SITUATION IN TUNISIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-12-3-30-1
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: March 4, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-12-3-30-1 ?,0v"%
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE
INFORMATION
24884.
25302
SECRET
SUBJECT:
relations as the era of President Bourguiba draws to an end.
It is addressed to the President in case you wish to send it on
to him.
w
~1#
Harold H. Saunders
Samuel M. Hoskinson
Situation in Tunisia
March 4, 1971
Attached is a memorandum describing the internal political
situation in Tunisia and some implications for our bilateral
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-12-3-30-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-12-3-30-1
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
.
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Eventual Transfer of Power in Tunisia
As you know, President Bourguiba was recently at Walter Reed Hospital
for diagnosis of his deteriorating brain condition and is now undergoing
treatment in Switzerland. He is not mortally ill, but there is little
prospect that he will be able to resume his duties except, at most, on
a part time and largely ceremonial basis. Below, just for background
are a few comments on the elements in the situation in Tunisia and
the eventual possible implications for our bilateral relations.
Succession Problem
Until now in Tunisia political power has been highly centralized and
personalized in Bourguiba. The people and institutions under him have
been of only secondary importance. Fortunately, Bourguiba's decline
.has been gradual and this has given him and the other leaders some
chance to focus on the succession problem.
At Bourguiba's initiative the constitution was amended last year to
provide for the automatic succession of the Prime Minister should the
President die, resign or become incapacitated. Then in early February,
Prime Minister Nouira proposed, presumably with Bourguiba's approval,
a new procedure for selecting a successor. Under the new measures a
Presidential vacancy would be filled by the President of the National
Assembly for "a few weeks, t' during which time he would be required
to arrange for National Presidential elections in which he could not
himself be a candidate.
circumstances to force the Prime Minister and his Cabinet to resign.
Other pending amendments to the constitutic.n would circumscribe the
authority of the President by increasing the powers of the,Prime Minister
and National Assembly. They would,, for instance, give the now relatively
powerless National Assembly the right under certain as yet unspecified
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-12-3-30-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-12-3-30-1
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The National Assembly has now appointed a special commission to
study the proposals,' which are the result of extensive deliberation
by the Tunisian leadership over the past eight months. It is expected
that the measures will be passed with few if any changes, although the
process can not be completed before mid-May at the earliest.
Bilateral. Relations
Even if the transfer of power and democratization measures go
smoothly, we must expect some modification of the relationship
between the United States and Tunisia. Much of the parallelism
between Tunisia and U. S. foreign policy and friendship for the U. S.
has stemmed from Bourguiba personally. - He has viewed the U. S. as
a powerful friend in the strategic North Africa-Mediterranean area
and one that has stood by Tunisia in its numerous quarrels with the
French and has contributed to Tunisia's economic development.
Bourguiba's political heir or heirs are less likely to feel the same
personal sense of attachment for the U.S. Moreover, none of them--
Nouira, former Prime Minister Ladgham,. Foreign Minister Masmoudi,
or Minister of Interior Ahmed Mestri- -has either the personality or
prestige that would make it possible for him fully to withstand domestic
and Arab pressures for a more "Arab" policy on the Middle East and
more non-alignment on other issues of importance to us. On the other
hand, the new leadership is not likely to respond to Soviet blandishments,
although any further reductions in our economic and military aid will
make it more difficult for Tunisia to resist Soviet offers.
.In short, a shift in political forces is already underway and with it a
change in the tone of our relationship. In this process, the Tunisians
may begin to gradually adopt more positions at variance with ours, both
on regional and wider international issues. However, barring a major
revolution in Tunisia, which nobody forsees, the chances are that the
Tunisians will continue to want a relationship with the U. S. Even if
they do not, Tunisia can not damage U. S. interests in the Mediterranean.
We have no economic interests there and no military interests. What
is likely to happen when Bourguiba goes is that we will drift into a new-
relationship rather than finding ourselves precipitated into one.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-12-3-30-1