LETTER TO HENRY KISSINGER FROM HAL SAUNDERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-161-7-21-2
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: May 14, 1976
• Content Type: LETTER

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF
INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
SECRET/NODIS
Mr. Secretary:
May 14, 1976
In preparation for your talk with
Ambassador Dinitz this afternoon, I want
to put back into your hands the last
memo which I sent to you on the subject
of Israeli settlements. Although it does
not reflect the latest Cabinet discussions,
I believe re-reading the first page and a
half and looking again at the three maps
at the end would be useful for two reasons:
The introduction establishes that
the Israelis have steadily con-
tinued to construct settlements
since the 1974 disengagement
agreements when you made such a
point of how the settlements on
the Golan would impede future
negotiations.
Hal Saunders
SECRET/NODIS
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The map on the last page answers
the question you asked in staff
meeting this morning about the
location of settlements in the
Sinai that already exist. As
you well recall, Fahmy has asked
you repeatedly to raise this with
the Israelis.
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BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
SECRET/NODIS
To The Secretary
Through: P -- Mr. Sisco
From INR -- Harold H. Saunders
December 24, 1975
Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories
The recent approval by the Israeli Government of
four new settlements on the Golan Heights, Fahmy's
continuing complaints about Israeli settlements in the
Gaza/Al-Arish area, recent unauthorized settlement
efforts on the West Bank by Israeli religious extrem-
ists, and Ambassador Toon's recent exchange with Rabin,
on instructions from you have prompted me to draw
together for you the overall picture from the latest
intelligence. I want you to have this picture as
background for your coming talks with Allan and Rabin.
The larger purpose of the memorandum, however, is
to put Israel's policy on settlements in the occupied
territory in the context of the negotiations. In
short, there are two points to be made:
--Since the 1974 disengagement agreements, the
Israelis have steadily continued to construct
settlements in the occupied areas. Some addi-
tional expenditures for repair and adjustments
for security were necessary as a result of the
October war, but basic policy has not changed.
The point of concern to you, of course, is that
even while the step-by-step process has con-
tinued, with the professed agreement of the
Israeli negotiating team, a policy on settlements
has continued unchanged that will make. successful
culmination of the. step-by-step process even
more difficult.
SECRET/NODIS
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2 -
-With regard to settlement policy in relation to
the negotiations, Israel has two choices if it
were to modify that policy: (a) Theoretically,
a decision could be made in the context of uni-
lateral or negotiated moves on the Golan or-on
the West Bank to close some existing settlements.
That would obviously be quite difficult politically
for the Israeli Government, especially if it could not
show significant Arab concessions. (b) Alter-
natively, the Israeli Government could make a policy
statement that there will be no new settlements or
further development of present settlements while
negotiations on an overall peace agreement are going
on. This would require a cabinet decision, and
opinion would be deeply divided even though the
decision would be to freeze--not to withdraw.
But such a decision could be an important demonstra-
tion to the Arabs that the US is serious in
pressing Israel eo create favorable conditions
for further negotiations. Therefore; this memo
describes what Israel is doing by way of establish-
ing settlements and takes a first cut at assessing
the nature of the opposition' Rabin would face if
.he attempted to stop the settlement process.
Israeli Policy Toward Settlements
On December 5, Rabin concisely restated his govern--
ment's policy toward settling the occupied lands;
"We favor settlements in places and in situations
that will serve our political goals. We are for
settlements--the more the better--on the Golan
Heights, along the Jordan River and in the Rafah
Approaches... [to strengthen] Israel's lines of
defense in time of war...."
Israeli settlement in the occupied territories con-
tinues to follow long-range plans elaborated by the World
Zionist Organization (WZO), approved by the Israeli
Cabinet, and coordinated with the Jewish National Fund,
Israeli political parties, and agricultural organizations.
The WZO's five-year plan for investing over $66 million
in Golan settlements, for example, to provide for about
3,000 settlers in 17 farming communities, 3 rural centers,
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and 2 tourist centers by the end of 1975 is nearing
completion, despite the disruption of the October 1973
war.
The pace at which the Israeli leadership has
expanded settlements in the occupied territories since
the 1967 war has been steady and continuous. The con-
struction of new settlements and their improvement are
the result of long-range plans, which are implemented
as personnel and financial resources become available.
Indeed, the deliberate pace of settlement construction
is dictated'principally by three major imperatives:
--the lack of volunteers, despite official
encouragement and tax incentives;
--periodic funding shortages; and
--limited water resources.
On the other hand, the Israeli Government is subject
to pressure from various political parties and movements--
as well as from its own convictions--to step up the pace
of settlement construction as a means of forestalling
further surrender of land on the Golan and in the Jordan
Valley, in particular.
Recognition of these attitudes and, more specifi-
cally, reaction to the Syrian success at the UN on
November 30 formed the immediate stimulus for,the cabinet
decision to accelerate the establishment of the four new
settlements on the Golan on December 2. But even this
decision does not represent more than an acceleration of
construction activities already underway. And the
December 7 pronouncement reaffirming the government's
tight rein on settlement policy and refusing to renounce
the use of force against unauthorized settlers makes
clear that the cabinet is trying to control the pace of
settlement.
Yet there are limits on how far the government can
resist domestic pressure on this issue. Rabin and Peres
felt constrained to conclude a "compromise" agreement
on December 8 with the religious-irredentist Gush Emunim
group, which had attempted to establish an unauthorized
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4 -
settlement at Sebastia on the West Bank. The government
permitted some settlers to remain at a nearby army camp
pending review of its overall settlement policy within
the next three months. As on similar occasions in the
past, the unauthorized settlers may thus in the end gain
the approval they are seeking, even though Rabin has
strongly attacked the Gush Emunim movement in recent
days.
The Settlements
A review of the status of Israeli settlements in
the occupied territories indicates how extensive they
have become.
Golan Heights (Map at Tab 1): At the time of the
May 1974 negotiations, you will recall that there were 18
settlements on the Golan. We have carefully monitored
Israeli activities since then.. After the disengagement
agreement:
--Construction began on two new settlements, which
had been planned previously, and temporary quarters
were set up at three additional sites. (Construc-
tion activity is Confined largely to the summer
months because of the severe winters on the Golan.)
--Housing and infrastructure at all of the 18 earlier
settlements have been improved.
--The four new. settlements approved on December 2
probably are destined to house some o;f the,"transient"
settlers currently at Keshet, Yonathan, and Aliya-70.
(The "transients" at Keshet are settlers who were
removed.from al-Qunaytirah at the time-of the dis-
engagement agreement. Aliya-70, which i.s inhabited
by Soviet immigrants, was approved several years ago,
but the house trailers were moved to the site late
this past summer. Yonathan was settled in August
1975.)
--Other sites showing pre-settlement activity have
been noted near Aliya-70, Gamla (Tel Bazuk), and
Nahal Geshur.
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.We currently estimate the number of Golan settlers
at 2,500, compared with about 1,500 in May 1974..
West Bank (Map at Tab 2): When we began looking
at the possibility of a Jordan-Israel disengagement
agreement in the spring of 1974, there were 18 Israeli
settlements on the West Bank, largely around Jerusalem
and along the Jordan River. Since then:
--Five new settlements were established near
Jerusalem between April and August of this year:
Ofra, Nahal Kohav Hashachar, Maale Adumim, Moshav
Elazar, and Nahal Tekoa.
--The facilities of most of the older settlements have
been improved.
We estimate the population of the West Bank settle-
ments at 2,400, compared with about 2,000 in the spring.
of 1974. Of these, about 1,000 are at Kiryat Arba near
Hebron, 500 in the Etzion Bloc southwest of Jerusalem,
800 in the Jordan Valley, and 100 at Mevo Horon in the'
Latrun Salient.
Although East Jerusalem is a special case in the
Arab-Israeli context, the Israelis have ringed Arab
Jerusalem with housing for 15,000 Jews.
Sinai and Gaza (Map at Tab 3): At the time of the
1973 war, there were 11 settlements in this area: four
settlements in the. Gaza Strip, four in northern Sinai,
and three in southern Sinai along the Gulfcof Aqaba.
Since August 1974:
--Seven new settlements have been identified in the
Gaza/Al Arish area. Construction of one of these---
Yamit--began before the 1973 war, but the settlers
did not move in until October 1975. The settlers
moved into three of the others in August 1974, and
three were settled in January 1975.
--In February this year, the Israelis announced their
intention to set up six new settlements in the
Rafah Approaches, area over the next six years.
Some of the clearing operations and tent camps
noted in that region could be related to those
settlements.
SECRET/NODIS
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The number of settlers in the Sinai is estimated
at 1,100, compared to about 750 two years ago. Of the
1,100, about 300 are in the southern settlements and
800 in the north. There are an estimated 200 in the
Gaza Strip.
Political Aspects of Israeli Settlements
Most of the Israeli settlements in the occupied areas
belong to, are supported by, and obtain settlers through
one of the collective or cooperative farm organizations.
These bodies, in turn, are usually affiliated with a
political party or faction. Moreover, most of the settle-
ments are linked to parties making up the government
coalition. As you know, the settlers' associations take
a harder line against withdrawal and in favor of consoli-
dating and expanding settlements than do their affiliated
parties.
Although the settlement movements could split from
the leadership of their parent parties on this issue, the
National Religious Party being a likely candidate for
this development, the following party-by-party analysis
assumes that party discipline would be maintained.
Mapam: This most dovish of the coalition parties has
long held that its settlements (two on the Golan) will not
be an obstacle to withdrawal in the context of a final
settlement. Its kibbutz affiliate, however, called as
recently as last October for the creation of a third kib-
butz in Golan. Nonetheless, Mapam probably would support
Rabin on a construction moratorium. C 4
Labor Party: The Labor Party's affiliated settlements
are generally situated in the area where-the-party's
"Oral Torah" platform called for a permanent Israeli pres-
ence, i.e., the Jordan Valley, the Rafah Approaches and
the Gulf of Aqaba in Sinai, the Gaza Strip, and strategic
portions of Golan. The Achdut Haavoda faction of the
party, to which Allon and Galili belong, has within its
kibbutz wing some of the most strident proponents of
"creating facts" in the occupied lands. Galili might split
with Allon and oppose a proposal calling for a settlement
moratorium.
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The ranks of the larger Mapai faction of the party,
to which Rabin, Barlev,.Rabinowitz, and Ofer belong,
contain the full range of Israeli opinion on settlements.
Despite some strong opposition to a moratorium from many
Mapai kibbutzniks and hardliners, a majority of Mapai's
leadership probably would support Rabin in a call for
a moratorium, provided that Rabin could advance compell-
ing arguments why it would be'in Israel's immediate best
interests to do so.
The Rafi faction of Peres and Yaacobi would oppose
a moratorium.
Independent Labor Party (ILP): ILP ministers Kol
and Hausner probably would support Rabin in a call for..
a construction.moratorium, though this is not certain.
National Religious Party (NRP): The NRP's three
ministers probably would oppose a construction moratorium,
especially on the West Bank. The NRP and the smaller
opposition orthodox party, Agudat Israel, both assert
that this area, as part of Eratz Israel, must be taken
over.
Likud: The main opposition bloc, Likud, would
strongly oppose a construction moratorium. Indeed, Likud
argues for an..accelerated program of settlement construc-
tion in all the occupied areas.
On balance, a majority of the cabinet might well
oppose a moratorium on the establishment of new settle-
ments. Most ministers tend to view settlements as an
important means of putting pressure on the Arab states to
come to terms. Moreover, since most Israeli leaders have
become convinced that world opinion, including that of
the US, is increasingly unsympathetic with Israeli policy,
they tend to take.a particularly hard line whenever they
perceive external pressure on this issue.
Even the generally dovish ILP is not immune to this
tendency. For example, Minister Without Portfolio Hausner
commented recently that the political considerations that
had previously dictated self-restraint in the creation
of new Golan settlements now dictated the establishment
of the four new Golan colonies as a "classic Zionist
response" to the November 30 UNSC resolution..
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g
In these circumstances, Israel's settlement policy
is unlikely to be changed unless Rabin personally becomes
convinced that a moratorium is necessary, either to
elicit a major Arab concession or to maintain close ties
with the US. Two developments could bring about this
change in Rabin's attitude:
--Indications that, say, Syria is prepared to enter
into a second Golan agreement and to make con-
cessions in that context that would clearly justify
the moratorium.
--The active opposition of the US to Israel's present
settlement policy. Israel is dependent. upon the
good will of the US for the financial resources
that support Israel's economy and--at least
indirectly--the establishment of settlements, both
through the tax-free contributions of American
Jewry and the official assistance.that the US pro-
vides for the assimilation of Soviet immigrants.
These funds enable Israel to divert its own
resources to settlement projects. The money,
itself, however, is. less crucial to Israel than the
US posture toward the government's settlement
policy.
Clearly,,any attempt by Rabin to put into effect a
moratorium would generate a major political crisis in
Israel, and perhaps lead to splits in the coalition. A
question we are analyzing for you separately is what such
a crisis might look, like and how it would affect negoti-
ations. Such an Israeli move by itself would not induce
significant Arab concessions since the Arabs feel Israel
is in the wrong; any gains for Israel would have to be
in the context of getting negotiations started again and
what Israel might expect to gain there. At the outset,
it is the US position alone that would have any possibility
of inducing Rabin to press his colleagues for a change in
Israel's settlement policy. If we were to take a strong
stand or publicize our position on this issue, Rabin
would have two choices: (1) he could try to build sup-
port for going along, or (2) he could decide to resist.
our pressure, perhaps by forming a national unity govern-
ment. He might well perceive that a row with us over
settlements would: (a) rally Israelis more firmly around
him (the majority favor more settlements), and, more
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9
important, (b) deflect attention from the, issue that is
now on the front burner and about which Israelis are
most divided--the Palestinian issue.
In short, any proposal on this issue will generate
political opposition in Israel. However, in the choice
among'alternatives, the US would be on sound ground in
urging a freeze on new activities. Within Israel it is
the US position alone which has any possibility of
inducing a change in the Israeli posture.
Attachments:
Tab 1 - Israeli Settlements on the Golan Heights (map).
Tab 2 -- Israeli Settlements on the West Bank (map).
Tab 3 - Israeli Settlements in the.Gaza and Sinai (map).
Drafted: INR/RNA:JPFreres;PHStoddard
x21888:12/24/75
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Israeli Settlements on the Golan Heights
,-P?esizmed new settle
ment
A Israeli Settlement
- - - Arrmst,ce Line July 20. 19491
UNDOF United Nations Disengagement
Observer Force
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