CIA'S MEMO ON HANOI'S OPTIONS AND STRATEGY CHOICES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-13-4-27-3
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: April 27, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/01/29: LOC-HAK-13-4-27-3
SST
V
INFORMATION
April 27, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: TOM L A T I M E R R G
SUBJECT: QA's Memo on Hanoi's Options and Strategy Choices
I am concerned about the opening paragraphs of the CIA memo on
Hanoi's objectives and concept of the war. CIA seems to be saying
that we are up against a foe whose whole history indicates an unswerv-
ing pursuit of his paramount goal, unification of all of Vietnam under
party control. There is no doubt that the Vietnam Workers Party has as
a major goal the extension of its control over all of Vietnam. The key
scion, however, is whether or not under certain conditions, the
party leadership might not apt for a negotiated hiatus, if not settlement,
which would leave it somewhat short of its mum goal of control
over the South.
The CIA memorandum would seem to leave out the possibility of any
such option being considered, let alone adopted by Hanoi. In doing so,
I believe it distorts history. For example, a good case can be made
that during the years from 1954 to 1959 the party gave a lower priority
to gaining control over the Sown than it did to consolidating its control
over the North. That raises the possibility of a shift once again to a
lower priority being placed on gaining its maximum goal immediately.
Moreover, the memo's statement that "there have been no significant
changes in or addition to the Politburo for more than a quarter of a
century, " is simply not true. In September 1960 the Third Party Congress
named a new Politburo and a new panty first secretary. More importantly,
the whole purpose behind that party congress and the naming of the new
first secretary, Le Duan, was to signal the launching of a new policy
toward South Vietnamaa, one of armed struggle. In short, the history of
the Vietnam Workers Party is one of flexibility, of willingness to switch
from armed struggle to political struggle whenever such a change seemed
best given the "objective situation.
The ehanars that Hanoi will soon opt for a negotiated settlement may be
slim but by altering history, the CIA memo seems to attempt to rule out
such a possibility altogether.
SECRET
TL:nm:4/27/61
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/01/29: LOC-HAK-13-4-27-3