NORTH VIETNAMESE INTENTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: October 19, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

NSA review
completed
pages 1-28
USAF
review(s)
completed
pages 1-28
NSS review
completed.
? No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
MEMORANDUM
SE
ET/SENSITIVE
_5828
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
October 19, 1973
URGENT ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN
SUBJECT: North Vietnamese Intentions
A National Intelligence Estimate (Tab A) on short-term prospects for
Vietnam has concluded that the chances for a dry season Communist
offensive in 1974 are roughjy even and that, in alai event, significant
but localized NVA/VC attatk-t will accelerate in the coming months.
We concur in-this- estimate of Hanoi's intentions but believe that the
possibility of escalation --- sparked by major local attacks ? raises the
chances of a renewal of all-out fighting to better than even. In light of
Communist preparations in MR-3 and their significantly more threatening
rhetoric, we recommend early WSAG discussion of certain cautionary
measures (i. e., air reconnaissance, deploying another aircraft carrier)
to deter Hanoi from proceeding with its military option in the South, and,
in any case, to give us a longer warning of an offensive.
The Estimate
The Estimate at Tab A argues that Hanoi remains dedicated to Communist
unification of Vietnam and that ultimately it will have to resort to intense
military action to attain its objective. A successful offensive could force
the ouster of the Thieu government and immeasurably enhance the Corn-
munists' leverage to secure the partisan implementation of the Paris
Agreement they seek. The Communists' political prospects are negligable,
and their chances are not good for prevailing with a longer-term political/
military strategy. While the DRV may not have made a final decision
on the timing of its offensive, it is pressing forward with a military option
and would be able to kick off a major campaign with little additional prepara-
tion, perhaps less than one month. Our warning on an offensive would be
limited, and the immediate preparations might not even be detected if
accomplished in small shifts of assets.
ET /SENSITIVE
??
XGDS 513 (1), (2), (3)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
I.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
SECRET /SENSITIVE
The Estimate concludes that "it is a close choice" whether Hanoi will opt
for a major offensive this dry season and it presents the _arguments of both
those analysts who believe Hanoi will strike sooner rather than later and
those who apparently believe the Communists will delay an attack until the
1974-1975 dry season. (We specifically requested that various views be
expressed in this NIE.)
Hanoi's decision on timing will be based on its perception of the situation in
the South, and on the positions of the United States, the Soviet Union and the
PRC. The military balance in the South only slightly favors the GVN, and
the Communists have increased substantially their capabilities over Easter
1972 (e.g. forward positioning of troops and supplies; greater concentration
of fire power, including twice as many tanks as the GVN; and the presence
of considerably more combat maneuver battalions in the South than at the
outset of the 1972 offensive). The Communist powers, however, are
apparently urging restraint on the DRY and would, likely oppose an unprovoked
offensive while detente is p4y2i-ng dividends, particularly if it appeared the
United States would reenter the war. Soviet and Chinese military aid continues
but perhaps at a reduced rate: (See accompanying memo for fuller discussion
of DRY military imports.) Concerning the United States reactions, Hanoi
undoubtedly views the chances of American forces reentering the war "under
any circumstances," as "greatly reduced." United States distraction with
the Middle East could further reduce Hanoi's fears of U.S. retaliation, but
the North Vietnamese cannot wholly dismiss the possibility of U.S. reentry.
If Hanoi does launch an offensive this dry season, its forces would make sub-
stantial territorial gains in MR-1, and U.S. air support may be required
there to assure continued ARVN resistance in fall-back positions around
Hue and Danang. Communist gains elsewhere would be less dramatic
and ARVN ultimately should be able to blunt these assaults. Hanoi would
be in a position to launch such a country-wide offensive by early January
and would employ its air force in MR-1 to -neutralize VNAF ground support.
The GVN, for its part, will continue operations against Communist positions,
but probably will not launch a pre-emptive strike without prior consultation
with the United States. If Hanoi does not launch a country-wide offensive
this dry season, the NIE predicts a period of accelerated, significant,
but localized and limited, attacks intended to test ARVN and big power
reactions and to seize additional territory. The odds favoring a major
offensive, however, will increase significantly as the 1974.41975 dry season
approaches.
?11,
SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
4kap
SECRET /SENSITIVE 3
Comment:
We concur in the Estimate's major conclusions and are inclined to agree
with those analysts who see major hostilities corning sooner rather than later.
We agree that the North Vietnamese clearly intend ? as a top priority matter
to resolve the situation in the South to their favor and that a resumption of
full-scale fighting is nearly inevitable ? at least within the next 18 months.
We also view MR-1 as the greatest threat area and concur that U.S. air
intervention -- if only in an interceptor role -- may be required to avoid
an ARVN debacle north of the Hai Van Pass. However, the absence of U.S.
air support elsewhere, or an inability fully to resupply ARVN could leave
the Communists with substantial territorial gains, even if they fall short of
their ultimate objective.
Our major dissent from the Estimate concerns the.question of timing for
renewed hostilities. The Estimate, in our opinion, gives too great credence
to questionable factors rest?raining an early NVA attack. It also fails to
consider the possibility that major localized offensives could escalate into
country-widelighting as a result of increasingly severe mutual retaliation.
We therefore rate the chances of a 1974 dry season offensive as better than
even. We further believe that Hanoi's immediate objective is to so change
the balance of power (by greatly weakening the ARVN and GVN) that the GVN
would be compelled to implement the Agreement according to Hanoi's
interpretation.
Concerning the timing of an offensive, the Estimate evenly balances off
arguments calling for a delayed offensive against arguments supporting an
early attack. We believe the latter are more compelling.
Citing arguments for a delayed offensive, the Estimate notes the fear of U.S.
retaliation, the present unlikelihood of Sino-Soviet assurances of full re-
placement of losses, the desire to further build up a weak political apparatus
and the absence of any requirement to act in haste. We question each of
these assertions.
Fear of U.S. retaliation did not deter: the DRV's 1972 offensives.
Recent Congressionar legislation requiring prior approval of U.S. military
action in Indochina further undermines our credibility. The possibility of
U.S. air intervention would, however, make a difference in case of a close
Politburo decision on the timing of an offensive.
As indicated by the'current Mid-East situation, Moscow is unwilling
to refuse full replacement to an ally once hostilities have begun, although
previously it might have counseled restraint. Sino-Soviet polemics and
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
?????????????????????????????.????
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
SECRET /SENSITIVE 4
third world imagery further increases this prospect in Vietnam. Moreover,
as the accompanying memorandum on DRV imports suggests, we believe
that the Communist powers continue substantial military deliveries to the
DRV which by themselves endow Hanoi with its current full military option.
? The Communists weakened political apparatus and negligable
political prospects are an argument for -- not against -- an offensive earlier
rather than later.
? Finally, the Easter offensive of 1972 and indeed the whole pattern
of NVA strategic thinking indicate that the North Vietnamese have chosen
to strike at times when we thought there was no requirement for haste. As
stated by the Assistant Chief of Staff, USAF, in a dissenting note on page 16,
"inflexibly, the NVA ha gt always chosen to pursue the offensive -- logistics
permitting." We add that Hanoi's strategy has usually preferred the gamble
of a major offensive versus a more gradual approach, and that its political/
military doctrine favors short-cuts to victory, ko.pping stages required by
the purist strategy of Mao.;`-
We are more impressed by.the following arguments cited in the Estimate
for an offensive sooner than later:
-- The speed of the buildup since January and heavy infiltration in
September suggests an intention to strike early.
The very presence of sufficient stocks for an entire dry season
offensive makes it unlikely that Sino-Soviet pressure will be a decisive
factor. In any event, a complete cutoff of supplies -- which is mostly
improbable ? would not affect the front for many months.
? Hanoi may well regard the risk of U.S. reinvolvement as fairly small.
? Hanoi may wish to strike before .(1) the U.S. domestic situation
improves, (2) its own political apparatus in the South deteriorates further,
and (3) detente proceeds further.
Finally, a number of other recent developmenis form a pattern indicating
that the North Vietnamese will strike early. These are described in the
paper at Tab B.
For all of the above considerations, we believe that Hanoi is seriously
preparing for an offensive this dry season. The final decision to launch an
offensive would no doubt be influenced by Hanoi's estimate of our probable
? ?
SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
SECRET /SENSITIVE
5
reaction. Moreover, the Chinese would be more inclined to help
restrain Hanoi, if they believed an offensive would be countered by
U.S. air power. However, we do not believe a major offensive would
be launched before most of the South Vietnamese rice harvest is in (i. e.
February 1974). With the above factors in mind, we recommend con-
sideration of the following actions to discourage a DRV offensive, and,in
any case, to provide us with greater forewarning:
?????
Resumption of SR-71 flights over the DRY.
-- Stationing another aircraft carrier in the Gulf of Tonkin.
-- Assuring that adequate communications intelligence facilities
are allocated to the Vietnam 'situation. ?
gaps.
-- Reconvening the Paris Conference on Indochina.
-- Delivery of additional equipment to ARVN to remedy air defense
-- Immediate ear-marking of funds, equipment and transport -- on
contingency for ARVN resupply in the event. (If an nffpnsive.
RECOMMENDATION:
That the WSAG meet at the earliest possible date to discuss the actions
proposed above and the developing situation in South Vietnam.
APPROVE DISAPPROVE
zae
Concurrence: Don Stukeld-c
alecrrrisENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
RECEIVED
H
OCT It 11 rk03
NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE
Short-Term Prospects for Vietnam
Secret
Controlled Dissem
Secret
INI)E 53/14.3-73
12 October 1973
Copy N2 19
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
SECRET
NIE 53/14.3-73
SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS
FOR VIETNAM
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
SECRET
CONTENTS
Page
PR?IS 1
THE ESTIMATE 3
I. INTRODUCTION 3
IL THE VIEW FROM HANOI 3
A. Hanoi's Options 4
B. Factors Influencing Hanoi's Policy Decisions 4
North Vietnam's Internal Strengths and Weaknesses 4
The Communists' Position in the South 5
External Pressures 9
III. THE VIEW FROM SAIGON 11
A. Saigon's Options 11
B. Factors Influencing GVN Policy and Capabilities 11
Political and Economic Strength of the qvN 11
Can RVNAF Meet the Challenge? 13
IV. PROSPECTS THROUGH THE DRY SEASON (OCTOBER 1973-
MAY 1974)
A. The GVN
B. The Communists
Arguments for an Early Offensive
Arguments That an Offensive Will be Delayed
If There Is an Offensive
If There Is Not an Offensive
15
15
15,
16
17
18
18
V. OVER THE LONGER TERM
19
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22 : LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
SECRET
SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS
FOR VIETNAM
PR?IS
The major judgments in this Estimate are:
A. Hands actions are clearly designed to insure that it can again
resort to major military action at some point to gain its objectives if
other means fail. The chances of the communists gaining power
through the political provisions of the Paris agreement are negligible;
nor are their prospects good for achieving the GVN's collapse through
a combination of political and clandestine warfare backed up by only
moderate military pressure. Hanoi may not have made a final de-
cision as to the timing of a major offensive. It must, however, believe
that it will ultimately have to return to .the battlefield to seek its ob-
jective of reunifying Vietnam. (Paras. 3, 54.)
B. The current military balance in South Vietnam is only slightly
in favor of the GVN; with heavy infiltration and supply movements,
it may have shifted to the communists' advantage by mid-1974. The
political balance, however, is clearly in the GVN's favor and will re,-
main so. (Paras. 6-19, 31-53.)
C. The forward positioning of communist forces and supplies and
the improved road system give Hanoi the capability to kick off a
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
2
SECRET
major military campaign with little additional preparation, perhaps
less than a month. (Paras. 1345, 55.)
D. It is a close choice whether Hanoi will opt for a major mili-
tary offensive during the current dry season (October 1973-May 1974).
In making its decision Hanoi must assess the following factors:
? The likelihood and extent of a US response; the positions of
Moscow and Peking, particularly the consequences to the North
Vietnamese position if they can not be certain of enough ma-
terial support to cover losses that would accompany prolonged
heavy combat; the military balance between its forces and
the RVNAF; and the overall political and military situation
in the South. (Para. 56.)
? The arguments for and against an offensive this dry season are
presented in paragraphs 57-64.1
E. If there is not an offensive this dry season, Hanoi will continue
to launch and no doubt accelerate carefully orchestrated significant
localized, and limited-objective attacks in various regions of South
Vietnam to seize territory and test the GVN's resolution. ( Paras. 67-
(38.)
F. In the event of a major communist military effort this dry sea-
son, however, the communists would initially make substantial terri-
torial gains in MR-1 where they would probably commit their own
air assets. If the fighting were prolonged, RVNAF's continued resis-
tance in MR-1 would be in doubt without renewed US air support.
Communist gains in the rest of South Vietnam would be less dra-
matic, and RVNAF should be able to blunt the communist assault.
(Paras. 44, 65-66.)
G. Beyond this dry season, we believe the odds favoring a major
communist offensive will increase significantly in the following dry
season. (Para. 78.)
? Over the long run, Hanoi may place greater weight on trends
it observes in the South than on the external restraints imposed
by Moscow, Peking, and Washington. (Paras. 69-75.)
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that the case postulated in favor
of a North Vietnamese offensive in 1974, earlier rather than later, merits greater weight than
the case against such an offensive. His arguments in support of this position are presented in
his footnote on page 16.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22 : LOC-HAK-118-2-1,0-.7.Ismommommou
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
SECRET
THE ESTIMATE
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The current situation in Vietnam is one
of "less fire" rather than "cease fire", and there
is no real peace. Both sides have initiated or
provoked some of the fighting that has oc-
curred since the January accords, primarily
by attempting to seize or retake territory
deemed strategic. In addition, the commu-
nists have replenished their southern forces,
ignoring the Paris accords' strictures against
personnel augmentation or equipment re-
supply beyond ICCS-supervised exchanges of
used materiel. The communists have also en-
gaged in a variety of activities such as road
building which, while not technically a viola-
tion of the Paris agreement, enhance their
military potential.
2. The ICCS has been ineffective in its
peace-keeping functions. Nor is there reason
to hope that the ICCS \\rill be effective in com-
ing months. Neither Vietnamese party will
limit its actions solely because of the formal
machinery of the Paris agreement. If any-
thing, the ICCS became weaker with the with-
drawal of Canada and the substitution of Iran.
In essence, the governing factors for both
North and South Vietnam will remain what
they have always been?the perception of
both Vietnamese parties of the gains and risks
involved in pursuing a course of action.
II. THE VIEW FROM HANOI
3. Hanoi has made it clear that it clings to
its ultimate goal of uniting Vietnam under
communism and will pursue this goal by what-
ever means possible. But in signing the Paris
agreement, North Vietnam admitted that it
then faced formidable constraints?military
pressure had failed to crack ARVN's resolve
and the communist position was growing
weaker; the US would not dissolve its commit-
ment to Saigon (indeed, the US response in
1972 was greater than Hanoi anticipated);
Hanoi's Soviet and Chinese allies were an-
xious for detente with Washington; and the
cumulative pressures of the war were creat-
ing stresses and war-weariness in North Viet-
nam itself. The North Vietnamese were thus
forced to make major concessions in Paris?
they had to retreat from their longstanding
demand for Thieu's removal, the formation
of a coalition government, and an end to US
military assistance.
SECRET 3
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22 : LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
SECRET
4. Hanoi did not, however, leave Paris'
empty-handed. The cease-fire and bombing
halt left communist forces in control of sub-
stantial, but largely unpopulated, areas in
South Vietnam and allowed badly hurt units
an opportunity to rest and refit. Politically,
the PRG gained some aura of respectability.
Military pressure on the North ceased, per-
mitting renewed attention to reconstruction
and development. And?most important?the
agreement signaled the end of direct US
military participation in the war.
A. Hanoi's Options
5. In weighing its strategy in the South,
North Vietnam can choose from several
courses of action.
? It can forego large-scale military opera-
tions and attempt to compete primarily
through open political competition and
clandestine warfare. Displays of military
muscle would be designed primarily to
protect communist personnel in the field.
? While keeping a lid on large-scale mili-
tary operations, Hanoi can maintain a
moderate level of main-force pressure to
assess the capabilities and reactions of
the other side. At the same time, it can
continue to build up its forces toward the
time when it might be feasible to re-
new all-out hostilities. Essentially, this
is the course of action that Hanoi is now
following.2
? Or, Hanoi can opt to renew offensive
warfare on the scale of Tet 1968 or March
1972, either countrywide or in one or
two military regions with lower levels of
Neither of the above options necessarily excludes
an occasional flare-up of more serious fighting. An
integral aspect of both would be the build-up of the
political and economic viability of the communist
enclave in western South Vietnam.
4
action elsewhere. Such actions could be
preceded by a gradual escalation of mili-
tary pressure?rather than an abrupt
series of major assaults?on the theory
that such a course would minimize the
chance of US intervention.
B. Factors Influencing Hanoi's Policy
Decisions
North Vietnam's Internal Strengths
and Weaknesses
6. Political leadership in North Vietnam is
stable, cohesive, and unchallenged. From
time to time, however, there are indications
of public and private debate within the rul-
ing hierarchy over basic issues, e.g., large-
scale military attacks versus guerrilla warfare
tactics, reconstruction of the North versus
liberation of the South, and emphasis on politi-
cal tactics versus military action. Even though
rivalries and policy disputes may exist within
the collegial apparatus that has ruled since
Ho Chi Minh's death, they are masked by a
public display of unity and an apparent will-
ingness of the Politburo members to fall in
line once decisions are made.3
7. Since the cease-fire, Hanoi has rebuilt
and strenghtened its internal military struc-
ture. The country's air defenses appear
stronger than ever. Hanoi has replenished its
fighter inventory by bringing most of its
-Mig-15s and "Mig-17s home from China, is
integrating Soviet SA-3 missiles into its air
defense network around Hanoi, and has reno-
vated, streamlined, and modernized its radar
network. The navy also appears stronger as a
result of the acquisition in late 1972 of Chi-
It is not possible to speculate meaningfully on the
consequences of change by death or removal of one
or more of Hanoi's leaders. But in the short run, we
do not think it would make much difference.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
SECRET
nese and Soviet gunboats, including KOMARs.
The ground forces have been strengthened by
the addition of new armor and artillery, al-
though it is not clear when this materiel en-
tered the North Vietnamese inventory.
8. There is evidence as well that North
Vietnamese training programs have been
tailored to correct the weaknesses in leader-
ship, discipline and tactics that hampered its
army throughout last year's offensive. Accord-
ing to North Vietnamese military journals,
conventional warfare doctrine emphasizing
the combined use of armor, artillery, and in-
fantry forces is still being stressed. (Coordina-
tion between armor and infantry was markedly
lacking in the March 1972 offensive.) As in
previous years, the North Vietnamese con-
ducted their fall military conscription cam-
paign during August 1973. There is no doubt
that North Vietnam has adequate manpower
resources for maintaining a large standing
army, and the number of men reaching draft
age each year is more than sufficient for
absorbing a continuing high rate of casualties
if major military action were resumed.
9. Communist propaganda continues to list
reconstruction as the nation's foremost pri-
ority. The bulk of North Vietnam's efforts to
date, however, has gone into activities which
serve both war-related and civilian needs.
10. In making its policy decisions, the
regime might give some consideration?albeit
minor?to popular attitudes. There is no evi-
dence, however, of significant popular unrest
or serious opposition to the government's poli-
cies. The populace would fear that renewed
US bombing would accompany a major offen-
sive. Such potential problems, however, could
almost certainly be kept in bounds by the
regime, particularly if external military aid
were forthcoming.
The Communists' Position in the South
11. The communists failed to capture and
hold any major population centers in the 1972
offensive, but did seize territory which they
are turning into relatively secure base areas
in which an extensive and heavily defended
interlocking road system is being constructed.
(See Figure 1.) The termination of Ameri-
can bombing has relieved most of the pres-
sure on communist logistics and infiltration.
Communist efforts at population resettlement
and economic development in PRG areas will
be some time (if ever) in reaching fruition,
but the communists' western enclave already
provides them a forward staging area for any
future offensive.
12. Since the beginning of the year, North
Vietnam has also substantially increased the
capabilities of its forces in South Vietnam,
notably so in MR-1. Although the GVN re-
tains a substantial manpower advantage in
the other military regions, in MR-1 the com-
munists now have a rough parity of forces
with ARVN. (See Figure 2.) Moreover, the
expansion of NVA firepower has been impres-
sive throughout the country; North Vietnamese
forces have a greater concentration of fire-
power than they had at the outset of the of-
fensive in March 1972. There have been sig-
nificant increases in AAA, armor, and artillery.
North Vietnamese SAMs are deployed in
northern South Vietnam. In addition, the com-
munists have rebuilt, or can repair, a number
of baptured airfields.
13. Perhaps the most ominous aspect of the
communist buildup is the positioning of huge
stockpiles in or near South Vietnam. From
a strictly materiel standpoint, stockpiles of
major categories of equipment in place in the
North Vietnamese Panhandle, South Vietnam,
and adjacent border areas would allow com-
munist forces to maintain heavy combat ac-
tivity throughout an entire dry season and
SECRET 5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
SECRET Winh .... _ v....?,nncAroporternarrhnh!.,nh
trmnrretion
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7 L'n?
unn
Pais
Linh
Dong Ha
,Hon La
(anchorage)
Ouang the
Dong Hoi
Vinh Linh
Demarcation Line
simpsit New Communist Supply Corridors
13a La
Ouang Tri
MR 1.
D. Nang
Ouang Ngai
saHoynh
Vietnam
A
Phum Sdo
Ach Romeas
. /Khann
- 1
ittyr.,.n ? IN
a La .
ar
20 "
Binh
lhuan
e.a. Kap'
Ha Tien
Duong DOng? fr'Sao
I Phu ()UPC
,e
(Kien Glans)
Hoe
Pentane
G Id 11
56209 10-73 CIA
01,1A
hanh\
Hung
^ r7'on
KWO H0a
\ety Vinh
MR 4
Bar, Lieu
vu
Con Son
Phan Thiel
MIR 3
V.ang Tan
'CAPITAL SPECIAL ZONE '?
South Vietnam
, and
North Vietnam Panhandle
---- Province boundary
Ell UM Military region
lii:wirAtiiAri International Commission
of Control and Supervision
region boundary
Road
Railroad
POL pipeline
o 25 60 75 Miles
O 25 50 75 Kilometers
ha Trang
Can Ranh
Cars Ranh
Phan Rang
Deo Phu Qui
25X1
Nam.* and boundary rPotasentation
are not nee..... authoritative
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
Figure 2
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
Communist and South Vietnamese Regular Combat Forces in South Vietnam
South Vietnam
Regular Cotnhat Forces
vcyNVA1 RVNAF 2
180,000 320,000
Demarcation Line
Quang Tri
) 1
...
MR 1 .!" 0 .
VCIN VA RVNA F Thua
Thien
86,000 t,..
89,000
Chiang
325th
Nam r
VNMC
/
324B Airborne ,--....--
MR 1
320B 1st Quang Tin .....?..,..
304th 2nd r--?
711th 3rd
Quang
2nd Regional t4u:gani
Forces
Kontum
r...
I. Includes VC/NVA personnel in ground combat, combat
VCINVA R VNAF MR 2 /
support, and air defense units and local force companies and *\
(platoons. ..'------(?Pinh Dinh
2. RVNAF Ground Order of Battle. Includes assigned 32,000 68,000 ..-
personnel in ARVN/VNMC ground combat and combat (,)
support units, and Regional Force battalions. Although
...:1--N,
present for duty strength is no longer available, it is estimated 320th 23rd Pleiku I _ ,
to be about 85% of assigned strength. 10th 22nd
? r-C:;""hu
MR 3 3rd Regional )
VCIN VA RVNAF ? Forces
%..... Yen
\ ..)
36,00075,000 .----.X
Darlac
429th Sapper 25th)MR 2
, Command 18th,...4i(Hboa:h ,...
9th
5th
Regional Quang Duc
7th
Tj Cam Pa"
uyen fiL'c ,..... i"::--
..,,,.....,-,........'S'`.1 Dc:4)uc 4 i'll"..'h'I -1?
Oth Forces Phuoc "1.
Tay Ninh ? Binh f
1. Long Lam Dong .N, .....yrnuan -
1.14./..{.;.:_isuoionn.nhi_ggf.e.
? -1. ....,4?..,/,(Lhoanngh
..." Thuan ,
;) Binh
is???)-\,
, Binh
rau%_,. ll Bien
:1.17.huoc.1.?
.$ Kien\ Kien
Chau .3..,,,phong .Tuong Tuy L
....?? Doc....s N, , )7,..--:. pa
... ?
e\....), ' MR 3
YAn Glana(;.a ..4"C''''..?.--24'??:1-.?..?Gon?0
,......... Dec . i
..,r.Vinh Long & Kien Hoa _?...r CAPITAL SPECIAL ZONE
N
Kien >,,Phori-g\ ...r \.?
,
r \Dinh
Glang Ig
uon '?^P; N Binh \
rhienrY
i *Ba .
\
\"-.--4... Xu en
Bact-'4"? ,,iviR 4
..: Lieu
1.?
An 's, a t^
MR 4
1t/N VA RVNAF
26,000 88,000
1st
21st
9th
7th
44th Special
Tactical Zone
Regional Forces
, Deo
Phu Ouoc
(Klan Giang)
?itGP004 10-73 CIA
Xuyen
Con
?"woossisimok Military region boundary
-- Province boundary
AlIT' "I' ICCS region boundary
o 25 50 75 Miles
o 25 50 75 Kilometers
NAM
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
SECRET
beyond without any overriding necessity for
replenishment. The availability of POL and
food is probably more limited. Despite im-
provements of their logistical situation, how-
ever, communist forces would still face some
local distribution problems in preparing for
and sustaining major military action.
14. There are now considerably more com-
munist combat maneuver battalions and per-
sonnel in South Vietnam than at the onset of
the 1972 offensive, though many of the units
are not totally up to strength. Some 65,000
NVA combat and administrative services per-
sonnel have infiltrated south during the first
nine months of 1973, the largest portion going
to MR-1. Infiltration of combat troops picked
up in September, and we expect it to continue
in the coming dry season months. The level of
such movement will be one clue to Hanoi's in-
tentions. Heavy infiltration would bring NVA
forces in the South up to full strength and
establish a replacement pool, thus enhancing
their capability to launch and sustain an offen-
sive. A low infiltration level, on the other
hand, would suggest that Hanoi did not ex-
pect heavy military activity in the winter and
spring.
15. In general, the communists still have
the advantage of being able to choose the time
and place for military action. And with per-
sonnel and supplies in place close to the battle-
field, little lead time is needed for preparing
for an offensive, perhaps less than a month.
A rapid buildup of personnel and supplies
would be detected, but small shifts of per-
sonnel, units, or supplies might not.
16. In weighing the military factors, one
clear conclusion emerges: the current mili-
tary balance is only slightly in favor of the
GVN.
17. On the other hand, the political balance
is clearly in the GVN's favor and will remain
so. The communist infrastructure is still weak
8
as a result of the devastating losses of the
1968 offensive and subsequent government
pacification campaigns: although there have
been some improvements in the infrastructure
in at least a few areas. Hard intelligence on
the VCI is limited, but there is a generally
negative cast in reports on its status, at least
to the extent of strongly suggesting that the
rebuilding effort will take time. The most
serious problem of the VCI is its inability
to maintain close contact with the population.
This is most apparent in urban areas, but
even in the countryside, communist access is
18. The communist presence is still demon-
strated by terrorism, enforced tax collection,
kidnapping, and harassment. Much of the
population is not firmly committed to either
side and remains sensitive to any show of
force or any shift in the balance of power.
Local accommodations are easily arranged and
are probably widespread. The North Viet-
namese are making open efforts to communi-
cate with ARVN units to consolidate cease-
fire positions. Covert arrangements between
the communists and local GVN defense forces
in isolated villages and outposts are not easily
discerned or prevented. These usually work
to the communists' advantage by reducing the
pressure on base areas, facilitating entry into
villages and hamlets for taxing and prose-
lyting, and reducing the flow of intelligence
to the government on communist strength and
activities.
19. The communist enclaves provide Hanoi
a very limited potential for developing an
economic base in South Vietnam. The com-
munists are most securely ensconced in north-
ern and western MR-1, but this is not an
economically viable area. To build any type
of economic infrastructure in the communist-
held areas of MR-1 will require beavY imports
from North Vietnam and a continued influx
of civilian specialists. From a strictly eco-
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
mansofferause,111
Worbrx-Dpiram...-
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
SECRET
nomic sense, the communist areas in MR-3
have slightly more potential. In general, how-
ever, communist holdings are in isolated areas
that are sparsely populated and lacking in
resources. The North Vietnamese leaders ap-
pear to realize that there is little prospect for
a viable "Third Vietnam" in the South which
could compete economically or politically with
the GVN. Instead, the focus now seems to be
on using these areas as forward staging areas
for communist military forces.
External Pressures
20. The USSR and China. Hanoi has often
ignored the advice of its major communist
allies in formulating its wartime strategy and
counted on forcing their support for reasons
of fraternal solidarity and Sino-Soviet com-
petition. Nonetheless, the North Vietnamese
leaders are cognizant of their ultimate de-
pendence on their allies' material assistance
and have been somewhat sensitive both to
their positions on the war and to their rela-
tions with each other and with the US. Chi-
nese-Soviet rivalry offered Hanoi some insur-
ance in the past that neither would abandon
the field of fraternal support to the other.
While this still holds true to some extent,
their interest in detente with Washington has
produced a commonality of interest between
Moscow and Peking in restraining Hanoi's ac-
tions. Hanoi's latitude for playing China and
the USSR off against each other has been
reduced. For example, since the cease-fire,
North Vietnamese leaders have made their
annual pilgrimages to Moscow and Peking to
review their relations and seek new aid agree-
ments. Unlike past years, however, there was
no subsequent announcement of military aid
from the USSR, although military aid was
mentioned after Le Duan's visit to Peking.
North Vietnamese public statements ( al-
though not the most reliable weathervane)
seem to indicate less than a satisfactory out-
come.
25X1
21. Although Hanoi is now in a logistics
position to launch and sustain prolonged heavy
military operations in South Vietnam, a deci-
sion to do so in the face of opposition by
Moscow and Peking and without some as-
surances of a continued flow of supplies
would represent a major gamble unless Hanoi
were confident of RVNAF's collapse. To do
otherwise would leave Hanoi, should its mili-
tary effort fail, faced with drawn down stocks
and no assurance of replacement. Over the
short term, POL and foodstuffs would be the
major requirements, especially in North Viet-
nam itself. Since these items have civilian as
well as military value, China and the USSR
might find it easier to rationalize supplying
them to Hanoi than would be the case for
purely military equipment.
22. At this point, both Moscow and Peking
appear to be urging restraint on Hanoi, in
part because they view detente with the US
as a priority interest. They are not prepared
to abandon Hanoi and will certainly continue
to provide some military aid to North Viet-
nam, though perhaps at reduced levels. 5 (Dur-
ing the 1972 offensive, for example, while both
allies seemed to point to the benefits of a
negotiated settlement, neither attempted to
'Even without assurances from their allies, the
North Vietnamese might consider launching an offen-
sive limited in objectives and duration.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
9
, 44,,
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22 : LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
SECRET
force the issue by drastically reducing their
logistic support.) But an offensive launched
without provocation at a time when more
relaxed great power relations seemed to be
paying dividends would be opposed by Mos-
cow and Peking, particularly if the offensive
appeared likely to cause the US to reenter
the war. Under these circumstances, Hanoi's
allies would continue their aid, but would
probably not increase it to cover the losses.
But in view of Hanoi's sizable military stock-
piles, such reluctance on the part of its allies
would have more impact in political terms
than on Hanoi's military capabilities in the
short run.
23. The US. Judgments about the potential
US reaction to a major military effort by the
communists would be a major factor in Hanoi's
policy calculations. A large-scale offensive
would be a total rupture of the Paris agree-
ment and, as such, would remove its restric-
tions on active American involvement, Hanoi
undoubtedly views the chances of American
forces reentering the war under any circum-
stances as greatly reduced due to domestic
political pressures. In addition, if Hanoi per-
ceived the US as being preoccupied with try-
ing to settle a prolonged Arab-Israeli conflict,
it might calculate that the US would be di-
verted from responding to a major communist
provocation in Vietnam. But the North Viet-
namese leaders would not dismiss the pos-
sibility of an American reaction, in part be-
cause they have been so wrong before in
gauging the impact of American politics on
the war. While the "stick" of American air
power would be carefully considered before
deciding whether to launch an offensive, the
"carrot" of American dollars would represent
no more than a minor factor in Hanoi's policy
calculations.
24. Cambodia. Communist action in Cam-
bodia is not likely to provide clear indications
of Hanoi's intentions in South Vietnam since
there are uncertainties about how much con-
10
trol the North Vietnamese have over the
Khmer insurgents. In addition, Hanoi's en-
couragement of a relatively low scale of fight-
ing in the Cambodian - quadrant would not
necessarily mean that Hanoi had decided to
lie low in South Vietnam. Indeed, the North
Vietnamese might not want to tip their hand
by striking out hard in Cambodia if they were
contemplating major action in South Vietnam.
Conversely, prior to launching an offensive in
South Vietnam, Hanoi might want to wrap
up the Cambodian situation to obtain a more
accurate indication at lower cost of how the
US might react to stepped-up communist
action.
25. A communist victory in Cambodia
would not bring about an immediate or major
shift in the present balance of military power
in South Vietnam. Hanoi already enjoys the
access it needs to the eastern Cambodian prov-
inces along the South Vietnamese border, and
the cessation of US bombing has removed
most of the danger of using this region. A
communist-controlled Cambodia, however,
could ease communist logistical burdens by
opening the port of Kompong Som to com-
munist shipping. But Hanoi would probably
hesitate to make great use of the port in the
short run; it would almost certainly want
to wait to see how the US and South Vietnam
reacted to Cambodia's collapse, and it would
not want or need to reveal its strategic plans
by pouring supplies through Kompong Som.
26. In the short term, the major import of
a communist victory in Cambodia on Hanoi's
intentions in South Vietnam would be more
psychological than military. Hanoi might hope
that the fall of Cambodia would so unnerve
the South Vietnamese that the stage would
be set for major actions in South Vietnam.
We do not believe, however, that the GVN
would be so rattled by Cambodia's collapse
that, by itself, this would encourage Hanoi
to risk a major military push in South Vietnam.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-1,
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
SECRET
27. Laos. The settlement in Laos will have
little effect on Hanoi's actions. It is likely
that the combat structure in the Panhandle
will remain essentially intact during the up-
coming dry season to protect communist sup-
ply lines through Laos. Some NVA rear serv-
ices units which shifted into South Vietnam
earlier this year have already moved back
into the eastern Panhandle, and others will
probably follow.
III. THE VIEW FROM SAIGON
28. To Saigon, just as to Hanoi, the Paris
agreement reflects a less than satisfactory
situation. The GVN signed the agreement re-
luctantly and has violated it when such action
seemed advantageous. The GVN believes that
the January agreement left it vulnerable to
communist military pressure. The GVN also
has major reservations about the political
aspects of the agreement and will show little
interest in implementing the political arrange-
ments called for in the accord. The GVN is
determined not only to prevent the further
expansion of the communists' military and
political position in South Vietnam, but to
reduce it as much as possible.
A. Saigon's Options
29. Despite its unhappiness with the pres-
ent situation, Saigon's options for changing
it are limited. Over the years, the basic strat-
egy of the GVN has been the building of a
strong nation-state able to withstand com-
munist aggression and subversion. In this
effort, the GVN has significantly improved its
military and political position. It still lacks
the ability to expel communist forces from
South Vietnam, and it cannot effectively carry
the war to the North. In sum, the GVN is
still basically in the position of having to
react to communist military policies and
actions, while continuing its efforts to forge
a strong base of support which will erode
the communists' ability to pose a significant
threat to South Vietnam.- -
30. Though not sharply defined, the GVN
has several options in meeting the communist
military threat:
? Quick raids could be conducted against
established communist base areas?or
even into Cambodia.
? The GVN could launch air strikes on
NVA base areas, both within South Viet-
nam, and in Laos and Cambodia.
? Saigon might move on a large-scale and
sustained basis to reduce communist-
controlled territory.
? If the GVN concluded that the NVA
were, in fact, in the preparatory stages
for a new offensive, it might launch a
major preemptive strike of its own.?
B. Factors Influencing GVN Policy and
Capabilities
Political and Economic Strength of the
GVN
31. President Thieu's political position has
grown stronger over the past several years.
Non-communist groups lack the unity or
leadership to present a challenge, while the
ability of the communists to mount effective
political action has been very limited since
the 1968 Tet offensive. The massacre in Hue
turned the An Quang Buddhists, once in vig-
orous opposition to the government, away
from thoughts of accommodation with the
communists and toward working within the
'Concurrently with any of the above military op-
tions, Thieu would move rapidly to extend and con-
solidate his political controls at all levels. In addition,
a nation-wide effort to gradually extend and consoli-
date GVN-controlled territory by military and politi-
cal means would be continued.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22 : LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
11
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
?,.
SECRET
system. There are various leftist-intellectual
and student groups which arc vulnerable to
communist manipulation, but these groups are
small and lack public support?proving little
more than a nuisance to the government.
3. Thieu's power is based on the support
of the government bureaucracy and the mili-
tary establishment?the major instruments
through which he has worked to extend his
base of support throughout the country.
Although basically a loner who operates
through a skillful blend of patience and ma-
nipulation, Thieu is not unaware of the need
to gain popular support. To this end, he has
initiated a considerable number of reforms
and new programs, and?probably more im-
portant?he has worked to improve his ties
with village leaders and provincial councils.
These efforts have borne fruit; while still not
a popular figure, Thieu is accepted by most
South Vietnamese as preferable to a com-
munist alternative.
33. In the process of solidifying his position,
Thieu has whittled away almost all of the
political power of the individual military com-
manders, leaving them frequently beholden
to him in the process. Thus, even though there
are occasional grumblings within the mili-
tary hierarchy over Thieu's political actions,
there is no figure in the military who appears
capable of seriously challenging him. There
is little prospect of this situation changing
so long as Thieu maintains the image of a
firm and effective anticommunist leader who
commands continuing US support, although
ambitious men remain in the wings.
34. The government structure is becoming
increasingly centralized and personalized, with
loyalty to Thieu a prime prerequisite for any
significant government assignment. The re-
cently-formed Democracy Party?largely en-
cadred by military officers and bureaucrats?
has emerged as Thieu's instrument for extend-
ing his authority both at national and local
levels. The new party has a parallel clandes-
tine apparatus within the party organization
which serves as a potential vehicle for moni-
toring and enforcing the loyalty of its mem-
bers. While the forms of representative gov-
ernment may be preserved, Thieu is obviously
aiming for, and already has largely achieved,
a political apparatus that is wholly responsive
to his direction.
35. Although the GVN will have little
trouble in coping with overt communist po-
litical action, dealing with the communists'
covert activities will be difficult. This task
falls largely to the GVN's local paramilitary
and police forces, whose effectiveness varies
widely from place to place. Police effective-
ness is generally good in the larger urban
areas, but falls off rapidly the further one
goes into the countryside. Popular Forces
( PF ) units and Peoples' Self Defense Forces
( PSDF )?the night watchmen of the rural
hamlets?often fail to resist when Viet Cong
finance cadre or proselyters and their guer-
rilla escorts visit a village by night, particu-
larly if there is no ARVN unit in the area.
36. Although the South Vietnamese econ-
omy has good long-term growth potential, key
commodity shortages, inflation, and declining
foreign exchange reserves are serious prob-
lems. The US military withdrawal has reduced
both dollar inflow and employment opportuni-
ties, and the de facto reduction of American
aid caused by the devaluation of the dollar
and rising commodity prices in world markets
have compounded the problem. Increased
foreign and dotnestic investment could im-
prove the situation, but, for the short run,
it is limited because of the uncertainties of
the GVN's long-term viability. The basic prob-
lems of inflation and stagnation defy quick
solutions and could come to have adverse
political ramifications. But for the short run,
as long as US economic assistance is available,
such problems are not likely to reach critical
dimensions.
12 SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22 : LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
SECRET
37. A more immediate problem, however,
and one which could lead to some popular
resentment against the government, is the
availability of rice. The fighting in the Delta
last spring contributed to a shortfall in rice
production in South Vietnam. This, coupled
with difficulties in obtaining immediate rice
imports because of a world shortage, raises
the spectre of a serious rice shortage in the
late fall. This is likely to be a temporary prob-
lem, however, since additional quantities of
American rice should arrive in South Vietnam
by late December.
38. The communists are actively seeking to
exploit the GVN's economic difficulties, while
trying to reduce the economic burden on the
North. Apart from enforced taxation, the com-
munists have always maintained a shadow
supply system in South Vietnam, buying food-
stuffs, fuel, and pharmaceuticals on the local
economy. Their recent purchases of rice and
kerosene at inflated prices not only help sup-
ply their military forces and civilian residents
in communist-controlled areas, but also tend
to aggravate shortages and price spiraling in
GVN areas. The GVN is taking stringent
measures to interrupt trade with the commu-
nists, but their effectiveness has been spotty.
On balance, however, it is highly unlikely over
the short term that the communists will make
significant gains in exploiting or even seriously
aggravating Saigon's economic problems.
Moreover, the severely restricted economic
situation in PRG areas will reinforce the com-
munists' need for continued taxation and com-
mercial. purchases in the GVN areas.
Can RVNAF Meet the Challenge?
39. The political strength of the GVN is
clearly adequate to cope with communist sub-
version, but its military adequacy is a matter
of concern, particularly in MR-1.
40. The South Vietnamese have large and
well-equipped arrned forces. Their combat
effectiveness is undercut, however, by logistic
and maintenance deficiencies and shortfalls
in training, command and control, and man-
ning of units. Corruption and desertion in the
armed forces continue to be problems. In
addition, the ground forces, including mobile
reserves, are fully deployed. Faced with a
communist adversary in South Vietnam which
is larger and stronger than at its peak in 1972,
RVNAF would probably yield substantial ter-
ritory, at least initially, should the communists
launch an all-out attack.
41. On the other hand, RVNAF has im-
proved significantly in recent years, especially
since the start of the 1972 campaign, as Thieu
has cashiered many inept officers. Further,
front-line units have gained valuable combat
experience and confidence, For example, in
the 1972 offensive, RVNAF ( albeit with the
benefit of US air support) was able to re-
group and reverse many of the communists'
gains. Even mediocre units hung together ( ex-
cepting the disaster-struck 3rd Division) and
maintained stiff resistance to the NVA.
RVNAF's problems would be at least partially
offset by the frequently poor tactics and per-
formance of communist forces.
42. In terms of overall military manpower,
the GVN has a substantial edge. RVNAF's
320,000 regular combat ground forces compare
with a communist regular combat strength of
180,000 men. (See Figure 2, page 7.) In
MR-1, however, no numerical advantage ex-
ists, as South Vietnam's 89,000 troops face a
comparable communist force. Moreover, with
the withdrawal of US air assets, the GVN's
firepower advantage in many parts of the
country is less impressive. The amount of
GVN artillery tubes currently exceeds that of
the communists, but the North Vietnamese
have demonstrated greater proficiency in the
use of such firepower. The communist tank
SECRET 13
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-11872-10-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
SECRET
inventory slightly exceeds the GVN's, but this
advantage is largely offset by greater RVNAF
crew proficiency. It should be noted, how-
ever, that communist inventories of tanks and
field and antiaircraft artillery are now at their
highest level of the war owing to a significant
deployment of such firepower to South Viet-
nam during the 1972/1973 infiltration cycle.
43. Massive air support and exclusive con-
trol of the sky have been crucial factors in
ARVN's defensive and offensive capabilities.
Most of this support was American; the criti-
cal question now is whether the GVN ground
forces could manage without it. The South
Vietnamese Air Force cannot begin to provide
the abundance of air support that ground
commanders were accustomed to prior to the
cease-fire. Even so, VNAF ground support
capabilities have improved considerably and
should help to counterbalance communist fire-
power in most of the country,
44. In northern MR-1, however, where
RVNAF is clearly most vulnerable, VNAF air
operations would be severely hampered by
the heavy concentration of NVA AAA/SAM
forces. In addition, the North Vietnamese are
in a position to mount air operations of their
own in MR-1. In the event of an all-out mili-
tary offensive, we believe that they would do
so. The effectiveness of North Vietnamese
close air support, however, would be curtailed
by inexperience in ground support operations
and the paucity of ground radar control facili-
ties. In terms of air defense, North Vietnam's
superior air-to-air combat experience, defense
in depth, and totally integrated air defense
system would probably result in an unaccept-
able VNAF loss rate if it attempted sustained
operations over communist-controlled northern
MR-1. Moreover, in the event of a major com-
munist push in MR-1, including the forward
deployment of AAA and SAMs and the pos-
sible use of Migs, VNAF would also experi-
ence serious problems in providing effective
ground support.
45. Successful preemptive offensive opera-
tions of any magnitude seem well beyond
GVN capabilities. The communist would un-
doubtedly be aware of - South Vietnamese
planning ( as in the past) and be prepared for
an attack. RVNAF could not sustain large-
scale operations without a significant expan-
sion of US military aid shipments to cover
losses. Moreover, the GVN would probably
be most reluctant to launch major offensive
operations without the assurance of US air
support.
46. Meeting lower levels of communist pres-
sure should be well within RVNAF's capa-
bilities. But the South Vietnamese are not
likely to improve their position substantially.
The communists obviously would put up a
determined defense against any moves by gov-
ernment forces against their enclaves. As the
communists continue to strengthen and con-
solidate their western base areas, South Viet-
namese chances of successful penetration
will diminish.
47, Curbing a campaign of terrorism, guer-
rilla warfare, and covert action would fall
more to the GVN's territorial forces ( the RF,
PF, PSDF, and NPFF ) and municipal police
than to the regular forces. As in the past,
certain areas can be expected to prove very
resistant to communist penetration. In gen-
eral, the communists are not well-prepared
to undertake a significant increase in such
activities.
48. Even so, the GVN's ability to stem a
gradual extension of communist influence is
uncertain. The communists cannot be satisfied
penned up against the borders of South Viet-
nam. They clearly are determined to extend
tendrils into GVN-controlled areas, especially
in southern MR-1 and northern MR-2, which
they must do if they are to support a resurgent
infrastructure. And Saigon is just as deter-
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
SECRET
mined to prevent this. Over the short run, the
struggle for the "contested" areas will remain
more or less stalemated.
IV. PROSPECTS THROUGH THE DRY
SEASON . (OCTOBER 1973-MAY 1974)
A. The GVN
49. Prospects for the GVN over the next
nine months are mixed:7 On the one hand,
Thieu's political position will probably grow
stronger, and the communists are unlikely
to make significant political gains. On the
other hand, by next summer, the GVN may
no longer have a military edge over the com-
munists if Hanoi continues its current level
of buildup in the South----which we believe
it will do.
50. The GVN, faced with a situation where
its real options are limited, will basically de-
vote its efforts to strengthening the country's
infrastructure, maintaining and building up
its military defenses, and attempting to counter
Hanoi's thrusts. Continued US military and
economic support will be crucial to the GVN's
performance and prospects during this period.
51. The GVN will push with equal force
to forestall the resurgence of the communist
infrastructure, but will be faced with some-
thing of a dilemma. Aggressive local govern-
ment chiefs can often interrupt communist
efforts to build bridges to the local population,
but government harassment often prompts
communist retaliation. The ensuing rash of
'Though either unpredictable or else very unlikely,
there are certain factors which, if they occurred,
could seriously affect judgments about the cohesion
and effectiveness of the GVN. Among these are:
Thieu's assassination; widespread civil disorders
sparked by economic problems or a sudden revival
of Buddhist opposition to the government; unexpected
US Congressional action that drastically reduced or
suspended entirely US assistance to South Vietnam;
or clear indications that the LIS was no longer com-
mitted to Saigon's survival.
terrorism and military activity upsets the local
population, whose lives and livelihoods are
threatened by the lack of security. As a result,
the local chief often loses his popular sup-
port and is hard pressed to prove that he
indeed has "pacified" his territory. Caught in
this situation, the local officials frequently
find it preferable to seek the apparent quiet
provided by accommodation. There is little
reason to believe that the GVN can success-
fully break this longstanding pattern, although
this is unlikely to be a serious problem over
the short run.
52. The GVN can and will ensure that the
PRG does not enhance its internal legal posi-
tion through the vehicle of the Paris agree-
ment. While a National Council of Reconcilia-
tion and Concord may eventually be formed,
it will play no substantive role; the local
councils will probably never be formed.
53. Militarily, RVNAF can be expected to
continue its operations against communist
positions, especially against enclaves not con-
tiguous to the western corridor, and against
NVA efforts to move into new areas. Main
force maneuvering in areas that are not clearly
controlled by either side could easily result
in sporadic surges of heavy fighting. A more
volatile situation could arise should the GVN,
fearful that a communist military offensive
was in the offing, attempt to launch a major
preemptive strike against communist forces.
In such a situation, there would be a high
risk that the communists would retaliate in
kind, and the fighting could get out of hand.
It is unlikely, however, that the GVN would
undertake such an action prior to consulting
its American ally.
B. The Communists
54. In assessing Hanoi's military intentions,
we arc hobbled by a lack of firm intelligence.
In fact, the communists have probably not yet
SECRET
No Ob.ection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
SECRET
made a final decision whether to attempt major
military action next spring, it is clear, how-
ever, that Hanoi is acting to preserve an option
to resume major military action in South Viet-
nam at some point.8 The chances for the po-
litical aspects of the Paris agreements being
realized are negligible; nor can Hanoi have
much hope of achieving the GVN's collapse
through a combination of political and clan-
destine warfare backed up by only moderate
military pressure. Ultimately then, Hanoi must
believe that it will again have to turn to the
battlefield to seek?if not the immediate mili-
tary defeat of the GVN?at least a situation
where new political arrangements will have
to be made (e.g., coalition government) that
would give the communists sufficient political
leverage in the South to ensure a shift to their
domination. The question, however, is when?
55. The forward positioning of communist
forces and supplies and the improved road
system give Hanoi the capability to kick off
a major military campaign with little addi-
tional preparation. As Hanoi continues to
augment its forces in South Vietnam during
the coming dry season, the military balance
may tilt to the communists' advantage unless
there is countervailing US support for the
GVN. Such a shift in the military balance
could encourage Hanoi to launch major mili-
tary action. In any event, with heavy infiltra-
tion, it appears likely that Hanoi would be
in a position to launch?with little warning?
and sustain such action by early 1974 if it
so chose.
56. This means that Hanoi will probably
be in a position to choose among the full
range of options to attain its goals in South
Vietnam. In the absence of firm information
As defined in this Estimate, major military action
could encompass a countrywide offensive on the scale
of Tet 1968 or March 1972, or attacks on a similar
level generally confined to one or two military regions,
with lower levels of action elsewhere.
16
on Hanoi's short-term intentions, it is a close
choice whether Hanoi will opt for a major
military offensive sooner rather than later.
It is such a close choice that the only prudent
assessment must allow for either. This is espe-
cially so since the US role in the situation
is a major one, and its position as perceived
in Hanoi could well determine whether such
an offensive will occur this dry season. The
other major factors are the positions of Mos-
cow and Peking, Hanoi's assessment of the
military balance between its forces and
RVNAF, and Hanoi's calculations about its
overall military and political situation?in-
cluding external considerations?should it
launch or not launch a military offensive this
dry season.9
The arguments which persuade some
analysts that a major North Vietnamese
offensive early next year is more likely
than not are as follows:
57. The buildup of North Vietnamese man-
power and war materiel in South Vietnam
and adjacent border areas since January 1973
should be seen not only as an expansion of
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF,
believes that the case postulated in favor of a North
Vietnamese offensive in 1974, earlier rather than later,
merits greater weight than the case against such an
offensive. Inflexibly, Hanoi has always chosen to
pursue the offensive?logistics permitting. Logistic
preparations in the three northernmost provinces of
MR-1 (Quang Tri, Thua Thien, and Quang Nam)
are now virtually complete. A major offensive to seize
and sever the northern provinces is almost a cer-
tainty, and will likely come earlier rather than later?
especially during periods when weather would inhibit
South Vietnamese air power. The South Vietnamese
Air Force is a clear weather force?a fact which
North Vietnam will exploit at the appropriate time.
Almost certainly, an enemy thrust in MR4 would
entail diversionary offensive actions in other parts of
the RVN to inhibit RVNAF reinforcement of the
northern battle areas. Hanoi probably believes that a
major effort to take the northern provinces entails
the least risk of American reinvolvement.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
SECRET
communist capabilities in the South, but also
as a probable sign of an intent to use these
capabilities sooner rather than later. Recent
indications that the beginning of the new dry
season will bring additional movements of men
and equipment to the South further strengthen
the case that Hanoi may be preparing for a
major offensive during this dry season.
58. With sufficient stocks of equipment and
munitions in the South to engage in heavy
combat for the duration of an entire dry sea-
son, it is unlikely that pressure from Moscow
or Peking will be a decisive factor in pre-
venting the North Vietnamese from starting
an offensive. Even a complete cutoff of Soviet
and Chinese exports to North Vietnam would
affect Hanoi's domestic economy long before
it affected the war in the South, and it is
highly unlikely that Moscow or Peking would
take such a step.
59. Further, Hanoi may well now regard
the risk of the reinvolvement of US combat
forces ( air as well as ground) as fairly small.
North Vietnam's view of the risk probably
would not restrain its leaders from launching
a major offensive if they felt other factors
were favorable. Throughout the coming
months, Hanoi will be constantly reevaluat-
ing its views on this matter. Political trends
in the US that seemed to further restrict or
to liberalize the President's power to react,
would of course affect Hanoi's assessment of
the risks.
60. Finally, the North Vietnamese leader-
ship may see its chances of winning a major
military victory as being greater in the spring
of 1974 than later. There is an appreciable
volume of evidence that the communists them-
selves believe they are doing badly in the
political struggle in South Vietnam, and that
in this struggle time is on the side of the
GVN, not the communists. If this is the case,
there are almost certainly elements within
the Hanoi leadership -which favor a resump-
tion of military action sooner rather than
later. North Vietnam's leaders might also be-
lieve that US domestic problems are likely
to be greater?and the restraints on the gov-
ernment's actions more severe?in the next
six to nine months than would be the case
a year or two later. Moreover, if the Soviet
Union and China are reducing arms aid to
Hanoi, the North Vietnamese might consider
that they would be at their maximum strength
for an offensive during the coming dry season.
The arguments which persuade other
analysts that the North Vietnamese will
delay an offensive beyond the current dry
season are as follows:
61. Hanoi will weigh a number of factors?
no one of which is likely to be controlling?
in deciding on the timing and scope of a mili-
tary effort. A vital judgment will be what
Hanoi gauges it can get away with and still
avoid a crushing US response with air power.
The North Vietnamese leaders almost cer-
tainly entertain major reservations on this
score. Faced with uncertainties on the likeli-
hood of a US military response to a communist
offensive, the North Vietnamese would prob-
ably prefer to wait for the passage of time
to provide them a better indication of the
depth of the US commitment to South
Vietnam.
62. In contemplating prolonged heavy com-
bat, Hanoi would also want to be assured
of enough continued material support from
Moscow and Peking to cover losses. Such
assurances are unlikely over the short term.
Despite the heavy stockpiles in or adjacent
to South Vietnam, it would be exceedingly
dangerous for Hanoi to attempt a go-it-alone
strategy. Given the close military balance
between communist forces and RVNAF, pru-
dence?if nothing else?would dictate to the
North Vietnamese leaders that they would
SECRET 17
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
SECRET
have to be prepared for a possible failure of
the offensive. And without assurances of suf-
ficient supplies from Moscow and Peking to
replenish battlefield losses, the communists
would be left, should the offensive fail, in
a weakened and vulnerable position.
63. The situation in South Vietnam will also
be a compelling factor in Hanoi's policy
choice. Although the communists have made
significant strides in building up their military
forces, their progress in the political field has
been very limited. Aware of their past and
present shortcomings in the political sphere,
the communists are placing high priority on
some strengthening of their political appara-
tus. To date, however, efforts at refurbishing
and expanding the communist infrastructure
have fallen far short of party goals, and com-
munist leaders do not expect rapid or spec-
tacular gains over the short term. The weak-
ened state of the communist political appa-
ratus would argue for the communists delay-
ing a major military offensive until they are
in a better position to take advantage of it
politically.
64. Finally, there is no apparent require-
ment for Hanoi to act in haste in South Viet-
nam. Certainly the GVN will not make such
rapid progress in strengthening the economic,
political, and military fabric of the South over
the next year or two as to become invulner-
able to a later, large-scale communist offen-
sive. The communists are in a position to main-
tain their position?and to strengthen it?
inside the base areas in the South for the in-
definite future. Thus, the communists will
be in a position to carefully weigh all fac-
tors?and to, entertain extended internal de-
bate?as they shape their strategy beyond the
current dry season.
If There is an Offensive
65. In the event of an all-out offensive this
dry season, the communists would initially
18
make substantial territorial gains in MR-1.
Although GVN forces might be routed, it is
more likely that they would fall back in reason-
ably good order, and they could probably
hold out for some time around the major cities
of Danang and Hue, though the latter would
be geographically more vulnerable. Prolonged
fighting would raise the crucial question of
the rapidity of outside assistance for the GVN.
Without renewed US air support, RVNAF's
continued resistance in MR-1 would be in
doubt,
66. Communist gains in the rest of South
Vietnam would be less dramatic, unless their
forces were significantly upgraded from pres-
ent strengths. The GVN forces undoubtedly
would give ground, particularly in areas
where NVA units are concentrated, but should
be able to blunt a communist assault.
If There Is Not an Offensive
67. If Hanoi does not mount a major offen-
sive this dry season, there will probably be
a period of internal building and testing on
both sides with military action remaining
generally restricted. Hanoi will continue to
launch and no doubt accelerate carefully or-
chestrated, significant localized, and limited-
objective attacks in various regions of South
Vietnam during this dry season under the
guise of a response to prior GVN aggression.
Hanoi will limit the type and scope of such
attacks to that which it believes will not pro-
voke a US military ,response or a negative
reaction from Peking or Moscow. Operations
will be designed to seize more territory, to
test GVN resolution, and for their psycho-
logical impact.
68. Hanoi will also continue to make a
major effort to rebuild the communist politi-
cal infrastructure, immediately in contested
rural areas and more gradually in towns and
cities; however, we anticipate only limited
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
' No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
SECRET
success in this effort. The communists will,
moreover, attempt to entice the population
to move to PRG areas, and government offi-
cials will be approached to arrange local ad
hoc trade agreements and "peace treaties." At
the same time, the communists will continue
trying to infiltrate the government's ranks for
intelligence and subversive purposes. Some
increase in terrorist and guerrilla activity is
likely as the communists by to break down
GVN control at the grass roots and enforce
popular tolerance of their own presence.
V. OVER THE LONGER TERM
69. The foregoing summary of prospects
over the short term reflects the impossibility
of offering confident judgments on the timing
and shape of future communist military strat-
egy. North Vietnam's timetable?even over
the short term?will be influenced by its per-
ception of shifts in the relative balance of
power, military or political, in Vietnam or
in the positions of its own allies or the US. If
Hanoi does not undertake a major offensive
during the upcoming dry season, the question
remains whether the communists are likely
to opt for a return to major hostilities at some
point relatively soon thereafter.
70. The strength of the American commit-
ment to South Vietnam will continue to be
a vital factor for the GVN's survival. Not only
will it influence Hanoi's policy decisions, but
it will also be a critical political and psycho-
logical factor in maintaining GVN confidence.
Continued US military aid will be essential,
even though the amounts allowed by the
Paris agreement are not likely to offset the
expansion of NVA strength in the South.
Further large-scale US economic aid will also
be required if the GVN is to have a chance to
solve its economic problems. Other sources
of external financing, such as offshore oil and
foreign investment, offer good potential but
will require several years to make a signifi-
cant dent in South Yietnam's foreign aid
requirements.
71. Apart from US support to South Viet-
nam, the overall American military posture
in the Far East will also be carefully noted
by Hanoi. A major US disengagement from
the area, or a pulling apart of the American
alliance with Thailand?now the site of
American reserve forces potentially available
to Vietnam?would be demoralizing to Sai-
gon and would encourage Hanoi ( and possibly
its allies) to feel that the risk of confrontation
with the US was negligible. Even in the ab-
sence of such signals, however, it cannot be
assumed what conclusions Hanoi would draw
concerning US intentions. Its record for mis-
judging the depth and duration of the US
commitment to the GVN is well established.
72. At the same time, the willingness or
reluctance of Peking and Moscow to under-
write another major military effort to topple
the GVN will condition North Vietnam's
strategy. At some point, the North Vietnamese
are likely to press China and the USSR for
substantially increased military aid. This will
force these countries to weigh the impact of
responding on their relationship with the US
and with each other. Great power d?nte
has contributed to a dampening of the Viet-
nam conflict; it has also served to undercut
the North Vietnamese ability to play their
allies off against each other. There are no
indications now that these conditions will not
continue for sane time.
73. But there are conceivable developments
that might make the Chinese or the Soviets
( or both) more receptive to Hanoi's impor-
tunings. For example, if the Chinese and Rus-
sians came to believe that Washington was
no longer so devoted to the GVN's survival
as to risk progress in furthering d?nte,
Hanoi's allies might think it safe to provide
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22 : LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
19
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
SECRET
the stepped-up aid required to sustain a major
communist offensive in South Vietnam. Simi-
larly, if Moscow and Peking become less in-
terested in d?nte with the US, they might
be more willing to provide increased military
assistance to Hanoi. On the other hand, should
the Sino-Soviet split widen, either Moscow
or Peking might step up its aid to Hanoi to
undercut the other's influence in Southeast
Asia. None of these possibilities appears likely,
but should they occur, they would isolate the
American commitment to Saigon as the major
external restraining force on Hanoi.
74. In weighing its longer-term strategy,
Hanoi will also be sensitive to political and
military trends in South Vietnam. A steady
consolidation of power by Thieu, with little
obvious deterioration of RVNAF capabilities,
and a failure of the communists infrastructure
to make inroads of any significance into
the GVN's control of the population would
argue?given Hanoi's determination to reunify
Vietnam?for a bold military stroke even
though the risks in such an offensive would
be high.
75. In Sum. The key factor shaping Hanoi's
policies will remain its perception of the likely
US response, the availability of external sup-
port, the pressure imposed by Moscow and
Peking, and military and political trends in
South Vietnam. Over the longer run, how-
ever, Hanoi may place greater weight on the
trends it observes in the South than on the
external restraints imposed by Moscow, Pek-
ing, and Washington.
76. In any event, Hanoi's actions are clearly
designed to insure that it can again resort
to major military action to gain its objectives
if other means fail. If a major communist mili-
tary offensive does not occur in the upcoming
dry season, we believe that the odds favoring
such an action will increase significantly as
the 19744975 dry season approaches.
20 SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
MIk
It
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
SECRET /SENSITIVE
Recent Indications of Communist Offensive Preparations
The following is a compilation of recent intelligence and other reports which
point to possible Communist offensive operations in the 1973-74 dry season:
DRV/PRG propaganda and negotiating behavior have taken a
noticeably more threatening tone since October 1--or roughly about the time
we suspect that the Politburo was considering a decision on its dry season
option. On October 15 the PLAF National Headquarters published its first
combat order to all forces since the cease-fire. The DRV/PRG have walked
out of the Four Party talks twice in October (on the 2nd and 9th) and have
evidenced their most bellicose attitude to date. They also walked out of
the Two Party talks October Z and boycotted the October 12 session. On
October 4 the PRG walked out of the Paris talks. For only the second time
since February, the DRV/I3RG Sent protest noted bn October 22 to the
-
Paris Conference on Vietnam: A barrage of editorials in leading DRV
media and authoritative statements by the Foreign Minister on October 8,
14, 17 increasingly display'a threatening tone. These moves indicate that
the other side will react more aggressively to alleged GVN "violations" of
the Agreement.
-- Numerous intelligence reports recently indicate planning for 25x1
offensive operations in the forthcoming dry season:
SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22 : LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118-2-10-7
SECRET /SENSITIVE
2
-- The slow pace of reconstruction is, we suspect, another indicator
of plans for an early military offensive.
Logic would support
the contention that Hanoi wotila not press forward with plans for a full 25X1
economic recovery if it intended to launch an early attack. Indeed, as the
accompanying memorandum on DRV imports suggests, the pace of re-
construction has been slow in North Vietnam (only a small fraction of its
industrial capacity has been put back in service). Allowing for an under-
standable lag in reconstruction planning, Hanoi's efforts to secure non-
Communist aid have been suspiciously dilatory.
0.
SE No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/22: LOC-HAK-118:2-10-7
25X1
25X1