1967 Middle East war.
It should be noted that any contact by AID with suppliers or shipping
firms regarding the location of U.S.-financed cargoes would have a
shock wave effect in the private sector and would quickly be communicated
to both India and 1' kistan. Any contact with the "trade", then,
should be made with the full understanding of the consequences of such
an action.
Step Four - The last and most severe measure would be to undertake the
three steps above and, in addition, assume title to:all commodities
on the high seas destined for India and Fakistan. In order to identify
the whereabouts of AID-financed cargoes on the high seas, AID would have
to find out from each supplier whether his commodity (ies) has been
shipped, and. if so, by which shipping line and vessel. AID would then
have to assume title to the commodity and request the carrier to either
discharge the commodity in a third-country port, or have it returned
COTWIDENTIAL
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CONFIDE AL
to the'United States. In either case, AID would be responsible for
paying any damages . Again, one must consider the potential problems of
subsequent disposition of any commodities on the high seas f6r which
AID assumes title. If AID should order commodities on the high seas
diverted, we could only expect U.S. flag ships?to comply with our request,
even though these carriers have.no legal obligation to AID. We also could
not legally force Indian, Pakistani and third-country ships to divert
AID cargoes.
Seized Cargoes
There is little that AID can do to prevent impounding if we. are unsuc-
cessful in having,India and Pakistan destined cargoes offloaded in third-
country ports prior to a ships arrival in the ports of either combatant.
In view of the current dock strikes at all major U.S. ports, there are
at this time only relatively small amounts of AID-financed 'commodities
on the ocean destined for India and Pakistan. However, because of the
much larger pipeline for India the problem of seized caroges, to the
extent that it would occur, would likely lie in the impounding in Pakistani
ports of commodities destined for India. Outside of the normal commercial
claim procedures, AID could possibly debit the value of the India coi oditie,:
seized by Pakistan against the outstanding balance of the current Pakistan
loan program.
NESA/SA: WGBollinger :mar :112/'71
,,Clearances: NESA/CDE, VHancock draft
NESA/GC, SStein draft,
CONCIDE'i'IIAL
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 No Objection
MEMORAAND
w
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
SECRET November 22, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
SUBJECT,
HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
WSAG on South Asia--2:30 p.m.
November 22
Attached at Tab A is a brief memo on what we know- of the situation
at this moment.
At Tab B is an intelligence study of what a war might look like.
steps that might be taken could indicate what modifications might be
possibilities that this morning?s news may represent. Discussion of
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0
Perhaps the best way to conduct this meeting is to lay out the three
2. The Pakistanis might have become desperate over the rising
pressure of Indian and guerrilla activity and decided to accuse
India publicly of having started the war so that Pakistan would
feel free to act in any way it considers necessary.
3. This may have been an unplanned escalation growing out
of the increased fighting of recent days.
1. This could be a major Indian attack in support of a Mukti
Bahini offensive to seize a portion of western East Pakistan.
required in each case. Those three possibilities are:
Talking Points
The following talking points are designed to address the steps that might
be taken so that you will have established a WSAG base for decisions on
each:
1. If this is a general outbreak of hostilities, what steps might
be taken to limit hostilities to the East Pakistan border? This
would be most possible if this were an unplanned escalation,
SECRET
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 No Objection
SECRET
2. Should we urge the Soviets to associate themselves with,
a call for an early end to hostilities?
--Should this be done bilaterally or in the UNSC context?
3. What are the pros and con
stage'?,
of involving the UNSC at this
4. Is now the time for a direct approach to Mrs,''Gandhi urging
time for the
litic
po
al process? I the Pide
nresnt's name or not?
vuvu.ccx the Chinese be approached
ll
L_ - ,+ 1 .
ht nat-
mi
y
g
ra
6.
What public line should we take?
cr ary when the facts become clearer?
--What are the pros and cons of a statement by the President
or the 3e t
What Is Desired from the Meetin
All of the above will be prefaced by the fact that we do not have the full
story.or what is actually happening. The purpose of the meeting is to
discuss what steps should be taken if the next few hours indicate that
there has been a significant escalation of any kind. Perhaps you should
ask State to begin drafting the following on a contingency basis::
1. Instructions for an approach to Mrs. Gandhi (a) urging a halt
in military activity with a special word about preventing spread
to the west and (b) allowing time for the political process.
2. Instructions on a US posture toward UNSC involvement.
. Draft public statement.
4. Instructions for Farland to review situation with Yabya..
The subject of aid is being dealt with in a separate memo,
SECRET
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MEMORANDU
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Indo-Pak Fighting
Pakistan border. o er locations along the East
Th+eIndians claim that these reports are "absolutely
false" although they say that several Pak planes have intruded into their
airspace and that the Paks are trying to increase tension and create a "war-
like situation.
e
r
far from Calcutta and includes infantry, armor, and aircraft. ThetPtoo
ak
claim that fighting has flared u s also
p in several th
casts that India 'without a formal
declaration of war, has launched an all-out offensive against East Pakistan. it
They claim that the attack is nonc
t
FORMA TIO
The Paks are claiming in radio broad
on that. get a reasonably good fix
is ha enin y w at these reports indicate about what
pp g. We have no independent evidence yet of significantly increased
fighting, although there has., of course, been a continuing series of serious
incidents along the India.-East Pakistan border. There are three possible
explanations for today's developments:
The Indians may have stepped up support for a major uerrilla o
including more direct participation of their forces, g ffensive,
--The Pakistanis might have decided that war was inevitable and could
have decided to charge the Indians now with having begun it in order to
free them for whatever reaction they may feel necessary.
-There may have been an unplanned escalation of the fighting.
I am holding a special WSAG meeting this afternoon to. consider what we
can do to perhaps head off a war. Much will depend, of course, on what has
actually happened and it may be a while before w
At this point, we cannot tell exactl h
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eanorandum
FROM
QP VMr4AL FORM IN16 w
MAY I CbIYION
{M FPMs (41 Cr*) tbt.11.0 CPanw.r- last Anr Ta **
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,
NEA - Mr, Christopher Van Hollen
INR/RNA - Herbert J. Liebesny
SUBJECT:
Indo-Pak Contingencies: Three Faces Of War
DATE: November 17, 1971
In response to your request, we have reviewed the most likely
over West Pakistan.
1. Border War in the East: The most immediate and likely contingency
would e a su stantia expansion of the present undeclared hostilities
along the Eastern borders in which both sides would seek to engage and
destroy units of the other but neither would attempt to seize and hold
territory except for short-term tactical purposes. India could, at any
time, expand its present limited incursions heretofore concentrated in
the Tripura-Sylhet areas, to deeper probes by brigade size units across
any or all sectors of the border. Pakistan would probably not initiate
order to asse'ss the possibilities for mediationand,compromise short
of capitulation by either side. We have not considered international
reaction to these contingencies; although there would be some important
assessments to be made in this area, international reactions would not
be likely to alter-the situation appreciably in any of these contingencies.
Nor have we considered the possible role of Bangla Desh representatives
in any negotiations which might be attempted during the course of
hostilities since they appear unlikely to be able to play a role sub-
stantiall-y separate from India's in such circumstances.
Summar : There appear to be three patterns of hostilities .which could
occur in sequence, concurrently or independently. The most immediate
and likely possibility is that India may initiate major but undeclared
hostilities in the East which would quickly force Pakistan to choose
between an accomodation and retaliation in the West. Limited hostilities
-in the West are possible, but would constitute, in effect, merely a
prelude to total hostilities. In the event of total hostilities,
Pakistan would ultimately be forced to capitulate, and it is likely that
neither side would be in a position to accept a ceasefire or negotiations,
international efforts notwithstanding, until the Government of Pakistan
had accepted defeat. Under such circumstances, there would be a very
real question as to the ability of the Pakistan's Army to retain control
terms of each country's likely actions, objectives and prospects in
take during the next few weeks. We have reviewed these patterns in
patterns which major hostilities. between India and Pakistan might
an escalation of border hostilities. However, Pakistan would respond to
Indian initiatives with cross-border attacks on Indian positions, probably
limited to multi-battalion attacks at most,-and might attempt to lure
SECRET/NO FORFIG
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SECRETINO FOREIGN
2-
Indian forces across the borders into ambushes. Both governments would
deny responsibility for initiating the incidents; in most instances, it
to which. guerrilla rather than Army forces were involved.
ascertain the results of the action, or,.on the Indian side, the extent
would probably, be impossible to confirm which side startea the action,
In this contingency, India's strategic objective would continue to
.movement,`particularly the.Awami League and Mujib, which would at least
be to force Islamabad into an accommodation'with the Bengali resistance
of the Pakistani Army in the East wing; and c) to pin down regular
a) to increase pressures on Pakistan; by to sap the strength and morale
provide for the return of the refugees, its tactical objeCtiveSwoulcl.be:
Mukhti Bahini. India would continue these actions at least until
Pakistani forges inorder to,permit greater freedom or action by the
representatives would be faced with a fait accompli, and the Army would
insist that they deal with the "electedd government, rather than directly
and ostensibly representative civilian government established at both the
-national and provincial levels. In such asituation, the Bangla Desh
Pakistan's-initial objectives in this contingency would probably be
to maintain a holding action until the "bye-elections" had been completed
would: hare, to maintain this strategy, until it had achieved its objectives
without undertaking an outright invasion in the East or initiating
hostilities in the West.
forces at any point along the Eastern borders, India could, and probably ,
in the negotiations develop. With its ability to . outnumber Pakistani
Indian military operations would probably be stepped up should snags
might be reduced,-but full support for the guerrillas would. continue and
of territory and had established a decisive edge over Pakistani forces.
Should serious GOP-Bangla Desh discussions start', Indian Army actions
a) serious discussions began between the GOP and Bangla Desh representatives
.acceptable to Mujib, or b) the guerrillas controlled'substantial amounts
with the MLA. Pakistan would probably also hope that the establishment of
a civilian government of some kind would restore sufficient semblance of
legitimacy to force effective international restraints on continued
Indian intervention.
Both countries would have much to gain by restricting hostilities
to the East and keeping them at a relatively low level, thus avoiding the
committment to combat of their expensive hard,are and the risks of a full
scale war. It is possible, therefore, that a limited expansion of border
hostilities could continue for several months without leading to general
hostilities. However, India is in a position to raise rapidly the level
of border warfare in the East well beyond that with which the Pakistani
Army could cope. It could probably do so well before the new Pakistan
National Assembly would convene. Thus the chances are that Pakistan would
soon be forced either to accept negotiations with the Bangla Desh
representatives or to respond militarily some:here in the 'West where it
enjoys a relatively more favorable position. A limited Pakistani
retaliation in the West might not lead ininediatel'y to total war (see
II below), but the risks would be sufficient to cause Islamabad to
on with the
t7
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II. Limited Hostilities in the West: Be it as an extension of
for Bangla pesh. ~..
indicated they would accept something less than immediate independence
and on the degree to which India and the Bengalis (including Mujib)
reaction of the Army.and public in, West Pakistan to the war in the Last,
Bengali resistance. The choice would probably'depend largely on the
escalating Border hostilities to the East., br as a result of the already
prevailing tensions, eitner side (but more likely Pakistan) might initiate
and/or, cross-border hit-and-run strikes in the West involving battalion-
sized infantry and armored units. Pakistan might conduct such :activities
in Kashmir, southern Rajasthan or the Rannof Kutch; India might retaliate
.,across the Punjab border in the Lahore-Sialkot sector. The purpose of
each side would be to probe the defenses of the other and to signal to
each other and to the world the imminence of full-scale hostilities.
Neither side would attempt to hold territory, sti^ke'vital military
installations or engage major enemy forces; even limited air:strikes would
be ruled out.
In such a contingency, Pakistan's objectives would be to force
international intervention in the dispute; should Pakistan undertake such
actions before entering into serious discussions with Bengali leaders
it
,
would probably also indicate that Islamabad had decided to risk full-scale
war before accepting any meaningful compromise on Bangla Desh. India would
probably hope, at least initially, to maintain the emphasis on the internal
situation in Pakistan and prevent a shift of focus to an Indo-Pak dispute.
It would also wish to,establish a clear case of Pakistani provocation..
India might therefore attempt to contain Pakistani thrusts and limit
retaliation to tit-for-tat counteractions.
Given the -stakes 'involved, it is possible that such- a phase of limited
hostilities could preceed full-scale hostilities in the West. Yet neither
side could be expected to refrain for long from launching a major offensive
once actions at any significant level had begun on the Western borders, so
that any such phase would at best offer no more than a brief interlude
before full hostilities began.. Moreover, should international pressures,
during a period of limited hostilities in the West, appear to make
mediation between India and Pakistan inevitable, India, fearing that she
might be forced into some unilateral concession, might well decide to
initiate full-scale hostilities.
III. Full-Scale Hostilities: In the event of full-scale war.Pakistan
would probably launch attacks into Kashmir, southern Rajasthan and/or
the Rannof Kutch and attempt to remain on the defensive in central
Punjab, launching strong counterattacks into Indian Punjab, if necessary.
Possible, but less likely, would be a Pakistani effort to penetrate deeply
into Indian Punjab, cut off lines of communication to Kashmir and engage
the main body of Indian forces in an effort to cripple Indian military
capabilities and thus to improve Pakistan's position in a subsequent war
.of attrition. India would probably launch a full-scale attack on the
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SECRET/CIO FOREIGN
Lahore-Sialkot sector, attempt to take both cities, cut Pakistan's lines
of communication between Rawalpindi and Lahore, and to destroy as many
Pakistani forces as possible in the process.. India might also attempt
'a smaller offensive against targets and lines of communication-further
south, e.g, Hyderabad. In the East, India would try to destroy all
Pakistani forces, but, to the extent possible,ww-ould probably seek to
withdraw, leaving Mukhti Bahini forces in control.
The prospects are that, Pakistan` might: be able to hold t
r a i..c u1
forces in 3-5 creeks, but might--be-
ight be rar. forced . to remain in East Pakistan for
a cnnsiderabl 1
J o a S oN, Costly advance
resulting in a stalemate and the onset of a war of attrition outside the
rit ine ? 4n +kA C-4. T_JJ r- _
Lahore and Sialkot in a week or ten da s t 1 e cap ure of
emporar~ly
portions of Indian territory in Kashmir (although not the Vale),
Rajasthan or the Rann of Kutch. India's.:prosp.ects in the West could
range from the destruction of Pakistan's main forces and th t
Y onger period or time in order to help establish Mukhti
B
hi
i
l
n
a
contro
...
e qu
ckly as much
Y as MUM
1A 4u 6
Indian territory in theWest as possibie and ha f
Pakistan's objectives would probably be to seiz
1,
i
pe o
during which to negotiate the best cmmnrnmfce noceible Sh
uld P
s
's
o
aki
tan
f 1
J a any use u negotiations
between India and Pakistan could take place while hostilities remained in
progress.
n
m
um o,) L.Ives
would probably expand to include the irr:rtedi ate release of r-}u j i b and
full in East Pakistan. In order to achieve her. objectives,
India would probably continue full-scale hostilities until she was in a
position to dictate such a solution to East Pakistan. Under such
circumstances there would be'a very real question as to the ability of.
the Pakistani Army to retain control in West Pakistan. India would
probably not agree to any cease-fire as long as any Pakistani forces
remained on Indian territory, and it is unlikel th t
Once engaged in general hostilities India's mi
i
b
u
g ng until forced to capitulate.
t
on w yin days of
the outbreak of full hostilities; should Pakistan's offensive falter and
India's counter-offensive appear likely to succeed, Pakistan might well
contin
e fi hti
..~. ~.,,~ w. I unJuu a jii ar s Lrung,
Pakistan would'probably accept a ceasefire and median i
f
Clearances: CIA/OCI
DIA
INR:RNA SOA:WDHowells:mhm
SECRET/rn rnnrTnKI
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/23: LOC-HAK-18-4-6-1
25X1I