LAOS OPERATIONS: MEETING WITH MR. HELMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-17-6-19-6
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: October 27, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
October 27, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
DR. KISSINGER
RICHARD T. KENNEDY
Laos Operations: Meeting with
Mr. Helms
You are scheduled to meet with Director Helms on October 29, 1971,
concerning Senator Stennis' proposals regarding funding and manage..
ment of paramilitary operations in Laos. You wanted to position
Mr. Helms before talking with Senator Stennis (Tab D).
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You will recall that on September 2 Senator Stennis wrote to the
President saying that he could not support any further funding with
respect to Laos as part of the CIA
Director Helms wrote to you on September 20 (Tab. B) in connection with
the Senator's letter, stating that he believed it would be difficult, if not
impossible, for the CIA to continue its current role in Laos indefinitely.
, He is concerned that Senator Stennis wants the CIA to get out because
continued CIA involvement could (1) jeopardize the authority for engaging
in paramilitary activities in the future and (2) expose CIA to increasing
Congressional scrutiny. 25X1
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Director Helms believes that Stennis would agree to continued CIA
executive management of the irregular program only as an interim
measure and providing that an eventual, and probably early, orderly
transfer of the CIA operational role in Laos was contemplated. Stennis
reportedly has conveyed this impression in discussions with-CIA
25X1 representatives.
At a small Ad Hoc Group meeting on October 19, 1971, Defense agreed
provided that CIA would
25X1 continue to manage the operations. CIA (Gen. Cushman) agreed to this
but emphasized the need to look to a longer-term solution getting the
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rztfrmd
s re s
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This shift meets Senator Stennis' immediate
concern. Because it would be disruptive and detrimental to our effort
in Laos at the very time we are winding down elsewhere in Southeast
Asia, however, we want to avoid a shift in the operational responsibility
for now.
You will want to get Mr. Helms firmly behind the agreement to continue
CIA responsibility is
shifted to Defense as a precedent to your later meeting with Senator
Stennis.
Talking points are at Tab A.
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SECRET IIP ler
TALKING POINTS
HAK Meeting with Mr. Helms
on
Laos Aid: Management, Funding, and Stennis Letter
Defense has agreed to take over all funding
in Laos starting with FY 1973.
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--This meets Stennis' immediate concern.
--_However, at this time when we are winding down our operations
? in-Southeast Asia and withdrawing our men, any major change
in managing Laotian operations would be unnecessarily and
undesirably disruptive.
We will have to look to a long-term solution but clearly this is a
particularly critical juncture for all our operations in Southeast Asia.
-- If there were any implication publicly or in the Congress that
we were looking at major changes, there would be strong
pressures for an immediate, possibly ill-considered, shift.
We now have an on-going program with close working
relationships of several years standing. This is an important
asset. As Director Helms has pointed out in the past, the
program is effective with a minimum of direct U.S. involvement
in Laos.
-- It has been suggested all the CIA people could be seconded to
DOD.
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-- But this would appear to Congress as only cosmetics
and could cause more problems with credibility.
-- Giving DOD full management now could increase its
visibility in Laos and could cause pressures to beef up
the organization. Moreover, it would raise the problem
of the Geneva accords the very reason the CIA
program was set up in the beginning.
- Another possibility would be to turn over the CIA role to the
are not prepared to fill that role and
could not be in any reasonable time-frame.
? A complete reorganization and reorientation of all the forces
involved is another alternative.
But that would require a long preparatory period and a
long time to carry out.
Therefore, you believe management should remain with CIA
certainly for now.
(You will discuss these matters with Stennis along the foregoing lines,
but you want to have Helms' full views and support before you talk to
the Senator.)
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CLWRAL. INTELLIGENCE AGENalF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
20 September 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT:
? Senator Stennis' Letter to the President
of 2 September 19 71 on CIA's Role in Laos
1. In response to requests from your Staff for comment
on Senator Stennis' letter, it is important first to understand the
background of the Senator's concern as it relates to his ability to
protect the security of the Agency's budget and operations in the
Congress.
2. The attached memorandum (Tab A) recounts the
consistent opposition of key members of the Congress to Agency
funding of and participation in paramilitary programs of the scope
of the Laos operation. There is also concern, as noted in Senator
Stennis' letter, that the problems arising from the Agency's
involvement in Laos will jeopardize what the Senator refers to
as its "primary function" of collecting and evaluating intelligence.
3. In response to the direction of higher authority we have
continued our executive role in the Laos operations, but I believe in
the light of the concerns expressed in Senator Stennis' letter it will
. be difficult, if not impossible, for us to continue in this role
indefinitely. Those key committees on whom we depend for our
appropriations and our protection from damaging public exposure
and political debate appear firmly committed to the proposition
that they cannot support the continuedl
ULaos-type operations. In addition, it appears
extremely doubtful that they will long countenance the Agency's
conduct of such operations
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4. It is increasingly clear that the longer the Agency stays
in.the Laos operation, the more likely it is that the Congress will
be inspired to introduce legislation designed to limit the capacity
of the Agency and the Administration to undertake covert para-
military operations. So far the several bills introduced in the
Congress to impose restrictions partici-
pation of the Agency in paramilitary operations have been defeated
or are pending. It is unlikely that we can rest with any assurance
on the proposition that such legislation in the future will be defeated,
particularly lithe opposition to it is not wholeheartedly supported by
?the members of our oversight committees. ?
5. Under these circumstances, your Staff has asked for
our View on other possible ways of handling the Agency's paramilitary
role in Laos. In Tab B we outline three possible alternatives. In
brief they are:
It is doubtful
that Senator Stennis could be persuaded to agree to the
Agency retaining the executive responsibility on other
?than an interim basis short of a direct appeal to him
by the President. Even viere such an appeal made,
based on his statements to date, there seems little
likelihood that he would agree to our retaining the
executive role beyond the time necessary to insure
an orderly transfer. ?
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b. Transfer executive responsibility for
the conduct of the irregular paramilitary program
.to the Department of Defense during the course of
FY 1973. We wouad, of course; be prepared to
provide experienced personnel to assist the DOD
in assuming this responsibility.
c. Continue funding the irregular program
at approximately present levels but meld it into the
existing military assistance program in support of
the regular Lao Army and turn over to the
Lao the advisory role now played by CIA personnel.
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6. We recognize that these last two options will not be 25X1
warmly endorsed by the Departments of State and Defense but they
seem to us the realistic alternatives to abandoning the 25X1
25X1-7,ao irregular programs. I suggest that a detailed review o 25X1
these options should be undertaken by an ad hoc interagency group
to be appointed by you to come up with specific recommendations
as to how this complex matter can best be resolved. Through the
years', I have been able to persuade our oversight committees that
our current procedures were really the best with which to carry
on the paramilitary operation in Laos. With the visibility recently
given to these operationsihowever, I do not think they will accept
this position any longer.
Richard Helms
Director
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MEMORANDUM
TAB A
17 September 1971
? SUBJECT: Congressional Attitude Toward CIA
Major Paramilitary Activities
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? 1. For many years the attitudes of the .current Chairmen
of the Agency's subcommittees, including their predecessors,
were that the Agency's budget should remain as small as possible.
There have been expressions that the larger the budget the more
difficult for the subcommittee chairmen to deal with members of
the full committees and the Houses of the-Congress as a whole.
This difficulty existed not only in the Appropriations
? but also in the Armed Services Committees, since a considerable
portion of the Agency's budget was in accounts in the annual
? Etepartment of Defense Authorization Act. Specifically, when
programs begun and managed by CIA became too large and visible,
? our Subcommittees have urged that program responsibility as well
as funding be dropped by the Agency and picked up by Defense. This
memorandum will review four programs in which this problem has
arisen--Rural Development Cadre? (RDC), SWITCHBACK, MACSOG,
and operations in Laos.
Z. RDC - A project for developing Vietnamese teams to
carry out social, medical, and economic improvements in South
Vietnam's rural areas.
a. During early and mid4966, questions were
beginning to be raised by Agency congressional sub-
committees about continued CIA budgeting and responsi-
bility for the RDC program. At meetings with the Agency
rir.lr
? Lit:u1;f:
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on 21 and 22 September, the subject was discussed by
the Senate Armed Services and Senate Appropriations
Subcommittees. Senator Russell specifically stated
that he hoped the Agency could get out of the RDC
program in view of its planned expansion.
b. In a 6 April 1967 letter to the Bureau of the
Budget, signed by George Mahon, Chairman, House
Appropriations Committee, and Carl Hayden, Chair-
man, Senate Appropriations Committee, concern was
expressed about funds for the RDC program and the
fact that they were in the Agency's regular budget.
The letter pointed out it was difficult to handle funds
for this open program as a classified budget item.
The letter then requested that consideration be given
to an alternative method of funding for FY 1968.
c. The Chairman of the House Appropriations
Committee, Mr. Mahon, by letter dated 9 June 1967
to Senator Hayden, Chairman of the Senate Appropri-
ations Committee, reduced the Agency's budget by
allowing only sufficient funds for three-quarters of
the fiscal year. The Agency was advised that the
intent of this reduction was that the Agency should be
relieved of the funding for this program as of the
beginning of the fourth quarter of 1968 and there would
be no funding through the Agency thereafter. It specif-
ically pointed out that this was not intended as a cut in
? the program level; it was a means to force the Executive
? Branch's hand. The Senate Appropriations Committee
later concurred in the House action.
d. Agency funding ceased at the beginning of the
fourth quarter of FY 1968, but the Department .of
Defense requested assistance
funds for an interim period while it attempted to resolve
certain procedural aspects. The Agency agreed to this
for the final quarter of FY 1968.
3. SWITCHBACK - Organization, direction, and funding
of Citizens Irregular Defense Groups in South Vietnam.
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ZCCUL:1
MACSOG - A joint MACV/CIA task force to manage
GVN paramilitary and psychological warfare operations against
North Vietnam.
a. In the course of working with the staff People
of the Appropriations Committees in resolving the RDC
funding, the staff had made it clear that it expected the
Department of Defense to apply similar principles to
relieve the Agency from funding assistance for SWITCH-
BACK and MACSOG. The Committees, during the last
? half of 1969, continued to press for removal of the
? Agency from its role as a funding channel for the
SWITCHBACK and MACSOG programs. It was deter-
mined in January 1970 that immediate actions could be
taken looking toward turnover from the Agency to the
Department of Defense of the logistics aspects of SWITCH-
BACK which were being funded through Agency channels.
Target date was set for turnover of the remainder of the
fiscal aspects by 30 June 1970.
b. In May 1970 the Department of Defense formally
requested that the Agency continue to act as a channel for
Department of Defense funds for an additional six months,
that is until the end of calendar 1970 since plans were
then firm to phase down all aspects of the program.
The Agency concurred in this request. In the meantime,
however, the logistics funding aspects were completed
and the Agency phased out as of 1 July 1970.
c. During this same period, conferences were being
held with the Navy, which had responsibility for the
MACSOG program, and agreements were reached that
the Navy could take over the handling ofthe funding
aspects. Although Navy had budgeted for this program,
the Agency was being utilized as a funding channel. As
of 1 July 1970, the Agency was relieved of its role in the
MACSOG program.
a. As the Agency's role in Laos and Southeast Asia
" began to gain some visibility during 1970, there were
informal indications as early as February that the Senate
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Appropriations Committee might well direct the Agency
-- -to-phase-out of certain paramilita.ry programs.
On 14- July
1970, Representative Mahon said he "agreed 100 percent
?with-Senator Russell's position on_Agency funding of opera-
tions in Southeast Asia."
b. Throughout the remainder of 1970 and 1971,
there were continued expressions of concern from our
subcommittees concerning Agency fundir. of ars.-
rnilitar rams in Southeast Asia.
explaining further-tcrthe-Ag-ency his position,
on 14 September 1971 Senator Stennis expressed his view
he was unalterably opposed to any- funding. crurn-.
the Agency's budget after FY 1972 and that as far as other-
aspects of the Agency involvement were concerned lie
realized this could not be done overnight but he thought
it had to be done as soon as practicable. It was his opinion
that the Congress simply will not tolerate continued use
of the Agency's special authorities in this manner,,which
an. increasing number of Congressmen regard as circum-
venting the will of the Congress.
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TAB B
- 17 September 1971
Options to CIA Management of the Irregular Program in Laos
Background. Since 1961 irregular forces have assisted the regular Lao
Army to resist Communist encroachment. These irregulars have been
given support and guidance by the Central Intelligence Agency as the
executive agency for the United States Government. The program
started with the use of hill tribes, primarily Meo under General
yang Pao, and expanded to include lowland Lao.
The Ambassador has exercised overall United States policy
control of the program.
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f'1%-"?."?r-41
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In the broadest terms we see the following as the principal
options. These options are not mutually exclusive in that adoption
of Option II could well lead to Option III. We assume the continuation'
of U.S. tactical air support in the case of all Options.
'Discussion.. This option requires the least change from the status quo.
Executive responsibility remains the same. However, all support costs
would be made public and provided from one source.
? 2
Pros:
L This option has the advantage of continuing a successful
system of managing the irregular program in Laos, i.e., CIA
continues to handle day-to-day support and guidance in-country.
2. This option also meets Senator Stennis' first concern,
? i.e. ?removing irregular program expenses from the CIA budget.
Cons:
1. This option continues the CIA as the executive agency for
this program. This does not meet Senator Stennis' firmly stated desire
to remove the Agency from this role, as soon as feasible. It also risks
Congressional action to limit the capability of the Agency and the
Administration to conduct covert paramilitary operations in the
future, and could jeopardize Congressional support for other primary
Agency functions.
2. The budget, the program and the Agency's administration
of the\program would be subject to Congressional scrutiny outside the
CIA oversight committees and could lead to future exposure of Agency
techniques and personnel.
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Option II: Transfer the CIA executive role to
CIA will contribute personnel to DOD to
assist in the transition.
Discussion.. This would remove CIA from the war in Laos. The EKID,
would replace it as the executive agency under the Ambassador.. The
budget would become a separate line item in the DOD budget. open, ta,
the public view, with the advantages and disadvantages inherent ihi
that method of funding the program. Management of the program
would require additional military personnel in Laos, in deaance of
the Geneva Accords. Alternatively it could be done with civilian
officers including retired military officers.
Pros:
1. This option meets Senator Stennis' objection. lit remevew
money for the Laos irregulars from the Agency's budget It ramovem
the Agency from management of the program.
2. This option simplifies the command and control structu
or-U;S.' krinitary support to the Royal Lao Government.
? ?
3. Assumption by DOD of guidance to the irregular program.
introduces military training and experience into what has become a
largely conventional, positional warfare situation for the irregular units..
Cons:
1. This option would increase the U. S. military presence in.
? Laos in violation of the Geneva Accords. This could be partially
circumvented by use of TDY officers from outside Laos, as is now
done in advising the Regular Lao Army, by the assignment of some
CIA officers under U. S. military control, or by the use of genuinely,
or ostensibly retired U. S. military officers.
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OUTSIDE THE SYSTEM
ACTION
October 20, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: BMNRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: =CHARD T. KENNEDY
SUBJECT: senator Stennis Letter on Laos
-Background
You will recall that an September 2, Senator Stennis wrote to the President
advising him that he could not support any further funding with respect to
Laos as part of the CIA Ludget., (Tab A) He urged that other funding alter-
natives be considered.
On September 20, Director Helms wrote to you in connection with the
Senator's letter stating he believed it would be difficult if not impossible
for the CIA to continue its current role in Laos indefinitely. He suggested
three alternatives to current handing and management of the irregular
program:
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The Issue
"The issue here is CIA's role Laos and the effect itexpostire hai had
on funding of the Agency's worId-wide operations.
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Stennis apparently wants to be helpful but needs ammunition to put down
some of his colleagues who are demanding that the entire CIA budget be
revealed and debated and that CIA's authority to engage in-paramilitary
operations be terminated or severely restricted. Thus ;itennis focuses
on the funding question in his letter to the President, presumably because
if funding were shifted to DOD, then Stennis would be armed to tell the
critics that the Laos operation is no reason to expose the CIA budget
since all that is paid for by DOD anyway. He does not raise the manage-
ment issue in a concrete way in his letter to the President; but only
alludes to it by noting that criticism of the Laos operation jeopardizes
the Agency's intelligence program.
Director Helms believes that Stennis would agree to continued CIA
executive management of the irregular program only as an interim measure
and providing that an eventual, and probably early, orderly transfer of
the CIA operational role in Laos was contemplated. Stennis reportedly
has conveyed this impression in discussions with CIA representatives.
Director Helms, in suggesting alternative organizational arrangements
designed to take CIA out of the executive management role is prompted by
legitimate concerns for his agency's world-wide operations. But though
Stermis may eventually take this position beyond FY-73, he hasn't pushed
hard on this yet, at least formally. Moreover1 there are.good reasons
relating to our Laos policy for our not precipitating this eventuality any
sooner, than necessary, principally because the present system of operation
seems to be the most effective available.
Steps Taken Thus Far
You earlier agreed to meet with Senator Stennis on this issue but you
wanted to "position Helms first".
/ chaired a meeting of a small ad hoc group on October 19 comprising
representatives of the agencies concerned, including Fred Buzardt, Ken
Darn and General Cushman to explore the funding and organizational alterna-
tives.
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The following was agreed:
General Cushman, however, emphasized CIA's belief that Stennis really
wants CIA out of the management of this program as well. Cushman, there-
fore, said the Agency looks forward to the day when management, as well
as funding, shifts to another government department, although CIA stands
ready to continue to provide personnel to staff the program under any such
management. We will work out some options for such a future transfer
but believe we should riot snrface such ootions now. The mere discussion
of them could generate pressure for an immediate shift.
Next Steps
Now that the necessary preparatory work has been done. I recommend that
25X1 you meet urgently with Helms to firm-up the consensus described above,
namely:
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You will discuss these matters with Stennis along the foregoing lines.
Once you have talked to Helms, then the ground will have been laid for
your approach to Stennis immediately thereafter.
After that is done, and depending on the reaction you get from him, you can
decide whether a formal reply to Stennis' letter is also required.
JOhn Lehman concurs.
Recommendation:
: .That you meet..with1ms and 51:enni3 along the 'inee. of. the E.: cen-ario outlinc.ti
? above.... I am prepared to brief you if you cleith.e?anci Will prepare tal:;:ing ?
meeting.
Approve Other
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Authorizalioci whEcti. Encludes a portion of the authorization for
funding United : States erations in Laos. Moreover, as you know, for
a number of years the emntral Intelligence Agency-al o has funded a
portion of U. S, wiragrams:iin Lacks.'
I strongly defended the budget requests,for.Laos for fiscal year
1972 and the full! requist was approved by the Committee. 1 have con4
chided, however, that for the CIA to continue funding any portion of
.the Laos operation after fiscal year 1972 would be a serious mistake
'and possibly jeopardize tha success with which the CIA carries out its
other wortd-wide functiions..
The CIA invoEvement En. Laos is now a matter of public knowledge.
Moreover, as you kaaw, the U. S. programs in Laos have become an issue
iwithin the Senate whi,ch will doubtless be raised by floor amendments.
These consideratlions nawm led to demands that all the CIA budget be
revealed and 4ebate4. Titim Laos_ matter therefore adds to the difficulty
In protecting the CM Wwdget against demands for greater disclosure.
There. is tho flimmE annsiderdlion of iho fact that thr; primar/
purpot.?2 434 flit, Nqmnacy crillorA !he
Laos program serums tm jjeepardize thin primary funciion due to -I-1e
crificiSa of its invaiwoment in the Leon operation.
I am writing maw' tm advise you that I cannot support any further
funding with respect to Laos as a part of tho CIA budget for fiscal
year 1973. 1 urge that other funding alternatives be considered in
connection with the formation of the fiscal year 1973 CIA budget.
This iettor Es vrEtten to ypit., directly because of the serious
nature of this matter and the interagency relationships involved.
(M0.5.1, re:-./pccAply yours,
\
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? ' ?
/
John C. $1:ennis
(
,ChairMan
Senate Armed Services Committee
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