1. CONSEQUENCES OF STATE'S MID-EAST PROPOSAL 2. AN ALTERNATIVE GAME PLAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-12-4-35-5
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 23, 2009
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: March 10, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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1- Is, AC nON
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1%,,arch 10, 1971 25X1
tviE1v.ORANLUM FOR DR, KISSINGER
FROIV?: Harold It Saunders
`...51J13..TLC I': I Consequences of State's Mid-East Proposal
Z. An Alternative Game Plan
Attached as promised to you this morning are:
At tab A--a men oraridum for the President outlining the
possible consequences a a confrontation with Israel.
At i'ab -an alternative game plan embodying the Rpm- ch
that you and I have discussed.
The later is written mainly to ;give you something to react to and
to refine. You will note that I have deliberately left out any mention
of a direct White House approach to the Israelis. l'his is delibeAete
because the time might come when you would want to show something
like this to Sisco to illustrate what you have in mind.
State Dept. review completed
/ NO
IIHSaunders:tmt 3/10/71
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
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:NIEWORAIV. tita FOR IE PRLSLLNT
Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: h.eplications of a Canfroutation with Israel
Ig you consider the State Department game plan for the td4le
East, it is worth thinking through the possible outcomes of the all
out approach to Israel that it recommends.
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rho State Department proposal refits on the premise that
there may be a faction in Israel potentially strong enough to
change Israeli policy if given sufficient inducement and
justification. the assumption is that a substantial US assurance
of isratl'e future security- -along with the in,plied threat of
reduced support- -would enable those just tinder the Israeli top
leadership to argue that Israel should withdraw from the tnal
provided there are serious international guarantees. Put in
another way: Israel could be persuaded to go back to the pre-war
UAR-Israell border provided there were ironclad assurances
against the U.AP.'s ever again closing the Straits or mobilizing
In the Anal. Secretary Rogers. Secretary Laird and Assistant
Secretary Sipco seem to be working from this premise.
--People in CIA and some others in 'Washington see n
that the Israelis are prepared to give up an Israeli poi
Therm al-Shetith. rhey believe the leraelis are virtually united
in wanting to change the Sinai border. They would concede that
there are differences among Israelis as to just exactly hew much
withdrawal from the Sinai there should be. Some these people
feel that 1$rael would not withdraw much behind the mountains
40 kilometers froze the Canal, white others believe that they
would be content with Sharic al-Shaikh and a land corridor down
the west bank of the Cal( of Aqaba. ihey take .Dayan at his word
CCRI.;.1" NODIS
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when he says he would rather have Alarm
peace agreement. Put the other way: the US cannot now
persuade Israel to go back. iL:r. Heim. at the rueeday meet
seeened to hold this prim-Atte.
The basic question to be answered before we
therefore, is:
ii
n formulate a strategy,
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that the US can persuade Israel to withdraw to
esse borders this year, then there could be reason
for going ahead withson-,ething iiite the state bepartznent approach.
The consequences of this approach would be as they are laid out in
the Stat. Department game plan: Such an overall approach on our
partwould hopefully set in motion the kind of reappraisal in Israel,
perhaps leading to political re.aligarn ant , which we have increasingly
felt nray be necessary before the Israeli governn-,ent can be brought
to risk the compromises that peace will entail." In short, success
of the State Department game plan by its own definition requires a
major Cabinet crisis in Israel and perhaps the resignation of
rime lk.linister Meir. rhe underlying aesurnption is that perhaps
the present Finance Minister Pinhas 5apir would take over and in
collaboration with Day-an, might be able to accept the kind of
proposal that is being made.
.-If, however, one assumes that the Israelis are not prepared to
withdraw totally at this point, than one would have to aSet10)* a
confrontation in which the Israelis would stand firm and in which the
US would make the choice between backing down or beginning to
separate itself from Israel by applying the leverage of withholding
major support ftor israel. Because of the n.,agnittiele of these
c;onioquenc es, it is wcetbwhile examining them in .e,ore detail.
or the sake of analysis,therefore, let us assume for a moment that the
Israeli government decides to reject our approach and to stand firm on its
present position that Israel must change Its Sinai border and u4.tist negotiate
these changes directly with the Arabs. in that case, the following cones-
nc.euldaei likely:
5.11: N .
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RZ T N
unable to force a change in the ernel% stand,
n would have hardened and it I. unlikely that
the Israeit uwont could advance any position in the Jarring
de sufficient hope to Justify Egypt's continued
participation4 The jarring talks would presumably grind to an
early halt.
Given the,
it seams Intel
snipe sort of harlots=
would not necesiparily be an
to see how he could very long go
least helOtening the tension with threats.
the Egyptian* might be emboldened if they knew of the nen
confrontation and *specially if the U$ appeared to have taken some
distance from the Israeli position.
rev on him?
vs to begin
oss the Canal.
it is difficult
g fire or at
?
The leraelis might trek* only a minimal response for some
period. but if the barressing fire reached any significant levei.
it is difficult to see how they could avoid responding In sorx.le way
either with air attacks across the Canal Or even perhaps with
ground raids.
--President Sadat must have received some ass *WC* in Mfaiccew
that if the ceasefire did break down the Soviets would stand behind
Prosrls, ably, the Soviets Aire not anxious to Lrecorne involved
in a renewal of hostilities. But if fighting retainer to the intensity
of last Rummer, it seems likely that Soviet pilots would become
involved again. it may be that Egyptian missile crews are now
trained and that the Soviets would be less involved than they were
last eurnmer I a the air defense system.
-
Alternatively, the igypan. t1,-A ght not resUMe fi
might, AS in 1967, mobihte and make waves portal,
with the Soviets that would be sufficiently threatening to make the
IP:melts feel that they had to mount some sort of preeinptive strike.
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Iy hut
-if hostilities resumed and eapectafly if the Soviets became involved
the US would then face a choice between standing back and supporting
an hornet which took a position that the US had already denounced.
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n if boatLlitit. dd not refusal., the Israeli reaction would
hswe been such that 1t is difficult to imagine restur.ption of any
peacemaking effort.
et, the consequences a confrontation with Israel seen sufficiently
grave to warrant discussion of an alternative course.
CRE E
HELSaundereamt 3/10/71
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10, 197125X1
The sceirto propos he State Depart:me ? on urnption
that it I. poesible to aet loose polttic.l fors*. 1 that would cause
the leradili goveenceent to accept withdrawal to the international VAR-
Israeli border provided there were reliable US and iaternationel.murances
that the Egyptians would not again be able to mobilise in the Sinai or
dome either the Sues Cana or the Straits of Tiran. The State scenario
enviskions a major approach to Israel asking Israel to accept eseenti-ally
the US positione on the tero,e of a border settlement that were outlined
at the end of 1969 in return for a US comulltment to Involve its own
force* in reinforcing tntesoationel guarantees and to provide bilateral
aseurance. of a US security relstionalstp with Israel.
This alternative sem. pian is based on the assumption that the larseli
body pantie is not yet ready to accept total votthdremal from the Sinai---
U indeed it ever will be--and that the US strategy should aim, at trying
to construct a long drawn-out negotiating proves. that might have some
chance of containing this situation and of allowing both Arab and Israeli
attitudes to evolve in relation to each other. The essence of this proposal
is to try to buy time by concentrating efforts on a *chems for partial
withdrawal from the Sues Canal, and then to approech the Israelis quietly
to work out with them a common position on the other elements of a settlement.
ay, objective would be to avoid confrontation now 4tU. maintaining
pressure on the Israelis to negotiate seriously. U this were to be our
strategy. we would have to acknowledge frankly to Israel that we are
prepared to work with them in stringing out the negotiating process
provided they were prepared to yet enough into it to give the Egyptians
se excuse for keeping it alive.
rhe key issue irt *totting a strategy I.e how long the US will delay before
Pressing Israel to accept 1969 positions. The Israeli. -will want to know
whether if they advance their own negotiating potation the US will Imme-
diately press them to change it or whether the US will give lereal sorne
latitude to negotiate. They know the US will be limited by Arab and Soviet
osistence that Israel. not be given conzplete freedom to negotiate borders.
T
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C /NOD,
The *merging Qholce of strategies seems to be shaping up as a choice
between;
1. A modified State Department course in which we would hold
to the objective of talking Israel into changing position in the
immediate future but would change tactics to try doing this in a
dialogue about our respective positions rather than by bluntly
requesting an Israeli change of policy.
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Z. An alternative which would seek to divert major attention to
partial withdrawal from the Canal and would give Israel genuine
latitude to advance a negotiating position on borders without threat
of US disapproval. In the dialogue, we would seek less to change
Israeli positions by direct approach than to create situations in
which Israel itself would have to weigh security alternatives to
terkitory.
An important parallel element in Ms strategy is 11 plan for getting Soviet
combat forces out of the UAR. It will be essential in any approach to
Israel to maks clear that the US recognizes the threat those forces pose
to Israel and can be effective in reducing that threat. It is also important
to the United States' own interests in this area to reduce the Soviet combat
presence. The only inducement we have to offer the USSR is Israeli with-
drawal from much--If not all--of the Sinai.
The State Department game plan includes a promise that the US would
seek an understanding in Moscow that a final Arab-Israelt settlement
would be paralleled by a US-Soviet agreement not to base operational
combat force, on the territory of Israel or any neighboring Arab country.
The State plan explicitly says this would not be a precondition to a eettlerrent.
The alternative strategy would be to use the negotiations on guarantees to
pin down this understanding and, by incluaion of US and Soviet forces in
a peacekeeping force, to legitimise but limit the Soviet presence to that
operAtion.
For the sake of concreteness, a draft telegram bodying this smooch--
minus repetition of the rationale *toted abov.-L, attached.
IiIISaunders:tmt 3/10/71
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DRAFT
ACTION: ba ey TEL AVIV
bass y:OSCOW
INFO: USUN New York
AM EMBASSY Amman
USINT Cairo
AM EMBASSY Beirut
sTATE
arch 10, 19725X11
1. To set this scenario in motion. the Secretary would call in Ai bassadors
Rabin and Dobrynin to make presentations along lines described in para-
graphs 4 and 5 below. Ambassador Barbour would follow-up with a
parallel presentation to Prime Minister lv,eir (Paragraph 4) and Ambassador
Beam with Gromyko (Paragraph 5).
2. A central purpose of this approach is to reduce Israeli aaapicLon that
the US is setting Israel up for major preseure to accept the US 1969
positions the strategy is to show US willingness to let Israel try its
hand at negotiation nrovrUkfl it is willing to inject enough movement into
the negotiating process via a reasonable proposal on partial withdrawal
from the Suez Canal to keep the ceasefire alive.
3. The strategy toward the USSR is to re-engage the Soviet Union in the
peacemaking process and to establish a frau .work for reducing the Soviet
combat presence in the UAR.
S CRETINOUM
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4. The following are the elements of the approach to the Israelis we
envisage stated in the form of tentative talking points:
A. After almost four years, the US and Israel have succeeded in
establishing a negotiating framework which we both have agreed is
eseential in moving toward a settlement. rhe US has also succeeded
in re-establishing the ceasefire. In thie process, the US has persistently
resisted pressures from other powers to move toward an imposed
settlement. This continues and will continue to be the US position.
B. Our purpose in approaching the Israelis now is to devise a
common strategy for prolonging the ceasefire and preserving the
negotiating fratr_ewark which has been established at such cost. ' bile
we share Israeli reservations about Arab intent, the fact is that we have
succeeded in eliciting from the principal Arab leader a public commitment
to make a peace agreement with Israel. We feel that US interests
require that this opportunity not be allowed to pass. Va even presume
to say that Israeli interests are parallel to ours in this respect.
C. We fully understand the Israeli fear that if Israel advanced a
specific negotiating position on a subject other than borders or if it
advanced a position on borders with which the US did not agree, the US
would publicly confront Israel and press it to change that position to
conform to the US position papers of 1969.
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D. The LS, for its part, frankly continues to believe that pre-war
borders with minor changes are all the Arabs can accept. Despite that
continuing conviction, however, the US will not now press this position
lir 1. It is willing to see Israel test the A ab position itself.
E. In particular, the US is prepared to join with Israel in an effort
to keep the present negotiations alive by concentrating On a limited
proposal for partial withdrawal from the Suez Canal and re-opening of
the Canal. The pQrpose of this move would be to enable the Israelis in
contact with the Egyptians to work out over e period a practical cOrrirnon
arrangement which would give the Israelis not only a chance to test
Egyptian intentions but also a chance to decrease the likelihood of
renewed hostilities.
F. The LIS is prepared to take this position only if the Israeli govern-
ment will advance a proposal on the Canal and put forward positions in the
Jarring talks that will have a reasonable chance of keeping the negotiating
process alive for the next few months. This would require not only a
scheme for partial withdrawal from. the Sues ceasefire line but also a
position on borders which could provide a basis for discussing next steps
toward an overall settlement. The US would be prepared. if desired to
participate in the Injection of an international force at She al-"Thaikh
alongside Israeli troops.
SECEU''T/NODIS
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G. rhe LIS is prepared to make a major approach to
e
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'Union in which the US would propose limited Soviet involtement in
that international force in the context of the elimination of the Soviet
conhat presence in the UAF., Another way of putting this would be to
say that the US is prepared to negotiate with the oviet Union an
areement on the liriaation of stationing US and Soviet forces--apart
frtur peacekeeping u it *n the soil of Israel or its neighbors.
.his eu4gestion to Israel Le made in the full knowledge that it
will be very difficult for Lgyptian leadership to accept. t her *for e, to
repeat, the one condition for US cooperation with Israel in this endeavor
is that Israel e.gree to put forward sufficiently imaginative proposals to
enableyotiaaesidership to continuo the ceasefire.
I. Just so Israel can understand what the US has in mind in the long
term. US support for en eventual i).P.R-lerael agreement could include
lo te arranemente to satisfy Israeli arms requLretnents (the aircraft
Israel vants) under generous financial tern.. U$ executive and congressional
declarMtons of support for Israel's security. forn &Illation of b lateral
defense consultations, financial contribution to refugee settlement and
$S90 otUIon in credits each in FY 191Z and FT 1973.
5. be follovolag are he moan talking points for an approach to the
',.,oviet government after the Israelis have indicated readiness to advance
what the US regards as
i proposal the LAi could reasonably
accetA:
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A. in view of the importance of maintaining movement toward a
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settlement, the US is eonveying simultaneously to the UAR and USSR an
Israeli proposal in response to President Sadat's suggestion for Israeli
pullback from the Suez Canal as an important first step toward a peace
agreement.
B. If the UAR is prepared to tilaCele this proposal, the US is prepared
to discuss with the USSR appropriate means of guaranteeing scrupulous
adherence on both sides to the agreed terms of a pullback. The US
proposes that en international team including US and Soviet nationals be
established in a UN headquarters to verify observance. Eh. US would
propose bilateral discussions to be followed by discussion by the Four Powers
in New York.
C. In introducing its own nationals into this situation, the US is prepared
to discuss with the USSR an agreement that both the US and USSR refrain
from stationing any combat forces in Israel or in any neighboring Arab
country except as part of agreed peacekeeping forces. These discussions
would, of course, remain in the bilateral channel.
FYI, fhe objective behind the proposal on peacekeeping force* is to try to
trade withdrawal of all Soviet combat forces from the UAR for a legitimized
but limited Soviet presence in the context of a peacekeeping force. ND FYI.
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