CUBA PROBES FOR A DIALOGUE WITH THE US

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-121-14-15-5
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: January 30, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/14: LOC-HAK-121-14-15-5
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE 7593 ,
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To The Secretary
. From: INR -- William G. HylYx d
January 30, 1975
Cuba Probes for a Dialogue With the US
Summary
In recent months Cuba has put out signals that it
wants to begin a dialogue with the US, in contrast with
its pre-1974 position.
Castro probably calculates that conditions for
bargaining with the US now are the best since relations
were broken 14 years ago.
--He is politically and economically in control at
home and no longer needs to blame the US for eco-
nomic difficulties.
--Probable early OAS moves to end sanctions will
increase pressures on the US.
--Cuban/Soviet ties are strong, and they are confident
that the pace of Cuban-US relations can be controlled
to minimize US influence.
--Castro knows that the US could use Cuban sugar.
---Once talks begin, US exporter pressure to enter the
Cuban market will grow.
Cuba will need US technology as well as private and
international financing, which wnu'd follow improved
relations with the US.
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XGDS-
WARMING NOTICE
SENSITIWE IV1RIG NCE SOURCES
AMID M0thO0S IN RVEC
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Castro seems to understand the need for step-by-
step negotiations with the US and to realize that lifting
restrictions on US-Cuban relations depends largely on US
congressional rather than executive action.
Cuba has nothing to lose--and a great deal to gain--
by appearing to offer the US an opening toward improvement
in relations.
--If the US moves toward understandings, Cuba will become
politically more acceptable and economically more
creditworthy.
--If the US remains aloof or if negotiations drag,
Castro will at least gain politically among Latin
Americans, third-worlders, and certain European
countries.
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Cuban Overtures
During the past year, and particularly the last
several months, Cuba has put out a variety of signals
strongly suggesting that it wants to begin a dialogue to
diminish the hostility that has characterized Cuban US
relations for more than a decade. Specifically
Cuba
--is ready to bargain with the US on longstanding
differences, including payment of compensation to
the US, provided an appropriate payment formula can
be devised, and
--may even be prepared to compromise on its so-called
firm precondition (i.e., lifting the "immoral block-
ade") for beginning the bargaining process.
Taken at face value, these signals portray Castro and
other Cuban leaders as being anxious to talk now if the
US will respond.
This seeming interest in getting talks underway now
to improve relations contrasts rather sharply with Castro's
pre-1974 position. Although willing to work out agree-
ments on specific issues, such as the 1965 refugee air-
lift understanding and the 1973 anti-hijacking agreement,
he remained convinced that the US was basically hostile
to his revolution, and he was suspicious of US. intentions
toward his regime. His basic demands were that detente
proceed on Cuban terms, i.e., the US would have to:
--discontinue the economic "blockade"; and
--cease playing the role of "gendarme" of the hemi-
sphere.
Now, Castro appears to be much more flexible and to
be concerned primarily with suggesting to the US that dif-
ferences can be resolved once talks have been initiated.
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As if to underscore Cuba's changed position, Carlos
Rafael Rodriguez, Cuban Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign
Affairs/
during a January inter-
view with a French writer. ter explaining Cuba's strong
feelings concerning this aspect of US policy, he insisted
that the blockade must be lifted, but he said that "the
lifting...could comprise various phases and assume various
forms...." These statements represent the first time
Cuba has
--made a concerted effort to argue its case on the
economic denial program; and
--indicated willingness to consider a phased reduction
of the program.
Cuba's Strengthened International Position
Cuba is no longer isolated in the hemisphere and has
established or repaired political and economic re-'ations
with most of the world other than the US. Diplomatic
relations with the Vatican and West European countries
have recently been elevated to a new, higher status.
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Cuba has been accepted as part of the Latin American
family in some UN circles, and the OAS General Assembly
meeting in April may take significant steps toward ending
Latin American economic sanctions. Castro's new support
of nationalism as a first step toward socialism burnishes
his credentials among other developing countries.
Convertible export earnings of around $1 billion in
1974 enhance Cuba's economic attractiveness. The much-
heralded gains which mark Cuba's improved economic situa-
tion include;
As a practical matter, however, none of these gains
provides Cuba with a long-term alternative to dependence
on Soviet goodwill and economic generosity. Western
Europe and Japan, now saddled with balance-of-payments
problems, do not appear willing or able to provide large-
scale development credits. Spain is a partial exception
because it buys large amounts of Cuban sugar, but Japan--
hitherto Cuba's largest "free-world" sugar market--remains
reluctant to engage deeply in the faraway Cuban economy.
Latin American countries, except antagonistic Chile and
Uruguay, are not sugar buyers.
The Soviets appear willing--even eager--for Cuba to
knit its relations with Western countries, including the
US. They have a major stake in Cuba's 1976-80 develop-
ment plan, which they helped draw up. East European
CEMA partners remain marginal contributors to Cuba.'s
basic development. The cooperation of Western ec-nomies
would clearly lessen the burden of Cuba's development on
the Soviets.
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Renewal of trade with the US would give Cuba access
to products, capital, and technology not available on a
large scale from the USSR or elsewhere. The mending of
political relationships would afford Cuba access to such
international financial institutions as the World Bank.
Why Now?
Castro probably calculates that conditions in 1975
offer Cuba a good opportunity to bargain with the US,
probably the best in the 14 years since relations were
broken, because:
--The revolution has been firmly institutionalized,
and much of the change it has wrought is probably
now irreversible. The Communist Party's role has
been strengthened without diminishing Castro's hold
on the ultimate levers of power.
--The economy is almost certainly stronger than at
any time since the beginning of the revolution in
1959. Sugar earnings are at an unprecedented level,
and the ill effects of the poorly conceived rush
toward rapid industrialization and agricultural
diversification are being overcome with better plan-
ning and management. Therefore, Castro no longer
needs to blame the US for Cuba's economic difficult-
ies in order to marshal domestic support.
--Likely significant OAS action in April on sanctions
.against Cuba will result in making sanctions largely
a bilateral matter between the US and Cuba.
--Cuban willingness to talk with the US would increase
Latin American pressures on_the US to moderate
requirements to normalize relations.
--As the Cuban economy moves forward, the need for US
technology will increase if long-term economic goals
are to be realized.
--Interest of prospective US exporters in entering the
billion-dollar Cuban convertible currency market is
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growing and would work as a pressure factor on the
US once talks were initiated.
--Negotiations undertaken now would facilitate access
at a later date to private sources of finance and
the international lending institutions.
--Relations with the Soviets are good, and the process
of opening up Cuba could be accomplished in a con-
trolled fashion to safeguard Cuban/Soviet ties,
while minimizing the risk of a restoration of US
influence. Both Cuba and the Soviets are much more
confident of their relationship, and Castro apparently
has satisfied himself that the USSR will not deal
with the US in such a manner as to jeopardize Cuban
interests.
Possibly as an opening to the US, Castro stated on
January 11 that Cuba is willing to sell sugar to the US
because "we do not have any law prohibiting" such sales.
--He may see recent US abandonment of country import
quotas on sugar in favor of a global quota as a
gesture designed to ease the possibilities for
renewed Cuban sugar purchases.
--He knows that the US needs to import 4-5 million
tons of sugar in 1975 and that world supplies remain
tight.
--He wants to get better prices for his sugar from
the Soviets, and sales to the US at high world
prices might spur generosity on the part of the
USSR.
--Diversion of Cuban sugar to the US market would pro-
mote Cuban acceptability among other sugar-producing
countries by shoring up prices and in some cases
opening up markets for them (e.g., Philippine sugar
could go to Japan instead of the US).
--Dollar sales this year would be especially desirable
while prices remain high.
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Step-by-Step: Castro Appears To Understand
Castro apparently realizes the difficulties of imple-
menting any scenario leading to normalization of relations
He seems to understand the nee or a step-
by-step approach to the process of dismantling complex
restrictions on US relations with Cuba, and to realize
that that would mainly require US congressional rather
than executive action.
The Cuban press has played up your role as mediator
and negotiator. Castro himself, in speaking of you,
tends to uses the word "realist," and he has several
times separated your role as a peacemaker from certain
US policies he considered negative or "imperialistic."
Once discussions got underway, Castro could fine-
tune his requirements up or down to maximize pressures
on various interest groups in the US and to gain politi i
advantage in other parts of the world. He probably antic-
ipates that pressures within the US, though divided pro
and con, would be weighted in favor of some degree of
normalization and that time would work in Cuba's favor.
In any case, Cuba has little to lose and a great deal
to gain by appearing to offer the US an opening toward
step-by-step improvements in relations.
--If the US moves toward understandings--even slowly--
Cuba will become politically even more acceptable
and economically more creditworthy.
--If the US remains aloof or if negotiations drag,
Castro will at least have gained politically among
Latin Americans, third-worlders, and certain
European countries.
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Drafted: INR/RAA:LEMisback;MKManzoli:cad
x20584; 22242:1/30/75
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