CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-13-2-21-1
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: April 5, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/07: LOC-HAK-13-2-21-1
MEMORANDUM FOR:
April 5, 1971
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Cuba
Recent reports of internal political and economic changes in
Cuba, and of growing Soviet influence in that country, suggest
that an intelligence estimate on Cuba might be desirable at
this time. In particular, it would be useful to have the intel-
ligence community's assessment of:
-- the relative power positions of the various political elites
in Cuban society, and their attitudes on key domestic and
foreign policy is sues;
-- the prospects for Fidel Castro's continuing leadership;
-- Cuban-Soviet relations, -including the role of the Soviet Union
in internal Cuban power relationships, as well as its influence
on Cuban economic and foreign policy;
-- the current status and prospects of the Cuban economy;
-- the implications of these factors for Cuban domestic and
foreign policies over the next two-three years.
Therefore, a Special National Intelligence Estimate on Cuba
should be initiated, including consideration of but not necessarily
limited to the points mentioned above. The Estimate should be
completed by May 1, 1971
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/07: LOC-HAK-13-2-21-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/07: LOC-HAK-13-2-21-1
MEMORANDU
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL /ACTION
March 5, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
FROM: Arnold Nachmasoff
SUBJECT:
Possible Power Shift in Cuba
Attached at Tab A is an interesting report
"traveling circus" of the Cuban leaders nip.
An abrupt shift in the techniques used to carry out the sugar
harvest in Cuba in the middle of the harvest season. The.
shift is from labor intensive to machinery intensive harvesting
methods.
-- A change in Castro's personal style to one in which he speaks
less and only the highlights of his speeches are reported in the
press,. which used to report him verbatim. He has also taken
to traveling about the country with what describes as a
From this admittedly slender evidence he concludes that:
- There has been some kind of manpower crisis probably arising
from reluctance on the part of the populace to participate whole-
heartedly in the sugar harvest.
-- Castro may be under pressure from the Russian-backed technical
and administrative elite of the Government because of the deteri-
orating economic picture as well as basic differences in outlook.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
This analysis is consistant with that presented by Pete Vaky in his
memorandum to you of last November (Tab B) which essentially pre-
dicted the. power struggle suggests is now going on. However, 25X1
the Vaky analysis and the British report differ slightly in their con-
clusion regarding the probably outcome of such a power struggle.
'Vaky thought it was quite possible that those in favor of Russian-
style bureaucratic Communist rule might win and succeed in shunt-
ing Castro tothe sidelines. He argued that this probably would not
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/07: LOC-HAK-13-2-21-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/07: LOC-HAK-13-2-21-1
be in our long run interests. ~on the.oth.er hand, feels that
Castro still has enough popular support to withstand a challenge
from the other camp, though he may well be under sufficient pres-
sure so that he. feels constrained to adopt a more collective form
of leadership, at least for a time.
In his memorandum Pete Vaky suggested that a new policy study on
Cuba be called for. You indicated that you wanted to hold on this for
the present. It might be useful, before considering a new policy
study, to have an updated intelligence'estimate on the internal situ-
ation in Cuba and Cuban-Soviet relations. A special NIE might be
the best vehicle to get such an assessment.'
RECOMMENDATION
That you request a special NNIIE on Cuba.
Approve !' _ Disapprove
Attachments:
Tab B - Memo from Vaky
CONFIDENTIAL
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/07: LOC-HAK-13-2-21-1