U.S. PRESSURE AGAINST ISRAEL SAID TO HAVE PEAKED
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
LOC-HAK-157-5-37-2
Release Decision:
RIFLIM
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date:
July 30, 2010
Sequence Number:
37
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 17, 1975
Content Type:
OPEN SOURCE
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
LOC-HAK-157-5-37-2.pdf | 111.93 KB |
Body:
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/30: LOC-HAK-157-5-37-2
.,
FBI S, 41
S. PRESSURE AGAINST ISRAEL SAID TO HAVE PEAKE
TA172125 TEL AVIV DAVAR IN HEBREW 17 APR 75 P 7 TA
THE AMERICAN PRESSURE EXERTED IN THE PAST 2 WEEKS IS NO LONGER
AT IT S PEAK. HOWEVER , THE DIFFICULTIES ST ILL EXIST. THE TAL KS
ON QUEST IONS OF ESSENT IAL ARMS SUPPLIES ARE ST ILL FROZEN THE
(YEHOSHUA' TADMOR ARTICLE: "THE PRESSURE HAS PASSED ITS PEAK")
(EXCERPTS) IF ONE CAN JUDGE FROM THE SIGNS FROM WASHINGTON,
WARNING REGARD ING AN EXPECTED CUT IN AID HAS NOT BEEN CANCELLED.
TOO FAR, T HAT THE VAR IOUS PRESSURES EXERTED HAVE RESULTED IN T00
SEffIOUS COUNTERREACT IONS, AND THAT IT IS NECESSARY NOW TO CALM
FEEL INGS, AND TO LOOK TO THE FUTURE.
AL SO THE ANGER IS ST ILL SIGNI FI CANT. BUT THE GENERAL TREND
DOES NOT I NO I CATE A FURT HER WOR SE NI NG I N RELATIONS, THERE ARE ALSO
CLEAR SIGNS T HAT THE HEADS OF THE ADMI NISTRAT ION, ESPECI ALL Y
PRE SIDENT FORD AND OTHER KEY MEN, EE-EL ,4, THEY WENT A, LITTLE
IN VIEW OF THESE FIRST SIGNS IT IS WORTH TRYING TO SEE
..-WHAT- KISSINGER AND PRESIDENT FORD ATTEMPTED TO GAIN FROM THE
POLICY "REASSESSMENT" WHICH WAS ENTIRELY DIRECTED AGAINST iSRAEL,,
IT IS CLEAR NOW T HAT THE INTENT ION WAS TO SEE WHETHER IT WOULD
BE POSSIBLE TO "SOFTEN"' ISRAEL IN ORDER TO TRY TO SAVE THE NEW
DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT WHICH KISSINIGER AND PRESIDENT FORD SO
ARDENTLY DESIRED INVIEW OF THE EVENTS iN SOUTHEAST ASIA, PORTUGAL,
TURKEY, AND GREECE. THE HEADS OF THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION
URGENTLY NEEDED A CONCRETE ACHIEVEMENT, WITHOUT GOING INTO THE
QUESTION OF WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FAILURE OF THE TALKS.
AS-SADAT WHO FELT T H I S , EXERTED PRESSURE, ENGAGED I N BLACKMAIL, AND
BROUGHT ABOUT THE BREAI?OWN OF THE TALKS. KISSINGER WHO HAS NO
LEVER OF PRESSURE AND INFLUENCE ON EGYPT, CHOSE TO PUT PRESSURE
ONLY ON ISRAEL, WITHOUT REAL IZ I NG THAT HE ALMOST WENT BEYOND THE
LIMIT.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/30: LOC-HAK-157-5-37-2
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/30: LOC-HAK-157-5-37-2
f
E
IN HIS ATTITUDE KISSINGER WAS CONSIDERING PRIMARILY THE MOOD
ON CAPITAL HILL. KISSINGER SIMPLY CONCLUDED THAT THE CONGRESS
WHICH HAD DISPLAYED INDIFFERENCE TOWARD WHAT WAS TAKING PLACE
IN SOUT'HEAST ASIA, AM HAD REFUSED TO ASSIST SOUTH VIETNAM AND
CAMBOD I A OR T O RE SUME A I D T O T UR KEY, WOULD SHOW THE SAME
ATT IT UD E TOWARD ISRAEL A S WELL. KI SS I NGER THOUGHT THAT PERHAPS
JERUSALEM WOULD SOON FEEL ITSELF DESERTED AND ISOLATED, AND WOULD
HASTEN TO MAKE ITS STAND MORE FLEXIBLE AND WOULD RUSH INTO AN
AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT--AN AGREEMENT WHICH KISSINGER CONSIDERS WITAL
TO ISRAEL. THE "REASSESSMENT" HAS ONLY SERVED AS A FRAMEWORK,
AND WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK PRESSURES WERE EXERTED AND THREATS
WERE MADE TO TURN OFF THE TAPS AS PART OF A PSYCHOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN
WHICH IS STILL GOING ON. HAD ISRAEL SHOWN ANY SIGN OF WEAKNESS
AND READINESS T O "RETREAT,,- THE NEW U.S. POLICY WOULD HAVE
RECEIVED NEW IMPETUS AND WOULD HAVE PROMOTED THE ADMINISTRATION
TO DEMAND A HASTY AND INADEQUATE PARTIAL SETTLEMENT FOR WHICH ISRAEL
WOULD HAVE HAD T O PAY THE FULL PRICE.
THE MOMENT THAT THE ONE-SIDED PRESSURE ON ISRAEL CEASES
THE PROSPECTS FOR A SETTLEMENT WILL IMPROVE IMMEASURABLY. T HI S
IS ONE FACT WHICH THE FOREIGN MINISTER WAS ASKED TO POINT OUT TO
KISSINGER. ANOTHER CLARIFICATION, WHICH IS NO LESS IMPORTANTp
IS Ir HIS: T4 , TAL..KS ARE NOT BEGI NNI NG AT THE POINT AT WHICH T HEY
WERE SUSPEI EO .... THIS MEANS THAT ISRAEL SHOULD NOT BE EXPECTED
TO CONTINUE TO MAKE CONCESSIONS SINCE IT HAD MADE MOST OF THE
CONCESSIONS. IT IS NOW EGYPT'S TURN TO SHOW READINESS AND FLEXIBILITY.
18 APR ) 6222 EE NB
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/30: LOC-HAK-157-5-37-2