SOVIET NAVAL THREAT IN THE BALTIC AND NORTH SEAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-18-1-33-4
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 20, 2011
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: November 3, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASUINOTON
0 8 NOV 1971
OECRET
750,4,4 illuNk4i1M.04
MEMORANDUM FOR: tif1I10011115611001411.
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Soviet Naval Threat in the Baltic and
North Seas
The annual appearance of Jane's Fighting Ships has attracted
considerable media comment in recent years due to its pro-
minent coverage of the Soviet naval expansion efforts. In
late July, your News Summary briefed a CBS commentary on the
1971-1972 edition; allegedly, Jane's reported that the Soviets
could "wipe out our land-based deterrent" in a first strike
in the mid-seventies, and there was further editorializing
that the Soviet Navy now dominates the Baltic and North Seas
"and nary a NATO vessel seems in sight."
In the interests of accuracy, the actual Jane's account of
the evolving strategic nuclear balance was not as lurid as
depicted. In any event, this matter will be assessed in
great detail during NSC addressal of the Strategic Posture
and other studies in the near future.
With regard to the evolving naval situation in the Baltic
and North Seas, some brief comments might be helpful in es-
tablishing a perspective since public attention hitherto
has been focused on Soviet naval activity elsewhere.
At the outset, it should be noted that any assessment must
consider two aspects of the present naval balance - the
actual and the virtual - and place both in the context of
our overall security interests.
NSS, DOS,
OSD, NAVY,
DIA, JCS
reviews
completed
31057
-- While the Soviet Baltic and Northern Fleets have not
increased markedly in size during recent years, there
has been heavy and sustained emphasis on moderniza-
tion with new and converted units replacing the old.
Their surface ships are shifting to surface-to-surface
missile capability as well as surface-to-air; diesel
submarines are being replaced with nuclear-propelled
and a significant number are being equipped with
cruise missiles capable of attacks on shipping as
well as shore installations; and the associated land-
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based air units have improved their air-to-surface
missile capability. Amphibious ships continue to be
added at a slow but steady pace. In general, these
new capabilities have not been matched by the pace
of modernization in the NATO navies and there has been
steady downward pressure on the size of most West Euro-
pean navies. These trend-lines are a major source of
concern to Western naval observers.
The popular perception of relative naval strengths has
been influenced further by the accelerating pace of
Pact naval activity over the last few years. Their
naval exercises have become larger and more complex and
have moved into NATO waters. Intelligence collection
and surveillance activities have become increasingly
pervasive. The number of transitors to the Mediterran-
ean and elsewhere has increased and the newer Soviet
ships are making more frequent port visits in Western
Europe. This apparent dynamism has dramatized the
Soviet naval presence whereas that of the NATO navies
has been relatively low-keyed and generally taken for
granted.
In the Baltic, it does seem clear that the Soviets have moved
into a position of naval dominance. In the event of NATO-Pact
hostilities, the Pact could probably gain early control of the
inner Baltic although NATO has reasonable prospects of preven-
ting egress of most of the Pact naval forces into the North Sea
and beyond. However, the Pact has attained a significant amphi-
bious capability which could be used in an attempt to seize the
Baltic exits in conjunction with airborne forces or to conduct
flanking operations to support an overland thrust across the
North German Plain. Success in either of the latter two attempts
would depend critically on the NATO air and ground forces that
could be localized for defense.
The present naval balance in the North Sea is less clear cut and
depends heavily on whether French naval forces would be committed
in the event of NATO-Pact hostilities and, to an even greater
degree, on the timely availability of US naval reinforcements.
There would be a substantial Soviet submarine threat in the North
Sea and the possibility of cruise missile attacks on key instal-
lations could not be excluded. There do seem to be reasonable
prospects for containing the Soviet surface units to the Norweg-
ian Sea; however, they would still be a significant threat to NATO
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reinforcement efforts in the event of a Soviet ground attack in
northern Norway.
In short, the Soviet Baltic and Northern Fleets do pose signi-
ficant and credible threats to NATO; and although the Soviets
may not have yet attained the crossover point in the overall
naval balance, they now have additional politico-military lever-
age at their disposal, particularly in Scandinavia where it
would be a credible aim to induce a pro-Soviet drift on the
part of Sweden and Finland and a weakening of Norwegian and
Danish ties to NATO. Under these circumstances, the NATO
naval presence assumes greater significance and should be
sustained with NATO and national naval exercises and such
measures to ensure demonstrable readiness as are feasible.
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_
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MEMORANDUM
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dh ?SSINGER
FROM: R. O. WELANDER
SUBJECT:
NATIONAL
ITY
UNCIL
.5.LUD
ACTION
6 October 1971
Soviet Naval Threat in Baltic and North Seas
Jon Huntsman has sent to you a memorandum concerning a report
in the News Summary citing media reaction to the latest edi-
tion of Jane's Fighting Ships (Tab C). Huntsman's memorandum
notes: "It was requested that you get the answer to this."
Each of the recent editions of Jane's has attracted consider-
able attention in the media due to the prominence given to
. the changing U.S.-Soviet naval balance. Early last fall USIA
requested guidance in order to establish a policy line.
understand Wayne Smith provided you his analysis and perspec-
tive on the situation at that time.
In this instance, it should be noted at the outset that there
is considerable disparity between what Jane's in fact says
and what some sectors of the media saysTiTys. The Summary
item reports:
"This time, CBS notes that Jane's says that the
Soviets by mid-seventies could wipe out our land-
based deterrent in a first-strike."
The actual statement in the Foreword of Jane's (Tab B) is as
follows (underlining is mine):
"In the strategic/nuclear balance of forces the
USSR has gained superiority over the US in num-
bers of ICBMs and the megatonnage that can be
delivered; and the current Soviet ballistic
missile submarine construction rate of at least
six submarines per year could give the USSR par-
ity if not superiority in "Polaris" type submar-
ines by 1975. (In addition to which the USSR
has a number of nuclear powered and diesel-driven
submarines with shorter-range missiles).
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al Polaris submarines are acknowledged as
the most survivable US strategic deterrent forces
for the foreseeable future."
find little to quarrel with in the Jane's assessment; the
CBS account thereof just did not set the full context.
The Summary item goes on:
"Then comes report on the Northern Flank of NATO
where Soviets have turned the North Sea 'into a
Soviet lake.' Alarming report on the networks,
which says while US is watching Soviet thrust
into the Med, no one seems to be paying great
attention to the North and Baltic Seas where
Soviets dominate and nary a NATO vessel seems
in sight."
cannot find these assertions in the Foreword or elsewhere in
Jane's - nor any assessments therein which would lead to such
judgements. Again, it is the CBS editorializing which is
sounding the alarums.
Presumably, the Summary item piqued Presidential interest in
two areas:
-- The Soviet first-strike capability and
-- The evolving naval balance in the Baltic and North
Seas.
The first issue is to be addressed in great detail in the DPRC
in the near future; it would be inappropriate to do so herein.
Therefore, this memorandum focuses on the second issue and pro-
vides a response to the President's request for an answer (Tab A
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Constraints on Analysis
The Soviet Baltic and Northern Fleets, with their associated
land-based air, constitute the primary naval threats in the
Baltic and North Seas. While we have rather precise inform-
ation on the composition of these forces and their unit cap-
abilities, any gross numerical comparison with opposing NATO
naval assets must be tempered by consideration of other fac-
tors.
On the Soviet side of the equation:
-- The nominal threat to the North Sea is posed by the
Northern Fleet which has many diverse wartime tasks
in the Atlantic; the fraction of the total assets
that could be concentrated in the North Sea would
be highly scenario-dependent;
-- Despite the real constraints of the Denmark Straits,
the Baltic Fleet could also constitute a threat in
the North Sea under many circumstances;
-- Both Fleets contribute forces to the Mediterranean
and elsewhere; residual strengths would depend upon
the pre-hostilities Soviet posture;
-- Both Fleets rely heavily upon the protection of land-
based air, although major efforts are underway to
improve integral air defense capability;
-- The employment of both Fleets, but particularly the
Baltic, would be influenced by the situation in the
Central Region;
-- The employment of the Baltic Fleet would be further
influenced by the posture assumed by Sweden and, to
a lesser extent, Finland.
On the NATO side of the equation:
-- The initial role of the French Navy is questionable
? yet its assets would be significant in the North Sea
as well as elsewhere in the Atlantic;
-- The UK still maintains worldwide deployments and has
major wartime commitments in the Mediterranean; as-
sets available to counter a thrust into the North
Sea would be scenario-dependent;
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-- US naval assets that could be applied in either the
Baltic or North Seas would depend heavily on the sit-
uation in the Mediterranean, along the trans-Atlantic
SLOCs, and in the Pacific.
Situation in the Baltic
With the foregoing caveats in mind, the relative strength fig-
ures in Tables 1 and 2 may give some rough feel for the current
situation in the Baltic.
It would seem clear that the riparian NATO states are pretty
well outnumbered by the Soviets alone and even more so when
the other Pact assets are put into the equation. Sweden's
capacity for naval defense would appear to be short-lived.
Although the Soviet Baltic Fleet numbers have not changed appre-
ciably in recent years, there has been a sustained emphasis on
modernization with new or converted ships replacing older units.
The growing SAM and SSM capability afloat is matched by exten-
sive installation of coastal defense SSM batteries and it should
be noted that the mine warfare and amphibious forces are now
the largest of any of the Soviet fleets. Of perhaps equal
importance to the perception of relative strength is the current
tempo of Pact naval activity. Patrols in the Danish Straits and
aerial reconnaissance are routinely maintained; foreign naval
ships are surveilled continuously; and training activity re-
mains high. Pact amphibious exercises have become increasingly
complex, and have incorporated airborne and tactical air elements.
One can only speculate on the psycho-political uses to which
the Soviets will put this naval power in the years to come; the
Fleet is clearly larger than necessary to ensure defense of the
Pact Baltic coastline. On his recent trip through Scandinavia,
Admiral Zumwalt sensed a drift away from neutrality toward a
pro-Soviet stance on the part of Sweden as well as Finland and
a weakening of Norway's NATO ties. Dependent as these countries
are on seaborne commerce, they would appear vulnerable to com-
bined Pact political and naval pressures and it would be a cred-
ible Soviet aim to induce a sense of isolation from Western
Europe to achieve a pro-Soviet orientation in all of Scandinavia
and, ultimately, the withdrawal of Norway from NATO.
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In a NATO war scenario, most assessments attribute the follow-
ing missions to the Soviet Baltic Fleet:
Destruction of NATO naval forces in the Baltic;
-- Denial of ingress into the Baltic by external NATO naval
forces;
-- Seizure of the Baltic exits (Zealand, Jutland, and later
Southern Norway) by amphibious and airborne operations
to permit Soviet egress to the open oceans; and
-- Leapfrogging amphibious operations to support land op-
erations along the North German Plain.
The ability of the Soviets to carry out these missions would be
heavily dependent on the air assets either side could apply -
and this in turn would be dependent upon the situation in the
Central Region and, to a lesser extent, northern Norway. The
early availability of Swedish air bases to the Pact forces
would be significant.
It seems evident that the Pact has the surface and air power
to bring the naval battle well into the western Baltic soon
after the commencement of hostilities. NATO naval reinforce-
ment would become increasingly difficult as the scene of action
moved up into the Danish Straits and there is a good probabil-
ity that at an early juncture the only external NATO naval force
that could be applied in the western Baltic would be carrier-
based air from the North Sea or the Skaggerak.
While most analyses indicate that NATO has at least a reason-
able chance of denying early egress of the Pact surface and
submarine units, this should not be accepted as an end in
itself.
To the extent that local air supremacy is gained and freedom of
surface operations achieved inside Zealand, the Pact amphibious
capability opens important options. They have the lift to
assault land the two Soviet naval brigades (about 4,200 men and
60 tanks) and the Polish assault landing division (about 3,700
men and 60 tanks). This respectable assault force could be
supported by the two Soviet airborne divisions (or one Soviet
and one Polish) totalling an additional 13,000 men for which
adequate air transport is immediately available. With a beach-
head or port area seized, Pact merchant shipping in the Baltic
could be mustered to administratively land up to an additional
511 divisions.
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This capability could be applied in an attempt to seize control
of the Baltic exits. Influencing factors would be the status
of concurrent operations in Norway and the role played by Sweden.
A concentrated Soviet Northern Fleet thrust into the North Sea to
draw off NATO covering forces could not be excluded. If not com-
mitted to the Southern Flank, the ACE Mobile Force and NATO am-
phibious forces might be utilized to reinforce in Jutland, but
otherwise there is little likely prospect for early ground or air
reinforcement and the Danes would have their hands full unless
well into mobilization.
In my view, a more likely exercise of this capability would be
in support of a strong thrust along the North German Plain aimed
at the Hamburg-Bremerhaven port complex. Countering such a force
would require diversion of significant NATO ground and air assets
which might be critical to containing the main overland thrust.
By their very nature, such amphibious assault operations would
provide lucrative targets for the use of defensive tactical
nuclear weapons. At what juncture such use would be feasible
in the overall context of a NATO conflict scenario remains, at
least to my mind, a moot question.
Some NATO studies postulate a surprise thrust to seize control
of the Baltic exits from an advanced exercise posture of both
the Soviet Baltic and Northern Fleets and their amphibious
components. I would judge this highly unlikely but it raises
interesting questions about the certainty of a full NATO res-
ponse under conceivable sets of circumstances.
Situation in the North Sea
Tables 3 and 4 compare the Soviet Northern Fleet with the NATO
navies that operate in the North Sea. UK and French strengths
reflect ships normally operational in the Atlantic/North Sea and
the maximum strength that could be concentrated if all assets
were withdrawn from the Mediterranean. US strength shown is for
LANTCOM at M+30 after augmentation by the Pacific Fleet in the
Atlantic and Mediterranean.
In assessing the relevance of these figures, the following points
are pertinent:
-- The Soviet Fleet has a significant qualitative edge over
most of the non-US NATO navies in terms of modernity,
SAM capability, and its unmatched SSM and ASM capability.
Operating under its umbrella of land-based air, it has a
potency belied by its numbers.
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Much of the NATO force of destroyer-size and below would
be committed to ASW escort duty in the English Channel
and Western Approaches in the event of hostilities or
even during a crisis phase and would probably not be
available for surface engagement. Conversely, most of
the Soviet destroyers and escorts could be used to pro-
tect a surface strike force.
The Soviet cruise missile capability has added a new dim-
ension to the submarine threat to the NATO surface units.
In addition to the uncertainty of their commitment, the
French forces shown could be reduced in the event of con-
current hostilities in the Mediterranean.
The "sub-total" column is probably a good indicator of how the
North Sea states view the naval balance and it is not particu-
larly reassuring. Moreover, these are the NATO forces that
initially would have to cope with the threat from the north as
well as cover the Baltic exits. The US strengths shown can
only be achieved over time; if there is a concurrent Mediter-
anean crisis, SIXTH Fleet reinforement could well take priority
and the initial capacity for allocation of major surface units
to the north would be limited in what might be a critical period.
As in the Baltic, it seems clear that the present perception of
relative strength has been influenced heavily by both the drive
for modernity and the sustained high operating tempo on the
Soviet side. While the Soviet Northern Fleet numbers have not
changed markedly, new or converted ships with impressive SAM
and SSM capability are replacing the old and the attack sub-
marine force is shifting to nuclear propulsion and cruise
missile capability. This stands in marked contrast to the
drawdown in the UK fleet size and the generally slow pace of
modernization in all the North Sea NATO navies.
The Soviets have been conducting increasingly larger and more
complex fleet exercises which progressively move further south
in the Norwegian Sea, and during OKEAN, there was a consider-
able presence in the North Sea for an extended period. Intel-
ligence collectors roam the North Sea and NATO and national
naval exercises are heavily surveilled by both air and surface
units. Additionally, there has been the increasingly frequent
transit of ships proceeding to and from the Mediterranean and
elsewhere and now the newer Soviet units have recently begun
making calls in the North Sea ports. In sum, the Soviet Navy
has made the North Sea states keenly aware of its existence in
the last few years.
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In this latter regard, the Soviet Baltic Fleet has also had
units exercising in the North and Norwegian Seas and, on one
occasion, sailed an amphibious force up the coast of Norway
to participate in landing exercises in the north. From this,
some observers have concluded that the Soviets may not con-
sider the Baltic exits an insuperable wartime barrier. While
not shown on Table 3, it should be understood that a signifi-
cant portion of the Baltic Fleet could be put into the North
Sea as a show of force during a localized crisis.
In the NATO war scenario, most assessments ascribe the follow-
ing missions to the Soviet Northern Fleet:
-- Covering and supporting ground operations to seize
northern Norway to provide warm water ports and air-
fields to extend the radius of action into the north-
ern Atlantic;
Intensive ASW against NATO barrier submarines to fac-
ilitate transit to and from the Atlantic of their own
submarine force;
Intensive submarine warfare against all SLOCs into Western
Europe;
Destruction of NATO naval surface units to permit greater
freedom of action against the North Atlantic SLOCs by
their own surface forces.
Additionally, I would postulate the possibility of SSM strikes
against key NATO maritime facilities such as those in Iceland,
the Faeroes and alsewhere.
The NATO naval strategy, in general terms, is to attrite the
Soviet submarine force in the G-I-UK gap, to contain the surface
threat to the northern reaches of the Norwegian Sea, and to con-
duct naval air and amphibious operations in defense of northern
Norway. Defensive minefields would probably be laid to assist
in containing both the submarine and surface units.
I have not seen any analyses of possible outcomes which are
completely persuasive. Most are driven by how quickly we can
cope with the preponderant Soviet submarine threat and this, in
turn depends upon critical assumptions - technical, tactical,
and scenario - on which there are diverging views.
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In my own view, we would be hard-pressed to hold northern
Norway, particularly in the event of concurrent hostilities
in the Central Region and on the Southern Flank.
The Soviets have an amphibious assault capability for landing
one naval infantry brigade (2100 men and 30 tanks); airborne
support could be rendered, depending upon the availability of
air transport; and merchant shipping is available for admin-
!.strative landing of up to 4 divisions of ground troops after
seizure of a port. However, most analyses posit the major
threat from mechanized divisions moving across the mutual
boundary or through northern Finland or Sweden with the Fleet
acting in a covering role.
The initial threat in the North Sea would be primarily from
the Soviet submarines and land-based air with the possibility
of cruise missile attacks on surface shipping and key shore
installations. While the lower reaches of the North Sea are
fairly shallow for optimum submarine operations, the impor-
tance of the coastal ports to Western Europe would warrant
Soviet risk-taking.
Depending upon how the Norwegian campaign goes and the attri-
tion of NATO surface strength from submarine and air attacks,
the Soviet surface units could in time pose a direct threat in
the North Sea; the severity of this threat would further depend
on the degree to which NATO has retained air supremacy. In my
view, this threat would be a long time in developing although a
feint or an actual thrust to cover an attempted seizure of the
Baltic exits could never be discounted.
Summary Conclusions
In the Baltic, it seems fair to say that the Soviets have
attained a position of naval dominance with significant am-
phibious and airborne assault options. While there are fair
prospects of containing this naval threat to the Baltic in
event of NATO-wide hostilities, air and ground forces must be
maintained to counter attempted seizure of the Baltic exits
or flanking assaults into Schleswig-Holstein. The possible
use of tactical nuclear weapons would have to be considered
in a NATO-wide context.
In the North Sea, the naval balance has not yet shifted so
dramatically. The main threat stems from the Soviet submarine
strength and, to an increasing degree, from the Soviet cruise
missile and ASM capability. Northern Norway does appear to be
in considerable jeopardy. Major factors in the relative bal-
ance are the availability of the French Navy and the capability
for timely reinforcement by the US Navy.
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Current perceptions of the relative naval balance in both the
Baltic and North Seas are colored by:
-- The sustained Soviet emphasis on modernization in both
fleets which does not appear to be matched on the NATO
side; and
-- The upsurge in Soviet naval activity. Pervasive sur-
veillance, out-of-area exercises, ship transits, and
port calls - all Df which have increased steadily in
the short span of the last eight years - have drama-
tized the Soviet naval presence, particularly in the
North Sea.
Any assessment of the significance of the evolving naval sit-
uation in the Baltic and North Seas is inevitably influenced
by the primacy one accords the Central Region and one's judg-
ment as to the rapidity with which a NATO-Pact conflict there
would be resolved. At the least, it seems clear that the
Soviet Baltic and Northern Fleets constitute significant and
credible threats and provide the Soviets additional politico-
military leverage in Scandinavia which could, over time, weak-
en or dissolve the Norwegian and Danish ties to NATO. In this
latter context, it would appear important to sustain a counter-
vailing naval presence with NATO and national exercises and
by such symbolic means as the Standing Naval Force Atlantic,
the multi-national destroyer squadron which periodically oper-
ates in the North Sea and conducts port visits.
Recommendation
That you sign the brief memorandum to the President at Tab A
which reflects the foregoing conclusions.
Concur:
-Hal Sonnenfeldt
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Reference Material Consulted
1. National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-71, "Warsaw Pact
Forces for Operations in Eurasia," dated 9 September 1971.
4. Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning, Vol. III, FY 1972,
SM 80-71.
. Report of Interagency Working Group 5 for NSSM 84, "The
Warsaw Pact Threat to NATO," SR JS-70 dated February 1970.
5. Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, FY 1974-1981, Vol.
Vol. II Book 5.
. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for FY 1971, Vol. II
(Forces).
7.
8.
and
? NATO MC 161/71, "The Soviet Bloc Strength and Capabilities,"
dated 6 May 1971.
10. NATO Naval and Naval Air Intelligence Conference 1971,
Agenda Item IV, "Trends and Developments in Warsaw Pact
Naval Vessels," dated 1 September 1971.
11. Chief of Defence Norway - Ministry of Defense Germany,
"Trends and Developments in Warsaw Pact Naval Operations
and Exercises in the Baltic and the Approaches," dated
30 August 1971.
12. Ministry of Defense Germany, "Assessment of the Threat in
the Area of Operations of the German Navy," dated 5 August
1971.
13. Chief of Defence Norway - "Soviet Naval and Naval Air
Operations and Exercises in the North, dated 17 September
1970.
14. Chief of Defence Denmark, "Warsaw Pact Coastal Missile Order
of Battle in the Baltic," dated 14 September 1970.
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IIP 111
?FOREWORD
Since last year's edition of this annual was published two
factors have projected from the maritime defence concept
which could influence the composition and deployment of
many navies in the immediate future.
One is a somewhat belated but now acute awareness
evinced by hitherto quite autonomous navies ot the need
for international co-operation and mutual security.
The other is the recognition, not, only by mor powers
but also by smaller countries, of the tactical power and
strategic influence of the fast and diminutive warship
armed with the optimum payload of guided missiles.
Ironically it is the new world sea power of the Soviet
Union which has engendered the yen for co-operation, and
it is the Soviet Navy which has pointed the way to the
ascendency of the missile boat over much larger orthodox.
warships.
As regards international naval co-operation, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation is, of course, now well estab-
lished, and there is a Standing Naval Force Atlantic, a
permanent, multi-national squadron, albeit not nearly as
powerful as it could and should be; but there is no compar-
able multi-national naval force in the Irelian Ocean.
Recently, however, there has been a change in the
climate of opinion. From last year, when it seemed that
few countries officially showed the slightest interest in the
void created by a combination of the prospective withdrawal
of British warships from the Far East and the preoccupation
of United States naval forces in Vietnam and the Mediter-
ranean: to this year when, not only several navies, but
almost every thinking-ahead authority, is, suggesting or
formulating ways of filling the Indian Ocean gap from Cape
Town to Singapore,
If the arms for South Africa controversy has done nothing
else it has shed light on the problems of sustaining the
European ocean trade routes round the Cape to India,
Pakistan, Malaysia, Hong Kong and Australasia. and has
brought home to all countries on the Indian Ocean -seaboard
the extent to which they are laid open to foreign maritime
infiltration and influence.
The prime necessity would appear to be a multi-national
Standing Naval Force East comprising warships seconded
from each of the countries with military or commercial
interests in that oceanic hemisphere from South Africa to
Indonesia. Ideally this Standing Naval Force would include
ships from U.S.A., Britain, Australia, New Zealand, India,
Pakistan, Malaysia, Singapore, Portugal and South Africa.
As regards the new era of guided missile boats in spate
it is quite remarkable how many of tho smaller countries as
well as the major powers have seen the light and have
taken up the small fast boat with the long-reach big-punch.
An alarming feature of the past decade has been the
progressively increasing cost of fighting ships of the
categories to be found in most navies: destroyers, frigates
and escorts. When confronted with this escalation problem
several of the smaller countries decided that the answer
was smaller and cheaper vessels.
This policy was given impetus after the sinking of the
Israeli destroyer Elloth by an Egyptian missile boat, and
several western navies became aware of the possibilities of
equipping small and fast vessels with modern guided
missile systems for the surface-to-ship role.
Of particular interest are the missile boat flotillas created
by Norway, which represent a considerable increase in
the effectiveness of her navy. Adopting the indigenously
designed "Penguin" system, four missile launchers are
being installed in six new fast torpedo boats and six missile
launchers have been or will be installed in 20 existing fast
gunboats in addition to their present armament.
'Germany has also taken up guided missile boats in a
very decided way. Abandoning what seemed to be a firm
project to build four guided missile frigates of 3,500 tons,
the German Navy is instead to build ten guided missile
boats of 350 tons and 20 guided missile boats of 250 tons.
Among the other countries which have or are building
missile boats are Denmark, Israel, Italy, Greece and Malaysia;
and Algeria, China, Cuba, Egypt, Finland, East Germany,
Indonesia, Poland, Romania, Syria and Yugoslavia, indeed
most of the satellite countries who take their marine arma-
ments from the Soviet Union.
Much the same as the submarine was in the past reckoned
to_be the weapon of the weaker power, so the diminutive
missile boats with surface-to-surface systems will give
smaller navies an offensive power out of all proportion to'
their modest overall size.
In fact, viz-a-viz a country with a much greater fleet of
larger warships without missiles the smaller country with
missile boats could hold the balance of deterrent power and
exert a containing influence. And withall the missile boats
are cheaper and quicker to build, easier to maintain and
much more economical in manpower.
Yet there is seeming reluctance on the part of some of
the larger maritime powers to build missile boats, The
British Navy, for instance, has no missile boats and has
not shown any inclination to operate such craft, although
at the time of writing the Royal Navy is temporarily using
the guided missile boat Tenacity built by Vosper Thornycroft.
The two fast patrol boats of the "Brave" class have been
laid up and Britain's representatives of the Coastal Forces
are three new fast but unarmed training boats, However.
these are eminently suitable for arming with missiles and
doubtless would be if emergency required.
A great volume of new facts and figures and a large
number of pictures have been added in this edition, the
74th year of issue of Jane's Fighting Ships. For the fourth
successive year the Soviet section has been considerably
enlarged and is now three times the size that it was in the
late sixties, reflecting the growing size and power of the
Soviet Navy, And the volume is again issued earlier in the
year, the earliest publication date in the 23 years of the
present editorship. More than 1,100 new illustrations have
been added in this issue, including over 200 scale drawings.
Altogether there are some 3,200 illustrations in the book
. comprising nearly 2,700 photographs and nearly 500
drawings. Particulars arc given of over 15,000 ships and
craft in 110 navies or sea-defence forces.
USA
Norman Polmar, editor and compiler of the American
section, has given an outline of the American naval scene:
'The size and relative capabilities of the United States
Navy continue to decline at what many authorities consider
to he an. alarming .rate. This situation, hitherto discussed
in closed sessions of naval officials and in this annual, is
now being addressed openly. The Chief of Naval Obera-
tions has told Congress that the Navy has "a lower than
prudent level of current forces" and has "been falling well
behind a. responsible replacement rate".
? The force levels of the Fiscal Year 1972 budget reduce
several categories of warships to their lowest strengths
for over a .decade. The situation is evident in the plannird?
force of 1.3 attack aircraft carriers (one with a mixed attack/
anti-submarine air wing) compered to 16 attack carriers
three ? years ago; three anti-submarine carriers instead of
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FOREWORD?continued
sIx in 1969; 160 cruisers, frigates (leaders) and destroyers
decreased from 240; and 93 attack submarines, a drop of
ten boats since 1959. The number of nuclear-powered
attack (fleet) submarines has increased horn 41 to 57
during the past three years, but this is limited compensation
for the reduction in destroyer-type ships and ASW carriers
with their air groups.
Despite the wind-down of the Vietnam War, the res-
ponsibilities of the US Navy remain. The Navy will long
be engaged in supporting US and South Vietnamese forces
on the Indochina peninsula; the "Nixon Doctrine" for
foreign policy in the 1970s calls for meeting overseas
military commitments and responsibilities, but with a "low
profile" of US forces overseas, an obvious mandate for the
astute employment of sea power. Simultaneously. US
strategy calls for maintaining a capability for countering the
other super-power at sea. But the Soviet Navy has already
exceeded the United States in active surface ship and
submarine numbers, including near parity in nuclear sub-
marine strength (and a larger nuclear submarine construction
programme). In some respects the characteristics and
capabilities of the Soviet ships obviously are superior to
those of their US Navy counterparts. Expanding Soviet
naval operations during the past few years. notably the
200-ship-plus "Okean" exercise of April 1970, demonstrate
that the Soviets have developed the ability to operate these ?
ships on the high seas; regular deployments of warships
to the Caribbean, Mediterranean, and ledian Ocean areas
demonstrate that the Soviets are in fact using these ships
as politico-economic-military forces.
The only category of warship in which the US Navy now
and for the near future maintains a decisive advantage is
the aircraft carrier. No other ship or even combination of
surface ships can match the versatility, striking power and
range, or endurance of the modern attack carrier and her
80 to 90 aircraft. Yet even this margin over the Soviet
Navy is narrowing as the number of attack carriers in
commission is being reduced, the construction of a fourth
nuclear-powered carrier (the CVAN 70) is in doubt, and
the adequacy of the F-14 ship-borne fighter (successor to
the F-4 Phantom) is being questioned.
In their stead, some naval authorities are advocating
smaller and lower-cost air capable ships, hydrofoil missile
boats, and surface effect ships for a variety of missions.
However, it seems questionable to consider even a squadron
of air capable ships, each with perhaps six Harrier V/STOL
attack aircraft and six SH-3 helicopters, as comparable to
a single attack carrier.
But if the United States is seriously to address the question
of countering the Soviet Union at sea, or indeed the Soviet
allies equipped with advanced aircraft, missile boats, and
submarines, the question of maintaining and even increasing
attack carrier strength must be considered and difficult
decisions have to be made. The aircraft carrier has been
viable for so long, proved itself so often in hot and cold
wars, and is so versatile that its place in modern warfare
should te understood and properly evaluated.
The cost of modern air power?both land-based and
sea-based is rising at an awesome rate. The costs of
aircraft, ordnance, support .equipment, manpower, and
bases all are increasing. The CVAN 70 probably will cost
more than S800 million dollars if constructed under the
Fiscal Year 1972 or 1973 programme; the cost will most
likely be a billion dollars if delayed until 1975. However,
this cost is comparable if not actually less than the cost of
suPPorling an equivalent number of aircraft at land bases
overseas in view of vulnerability, political considerations,
support and logistics. Korea and Vietnam have amply
demonstrated this comparison.
Solutions to the problem of maintaining a strong Navy
with limited funds are difficult to devise. However, there
are some alternatives that warrant consideration: To main-
tain carrier strength the Navy.could consider a halt to the
construction of destroyers and frigates?which are being
criticised for poor design as well as increasing costs?to
permit Carrier construction arid operation. This would
result in fewer screening ships, but this partially could be
compensated by increased use of ship-based early warning
end anti-submarine aircraft and helicopters, operating
nuclear submarines as ASW escorts for carriers, and
expansion of passive defensive activities (e.g. operating
the carriers under conditions of electronic silence). Imagin-
ative concepts of ?million can compensate for shortages
of escorts as long as carriers are available to provide the
increased reconnaissance and strike capabilities over
opposing naval forces.
?
All of the above is predicated 3n the thesis that a naval
confrontation with the Soviet Union is possible (or could be
avoided by strong US naval forces); similarly, sea-based
tactical air would be the key in supporting US and allied
operations ashore, and in operations against other naval
and air forces. The North Korean capture of the US
intelligence ship Pueblo and downing of a naval reconnais-,
sance plane have called attention to the "other" military
threats to US activities.
In the strategic/nuclear balance of forces the USSR has
gained superiority over the United States in numbers of
ICBMs and the megatonnage that can be delivered; and
the current Soviet ballistic missile submarine construction
rate of at least six submarines per year could give the USSR
parity if not superiority in "Polaris" type submarines by
1975. (In addition to which the USSR has a number of
nuclear powered and diesel-driven submarines with shorter-
range missiles). Soviet progress in the strategic weapons
area is of utmost concern to US; defense leaders because
improved guidance and multiple warhead technology
(MIRV) could permit the predicted Soviet strategic forces
of the mid-1970s to destroy virtually all US land-based
ICBMs in a surprise first-strike attack; simultaneously,
Soviet missile submarines could destroy most US manned
bombers before they could become airborne. Accordingly,
the US Navy's 41 Polaris/Poseidon submarines are ack-
nowledged as the most survivable US strategic deterrent
forces for the foreseeable future.
Arguments for partially or entirely replacing the land-
based missiles and bombers with additional missiles at sea
are being countered by arguments for maintaining the "triad"
of deterrence--the combination of land-based bombers,
land-based missiles, and sea-based missiles that have been
the premise of US strategic -forces for more than a decade.
Although modern technology argues against this "triad",
political and separate service concepts survive. Increasing
the sea-borne portion of deterrence, either in submarines
or surface ships, would increase weapon survivability,
remove strategic targets from the heartland of the United
States, and eliminate or reduce the need for the Safeguard
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system that will have the
primary purpose of protecting land-based Minuteman
ICBMs.
The US Navy is receiving the largest portion of the
proposed Fiscal Year 1972 defense budget allocation to
the services, 34.56 per cent compared to 33.77 per cent
for the Air Force and 31-66 per cent for the Army (about
500 million more than the Air Force and S2 billion more
than the Army). This is the first budget since the "unifica-
tion" of the armed services in 1947 that the Navy has
received the largest share. However, the FY 1972 military
budget represents the smallest portion of the Federal
budget (32.1 per cent) and the smallest portic.m of the
Gross National Product (6.8 per cent) since before the
Korean War of. 1950-1953. A comparison of FY 1972
defense spending in terms of constant dollars repre:;ents a
decrease of S23?9 billion from FY 1068, the Vietearn War
peak.
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FOREWORD?continued
The situation for the US Navy is serious: winding down
the war in Indochina will make sea duty and its family
separation less attractive; there is increasing hostility
toward the military in the United States; reductions in ship
strength make deployments longer and more arduous:
commitments are continuing and, in some areas, increasing;
inflation and real cost increases are making ship and aircraft
procurement difficult; and new ships with relatively
inferior capabilities are conmounding the problems. There
are no simple answers, The US Secretary of Defense
declares: "I pledge that I shall continue to urge actions
vtrich will assure the supremacy of the US naval power".
The President of the United States. avers: "What the Soviet
L6tion needs in terms of military preparedness is different
flom what we need. They are a land power, primarily,
with a great potential enemy on the East. We are primarily,
of course, a sea power, and our needs, therefore, are
different."'
USSR
By any standards the Soviet Fleet now represents the
super-navy of a super-power. This tends to serve as the
red rag to the bull to some countries whose spheres of
influence, commensurate with their declining navies, are
shrinking, while in step with her expanding navy Soviet.
spheres of influence are widening.
But it might well be the case that Cie Soviet Union is
just as concerned about what she considers to be a threat
to her overseas trade and ultimate security, namely the
knitting together of NATO navies and the deployment of
the fleets of western countries the breadth of the Atlantic
and the breadth of the Pacific away from their own domains,
as the USA is worried about the expansion and broad-
scattering of the Soviet Navy,
After all, seen through Soviet eyes, the naval squadrons
of the USSR are only just off their own Baltic doorstep
in the North Sea, only just off their own Black Sea doorstep
in the Eastern Mediterranean, and only just off their own
Vladivostok doorstep in the China Seas. It is only in their
recent forays into the Indian Ocean that Soviet warships
are off limits and even then the excuse could justifiably
be made that they are on passage from one part of the
Soviet Union to another.
Whereas, also from the Soviet point of view, the USA
maintains a powerful fleet in the Mediterranean 4,000 miles
from New York and a huge fleet in South East Asia 5,000
miles from San Francisco.
So the USSR probably fears the overseas extension of
the USA and the constant liaison of the British, French,
Italian and German navies, through NATO, as much as
the USA fears the ever widening ripples of Soviet sea power
all round the world. And the USSR can always say that
they are merely "showing the flag", much the same as
the US Navy have done since the Second World War and
the British Navy did when it had a comparable navy.
"The Soviet Navy on the seas and oceans reliably guaran-
tees the USSR's security and its state interests", says the
Soviet Minister of Defence. The men of the Soviet Navy
were tirelessly improving their military and political know-
ledge, successfully mastering modern combat equipment
and weapons, and enhancing vigilance and combat
preparedness. They were ready at all times to defend the
sea frontiers of the socialist motherland. The shipbuilding
industry was reaching new achievements in equipping the
Navy with combat ships and formidable armaments.
"Our strong ocean-going Navy is the basis of the might
of our country" says the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet
Navy. "Soviet fighting ships are systematically present on
the seas, including the areas where the shock navies of
NATO are present. The presence of our ships in these
areas binds the hands of the imperialists and deprives them
of the possibility of unhindered interference in the internal
affairs of peoples. This situation is undoubtedly not to
the liking of the imperialist 'hawks' who are trying to
distort the purpose of the voyages of Soviet ships and to
diminish their importance for the cause of peace. Of
decisive importance in present day conditions is not only
the number of ships, but mainly the quality of their nuclear
Missile, weapons and technical capabilities and the high
morale and fighting capabilities of their personnel.
"In this respect our Navy is tp to the level of present
day demands. Its equiPment and the vigilance of the crews
protect Our country from all kinds of surprises. The pride
of our Navy is our nuclear submarines, which are fitted out
with a variety of missiles which can be launched from
under water. Our submarines, together with the Navy's
missile-carrying and anti-submarine high speed, long range
aircraft, are the, basis of the striking might of the Navy.
Up-to-date surface ships, equipped with the most modern
weapons, are assigned a major role in carrying out the
Navy's tasks. The Soviet Navy is an impressive deterrent
in the way of imperialist reaction and adventures. At the
same time the Soviet Navy is a symbol of our fraternal
assistance to the friendly and freedom-loving peoples,"
declared the Commander-in-Chief.
Friend or foe will read what they will from this peroration,
but it sounds very much like "show the flag and police
the world", which is what Britain did until the Second
World War and what the United States has been trying to do
ever since.
Every year for the last decade or so a new class of rocket
cruisers, missile destroyers, submarines, escorts, mine-
sweepers, missile boats and/or,torpedo boats has appeared
in the Soviet Navy and most western observers have been
impressed by their sophistication and novelty.
The past year has been no exception. Not only has a
new class of missile cruisers appeared, the "Kresta II"
class, bristling with their missile and radar control complex,
but a new type of general purpose destroyer leader, the
-Krivak" class, see photographs in the Late Addenda, and
two new classes of nuclear-powered submarines have been
operationally deployed, and a new class of guided missile
corvettes is being built.
So prolific has the Soviet naval shipbuilding effort been
that the USSR is now able to maintain a standing naval
force in the Mediterranean five times stronger than five
years ago to counter the American Sixth Fleet. Recently
a US admiral remarked to the Editor of this annual with
some bitterness that he could count more guns in the
Soviet Fleet in the Mediterranean than he could in his
own fleet there.
Again, five years ago the USSR had no warships in the
Indian Ocean, but today there are a score of surface ships
alone, and there is no telling how many Soviet submarines
are in the area. The Soviet Navy is believed to be Com-
pleting nuclear powered submarines at the rate of one
every long month. (There was a gap of three years between
the completion of Britain's third nuclear powered fleet
submarine Warspile and the completion of the fourth,
Churchill).
The United States is very worried about the growth of
the Soviet Navy's mounting strength in the Mediterranean,
along North Africa and in the Indian Ocean. But white the
USA is shackled to an enervating war elsewhere she expects
the countries of NATO in general and the countries bordering
the Mediterranean in particular to increase their naval
contribution to the common effort.
It is estimated that the strength of the Soviet Fleet now
comprises 83 'nuclear powered submarines, 318 conven-
tionally powered submarines, 2 cruiser helicopter carriers,
20 cruisers ilICk/CillIg missile ships, 100 destroyers including
missile armed vessels, 130 escorts of the small frigate and
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FOREWORD?continued IIP
corvette type, 270 coastal escorts and patrol vessels, 320
minesweepers, 125 missile boats, 325 torpedo boats, 125
amphibious ships and 75 smaller landing craft excluding
minor LCMs. Support ships, auxiliaries and service craft
run into thousands.
This navy list constitutes a very formidable force indeed,
both as a strategic deterrent and for conventional sea.
warfare. It indicates the transition of the USSR from a
land power to a sea power, and suggests that the Soviet
Union is just as concerned about the ganging up of smaller
Western navies, which have little power individually but
immense power collectively, as the United States Navy is
about the growing spread of the Soviet Navy all over the
world.
United Kingdom
The bald statement in the 1971 Defence Estimates that
"Work continues on the design of a through-deck cruiser"
was hardly calculated to inspire credibility in the fashioning
of the Royal Navy of the 1970s, to encourage those in the
Fleet Air Arm to perfect their skill in those incredibly efficient
dual-element machines Ark Royal and Eagle, or to aid
recruiting.
With a change of Government it seems likely that Ark
Royal will continue in service until the end of the decade
and that Eagle will not now disappear from the naval scene
until her economical life is expended. In which case,
providing the so-called "through-deck cruiser" is completed
and in operational service by 1980, the viability of the Fleet
Air Arm would be assured in continuity.
From the first picture impression, (see this edition, page
343) the new through-deck cruiser appears to be quite an
aircraft carrier in its own right, capable of operating vertical
and short take off fixed wing aircraft as well as helicopters.
"What's in a name? That which we call a rose By any
other name . . . "
In this particular case there is quite a lot in a name.
Had it been generally known at the time of the great Fleet
Air Arm controversy, when the late Government was
cutting down Britain's aircraft carriers right and left under
the expedient euphemism of "phasing out", that the new
through-deck cruisers, of which three are- envisaged
eventually, were going to be so viable for operating aircraft
it would have been realised that it was in the nation's
interests to maintain at parity, or even above par, the
recruitment of pilots and aircrew into the Royal Navy, thus
ensuring a continuity of training and expertise right through
from the passing of the great angled-deck carriers to the
advent of the smaller through-deck, aircraft-carrying
cruisers.
Smaller or not, however, the new style cruiser-carrier
does not appear to be any the less complex or cheaper,
judging by the time it is taking to get it off the drawing
board and the figures mentioned as being the likely eventual
cost. [50,000,000 was the estimate for the projected
fixed-wing aircraft carrier CVA 01 which was cancelled a
few years ago on the grounds of economy, but the first
through-deck cruiser will probably give no change from
that. The constant fear of the Royal Navy is that it will
price itself out of existence.
Perhaps it could be forgiven if the question were posed
as to why the "thing", as it has been both bitterly and
affectionately called, has to be so costly. A few years ago,
the Americans wanted a class of ships quickly "in the
vertical envelopment concept" to support the Marine Corps.
The US naval architects simply took a wall-sided mercantile
hull of the C 2 type, virtually an oblong steel box sharpened
at one end and faired-off at the other, and fitted in all the
offices and shops required to operate and maintain heli-
copters around this platform which of its own nature
provided the large hangar in its belly for the stowage and
servicing of helicopters and the long flat top for a flight
deck. The resulting first "amphibious assault ship",
essentially a helicopter carrier, but a potential take-off-and-
landing strip for vertical fixed-wing aircraft, was the Iwo
Jima, built for only $40,000.000/f16,000,000, less than
the cost of a modern British destroyer. Six more ships
of the class have been built since in an average time of
only two years. So it can indeed be said that the USA
got its amphibious/helicopter carrier squadron cheaply and
quickly. Yet it serves the purpose. That splendid acrobatic
flying machine, the Harrier, capable of hovering, lifting and
dropping vertically,' and crabbing sideways, could be
operated from simple ships of this type as well as helicopters,
And the flight deck is ample for a short take-off to save
fuel and boost the payload.
It is greatly to be trusted that the three through-deck
cruisers will materialise and rot only for strategic and
tactical reasons. There is a lot in prestige. Prestige is
power, and power is a deterr:nt, the last stop deterrent
before the nuclear one. But there is little prestige in an
entirely small ship navy, desirable though smaller and
cheaper ships are in many ways. There must be the
leaven of the capital ship whatever form it may take. When
Britain ceases to have big ships she will have lost face for '
ever and she will have no voice at the conference table.
Of the few big ships remaining in the Royal Navy; the
former fixed wing aircraft carrier Hermes (Britain's youngest
carrier, completed only eleven years ago) is being converted
into a commando ship/helicopter carrier; and the conven-
tional cruiser Tiger's conversion to a comment-lenient
helicopter ship is nearing completion, but the conversion
of her sister ship Lion has been cancelled.
The fixed-'wing aircraft carrier Centaur, only fifteen years
old, and originally a sister ship of Hermes, is regrettably
being scrapped: the question could logically be posed why
she is not also being converted into a commando ship/
helicopter carrier (for A/bion and Bulwark have now been
running almost continually for a decade or so and must
eventually be retired) or at least into some form of amphibious
ship combined with a vertical take-off interim role, until
the new through-deck cruisers materialise.
The last two of the class of eight "County" class guided
missile armed destroyers, Antrim and Norfolk have been
completed, and Bristol, the only guided missile armed
destroyer of her type, is nearing completion. The first of
a new class of guided missile armed destroyers, Sheffield,
has been launched.
Work continues on the design of a new class of general
purpose frigates, the "Type 22". The last two of the 26
very successful general purpose frigates of the "Leander"
class, Apollo and Afiadne, are being completed. The
first of the new "Type 21" frigates, Amazon has been
launched.
In the underwater field, the fifth and sixth nuclear-
powered fleet submarines, Conqueror and Courageous are
being accepted from the builders; the seventh, eighth and
ninth, Swiltsure, Sovereign and Superb, are under con- .
struction; and the tenth is being ordered. But a matter
of concern is that the number of submarines being produced
is not nearly keeping pace with the number being scrapped.
The "T" class diesel-powered submarines have gone, even
though 13 were reconstructed and converted in recent
years, and only a handful of the 16 "A" class conventional
submarines remain in service.
So the backbone of the Royal Navy's submarine patrol
service, apart from deterrent and strategic considerations,
are the 21 diesel powered boats of the "Oberon" and
"Porpoise" classes. The need is clearly pointed for the
urgent building of more medium siaed diesel-electric boats
of about 1,000 tons for normal operational patrol, fleet
exercises and .routine training.
Raymond V. B. Blackman
Ut
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IP
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS
July 31, 1971
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY KISSINGER
FROM: JON M. HUNTSMAN
SUBJECT: Soviet First Strike Capabilities
The following report appeared in the July 30, 1971 News Summary:
"Executive Privilege continues to be a subject of debate
on the Hill, with Rusk favoring it --- with Harriman
wanting to know more about China! and with the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee (Kalb) voting no foreign
aid until they get a secret DOD report.
Again, Jane's Fighting Ships --- and the Soviet
'buildup makes the nets.. This time, CBS notes that
Jane's says that the soviets by mid-seventies could wipe
out our land-based deterrent in a first-strike. Then
comes report on the Northern Flank of NATO, where
Soviets have turned the North Sea "into a Soviet Lake."
Alarming report on the networks, which says while US
is watching Soviet thrust into the Med, no one seems to be
paying great attention to the North and Baltic seas where
Soviets dominate and nary a NATO vessel seems in sight.
It was requested that you get the answer to this.
Please submit your report to the office of the staff secretary.
Thank you.
cc: H. R. Haldeman
A. Butterfield
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