NEW ASSESSMENT OF US/USSR RDT&E

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 61
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 26, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
24604
January 26, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: K. Wayne Smith it*/
SUBJECT: New Assessment of US/USSR RDT&E
Attached (Tab A) is a memorandum to Dr. Foster, DDR&E,
responding to the paper forwarded by his office concerning a
net assessment of US/USSR RDT&E in terms of technological
lead analysis. My comments on the DDR &E paper were
forwarded to you previously (Tab B). The memorandum to
Dr. Foster has been prepared in accordance with your
comments as noted (Tab B).
RECOMMENDATION
I recommend that you sign the memorandum at Tab A. 0j-si
C+
07111
141/%1
OSD, NSS,reviews completed.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
F.214J1
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
IP
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS HI NGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE DIRECTOR OF DEF ISE RESEARCH
AND ENGINEERING
SUBJECT: Net Assessment of US USSR RDT&E
I have read with interest the pape by the Acting Deputy Director
of Defense Research and Engine ing concerning a net assessment
of the relative positions of U.S and Soviet military RDT&E. The
paper contributes, particularly in the concept of technological lead
it develops, to the difficult t k of understanding the national
security implications of U. . and Soviet RDT&E efforts. The
strategic importance of te nological lead is clear in terms of the
initiatives it gives us for ptions to deploy new weapons systems,
the hedge provided aga- t technological surprise ("Sputniks") and
the economies implicit n a secure position of technological
leadership. I recogn e that the net assessment analytical technique
as presented in the per -- is still in the development stage, and
it would be prem.at e to employ this initial analysis as a basis for
U.S. RDT&E fund g programs. Below are some areas that I
believe might be onsidered in refining the net assessment
methodology an its applications.
The current ate-of-the-art in making meaningful comparisons of
aggregate 1 els of RDT&E spending needs considerablir more
clevelopmeylt. Implicit ruble-dollar exchange rates have not been
established with adequate precision for policy-making purposes.
We wou4 not want to impute to the Soviets our economic and RDT&E
syste , charge them our costs, and then assume that we have
deriv d a reasonably accurate picture of "relative effective effort"
expr ssed in spending. This concern leads me to question the
rel bility of the proportionality the paper claims to discover
CONFIDENTIAL
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
111 IP
CONFIDENTIAL 2
between technological lead and RDT&E spending levels. Ref ement
of the comparative costing technique would give us greate confidence
in determining the relationships between RDT&E spendi and
technological lead.
The concept of technological lead itself tends to be orne less
meaningful at each successively higher level of eapon system
aggregation. The problem of determining tec ?logically comparable
weapons is difficult enough to estimate, espe tally since compre-
hensive technical intelligence is so hard to tain. But the building
of categorical systems leads (e.g., "stra egic offense," "tactical")
becomes more worrisome as the typesweapons aggregated
become more dissimilar.
-- What is the meaning of a "t ctical" technological lead that
includes such disparate items as uns, missiles, tanks, aircraft
and rifles?
-- What is the relations ip between years of technological lead
and relative force capabilit s?
-- Can we different' te required technological leads by program
category or weapon sys ern?
In applying the resul s of technological lead analysis we should not
be too hasty to con ude that the only way to rectify adverse balances
is to spend more oney or RDT&E. Dollars are only one factor,
albeit an import t one, in gaining technological leadership. The
effectiveness o RDT&E resource utilization has an important impact
on advancing r technological position. We should also consider
ways to redu e the need for some magnitudes of technological lead
and ways to accelerate our ROME process,
an the need for technological lead be reduced by better
technic intelligence efforts?
- Can we develop a less costly and more efficient RDT&E
agement organization and a shorter RDT&E cycle?
CONFIDENTIAL
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
el!
rer
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
CONFIDENTIAL
-- To what extent can we achieve better military pa.bilities
by investing in less sophisticated quantity rather tha ? more
expensive quality?
3
Perhaps the most valuable use of a refined ana tical technique for
assessing technological lead will be in assist g us to construct a
long-term rational RDT&E strategy about w ich we can program our
spending. This strategy should focus on quired military
capabilities in the future rather than pos ulated RDT&E spending
goals relative to the Soviets' projected unding patterns.
? What are our alternative Ri &E funding strategies? What
are the cost, benefit, and risk tra e-offs ?
What program structure of technological leads do we need?
? Can we be more disc iminating in the selection of RDT&E
projects to identify those w ch really will advance national
security?
I appreciate receiving t e net assessment paper. It represents an
advance in our analyti 1 methodology. In due time I believe that
the refined technique ill be helpful to our policy-making and defense
programming effort.
Henry A. Kissinger
CONFIDENTIAL
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
ACTION
December 23, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KLSSINGER
FROM: K. Wayne Smith
SUBJECT: Net Assessment of U.S. Soviet RDT&E
Bob Pursley has sent me an interesting paper (Tab A) by the
Acting Director of the Office of Defense Research and Engineering
(DDR&E) giving a net assessment of the relative positions of U.S.
and Soviet military research, development, test and evaluation
(RDT&E). DDR&E's assessment is developed in terms of:
-- Technological lead
Funding patterns
? Trends which could change technological leads in 1972-1976.
? National security implications of U.S. RDT&E funding strategy.
The DDR&Eyaper is important because it represents a novel analytical
technique which may be seized upon to justify our spending billions more
to close a forecast "technological gap." 46,
This memorandum summarizes and critiques the DDR&E paper. Our
analysis indicates the need for considerably more study before we allow
ourselves to embark on an expensive crashyrogram to close the
"technology pp. "
DDR&E's Major Findings Are:
-- In 1968, the U.S. had an overall military RDT&E technological
lead of about two years across the board.
SECRET
No Obiection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
ano.ltadvard...,
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
IP
-- In 1968, U.S. and Soviet military RDT&E "efforts" were
approximately equal in terms of estimated spending.
^ Since 1968, U.S. spending has declined while the Soviet
expenditure has increased at relative rates which, if continued, will
reduce overall U.S. technological lead to zero or minus 2-3 years by
1976 (depending on possible alternative Soviet efforts versus the U.S.
RDT&E spending program reflected in current fiscal guidance).
-- To minimize the effects of these trends and regain about a two
year lead, the U.S. will have to spend at least $12.5 - $13.7 billion
annually from 1972 through 1976-78, and $10.5 billion a year thereafter.
-- U.S. RDT&E funding patterns must change to concentrate on
avoiding surprise in "sputnik" areas and incorporate selective
"recovery plans" to regain leads.
The paper's basic argument for buying a technological lead is that it
is essential to national security because:
-- The state of development technology determines our options to
produce military hardware systems.
? The range and choice of developmental "options to produce"
determine the weapons and capabilities that will be ,available five years
hence, and thus strongly influence our future strategy and defense
posture.
? Technological leads are necessary now to have superior force
capabilities in the future.
The U.S. Needs Technological Leads to Avoid Surprise
-- Soviet ?RDT&E is closely guarded. We usually do not know
what weapons they are developing until 2-3 years after they start.
-- U.S. RDT&E largely takes place in the open, giving the Soviets
current knowledge of our state-of-the-art and early warning of our
weapon developments. They can begin to develop countermeasures, and
can enjoy the economies of copying our technology.
SECRET
No Obiection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
Ad ...A a+,.44.01.4itga
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
IIP
-- Technological lead enables our intelligence analysts to understand
6servations of Soviet phenomena, interpret development and project
trends. We can assess the threat more accurately insofar as we under-
stand our own more advanced technology and from this vantage point look
backward on the Soviets.
-- We need technological lead to compensate for the advantages
inherent in a closed (Soviet) versus open (U.S.) society in RDT&E, and
thus avoid technological surprise, i.e., "sputniks."
Technological Lead is Economical
-- The leader inherently has a larger technological base plus the
"commanding heights," from which he can:
(1) Exercise more choice and initiative as to future weapon
systems. The leader is free to choose the weapons to support his
strategy. The follower is driven to close gaps and has less choice of
strategy.
(2) Time initiatives more flexibly and still keep ahead of the
enemy. The leader can spend more deliberately over time, and has
more flexibility to vary spending without endangering security.
(3) Develop "sputniks" relative to the enemy's technology,
thereby increasing lead and strategic advantage.
-- The technological leader has less need to invest in hedges against
enemy surpilses because of his advanced position and better understanding
of enemy technological capabilities and limitations.
-- The leader avoids crash catch-up programs which are inherently
less efficient and more expensive. The follower's smaller and less
advanced technological base means that his incremental advances are
shorter and more projects are needed within a given time frame to close
a particular gap.
The Net Assessment of Technological Lead Methodology
-- Based upon observation of the initial appearance of comparable
military systems, technological lead is established (e. g. , the U.S.
POLARIS submarine appeared five years before the comparable Soviet
YANKEE-class submarine, thus a five year U.S. lead).
SECRET
tn nAclassification in Full 2013/08/02 LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-
1.
/ SECRET
-- Weapon systems are categorized (e. g., strategic offensive,
tactical, intelligenCe?systerns) and a-gerreTat-rent-by category
established. (e.g., in 1968 the U.S. had a three year general lead
in strategic offense systems, one to two years in tactical systems,
three years in intelligence.)
? An overall "weighted average" technological lead is determined
with weighting based on proportional funding levels for each category
of systems relative to the others. (e. g., in 1968 the U.S. had a 1. 6 to
2.3 year overall technological lead in military RDT&E. The range is
due to uncertainties in the data and excludes "civil" space programs.)
Change in lead is noted over time and this establishes the
percentage of additional "effective effort" made. (e. g., the U.S.
gained between 0.6 and 1. 8 years technological lead over the Soviets
between 1960 and 1968, an additional U.S. relative "effective effort"
of 10%-20% greater than the Soviets.)
-- U.S. and Soviet RDT&E funding levels are plotted and related
to overall technological lead times. It is noted that Soviet spending,
estimated in dollars, was about 10%-20% less than U.S. spending in
1960-1968.
? Therefore, technological lead is gained by greater relative
effort, and effort is proportional to spending, i.e., dollars buy
technological leadership, Q.E.D. These are the major analytical
concepts of the DDR&E analysis.
Since 1968, the Soviets have been spending both absolutely more and
an increasing proportion of their GNP on RDT&E than the U.S.
Meanwhile, the U.S. has been declining in its annual RDT&E spending
both absolutely and as a proportion of GNP. Thus, despite our current
technological leads, the Soviets already have the initiative and will take
the lead in the very near future. The "technological gap" of the mid-70s
is forming now.
Effects of Alternative Future Soviet RDT&E Funding Strategies versus
Assumed U.S. Spending:
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
U.S. is assumed to follow current fiscal guidance iii 1972-1976,
e.,i. about $7-5-$8 billion a year in military RDT&E spending.
-- If the current Soviet trend is projected straight out, assuming
steady GNP increase of 5% and an increasing fraction of GNP devoted
to RDT&E (the current trend), the Soviets will have a technological
lead of two to four years in all categories of weapon systems by 1976.
-- If the Soviets peg future RDT&E increases to 3% of GNP (as at
present) they will have a technological lead of one to three years in all
areas by 1976.
-- If the Soviets spend $10.5 billion a year, they will zero out
all U.S. technological leads by 1976. This is called the Soviet "base
line" case.
-- The Soviets need less technological lead than the U.S. because
they have less need to hedge against surprises from our open society.
They are ahead just by zeroing out our leads. (This leads to a familiar
dichotomy in U.S. military thought -- superiority or defeat.)
Proposed U.S. Responses versus Soviet "Baseline" Strategy
-- Spend $13.7 billion annually until 1976, and $10.5 billion
thereafter, to regain the 1968 level of technological lead (two years)
by 1976. (Alternatively, spend $12.5 billion annually to regain 1968
lead levels by 197a) This is $5-$6 billion more annually than presently
planned.
-- Restructure RDT&E programs to emphasize avoidance of surprise,
minimize the maximum risks, hedge against "sputniks." (We don't know
what "sputniks" the Soviets are working on, but an imaginative scientist
can think up a long exotic shopping list which will cost the requisite
billions to pursue. DDR&E has suggested ten programs as a start.)
Critique
Do we really need technological lead?
programs ?
If so, how much?
In what areas,
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1_q_q
Kr -
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
111,
-- The advantages of technological lead are valid, but how much
lead is enough? Is parity an acceptable risk? The DDR&E paper has
accepted the 1968 7-17ST technologioe-Wearl-lezelsiincritically as the
desired objective. There is no analysis of the cost or rationality of
those historical lead positions. The alleged Golden Age) of technological
lead goes unassayed. What kind of technological leads are required by
our national security interests?
-- What are the cost-benefit-risk relationships of alternative levels
I lead, lag, and. parity?
How do alternative RDT&E programs relate to advancing our
ational security in terms of force capabilities? Surely, the composition
of RDT&E is at least as important as the total amount of spending.
Comparing aggregate levels of RDT&E spendiag is a faulty measure o
4 relative effort, both 9uantitatively and qualitatively.
-- Realistic sectorial ruble-dollar inferred exchange rates have not
been established with precision. Jim Schlesinger has pointed out that
these rates vary considerably within the overall Soviet defense budget,
and that RDT&E is apparently the least comparatively efficient sector
($2. 2/ruble).
-- Spending rates do not disclose the relative costs and efficiencies
of the different internal factor price relationships, RDT&E organizations
and management styles associated with the two very different competing
economic structures. The labor and machinery factor inputs to R&D vary
substantially between the U.S. and Soviet economies, and we have no
reliable way of pricing Soviet factors in dollar equivalents nor in establishing
the productivity of the Soviet factor mix. Furthermore, Soviet accounting is
an enigma which we have yet to solve intelligently.
-- Evaluating Soviet RDT&E spending in U.S. dollars, which the CI-A
and DDR&E do, tends to result in overvaluation of the externally produced
goods (Soviet). We impute to the Soviets all of our RDT&E system and
economic structure, which they manifestly do not have, and charge them
the costs. When the imputed spending exceeds ours, we assume that the
Soviets are doing more and better than we, and a "technology gap" is
"discovered" (or invented?).
SEC
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK_19_1_,
te,
L-,
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
-- Thus, the proportionality DDR&E asserts between "effective
effort" or technological lead ausi?RDT&E spending is probably not
nearly as direct as implied. If the disparity between U.S. -Soviet
spending is greater than "measured" gains in technological lead
(e. g., 20% more spending results in only 10% gain in lead), diminishing
returns could be inferred. Spending more on RDT&E, either by the U.S.
or the Soviets, may not result in proportionate increases in technological
lead (or "gap" closing). (That we are enjoying increasing returns to
scale is not evident from our consistent history of cost overruns.)
-- If Soviet RDT&E spending is more nearly proportionate to their
technological lead gains, then -ihsjj..._I_.h.a_ulc look more ....ska_s_tLy_
to learn the secrets of the possibly treater Soviet RDT&E efficienc
rather than simply spend more and peryetuate our own relative inefficiencies.
ri Even if the Soviets are spending more, in real terms for RDT&E than
,6.,,,
(.., we are; it does not necessarily follow that their output will result in
relatively better military capabilities or increased strategic advantage.
"1461 -- How much Soviet spending is wasted on abortive systems or those
hich fail to advance technological lead relative to their U.S. competitors?
By analogy, we spent $1.5 billion on the nuclear aircraft programs and
undoubtedly gained several years in technological lead in a system that
was still useless the day it was cancelled. We spent $15 billion on SAGE
to develop an automated air defense system that works like a sieve. The
Soviets opted instead for a redundant air defense System based on manual
radars and communications. Does the "technological lead" in the decrepit
SAGE system give us a better air defense capability over the clumsy
Soviets? A new Soviet weapon may be better than its prtlecessor but
may not represent an advance upon the technology of concurrent and
competitive U.S. weapons. The 55-8 improved upon the S5-7 but gained
nothing on the Titan technologically. The technology race may be like
Alice's "caucus race." Defense R&D spending should focus upon improving
our relative capability, not on comparative technology az se.
-- Even if a weapon is technically superior to the opponent's, it does
,not follow that a better combat capability results. Operational, counter-
easure and quantitative factors also impact combat capability. Do
00 SS-9's offer a better strategic capability than 1000 Minutemen? Does
rnix of 1440 Soviet SS-9s, SS-11s, and SS-13s give a better strategic
capability than a mix of 1650 Minuteman and Polaris? Why do the Soviets
build T62 tanks instead of MET-70s? (They do not lack the technology.)
Are 100 MBT-70s better in a firefight than 300 technically "inferior" T62s?
These questions seem more relevant than the temporal technological leads
of different weapons.
_ NoObjection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1q
t\i\ier,
,
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
IIP
Technological lead corn'. parisons are dubious in themselves and
confidence diminishes at each successively higher level of aggregation.
-- Technological "lead" is based on our estimate of what we would
have to do to develop the counterpart of a Soviet weapon or vice versa.
Again, we impute our whole approach to R&D and production to the
Soviets. But the Soviets do not build weapons like we do (MIG 21 vs F4).
Measuring technological lead is about as "scientific" as caliphering
craniums to determine IQs.
4 (./(L-?
- Technological leads, as defined by the date comparable items are
first observed, are biased by non-technological factors. Observed
products are the result of the timing of the decision to produce plus the
ficiency and lead time of the production process itself. These decisions
e influenced by political and economic factors that necessarily post-.
te the technical option to produce point. Can we factor out decision-
baking and tooling-up time lags to establish more accurate technological
optionsto produce points? (Should we factor out the tooling-up process?)
DDR&E's technological lead measurements are based on historically
observed phenomena, and "estimates" of intrinsic technology ? in which
-7...eanay tend to fix upon the worst case.
-- How accurate and meaningful are categorical aggregates (e. g.,
"strategic offense") and overall national technological lead time? We
,re increasingly adding and averaging apples and oranges. What is the
*leaning of a "tactical" technological lead that includes guns, missiles,
taytks, aircraft, rifles, etc.? How helpful is such information in
ermining what specific weapons to develop, when ai-t-o: how many?
-- What is the net effect of cross-comparing countermeasure
technological leads? How meaningful is a two year lead in strategic
offensive systems if the opponent has a two year lead in strategic defensive
defensive systems?
-- Weighting technological leads by proportional spending on
categories of systems obscures relative sectorial efficiencies, tends
to equate technology with money and may confuse quantity with quality.
-- We need to compare relative capabilities, not quantitative inputs
and historical time differentials in outputs.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
-
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
11,
How much of a given technological lead is attributable to the quality,
quantity and scope of basic and applied research?
? We should differentiate spending to expand the technological base
from spending to develop a particular application. Which is the strategically
more productive factor? What are the interrelationships between research
and development with regard to funding allocations? What are the trade-
offs? How should we allocate between the two types of R&D spending?
Rather than spend more on R&D indiscriminately, perhaps we could make
some gains by re-allocating between R-&-D.
Can the need for technological lead be reduced by better technical
intelligence effort?
-- If the Soviets' closed society generates a requirement for us
to buy technological lead, perhaps we could reduce the need for lead,
at less cost, by better intelligence efforts instead of spending more on
RDT&E. What are the trade-offs?
Can we develop a more efficient and shorter RDT&E cycle, at less cost,
-rather than perpetuate the status quo on a larger and more expensive
e? (The DDR&E paper implicitly assumes not.) The faults of
. RDT&E are well-known and costly:
-- Over (gold-plating, multi-purposing, customizing,
ushing the state-of-the-art, ignoring on-the-shelf components,
countering the worst possible threat, not trading-off design criteria).
? Competition, duplication of effort and the not-invented-here
_syndrome.
s\
-- Over-organization into multiple layers of R&D bureaucracy that
smothers creative R&D in too much paperwork and beats to death good
new ideas in a bureaucratic gauntlet of too many nay-sayers. Why is it
that a small French aircraft company can turn out a high performance
aircraft prototype every two years using 25 engineers, 50 draftsmen and
100 workers while we can't even write a proposal for a new fighter with
less than 1500 engineers? To add insult to injury (self-inflicted), the
Israelis say their $1.2 million Mirages are a match for the MIG-2I while
our $3 million first line fighter is an adequate bomber.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
No Objection To Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
-- Proliferation of small-scale efforts (something new for everybody)
and reluctance to invest in fewer but more expensive and vulnerable --
politically and budgetrriTy) large-scalt-grugrailib. The big programs are
apt to be studied, starved, stretched and sliced to death as a nostrum for
seemingly endemic cost overruns. Why not try to cut unit costs with
more realistic specifications, simpler systems, better planning and good
management? The technical disasters and 100%-300% gold plate of such
programs as the F-111, Cheyenne, DABT-70, C-5, Typhoon, E-ZA,
Skillelagh, Falcon and Sparrow raise the nagging suspicion that at least
a Yew of our allegedly inadequate R&D billions have not been accomplishing
the job as efficiently and as effectively as possible.
-- A more streamlined and responsive RDT&E management
organization and process might get us more output, quicker and at
less cost.
What ought to be our ROME strategy in terms of (1) goals, (2) technological
lead, (3) program structure, and (4) funding? (DDR&E's paper assumes
uncritically that the 1968 leads should be our goal at whatever the cost and
ignores strategic goals and program mix.)
- What are our alternative RDT&E strategies?
-- What program structure of technological leads do we need?
What RDT&E programs really will advance national security?
? Can we differentiate required technological leads by program
category or weapon system? What are the cost, benefit, and risk
-trade-offs?
? To what extent can we achieve better military capability by
investing in less sophisticated quantity rather than in more expensive
quality? Our penchant for the superlative leads to such high-strung
weapons that enormous and expensive maintenance and supporting
structures are needed to keep the weapons operational. The tungsten-
coated SR-71 absorbs 300 maintenance manhours for each flying hour.
The F-104 regularly depletes the German air force pilot inventory.
Meanwhile, the MIG-21 manages Mach 2 with 1/32 inch tolerances on engine
turbine blades -- a supersonic windmill that Egyptians can fly.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-
_
IP
Summary of Critique
DDR&E has an interesting and possibly valuable argument. It
is worth study. We need to be able to evaluate relative RDT&E efforts.
Refinements in the comparisons are needed and should be explored to
obtain a more accurate view of technological lead.
-- We need to examine means to reduce the requirements and costs
of lead (e. g., better and earlier intelligence about Soviet RDT&E, and
better management of U.S. RDT&E). We don't have only the choice of
buying more lead; it may be well to invest in ways that would permit
requiring less lead.
-- We need better analysis to determine what ought to be our
technological lead position, overall and by category (the latter may be
more important to national security since it has the stronger strategic
implications), i.e., an RDT&E strategy.
???
We need to know the incremental costs and trade-offs between
and within alternative RDT&E funding strategies.
My conclusion is that DDR&E has produced an interesting study, but
the significance of the results are difficult to assess. Basically, the
problem is that its evaluation is based on a comparison between
financing of R&D in the U.S. and USSR derived from a comparison of states
of military weaponry in the two countries both crude arts despite the
psuedo-quarification. This means that we are comparing quantities and not
capabilities. As you know, the President has said that?we should emphasize
military capabilities, not force levels. This is a good case in point. Just
because the Soviets may be spending more money on R&D than we are, it
does not mean that their military capabilities will necessarily exceed ours.
What we should be evaluating is whether the expensive programs which we
now have are really contributing to our military capabilities so that we
will not be behind in the future. Perhaps the time is right for a NSSM on
our RDT&E program, exploring the issues raised by DDR&E and our
analysis. At least, DDR&E should answer the questions we have raised
before launching a campaign for billions more to close the technology "gap."
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: Lor_kA 4 ,1
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
111P
Prepare a NSSM.
Assuming you do not want a NSSM, I recommend that you
send a memorandum to Dr. Foster expressing your interest
and raising the questions we have asked above.
Alternatively, I could send a memorandum to Pursley
expressing our interest in the DDR&E paper and introduce
the issues surfaced by our analysis.
Other
ei/dar-v1Y
/ree.-7(tc.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
1111
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASIVNGTON, D.C. 20301
November 12, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Wayne Smith, National Security Council Staff
SUBJECT: Comparative US/USSR Research and Development
The DDRa staff has put together some materials on the
relative postures of US and USSR research and development.
You may find the attached compendium of interest. John Foster
or Eb Rechtin would be happy, of course, to amplify or explain
any portions of the materials on which you might like added de-
tail.
2(iLI,14)
Robert E. Pursley
Brigadier General, USAF
Military Assistant
Attachment
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
?
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
lUzE 1170-426Z
Cy 7 of 35 Cys
18 September 1970
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH
AND ENGINEERING
SUBJECT: A Net Assessment of US/USSR. RDT&E
The attached assessment was prepared based on the work of the
ODDR&E Net Technical Assessment Group under Dr. ?N.F. Wikner. ?
The basic rationale was developed following many discussions during
the, past three months with the Assistant Secretaries of the Services
for Research & Development and their staffs; the Chiefs of Research
& Development of the Services; the Deputy Directors of ODDR&E and
their .staffs; members of the Defense Science Board; members of
the President's Science Advisory Committee; the Technical Staff of
the Central Intelligence Agency and members of the Defense Into-M.
gence Agency. However, this assessment represents my appreciation
of the situations: not their official positions or views.
If there are new elements in this assessrxwiit they are: (1) the
virtual elimination of the "economic uncertainty factor" in the USSR
budget as a factor in such assessments, and (2) the relation of
budget amounts in dollars to technical leads in years.
tc,IiVck,;::
E. Rechtin
Acting Principal Deputy Director
Encl.
s
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
MP ?
?
R&E 00-126ZA
Cy J of 35 Cys
A NET ASSESSMENT OF THE OVERALL MILITARY
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST & EVALUATION (RDT&E)
EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION
I. PURPOSES OF THIS ASSESSMENT
Establish the relative military RDT&E positions of
US & USSR
Relate relative RDT&E positions to funding patterns
- Identify trends which could change the relative RDT&E
positions in the 1972-1976 period
- Indicate implications of U.S. RDT&E funding strategies
to national security
- Provide a basis for judgment of adequate levels of U.S.
military RDT&E
II. THE PURPOSES OF RDT&E
- Develop military technologies and systems for possible
production and deployment
Definition and significance of technological lead; U.S.
policy 1950-1970
III. A TECHNOLOGICAL LEAD COMPARISON OF US AND USSR
MILITARY SYSTEMS, 1960-1968
- A comparison of specific systems
A comparison by major categories
Uncertainties in the comparisons
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3 -
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
W
Assumption: Lead is increased by greater relative effort
- Limitations of the assumption
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP OF EFFORT AND FUNDING
- Assumption: Effort is proportional to funding
- Limitations in the assumption
- US tt USSR RDT&E Funding 1950-1970
Budget plans as indicators of intended effort; US & USSR
plans for 1972-1976? (What can USSR afford?)
Uncertainties
V. POSSIBLE TECHNOLOGICAL LEAD POSITIONS IN 1976
- As dependent on USSR budgets and US fiscal guidance
- A possible Soviet strategy
Possible "Sputnik" areas
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. MILITARY RDT&E STRATEGIES
Assumption: U.S. military FY 1972 RDT&E budget will
not exceed fiscal guidance
Importance of close watch on Soviet military RDT&E and
its budgets; i. e., RDT&E initiative passing to Soviets.
Avoidance of surprise vs overall excellence in U.S. RDT&E
S trategies
"Recovery Plan" Budget Implications
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
?
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
A NET ASSESSMENT OF THE OVERALL MILITARY
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST & EVALUATION (RDT&E)
EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION
I. PURPOSES OF THIS ASSESSMENT
The purposes of this assessment are to:
- Establish the relative military RDT&E positions of the
United States and the Soviet Union accurately enough for overall plan-
ning purposes.
- Relate the relative RDT&E positions to past funding
patterns in order that future budget plans can be used to help predict
future positions.
- Identify budget trends which could change the relative
RDT&E positions in the 1972-1976 period.
- Indicate implications of U.S. RDT&E funding strategies
to national security
- Provide a basis for judgment of adequate levels of U.S.
military RDT&E
IL ? THE PURPOSES OF MILITARY RDT&E
The principal purpose of military RDT&E is to develop military
technologies and systems for possible production and deployment. The
availability of better technologies and systems for production will not, of
itself, increase the military capability to affect the outcome of battles
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
' 7
.!?
and wars. The systems must be produced, the men trained, tactics
developed, and the forces deployed and effectively used. But without
RDT&E, many subsequent force capabilities are precluded.
The United States has been faced for the last two decades with
potential adversaries who are numerically superior and whose closed
societies make it difficult to determine the intent and status of their
weapon system developments. Seldom have we known the character-
istics of their systems before they are in conspicuous 'testing or deployed
in service, by which time it is very late to initiate RDT&E in response.
Under these conditions it has been the policy of the United States to
develop and produce technologically superior military systems for its
armed forces.
Figure 1 shows a convenient way of visualizing how technologies
advance with time and how comparisons can be made between two
deVelopment programs. Figure 1 is a typical illustration of a plot of the
performance characteristic of weapons system, such as the speeCI of an
aircraft or the kill probability per dollar of a missile, plotted-at the year
when the system first became available for production. There are
several reasons why this assessment uses the year when the technology
is available for production rather than, for example, the year when
it is first conceived, when it is first demonstrated as feasible in
a laboratory test, or when it reaches final deployment. The "option to
a
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08)02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
? yo
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02:
produce point" looks at the output or results of RDT&E. These results
may or may not be produced, depending upon the national security situation
at the time, but they are available if needed. Also, this particular point
in the development is the first reasonably reliable point at which we
can observe Soviet developments. Earlier phases of the developments
are almost completely hidden from us. Unfortunately, the "option to
produce point" may be three to five years from the initiation of a new
development; consequently, a significant technological lead can be
built up by the Soviets in a new field before we first observe it.
To return to Figure 1, as further RDT&E is accomplished, higher
values of the technology become available at later times. Connecting
these technology/throe points together results in the time history of
the technology. Plotting the histories of two competing programs permits
an easy comparison. Figure 1 shows two comparable development programs
of two countries, 1 and 2, with number 2 being initially at a lower techno-
logical level but increasing to catch up. The simpliest comparison,
applicable to all such plots, is to use the common feature of "technology
lead", the time interval by which one development program leads the
other in a critical performance or cost characteristic.
Figure 2 illustrates one way that technology lead affects production
and deployinent timing and costs. In this illustration, a decision by
Country 1 is made to produce the technology of its program (lower left
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
?
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
NO:
corner of the chart), resulting in a weapon system which follows curve
(a). (The slight upward slope of curve (a) is due to continuing minor
improvements normal in a system under production and deployment.)
The weapons system, in this illustration, is regarded as "obsolescent"
when its technology equals that of Country 2, at which time Country 1
initiates a new weapons system production (line b). Of Course, Country I
could wait somewhat longer, but in any case it has the initiative. On the
other hand, Country 2, in order to minimize the obsolesence of its weapons
system (they are obsolescent before they are built), tries to stay closer
to its technology line, with the result that more systems must be produced
'with increased costs in produCtion tooling, logistics, training, etc. This
"scramble" tends to be characteristic of any program which is behind and
responding to initiatives taken by the leader; it has been observed in both
U. S. and Soviet programs which were behind.*
Technological lead thus gives a country several advantages:
(1) If converted into deployed weapons, it may determine the out-
come of the battle, increase confidence in the favorable outcome of the
war, or increase the deterreht effect of our defense posture. .
(2) It may be used to offset enemy secrecy, not only in operational
* The "scramble" is an uncontrolled version of an otherwise common
programmatic decision in certain lines of development: to take
smaller more frequent steps, rather than larger steps less frequently.
The significant difference is in the initiative or control of the steps -
in one case voluntary and in the other, not.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
?!.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
situation, but also in the earliest design and developments of new weapons
systems; one is ready for one's adversary.
(3) Technological lead gives a country the initiative in weapons
system acquisition, resulting in better planning, control of the
obsolesence factors, and a minimum number of crash developments.
Generally speaking, US policy has been to favor the longest lead
times in strategic offense and intelligence and settle for the shortest
lead times in tactical systems and strategic defense systems. Research
and technology leading to weapons systems in each of these categories
should, of course, have comparable or longer lead times than the
weapons themselves. Or, stating it in a different way, if the research
and technology base is too weak to provide a good head start, picking up
lead in development and engineering by crash programs will be both
difficult and expensive if not impossible.
?
In a very real sense then, the numerous and complex purposes
of RDT&E can be reduced to:
The primary purpose of RDT&E is to produce technological
lead in critical weapon system technologies and systems.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
.?;.?
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
11.
111. A TECHNOLOGICAL LEAD COMPARISON OF US AND USSR
MILITARY SYSTEMS, 1960-1968
Tables 1 A and 1 B give a listing of comparable US and USSR weapon
systems with their comparable first production (or occasionally IOC) dates
and technological leads. For example, in strategic offense, the Atlas and
the SS-6 appeared at approximately the same time in 1960 and were roughly
comparable weapon systems. Both systems were nsoft't, launched in the
open, and used roughly comparable guidance systems. The detailed designs
were different in structures, staging, and the use of radio guidance, but
the end weapon effectiveness was approximately the same. Therefore, the
United States is shown as having a zero technological lead in 1960, when the
Atlas and 88-6 existed. By 1964, the technologies had advanced to the Titan
II and 58-7 Class, but the Titan II had much more advanced technologies,
by approximately three years, than the SS-7. Tables 1 A and 1 B show
several other characteristics of technological lead. First, there are
numerous systems which can be compared. Second, lead in a particular
category, such as strategic offense, can change over the years. Third,
?
both the US and the USSR have some weapon systems which the other country
does not have undoubtedly due to the asymmetry in the national security
situation of the two countries. Fourth, some weapon systems become
obsolete because of political considerations or decisions to abandon a
particular line of development, and consequently the technological lead
$
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
enjoyed by that weapon system is no longer applicable. This is the case
for the B-47, cruise missile submarine, and 1RBMs for the United States.
The technological lead numbers in Table 1 were produced based
upon intelligence data, discussions with specialists in each of the fields,
and the subjective judgments of members of the Office of Defense
Research and Engineering. The subjective judgments were used when
the data was incomplete or controversial; however, disagreements when
they occurred were seldom larger than plus or minus 1 year.
Technological lead information, such as given in Table 1, can be
grouped into a few main categories which can then be followed through
the years. Table Z is a listing of the categories of the technological
lead in years for three times in the past: 1960,, 1964 and 1968. Again,
the technological leads are uncertain to about a year and there is some
debate about the long term trends. A good ex'ample of this is the tactical
category in which the 1960-1964-1968 pattern can either be 2-2-2 or 3-2-1.
The former pattern shows the US holding even whereas the latter pattern
shows a steady erosion. Strategic offense shows additional uncertainty in
1960 because the US and Soviet technologies were different and as can be
remembered from Table 1, many of those technologies later were dropped.
The rationale for intelligence systems is that the United States put
major developmental effort into satellite collection systems, whereas the
No Objection to Declassification in Full '5013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
Soviet effort was more modest, quite possibly because the Soviet needs
were less. The space systems line of Table 2 refers to civil space,
NASA and its equivalent in the Soviet Union, and the technological leads
refer primarily to those of manned flight systems where the major
efforts have been expended.
A weighted average technological lead can be obtained for each of
the three years by weighting the technological lead for each category
proportional to the funding level for that category. The purpose of such
weighting is to avoid over-emphasis on the less costly categories. (A
similar weighting could be used to derive Table 2 from Table 1, but the
weighting rules would have to account for the asymmetries in weapons
systems as well as the more directly comparable developments.)
Looking at the .extremes of the weighted average, one sees that
the US gained between 006 and 1.8 years of technological lead during
the eight year span 1960-1968. If the assumption is made that additional
lead is produced by greater relative effort, then the gain in lead corres-
ponds to an additional relative effort by the United States over the Soviet
Union of 10% to 20%*.
The same calculations can be made with the civil space systems
excluded, resulting in the military IIDT&E showing either a gain in
* These percentage numbers are rounded off to the nearest 10% point
in order not to imply greater accuracy than the available data.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
111P ? ? ? 6,
111111
technological lead of 0.6 years or .a loss of 1 year, which equates to an
additional effort between minus 10% and plus 10%, with the minus meaning
that the American effort was less than that of the Soviets.
Table Z might be summarized by saying that in the 1960's the U.S.
gained a significant technological lead in civil space systems and approxi-
mately held its own, relative to the Soviet Union, in military RDT&E.
Expressed in terms of relative effort, we clearly expended more in the
civil space side than the Russians and evidentally expended about the same
amount as the Russians in military RDT&E.
It is important to note that "effort" as used here is measured in
terms of the results in being able to change technological lead positions
over the years. This effective effort therefore includes many factors
which affect the efficient use of RDT&E resources such as the breadth
of the national technological base, the erosion of technologies by the
appearance of different technologies, and managerial efficiency.
Fortunately, separate analysis of each of these factors is not essential
for net assessment because the parameters of interest are not the
absolute values of these factors in each country but rather only the
differences in the. percentage changes with time of one country with
respect to the other. These differences can be expected to change
slowly, and consequently fairly short range predictions ? on the order
of 5 years or so -- can probably be made with accuracies comparable
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
p.
to that of the technological lead data. For example, the US may have
improved its managerial efficiency by 20% during the 1960's, but the
USSR, for similar reasons may have improved about as much -- say
25%. Over an 8 year span, the net difference is a fraction of a percent.
per year.
W. THE RELATIONSHIP OF EFFORT AND FUNDING
The technological lead comparisons of Tables 1 .and 2.suffer from
a common problem: reasonably reliable data ends in 1968 and this
makes projection as far as 1976 speculative without some form of
additional information.
The additional information is funding patterns and to use them
requires the following assumption: effort is proportional to funding.
? This assumption has both strengths and weaknesses. Generally
speaking more money does indeed produce more effort, providing
that management is sound that the RDT&E resource base is not
"saturated", that the research and technology base has sufficient ideas
which can be exploited and that the range of the variables (money and
effort) is not too great. These conditions appear to be satisfied in both
the Soviet Union and the United States at this time and until at least 1976.
Very few individual areas of technology are saturated, much less the total
RDT&E base. Rather, particularly in the United States, militarily
relevant research in advanced technology is being decreased solely for
budgetary reasons, not lack of ideas or the means to exploit thern. In
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
.4
I.
? r
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
11,
r 4.,"? 11111
? the Soviet Union, an extensive educational and facilities program is
continuing at a high rate. Both countries have "convertible" civil
space efforts and resources which could be diverted to military RDT&E
by adding funds to it. There appear to be few fields in which the effort
could not be doubled in three to five years. On the Soviet side in
particular, there is no evidence that Soviet military RDT&E reached
saturation limits at any time during the 1960's .
On the other hand, the weaknesses in comparing budgets are that
the U.S. and USSR budget systems are different, the national security
organizations are different, and costs are different in the two countries
to perform the same required tasks. A detailed budget comparison by
major category is not readily possible. The uncertainties in converting
the Soviet budget in rubles to equivalent US budgets in dollars is on the
order of 20%, too great for the budgets alone, to be useful as an
accurate predictor. However, the long term trends of each country
by itself, the shapes of the funding curves with time, can be much
better established and are much less controversial. The general rise and
fall of U.S. military RDT&E funding and equivalent effort in the 1960-1970
period is well established. For the Soviets, their published budgets permit
a similarly internally-consistent funding pattern to be derived for the sum
of civilian space and military RDT&E for the period 1953-1970, The re-
maining difficulty in comparing the two funding pattcrns arises over two
points:
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
,?,,?
? No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
(1) The conversion of the Soviet funding pattern, expressed
in rubles, to an equivalent-pattern expressed in US dollars, and
(2) The division of the Soviet total funding into a "civil space"
part and a "military RDT&E" part.
This assessment treats both of these difficulties by using the
technological lead comparison data presented earlier. In brief, that
technological lead data showed that the US put in 10% to 20% more
equivalent effort in the 1960 - 1968 time period than the USSR which
means that if the US and USSR fundings for these efforts are plotted
on the same graph (dollars vs. time) then the total Soviet "dollars"
for the period of 1960 to 1968 should be about 10% to 20% less than the
total US dollars. Figure 3 is a plot of the US and USSR funding patterns
from 1953 to 1970 based on DoD and NASA data for the United States and
CIA data for the USSR. The USSR curve is 15% below the US curve in the
period 1960 - 1968, which means that in equivalent technological effort,
it agrees with the results of the technological lead comparison given
earlier. The uncertainties in the USSR curve are thus within plus/minus
10% and possibly plus/minus 5%. Were the USSR efforts appreciably
greater or less than this uncertainty a significant loss or gain in the US
technological lead should have been observed.
Parenthetically, the USSR curve on Figure 3 is the actual CIA
estimate and it did not require adjustment in absolute magnitude to be
?
plotted as equivalent technological effort in dollars. The CIA derived
Nn nbiecti011 to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
111, ?.?
,
their USSR curve solely on the basis of Soviet budgets and their own
estimates of the equivalent costs, expressed in U.S. dollars, for the
Soviets to perform the same kind of work as is required in military
and space technology. The past debates over the CIA estimates have
largely involved scale factors and not shape. The technological lead
comparison given in this assessment would appear to confirm the CIA's
scale factor within fairly narrow limits. Or, stated another way, there
are several different ways that Figure 3 can be derived and they agree
to 10% or better.
The importance of using funding patterns for this assessment is
now apparent: there has been a marked divergence in the efforts of the
USSR and the US since 1968, something which the technological lead
comparisons of Tables I and Z could not predict and whose effects will
not become readily apparent until technological lead comparison data
is available for 1972.
Figure 4 is the same as Figure 3 with the addition of an uncertainty
band around the USSR curve corresponding to the uncertainties in techno-
logical lead measurement. It can be seen that the divergence of the USSR
and US efforts is far greater than the uncertainties in the data.
The next step is to try to divide the total technological efforts into
civilian apace and military efforts. The CIA has made such a division
No Objection to Declassification in Full 20-13/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
3
by using a NASA formula to estimate the Soviet civilian space costs.
The remaining effort, after the Soviet civil space effort is subtracted,
is the USSR military effort, by definition. The results are shown on
Figure 5 along with the US efforts.
Figure 5 shows that the USSR military effort from 1962 to 1967
was essentially constant, with increases in the total Soviet technological
efforts going into their civil space program. But after 1967, the Soviet
space program evidently remained about constant and the continued
expansion went to the USSR military effort. In the US case, the US
military technological efforts, expressed in 1968 dollars, have re-
mained more or less constant during the 1960's, with the US space
effort peaking and then dropping off.
The CIA estimates of Figure 5 can be somewhat refined by using
the,technological lead data given earlier, which showed that the U.S.
picked up lead on the Soviets in the civil space sector, but held essential-
ly constant in the military sector. This refinement, shown in Figure 6,
iesults in a somewhat larger fraction of the total Soviet effoit being
devoted to military RDT&E and a somewhat smaller fraction to their
space program. The uncertainty band, carried forward from the techno-
logical -lead comparison uncertainties, includes the CIA estimate at its
lower edge. Stating it another way, if the CIA estimate of the USSR
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
iO Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
IP
military RDT&E were correct, then the technological lead numbers
we should use are those which show the US holding its own during the
1960's. If the upper edge of the uncertainty band is correct, we should
put credence in the US military RDT&E slipping about one year in
average lead over the 1960-1968 time period. One cannot go very far
outside the uncertainty band and still be credible. The US certainly did
not lose as much as two years, nor is there much evidence that we gained
significant military lead, on the average, during the 1960's. There were
spectacular gains in strategic offense and intelligence systems, but these
were offset by a slow erosion in the much bigger area of tactical systems
and of strategic defense.
The next step is to project from 1970 to 1976. This assessment
will not be concerned with the civil space projections other than to note
that the USSR has the option to convert a significant amount of civil space
efforts to military RDT&E, if it so chooses. The reasoning might be
quite simple: their civil space has been a "loser" and the majority of
the civil space is already a part of the military structure.
Projections for the US 'through 1976 for military RDT&E are
straightforward: this assessment will use the fiscal guidance nurrb era.
Projections for the USSR through 1976 can be made several
different ways:
No Obect ion to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 I nrs L
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
(1) The trend for the last 20 years can be continued for
the next six by a simple straight-line projection. This projection
consists of two factors, the steady increase of the GNP of about 5%
per year and an increasing fraction of the GNP being devoted to
military and civil space efforts (Figure 7).
(2) The USSR could decide to peg the future, increases to
the 3% of the GNP that it had in 1970.
(3) The USSR could freeze its effort at its 1970 level.
These three possibilities are shown in Figure 8 with possibilities
1 and 2 extrapolated from the adjusted curve (the one ODDR&E thinks
is the most probable) and possibility number 3, extrapolated from the
CIA (lower bound) curve.
No Ob.ection to Declassification in Full 201/08/02 :
, No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
? ? , lir
V. POSSIBLE TECHNOLOGICAL LEAD POSTURES IN 1976
Figure 8 directly yields three different values of US/USSR relative
effort over the period 1968 to 1976, which in turn makes possible calcu-
lations of the changes in technological lead which would be expected
upon the funding patterns followed. Figure 9 shows the results. If
the USSR follows either Plan 1 or 2, all US leads become lags. Figure 9
adds one more category, Research and Technology (R&T) to those given
earlier in order to make the point that even this area, amounting to
about 10% of the total RDT&E effort, could be pre-empted by the Soviets
by Plans 1 or 2. If the Soviets follow Plan 3, the erosion in US techno-
logical lead will be noticeable.
This situation raises several questions, the first of which is,
how much technological lead is adequate for the United States? The
leags in 1968 appeared to be adequate at the time and in retrospect,
at least within the limitation of our understanding of the more recent
Soviet developments (1965-1970). These 1968 leads seemed to be
adequate for understanding and responding to Soviet developments and
strategic offence, intelligence systems, and space systems; crash
programs were few, deployed weapons continued to be generally equal
or superior technologically. There are some limited areas of serious
concern. We have not engaged first line Soviet tactical equipment;
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
ICBM/ABM technology has never been evaluated in battle; our estimate
of lead may be out of date due to accelerating efforts; our strategic
defense technology has fewer options and possibilities than that of the
Soviets. But, on balance, the 1968 technological leads did not appear
to give serious concern to military planners and strategists. Twice as
much lead time would probably be viewed as unnecessary. On the other
hand, a zero lead in an area has historically been a cause for alarm and
has resulted in a major US compensating effort. A reasonable conclusion
might be that for the U. S. the lead time should at least exceed the
measurement uncertainty (about 1 year) and should be longer than a
year for costly weapons directly affecting national survival. A lead
of at least several years in research and technology appears advisable
to counterbalance superior Soviet force levels and to avoid surprises
from completely new technologies. From the Soviet point of view, their
needs are probably different. In general, they will have advantages in
force levels and intelligence collection. Thus a zero U.S. technological
lead is dangerous for the United States and desirable for the USSR.
This reasoning leads to a Soviet RDT&E strategy which is both
attractive and practical for the USSR. The ussr< can zero out all US
leads by 1976 if it sets its military RDT&E effort at an equivalent of
$10 to $10.5 billion a year and then stays at that value thereafter. (As
can be seen from Figures 6 and 8, the USSR is essentially at that equivalent
level now.) They could do still better if they wished to invest more.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
IP
For purposes of this net assessment, therefore, we will define
a "base line Soviet strategy as a $10.5 billion dollar a year military
RDT&E effort from 1970-1971 onward.
If the US stays with its fiscal guidance, then the USSR would be
investing about $3 billion a year more than the US in equivalent effort.
For this the USSR should be able to produce "Sputniks"* in military
RDT&E.
Table 3 is an illustrative listing of potential "Sputnik" areas
roughly in order of priority and probability as might be viewed by the
Soviets. A brief description of each follows.
In undersea warfare, the relative invulnerability of our sub-
marines is largely based on the belief that the sea is opaque for all
practical purposes. But, non-acoustic and optical sensors, as well as
better acoustic sensors, might significantly change that belief, particular-
ly if the problem was simplified by building sensor barriers rather than
instrumenting the whole sea. The undersea task force is an alternate
line of development to the "silent service" submarines operating alone.
* For purposes of this assesknent, "Sputniks" have the following
characteristics:
(1) Their appearance would seriously undermine our confidence
in a major element of US national security, probably by obsoleting a
major portion of our defense equipments within a few years thereafter.
(2) The reqUisite technologies exist in early form today in the
United States.
(3) The equivalent of the 1950-era "space cadets" can be found
for the 1970 Sputnik technology; i.e., there are enthusiasts in the
Services and.inclustry eager to talk about the field.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
In an undersea task force, different submarines have different functions,
much as is the case with surface task forces. There is reason to believe
the Soviets may be following this approach. The shallow confined seas
present much different naval problems and opportunities from the deep
oceans. A case can be made that the Soviet Navy is concentrating first
on control of the shallow of confined seas (such as the Mediterranean,
the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, the North Sea, the seas off the coast of China,
the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk, and even the Gulf of Mexico). H
the Soviets could control the Mediterranean and the seas around the
United Kingdom and North Europe, the credibility of US support to NATO
would drop very sharply.
Airborne, destructive lasers provide a method of aircraft attack
which is more nearly omnidirectional than by using guided missiles,
which are typically limited to a forward cone of attack of Fe rhaps 20?.
The most probable use is at altitudes above the clouds, which are
largely opaque to lasers, in the "air superiority" altitude range.
Technical counterintelligence is an option more available to the
Soviets than to the United States. It involves denying the United States
access to ELINT, COMINT, and PHOTINT by various coding and
camouflage means.
If exoatmospheric discriminants against re-entry vehicles existed
for antiballistic missile defense, destruction of RV's while they are
'
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
. . -?
still in space would be clearly practical. In the Soviet case, such a
development might make possible the use of SA-5' (or other barrier-
like systems) which are presently limited by saturation by penaids.
A night operations capability, if widespread in the Soviet land
forces could profoundly influence the ability of NATO to deter or
ward off an attack. Few, if any, night operations can be carried out
successfully at present by NATO forces.
A different kind of development might be new uses for politically
controversial weapons such as tactical nuclear weapons or non-lethal
chemical weapons. Such weapons suffer from being a different kind of
weapon which can invite escalation. The use of such weapons in a
different mode might appear "justified" by world opinion. One example
might be an undersea nuclear-armed barrier for blockade purposes
which is triggered only by the "aggressor" trying to break the blockade.
Another example might be the use of small nuclear weapons for control
of near-space whenever "aggressive" satellites or FOBs passed over-
head. The significance of these "Sputniks" is that they would combine
political as well as technical resolutions.
The increasing fire power of the foot soldier, now capable of
carrying even antiaircraft missiles means that dispersed fire power
carried by large numbers of individuals could effectively preclude air
operations and helicopter-borne armies.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
Many of these potential Sputnik areas could be covered by the
Soviets within their baseline strategy".
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. MILITARY RDT&E STRATEGIES
As of September 1970, it is unlikely that the U.S. military RDT&E
appropriation for FY 1972 will exceed the Fiscal Guidance, and it is likely
to be somewhat less. For purposes of this discussion, it will be assumed
that the first fiscal year in which a change could be made would be FY 1973
and that the Soviet strategy is the $10.5 billion per year "baseline strategy"
discussed earlier,
Th first implication for possible US military RDT&E strategies
is that a close watch must be kept on Soviet military RDT&E and its
budgets. Comparisons of US and USSR technologies and weapons
systems should be made on a more continuing and intensive basis to
help verify trends. It is possible that the Soviets would not follow the
strategies given here, that Soviet development programs would run into
severe difficulties, or that the Soviets would react to the decreased US
military RDT&E by a decrease 6f their own. In any case, the initiative
for increasing military RDT&E has clearly passed to the USSR. If the
USSR recognizes this, a Soviet counter move to our increased interest
in their RDT&E could be an increased secrecy in Soviet weapons systems
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
? IP
development so that the United States would not be aware of RDT&E
trends until as late as possible.
In the past, US military RDT&E policy has been one of maintaining
overall excellence across a whole spectrum of missions, conflict, and
contingencies. If the Soviets now follow a policy likely to lead to
Sputniks, the US counter-policy within fiscal guidance probably should
be changed to Sputnik avoidance;
io ee p
US should work to minimize
the maximum risks. This minimax strategy could be called an
"avoidance of surprise" strategy.
From past history, however, it is unlikely that the US would permit
Li..1its critic technological leads to be reduced to zero. Once that possi-
bility was very clear, recovery efforts would be likely. The recovery
efforts would necessarily involve major funding 'changes, although these
change's are not beyond the technical capacity of the US to undertake.
For example, if a recovery plan were initiated in 1973 with the
intent of returning to the 1968 technological position by 1976, it would
require $13.7 billion a year in 1973. through 1976, followed by $10.5
billion a year (USSR baseline) thereafter.
As another example, if the recovery plan is to start in fiscal 1973
but recover to the 1968 plan only by 1978, the budget from 1973 to 1978
would be $12.5 billion per year, followed by $10.5 billion po r year
thereafter.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
111P
Recovery plans of this magnitude seem so large as to be unbelievable
under present financial and political conditions. A true Sputnik may be
required to trigger off the recovery. Considering the status, motivations,
and "baseline strategy" funding for the Soviet programs, a Sputnik is un-
likely before 1973 but probable by 1976? This would tend to say that
actual US recovery efforts would more likely be later but still larger.
The large magnitude of such recovery plans, when discussed with
some members of the Services, revealed an interesting phenomenon:
the self-limiting of ideas in the RDT&E community by the narrow confines
of the budgetary restrictions. The RDT&E people were almost automatical-
ly excluding from any consideration any projects of "great" size. Instead,
the thinking tended.to be on a large number of smaller projects, many of
which might not survive, but at least some of which could be shoe-horned
in. The exclusion of the larger projects from consideration or even
paper studies could present a special kind of danger to the United States
-- the Soviet R&D people need not be so bound.
? It therefore may be important in any US RDT&E strategy for the
next several years to make sure that larger projects, such as the Soviets
might well undertake, at least be studied by the US, if not tried out on a
much scaled down basis.
Z4
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. In 1968 US had about a 2,-year, positive, technological lead
over the USSR, on the average, in military RDT&E.
B. In 1968 the US and USSR effective efforts were approximately
equal.
C. Since 1968 the US effort has declined and the USSR effort
increased at rates which, if continued in likely ways, would reduce
the US lead to between zero and minus several years by 1976.
? D. Changes in US military RDT&E strategy to Minimize the
effects of these trends include changes in program emphasis (avoidance
of surprise) and budgets (recovery plans). If the Soviets adopt the
"baseline strategy" given here, the magnitude of the US RDT&E fund-
ing problem is $3 billion to $5 billion per year through 1976.
E. RECHTIN
18 Sept. 1970
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
Comparative Technology Studies for Threat Assessment - Air Force
Systems Command, November 1969, SECRET
Comparison of Soviet and U.S. Military and Space RDT&E - Institute
for Defense Analyses. Research Paper P-615, December 1969.
SECRET
A Study of the Soviet Technological Threat - Foreign Technology Div.,
Air Force Systems Command, April 1970. SECRET
Economic Intelligence Statistical Handbook - Directorate, of Intelligence,
Central Intelligence Agency, 1970. SECRET
Net Technical Assessment (NTA) - A Report of the liefense Science
Board 1970 Summer Study, TOP SECRET.
Potential1 ABM Capabilities of a SA-5 (Tallinn) System,
Study Group, July 1968, TOP SECRET
Joint CIA- DIA
Advanced Submarine Technology and Design Concepts, Report of a 1969
Workshop sponsored by the Advanced Research Projects Agency, ARPA
Order,1348, June 1970, Marine Physical Laboratory of the Scripps
Institute of Oceanography, SECRET
A Vulnerability Study of the Fleet Ballistic Missile System, Special
Assistant (Threat Assessment) Office of the Director of Defense
Research & Engineering, March 1970. TOP SECRET
Analysis of Moskva Class CHG Second Deployment , Assistant for
Undersea Warfare Office of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations
(Intelligence), February 1970, TOP SECRET
Study of Polaris Vulnerability, Vol. III. Mediterranean Operations (Moskva)
TRW Systems Group, January 1970 TOP SECRET
26
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
IP
BrBLIOGRAPHY
This list is not intended to be complete, only to provide the reader with
contacts to areas where more detailed investigation is underway.
Defense Posture - A Report of the Defense Science Boards 1969
Summer Study, SECRET
Major US/USSR Weapon Systems Developed and/or Identified Since 1963
Special Assistant (Threat Assessment) Office of Director of Defense
Research & Engineering, 1969, SECRET
Janes' Fighting Ships - 1969-1970 - McGraw-Hill Publishing Company
US/USSR Naval Surface Systems - Department of the Navy, June 1969
(SECRET)
1
US/USSR Submarines - Department of the Navy, June 1969 - SECRET-
NOFORN
US/USSR Field Artillery Weapons (Tube) - Army Material Command (FSTC)
August 1969, CONFIDENTIAL
US/USSR ICBM Systems Air Force Systems Command , Sept 1969
SEC RET-NOFORN
Soviet Expenditures for Research and Development - Directorate of
Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, October 1969. SECRET
US/USSR Air Defense Systems - Special Assistant (Threat Assessment)
Office of Director Defense Research & Engineering, Nov. 1969 -SECRET
77
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
A New ,Air-to-Air Combat Weapon - Hundley et al, Rand Corporation,
ust. 1970 - Rand Control RM-6303-ARPA (8)
A Brief of the TOM Sub-group of the DDR&E Reentry Program Review
Group 10 May, 1968 - SECRET
?? Increasing Vulnerability of Established Governments to Increasingly
. Effective Foot Mobile Weapons
(ARPA/TIO), SECRET
- Cresson Kearny, 1968, Unpublished
Underwater Photo Optical Instrumentation Applications - SPIE Seminar
Proceedings Volume 12 Society of Photographic Instrumentation
Engineers. Seminar Proceedings Feb 5 and 6, 1968, San Diego, Calif.
(UNCLASSIFIED)
Detection of a Submerged Target from an Elevated Platform using an
Optical Radar - a British report by P. A. Blackburn, Published by
Plessey Electronics Co., Ltd 10 May 1967 -SECRET
Estimated Detection Depth of a Submarine Using an Airborne Optical
Radar, - a British report by P.A. Blackburn, Published by Plessey
Electronics, Co., Ltd. 12 June 1967 - SECRET.
Measurements of Collimated and Diffused Light Attenuation in Sea Water
at a Wave Length of 0145 microns. a British report by P. A. Blackburn,
-Published by Plessey Electronics Co., Ltd -31 March 1966- SECRET
?
Test and Evaluation of Airborne Laser Systems - Hughes Aircraft Co.
Aeronautical System Division -AFSWC-.TR-70-10 Vol. I, August 1970 -
W. A. Yates, S. P. Lazzara, D. A. Ethington et al -SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2-013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
TECHNOLOGY
aaar
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
TECHNOLOGY
LEAD
TIME
FIGURE I
TECHNOLOGY COMPARISON I
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
TECHNOLOGY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
* ,
11,
FIGURE 2
TECHNOLOGY COMPARISON II
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
. No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
W
:
SECRET
US
USSR
1960
1964
1968
IRATEG)G OFFENSE
? ATLAS
SS-6
0
TITAN TE
SS-7
3
MM- DI
SS-9(M)
.
3
POLARIS
Y-CLASS
5
B-47
BADGER
5
B-52
BISON
1
1
1
STRATEGIC DEFENSE
NIKE-ZEUS
MOSCOW (1)
3
SAFEGUARD
MOSCOW (2)
? NIKE-HERCULES
SA-2
1
0
'HAWK
SA-3
2
?0
,
RC-121 ?MOSS
5
3
TACTICAL A/C
INTERCEPTORS
?
6
1
FIGHTER BOMBERS
5
5
6
AIR SUPERIORITY FGTRS
0
0
0
MIL AIRLIFT
1,
?3
4
HEAVY LIFT HELO
3
n.
\SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
?
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-H4K-12-1-3-3
Sri
Cara
.CONTHMED
r\r(RV
US
USSR
1960
1964
1968
ATTACK SUBS PN ASW
ARRAYS
6
5
4
SOS US? S-3 - TOWED
CRUISE MISSILE SUBS
+4
-13
-0
SURFACE SHIPS
6
1
6
-2
CRUISERS
DESTROYERS
ARTILLERY
0
TANKS
T-54
T-62
-
-1
0
M-48
I
M-60
MBT-70
.
IRBM
SS-4
SS-5
SS-11
-
0
-2
a '
THOR
JUPITER
PERSHING
CIVIL SPACE
VOTOK
VOSHKOD
-
0
MERCURY
GEMINI
APOLLO
TABLE 1 B
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
ZEri
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
W
SECRCT
TI7 r \
4
""-1
'
Major Categories
1960
STRATEGIC OFFENSE
STRATEGIC DEFENSE
TACTICAL
INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS
SPACE SYSTEMS
To
3
-ro 3
1
1964
2
0
1968
,?pgrl...sw01001?14MIXIMPOWORNE.
3
1 TC
3
TC 3
WEIGHTED AVERAGE
'ADM., RELATIVE 'EFFORT
0.7 T? 1.2
1.3
1.8 T? 2.5
1.0Z To 20% -
MILITARY RDT&E ONLY
WEIGHTED AVERAGE 1.7-ro 2.6
2O
1.6-0 2.3
APDIT., RELATIVE EFFORT
TO
107o ?
. ? sEcri:_11.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
14p '
?
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
GP
Nr
rf14 Li \JUi
zi,nt
trfai
A
1968 DOLLARS (BILL
lerdarrtsm?LoriftrimisLoomarolLmn~....61.0.1.01.1ennemnmen
54 56 58 1960 62 64 66 68 1970 ci:cnrir
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
SECRET
16
14
12
" 7\1 f?7?)
"?:::bd V.tatAl `471:./
-..,.r.-7\AF-7 fr.
\
..M?1
!
1950 52 .54 56 58 1960- 62. 64 66 68. 1970 CT
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
W
SECiltaT
0
1960 1962
USSR
AilL/TIRY 41/Z/74/er
1964 1966 1968 1970 (.7.,EcloaiT
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
.AanAAWA
i'?? 7'1
f.j
8961
Z0/80/?1,0Z Ilnd uo!leowssepac04 uo!43eic10 ON
9961
\
[7961
Z961
0961
0
Ad11/7//1/ A di/72/W
&SSW
r
SeiV110C1 S96I
.441.-V1
Z.(
171
.7? ;
":y0.0-.1.....A
?tv...1c...
\"471/43,^50
,,4,?1Nn
;- 9T
a
Z0/80/?1,0Z Ilnd uo!leowssepac04 uo!Peic10 ON
IIDE1S
?
kr". ?
a A ?
?
?
:r ?fr
fsici,?? ? .
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
: .i'c. rorm,A) r...,,
.L
, i
I''' 2N *\44?19 1 i:r.7 LA \
t 4,, r
0 11"17\'1: f r,
, ? '41* LI - 411 i i i"/, t:
LiAtjs. tj .j\
i_e n , r.,7'r-.3 11 /. 7
'fl .;, lal (447>O? .. L (7,C). tr.11t
14 to, ,,/
?
1960 1962 1964
S
1966
1968 1970
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
?
16
SECRET
14
12
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
.4*
n1', a7.7-J
u
0.4
EtIr Va el EMI OE Sir 3
1968
1970 1972
u.s. FISCAL GLHDAWCE
1974
1976 s
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
16
SECRET
14
rn) 4-1
r,r()
12
A
dfr
t.10TTeil, Alt
fl IR TVS it2 US VW Ma liZt rot sar
'''koMBGEEME*
US, FISCAL
3
1968
LEAD SUNS ? 1976
Fiscal Plans
CATEGORY
1 & 4
2&4
3&4
3 STRATEGIC OFFENSE
1 "2 STRATEGIC DEFENSE
1 To 2 TACTICAL
3 INTELLIGENCE
3 R & T
-P.
-3T0-4
SWOONS, POWAY&
a
-210-3 0,- -1
.
iMPPOtal.
616
1968
1970 1972
1974 1976
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
rCT
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-12-1-3-3
UNDERSEA WARFARE
a. THE TRANSPARENT SEA; BARRIERS
b. THE UNDERSEA TASK FORCE
c. THE SHALLOW CONFINED SEAS
2. AIRBORNE LASERS & AIR SUPERIORITY
3. TECHNICAL COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE
4. EXOATIV1OS PHER IC DISCRIMINANTS FOR ABM
5. NIGHT OPERATIONS
6. TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR
BARRIERS AND NEAR SPACE CONTROL
7. FOOT/MB ILE AA & ANTI-HELICOPTER
SECRET
?
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/02 : LOC-_HAK-12-1-3-3