MEETING OF THE INTER-AGENCY AD HOC GROUP ON LAOS, JANUARY 6

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-174-2-1-5
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 7, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

? No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/07/31 : LOC-HAK-174-2-1-5
MEMORANDUM'
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH IN G TON
AC TION
SECRET/SENSITIVE January 7, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSTf\T
FROM: John H. Holdridge
SUBJECT: Meeting of the Inter-Agency Ad Hoc Group on Laos,
January 6
The Laos Group.held a somewhat truncated meeting on Tuesday in
order to comply with Our instruction that all major policy matters
be handled exclusively by the 303 Group.
6/93
The Laos Group did agree to draft a short statement of the assump-
tions as to US policy on which it would base its thinking in specific
cases. This will of course come up to the 303 Committee or whatever
group takes over responsibility for major decisions on Laos.
The Group also agreed to draft the terms for a SNIE on Communist
intentions and interpretations of our motives. It was agreed that the
issue will be put to you as to whether to request such a SNIE.
There was an intelligence briefing which brought out the following
points of interest:
NSS Review Completed.
-- Enemy Capabilities. It is assumed that the enemy can
take the Plaine des Jarres. It was also noted that if he
chooses, he can probably wear down Vang Pao's guerrilla
forces through attrition, since there are only 8, 000 Meo
under arms and they have already tapped young boys down
to 13-15 years of age.
-- The 'Chinese Road. There is no surveying beyond Muong
Houn, and no sign that the Chinese plan to carry the road to
the Mekong in the immediate future. Souvanna has twice
mentioned privately that he is not much concerned if the road
stops at Muong Houn. The Chinese are keeping a very "low
profile" in north Laos, and are not engaged in the adminis-
tration as are the North Vietnamese. CIA thinks that the
insurgency in north and northeast Thailand would not really
cvrip t"r'lq.PT?TTT'TATV`
? No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/07/31 : LOC-HAK-174-2-1-5
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/07/31 : LOC-HAK-174-2-1-5
IP
SECRET/SENSITIVE -2-
require the road for logistic support unless they were operating
at more than twice their present level. (COMMENT: The
Communists need road communications in north Laos. We
should avoid automatically assuming that road construction is
intended to change the game dramatically. There is always a
danger of escalating by over-reading the other side's signals.
For example, the RLG is building a road to Vang Pao's base,
which could seem as ominous in Communist eyes as the
"Chinese road" does in ours.)
? The Laos/North Vietnam Boundary. Last week, we had
asked for a study of the border in connection with the pro-
posed strikes within the 10 mile buffer zone. Research shows
no evidence that the Vietnamese disagree with the standard
border demarcation in north Laos, the only evidence to the
contrary being one very imprecise and small scale map
captured in 1964.
11 think that it would be useful if upon your return you could find time to
discuss-the Laos decision-making process with State (presumably
'Alex Johnson and Jonathan Moore). Some guidance clearly is needed
as to what if any mandate the Laos Group now has.
My own feeling is that the Group has gotten off, to a good start, and that
for the first time we in Washington, and particularly in the White House,
are getting a hand on the real decisions which will determine the future
:of our role in Laos. There is some reason to address these problems
- at the level represented in the Laos Group, simply because it can
devote more time to the issues than a more senior group such as the
303 Com-mittee. While the decisions would still be left to higher
authority, it can bring intelligence resources to bear, refine proposals,
and generally clarify the issues to be sent to the senior group.
You have expressed concern about widening the circle of those with
knowledge of Laos operations. I assume that this is the reason yDu do
not want the Laos Group to consider operational proposals. You should
be aware that Jonathan Moore has been very much aware of this danger.
On operational issues, the meeting is restricted to a core of five or six
persons, all with a legitimate need-to-know.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you authorize us to set up an appointment for U. Alexis Johnson to
discuss the role of the Laos Group with you.
- ?
ApproveDisapprove/ S70
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/07/31 : LOC-HAK-174-2-1-5