INVOLVEMENT OF PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT LEADERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS TRADE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-15-2-25-5
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: July 23, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

Nw-f
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13:
MEMORANDUM
11(4 A
LOC-HAK-15-2-25-5
1.11 /
NATIONAL SECURITY C
T/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
DOS, DOJ, NSS,
Reviews Completed.
UNCIL
MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISS'
GER
z e,
IACTICI;\4
July 23, 19711
?vi 1 7 1
"1
FROM: ARNOLD AC HMANOFFP.--
SUBJECT:
Involvement of Panamanian Government
Leaders in the International Narcotics e
Trade
4 er---
<
As you know, there have been reports for some time that figures in thel
Panamanian Government are involved in the international narcotics traf-
fic. Information developed by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs (BNDD) over the past several months indicate that:
-- Panama is one of the major way-stations and clearing houses
in the international narcotics traffic, and perhaps the major
one in the Western Hemisphere.
A good many important figures both within and outside the
Panamanian Uovernment seem to be involved. There is informa-
tion indicating that General Torrijos (de facto ruler of Panama),
and many if not most of the top officers of the National Guard
(GN) are deeply involved. In fact, the National Guard as an insti-
tution apparently manages the drug traffic. In addition, there is
evidence that elements of the Panamanian diplomatic corps also
play a role in narcotics traffic and are abusing diplomatic privi-
leges to further it.,
General Torrijos is apparently aware of our knowledge about involvement
of members of his Government and perhaps even himself in international
narcotics traffic, and his awareness recently verged on panic following
the arrest in New York of the son of a Panamanian diplomat who has been
charged with smuggling 80 kilos of heroin into the US. This week
Torrijos sent the G-3 of the National Guard to the US to meet with State
and BNDD officials. He expressed his Government's concern with dis-
covery of the existence of the narcotics traffice in Panama., e-rfered
f /SENSITIVE /EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-15-2-25-5
25X6
25X6
t
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-15-2-25-5
SECRET/SENSIIIIE/EYES ONLY
whatever cooperation was needed to surpress this traffic, and requested
a high-level mission from BNDD to visit Panama to consider joint mea-
sures for controlling the traffic. The State Department and BNDD were
non-committal, but were careful to emphasize that we had a great deal
of information from many sources about the narcotics traffic in. Panama.
The importance of the narcotics traffic through Panama, and the extent
of official involvement, have obvious implications for both our narcotics
suppression strategy and for the current Panama Canal Negotiations.
Clearly we have two goals:
? Eliminating official involvement and support for the narcotics
traffic through Panama, and to the degree possible squeezing
it off.
Attaining our goals in Canal Treaty negotiations.
Properly handled, the information developed by BNDD could contribute
to achieving at least one and perhaps even both of these objectives. How-
ever, there is some risk that we could lose the advantage given us by the
information in our hands without making significant progress toward
either goals due to rnishandlinq nr 1r4(-1 nf rnrvrt-linatinn Ttlfrf rq -
handling could result in serious damage to one or both interests. Several
agencies are involved (principally State, BNDD and CIA). In addition,
the Congress is becoming concerned about Panama's role in the narcotics
traffic due to the arrest referred to above, and BNDD officials could be
called to testify. Even if testimony were in executive session, the net
result could be to blow the whole affair before we have a chance to use
the information either to protect our several interests or to forward them.
BNDD and State will probably agree to accept in principle the invitation
of the PJG to send a high level BNDD representative to Panama to con-
sult on the narcotics problem. However, before he actually departs, it
is important that we develop a coordinated scenario covering both his
tactics in dealing with the PJG and actions which we might take in conjunc-
tion with or following his visit designed to gain the greatest advantage
from the present situation without jeopardizing either our narcotics con-
trol or foreign policy interests. We should act quickly if we are to take
advantage of the situation, and unless we respond to Torrijos soon he may be
driven by his own insecurities to take precipitate action against our inter-
ests. To assure that this does not slip between the cracks, I have pre-
pared for your signature a directive to State, Justice, and CIA instructing
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-15-2-25-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-15-2-25-5
111,
SECRE T /SENSITIVE /EYES ONLY
them to prepare such a scenario, with options and agency differences
highlighted where appropriate, by July 31, 1971.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the directive to the Secretary of State, the Attorney
General and the Director of Central Intelligence at Tab I.
Attachment:
Tab I - Memo to Secretary of State et al
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EY
S ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-15-2-25-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-15-2-25-5
111,
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAsHINGTON
SECRET/NODIS
MEMORANDUM FOR:
The Secretary of State
The Attorney General
The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Panama
Reports have come to the President's attention concerning Panama's
role in the international narcotics traffic and the recent invitation from
the Panamanian Government to send to Panama representatives of the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to discuss with high Panamanian
officials cooperative measures for narcotics control. This situation and
the handling of the BNDD mission to Panama and other related steps have
important implications both for our narcotics control and foreign policy
objectives. The President wishes to assure that our efforts with regard
to both sets of objectives are carefully coordinated, and he has, therefore.
.1.3eparLment oi State, tne bureau 01 iNarcoties and Dangerous
Drugs and the Central Intelligence Agency to jointly prepare a scenario
? for the handling of the BNDD mission and other related actions designed
to further our narcotics control and foreign policy objectives. The
scenario should include a coordinated position with regard to possible
congressional inquiries. Representatives of other agencies of the govern-
ment should be consulted as appropriate. The Department of State
should also coordinate as appropriate with the President's Special
Representative for Interoceanic Canal Negotiations. A report on actions
taken or planned should be submitted to the President no later than July
31, 1971. Agency differences and unresolved issues, if any, should be
identified for the President's decision.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-15-2-25-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-15-2-25-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-15-2-25-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-15-2-25-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-15-2-25-5
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-15-2-25-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-15-2-25-5
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-15-2-25-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-15-2-25-5
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-15-2-25-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-15-2-25-5
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-15-2-25-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-15-2-25-5
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-15-2-25-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-15-2-25-5
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-15-2-25-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/02/13: LOC-HAK-15-2-25-5
25X1