READINGS ON MAO TSE-TUNG AND CHOU EN-LAI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 225
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 3, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASIIINGTON
SECRET INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Readings on Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai
Attached is a book which we have prepared for r-111 r?eiritni14rIcrdircr
on Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. Included are
and analytic reports on the political philosophies and current political
status of Mao and Chou prepared by CIA and by an American lawyer
who was born in China and lived there for many years.
It is of course very difficult to draw a full or wholly accurate picture
of personages as complex as Mao and Chou. The CIA contributions
and those of the lawyer each have their strong points and perhaps
certain less strong ones as well. For example, the lawyer seems to
do better than CIA in assessing the romantic, revolutionary strain
which runs through Mao, while CIA is much more up-to-date on where
Mao stands politically today in China. CIA impresses me as being
more perceptive in commenting on Chou, who emerges in the lawyer's
study as a shallower personality than he was in his conversations with
me. Where CIA lacks color, the lawyer has an abundance of it.
In reading these materials, I believe that you should keep in mind that
we are seeing only the tip of the iceberg. CIA has had no direct contact
with the China mainland; the lawyer has, but in pre-Communist days
when the Nationalists were in power. (The lawyer's main Chinese source,
incidentally, falls into the same category.) But both are, in my opinion,
pretty much on target.
MORI/CDF C0332207 pages
98-130
25X1
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
SECRET
INDEX
A. Evaluations of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai by an
American lawyer, born and reared in China.
13.
E.
The author presents his assessments of China's two
most important political leaders. He describes how
they are likely to conduct themselves during your
negotiations in Peking, and suggests how an American
President should deal with two men he characterizes
as cunning and devious politicians. The analysis draws
On several scholarly studies of these leaders.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
"Mao Tse-timg's Favorite Novels."
The same American lawyer who furnished us the
materials at Tab A presents brief synopses of Mao
Tse-tung's favorite novels. He suggests they are
indicators of the Chairman's personality style, his
capacity for guile, audacity, etc., and his concern
with the decadence which overtook China's traditional
Mandarin ruling class. ?
? Meetings with Mao T se -tung.
An NSC staff distillation of some of Mao's major
philosophic and political themes. This should give
you a flavor of the man and his mind for your meetings
with him.
Chou's Phrases.
Colorful phrases Chou uses.
The Chinese Approach.
Basic Chinese principles and assumptions.
Transcript - Opening Meeting, October.
Gives flavor of Chou's style.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
Evaluations of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai
by an American Lawyer
Mao Tse-tung
Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung without question has a deeply
ingrained and implacable hatred for "imperialists" [the Western world],
and he hates the United States more than all the rest. His is not a simu-
lated emotion, to be displayed to arouse his people against a "common
enemy." It is a personal aversion to all of the nations who in his view
misused China in the days of the unequal treaties and during the warlord
period that followed the fall of the Ch'ing dynasty. Mao's intense dislike
for us applies to our nation, our country, our government and our people,
themselves. We are particularly singled out because we are strong and
successful. If England, France, Germany and the other western powers
were as strong as we, he would articulate his dislike for them more
frequently and more strongly than he does. But that is a tactic. Apart
from the tactic of singling us out for major criticism and attack, there
is no doubt from studies of him, his life, his writings and his propaganda,
and also from all of my interviews and conversations with informants,
that Mao nurses a deep and permanent hatred for us. It was accentuated
by Korea and by our 7th Fleet's presence in the Taiwan Straits, as it was
by our support for Chiang during the Second World War, and after it. But
Mao's personal antipathy for us was not caused by those events. He devel-
oped it in his childhood during the period in which China was powerless to
expel the English, other western powers and us. And he will always feel
hostile to us, regardless of his external appearance or his temporary
tactic of cooperating with us as a hedge against USSR and Japan.
Mao will be simulating when he treats President Nixon with courtesy, and
when he welcomes the Nixon group into China.
This basic attitude of hostility toward us is so great that Mao would con-
tinue.with it even in the illustrative and imaginary circumstance in which
the United States is postulated as a communist nation. Even under that
imagined circumstance, Mao would retain his dislike for America and
would be hostile to it, unless it were subservient to China.
In large measure, Mao's anti-American feeling is a manifestation of the
hatreds felt by an inferior for one superior; by a slave for his master;
by one who is poor for a rich man; by one who is crude for those who are
genteel; and by the conquered for the conqueror. Mao's dislike for us
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
2
also is xenophobic, but unlike the classical Greek concept that it is
strangers who may be disliked, 'there is a Chinese overtone here which
would have Mao feel the same way even if he knew us better. That is
because Mao is culturally and spiritually living in a Chinese fantasy
which places him back in the days of the ancient dynasties, mentally and
with respect to foreigners - and his view is not only that we hive harmed
China, but more than that, that we are "outer barbarians," under his
old China imperialistic and Sinocentrist mental outlook. Accordingly,
we are to be controlled or pacified when we are strong, or conquered
and driven away when he is strong. It is not a question of friendship
or lack of it, because the ancient Chinese emperors and Mao, the modern
Chinese emperor, could not possibly be friends with barbarians. That
is the Chinese twist to xenophobia in Mao's case. So his hatred for
America and the other western powers is in many layers, like an onion.
And as one peels away each layer, underneath is a fresh stratum or fold
of the onion. With Mao, at the heart center of his onion of Chinese-style
xenophobia for America is the ancient Chinese emperor's view toward
barbarians. Then, with the next outer layer, we have the supposed
excesses of the equal treaty days and the warlord periods; next, moving
outward, is the layer of resentment for our support of Chiang, the Korean
war and the Taiwan straits and 7th Fleet period; and so on.
Accordingly, when Mao Tse-tung permitted Chou En-lai to invite Presi-
dent Nixon to visit, and the new dialogue began to unfold, we may assume
that Emperor Mao was controlling or pacifying, either the American
"barbarians," or by using them in the traditional manner in which the
Han Chinese used one barbarian tribe to offset another, the American
"barbarianeare intended as a bulwark against the Russian barbarians or
the Japanese barbarians, or against both.
In Mao's mind, no permanent good relationship with America is either
possible or desirable. He condones Chou's invitation to us for some self-
serving reason, either external or internal. And it is useless to expect
Mao to keep his word or to develop any genuine warmth toward us. That
is not at all to say that we should not act warmly with respect to him and
China, at this time. By doing so, we too serve our own interests; adjust
the Asian balance of power in a way we desire; 'and, most importantly,
re-open communications with the Chinese people, who are not at all like
Mao for the most part, and thereby we can eventually help them to resume
their own basic characteristics, those of warmth, friendliness and indivi-
duality. In that manner, we have good and historical reason to expect,
Chinese communism can be made to erode, and finally fall.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
We can join Mao for a moment in his Chinese fantasy that we are back
in the imperial era of China. Emperor Mao Tse-tung's predecessors
in Peking, the Mings, in fear of a powerful brigand who was threatening
the capitol and empire, invited a barbarian tribe (the Manchus) into
Peking to drive out the brigands. The Manchus entered Peking in 1644 A.D. ,
and they drove out the brigand and his men, as promised. However, the
Manchus refused to leave, and established the Ch'ing Dynasty in China.
In our situation, our plan must be to attempt, once back in Peking (cultur-
ally, economically and through our dialogue and what we must work to
make an exchange of news, students, scientists, doctors, businessmen
and merchandise), we must emulate the Manchus of 1644 A.D. , and
although we may help drive away the brigands Emperor Mao Tse-tung
fears, let us hope we can remain in Peking in the ways described above,
and thereby bring about the fall of the emperor.
The example given is fanciful. But the inner feelings of Mao, as described
here, are accurate. He shows those feelings in his own actions, his
speeches, his own writings and in his choice of reading matter. We must
not be deceived by Mao's simple dress, plain way of living, folksy talk
and writing, or poetry writing. That may not look like an emperor's
characteristics to an American, but China's classics and history reflect
that Mao is living the legends of the ancient emperors, in each of those
particulars. Such spartan and simple qualities were highly admired by
the people in some of their emperors. The addition of such traditional
imperial skills as poetry writing and military conquest are appropriate
for a new emperor.
Once we grasp that Mao's "revolution" and its Marxist phrases in some
respects is a reversion to the concepts of some of the great Chinese
emperors, it is useful to study what those great emperors did: Expand
China's borders, in many instances; and expel the barbarians from within
her boundaries, if they had enCroached; and close the borders to all
foreigners, of course, excepting for a few trading outposts, traditionally
in Canton and also at the borders to the north and west; and, on occasion,
burn the books and, perhaps, use forced labor to build Great Walls; and
put down any intellectuals who protest; and kill off or otherwise purge all
internal rival princes; and war with the Khmer and the predecessors of
the Thais, if they refuse tribute; and war with the barbarians in Japan,
if they threaten; and seek to seize and control Taiwan and the Pescadores;
and assume a god-like presence in the eyes of the people, with a prolifera-
tion of monuments and memorials; and, if too many barbarians threaten
the distant borders, then call in some other barbarians to help cope with
those who threaten.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
-4-
Mao reflects all of the above, in his .choice of favorite novels; in his own
writings; and in his conduct. It is helpful to keep that in mind. That
"emperor syndrome" can be very useful to us "barbarians," particularly
in that it is helping us to establish a dialogue with the Chinese. Mao is
older now, and surely will pass away soon. That and his increasing age
will help us to deal with the more moderate and reasonable Chou En-lai
and, hopefully, others like him. J.
A number of practical concepts flow from the realization that Mao is a
neo-emperor:
? To use Mao Tse-tung for our own purposes and interests [to
balance powers in Asia; win an honorable and secure peace;
maintain an honorable and secure peace; and open China, to
the full extent possible, in order to have our dialogue and
increased dealings with her erode Chinese communism, and
so on], we must give him dignity and treat him with some
degree of respect, in the eyes of his own people and in his
own eyes. We must remember his is a form of god, and must
not soil his pictures or degrade his many statues.
-- We must not quarrel with Mao, himself, in our government's
public statements and releases. If it becomes necessary to
attack orally or in a release, we must direct the attack at
the People's Republic, or at some lesser individual, but never
against Emperor Mao.
? Like Chou En-lai, we mast not praise Mao too much, if at
all; and we must not blame him, as stated above.
7- In our program to develop enough good will on the part of
China to establish and maintain our dialogue, we cannot and
will not praise communism, because it is alien and unacceptable
to us. But we can safely praise the great accomplishments of
China's ancient hero emperors, and Mao will feel praised.
Although he gives lip service to putting p.side many old things,
he himself praises the powerful old empires. We can safely
praise China's art, paintings, architecture, and so on, and
the qualities of her people (who do have excellent qualities,
beneath the Mao-applied veneer of Marxism). It will please
emperor Mao and tend to gain his cooperation, if we can praise
China's history and ancient culture (and they are praiseworthy).
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
-5.
-- Our President can, safely in China and also politically safely,
in America, praise Mao's Chinese poems - at least, the non-
military ones, involving the beauties of mountains and clouds.
That might seem odd here, but would be pleasing to Mao and
his people, if it can be managed. Maybe a comment in a private
talk would be safest.
We need to get into a position, as to our own programs and
national interests, to have our own plan be "blessed" by the
semi-god neo-emperor Mao - because if he "blesses" any plan
or program we want carried out, the "blessing" will carry
most of the Chinese people with it, at least as of now, and will
be something powerful to cite to the Chinese people after Mao
dies. President Nixon's private talks with Chairman Mao will
have such an effect, too.
-- Mao inherently and also because of his historical bent, is and
likes to be devious, -use artifice, guile and deceit, and show
bravery. He would make a great poker player. He has shown
a number of times, including many incidents in his intra-
communist fights, an ability to act unconcerned until ready to
attack. And then his sudden attack is deadly.
Mao's love of his country is genuine. He has real pride in China,
its history, its accomplishments, its recent ejection of the
foreigners, and the fact that he has restored a large part of the
old empires. He is a patriot, but his patriotism sees a China
led spiritually only by Mao.
Mao fears (on behalf of his plans and for China's success and
safety) Russia, at present; and he fears the eventual threat of
Japan. However, Mao is enough of a fanatic as to his movement
to order an attack on Russia even though China is much the weaker.
The same would apply as to Japan, but Japan's threat to China is
believed by China to be more remote in time than that of Russia.
The moderating influence of Chou En-lai and his assistants has
influenced Mao to hold back as to Russia, and Mao's personal
day-to-day power in his own view and in fact are not sufficient
for him to override that Chou moderating influence. In addition,
although data is not complete, it is probable that Mao is allowing
Chou to effect the present moderate program at least in part
because Mao needed and needs Chou and Chou's old military
friends; support against the adherents of Lin Piao's.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
-- Mao is ill, but is in full possession of his mental faculties
at this time.
Mao occupies an almost legendary and god-like position with
a large part of the Chinese population at this time, and is and
will remain by invocation of his name by his successors, the
spiritual symbol of China. Although there is a communist hard
core of a few million in China, most of the Chinese revere Mao
for uniting China and for driving out the foreigners. That great
majority wishes in its secret minds that somehow they could
enjoy and have those two advantages (unity and no foreigners)
and also the at least relatively full bellies they now have most
of the time, and yet be able to return to their traditional ways
of family love, the family as the center of life, individuality,
fun-loving ways and personal dignity. As Mao succeeds more
in feeding the Chinese, this desire to regain their traditional
character will grow.
? Mao Tse-tung is convinced that if his people are exposed to any
outside influences or any genuine news or conflicting opinions,
they will lose their rote belief in his form of communism. He
shows that conviction in a number of ways, but mainly in his
fear of any outside news. Mao is astute and clever. He knows
his peasant armies and his millions of peasants very well. He
knows China's history, and the capacity on the part of the people
to switch China's history, and the capacity on the part of the
people to switch views in a flash, when they get tired of faking
a view, or of going along with it, in effect, "for laughs." The
Chinese for centuries have shown that if reasonably content
(i. e., if left alone by government, and if with sufficient food
and a life of relative dignity, peace and family relationships),
they will act as if they are going along with the current big
? movement. But if they are being bothered and interfered with,
and if they feel oppressed, or if they are reaching those condi-
tions but have not yet gone over the edge, traditionally they can
be aroused by speech, by word of mouth, or by news. Mao
remembers the eruption of the Taiping Rebellion, and its sudden
cessation. That episode has been often repeated in China's
history. Mao also knows he is playing with dangerous things,
in the following, which nevertheless he is doing because he is
an emperor, and he "knows they are right:"
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
-7-
Mao is attacking family ties, many old traditions, and the
individuality of the Chinese -- note, this does not refer to
freedom, but to individuality. The Chinese does not have
the fierce British and American passion for freedom, for
example. To the Chinese, freedom is a form of "irresponsi-
bility," or "licentiousness." But the Chinese is an indivi-
dualist. For example, he does not like to be marched around,
made to shout slogans in unison, made to listen to lectures,
and otherwise restricted. The Chinese for thousands of years
have prized highly the right to "do their own thing." Mao is
restricting that, and trying to wipe it out. That and the
attacks on family ties and old traditions are very dangerous
acts on Mao's part. He fears free news, free ideas and
communication, because they could fire up the Chinese and
cause them to refuse to go through all of the rote drills.
Mao is making the Chinese be too grim. They are not a
grim people. Their natural need, to a very great extent and
even more than with us Americans, is to have fun, to enjoy
gracious living and hobbies, numerous holidays and celebra-
tions, gay colored clothes, especially for their children,
leisurely chats as they rest after a hard day's work, and
laughter. It is much more serious than we Americans usually
imagine that Mao is making the Chinese grim. The Chinese
reaction would be and I know is, on a widely shared basis:
OK, we'll be grim to get rid of corruption, inflation, disease,
starvation, and especially, the foreigners who have plagued
.us with their superior rights for so long. When those have
been accomplished, then OK, we'll still be grim because
emperor Mao keeps telling us what terrible danger we are in
from those insane, greedy and expansionist Americans, who
hate and threaten us ,so. [That is the stage Mao has them in,
at the moment.]
Now, to bring President Nixon and his entourage into China at that stage,
with many friendly Americans looking quite human and warm, and with the
President expressing friendly sentiments, it is very hard for the Chinese
to keep going long with the ogre removed. The Chinese will get sick of
being grim, being drilled, being heckled constantly by the communist
cadres, and will suddenly begin to long for the old traits and old proce-
dures, again. So our presence in China does two major things: it demon-
strates that the most useful ogre to Mao is quite human; and with us,
hopefully, we bring the free contacts which will let in the news which,
eventually will bring about the erosion of communism.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
- 8
Mao knows all of the above. That is the reason for the fierce censorship
and the severity of the anti-revisionist programs, and similar things.
So why does Mao let Chou invite us in? Because Mao feels that the other
barbarians, the Russians and Japanese, are now far more dangerous.
So he will let the American barbarians come in briefly, just enough to
offset the other dangers. Mao intends to repel us again sooner or later,
and to close down the country, again. But we must work to give Chou
En-lai and his supporters the support they need, and to remain in touch
with China and her people, long enough (1) to have Mao's death occur; or
(2) to have Chou En-lai and his supporters develop enough strength to open
their doors wider; and/or (3) to have our dialogue and relationships with
China become so extensive that the feeble Mao by that time cannot effect-
ively interfere.
-- Mao is very shrewd. He is not widely educated nor has he traveled
very much (just to Russia, and in China), but he has a shrewd mind, a keen
intuition and a creative and poetic bent. He probably knows or infers all
of our purposes, but still plans to play some poker with us. It is unlikely
he will negotiate with our President, because (1) emperors do not nego-
tiate, and neither do gods - they leave that to their ministers; and (2) that
is Chou En-lai's job; and (3) he will feel that negotiating at his and your
high levels is not proper or dignified. Probably, in his bluff and some-
times somewhat crude peasant manner, he will do his best to entertain
our President; will banter in his rough but smiling way; and will argue
philosophies and ideologies. This can be done in a good-natured and
pleasant way.
? What will Mao be watching for and studying in our President, when
they meet? Mao has a script from which he will play this meeting - his
favorite stories in Romance of the Three Kingdoms and in Shui Hu Chuan,
or Water Margin (All Men Are Brothers). It is a safe assumption that
Mao in his inner mind will pict.ure this meeting between himself and the
President as a courteous and ceremonious meeting between great but
opposing war chieftains, two enemy "kings" or "emperors," if you will.
Mao will treat the President with courtesy, and ply him with Mao's favorite
tea, the famous "Dragon Well" tea, the great green tea produced in the
West Lake region of Hangchow, and wines, and:perhaps a boat ride around
the lakes. Mao will act the gracious host, but this is what he will be
searching in our President's face, eyes, bearing and manner:
What, Mao will wonder, is this man Nixon really like, inside -
is he strong (in the decisive, confident, spartan and erect
military sense); does he have the courage to order his legions
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
-9-
to attack, or to keep fighting? If so, I must respect him and
maintain peaceful relations ,with him. Or is he weak, so that
I should attack him?
? Mao-will study our President's mind, probe for its degree of
determination and shrewdness, test to see how sturdy or weak
is the American culture, as represented by this first important
and powerful American he has ever met closely.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
-10-
Chou En-lai
Premier Chou En-lai is a more rational and less complicated figure than
Mao Tse-tung, and can be evaluated from the Chinese standpoint and
from ours, in much less space than is required as for Mao. Chou En-lai
is a very loyal Chinese, intensely patriotic, ambitious for his communist
party and true to its causes. But he is not a fanatic like Mao. He is
rational, reasonable, cultured, informed, pleasant in manner when he
wants to be, and an able administrator and statesman.
He, himself, has said, "I am an intellectual, with a feudalistic family
background." He enjoys good wines, and especially the famous Shao-hsing
wine produced in his home town by that name.
Regarding Chou's record in international affairs, we know that he shares
with Mao and other Chinese communists a willingness to lie, break his
word and otherwise violate the codes of ethics of our world, and of China's
former world. But Chou does it with some grace, and one can believe
that he may suffer a twinge or two, or at least does not enjoy breaches of
ethics. In all events, he gives an appearance of rationality and at least
logical thinking, in his worst periods even, with respect to America.
Chou En-lai has been and still is our enemy. But he is an enemy with
whom we can communicate. He is not filled with the hatreds and xeno-
phobic reactions of Mao Tse-tung. He does not harbor any terrible hatreds
for Americans, and has some respect for us. Obviously, he is a Chinese,
and also a Chinese communist. So he would make dangerous move against
us if he believed it were in China's interest. But on the whole, his judge-
ments as to any such moves would be based on criteria not unlike those
we consider in similar situations, with an additional touch of the old
Confucian grace affecting Chou's manner of making his move.
Chou En-lai can be exceedingly charming and persuasive. But he has been
proven on a number of occasions to have been insincere in his protesta-
tions, and more than once has been charged with being "a complete fraud."
Also, his acting ability in the course of diplomatic exchanges has been
ironically praised. One close acquaintance of Chou's in the 1936-37 Sian
period, has claimed emphatically that "Everything that appears to be human
in Chou En-lai is false, absolutely false! And he is sharp and capable -
that is what's terrible about him. He has too many tricks, and yet he can
appear so touchingly innocent. He is the god of revolution, and the demon
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
of bloodshed, but never a man! " However, Chou En-lai is a rational and
educated man, without ungoverned passions. And he is a man with whom
we can establish and maintain a dialogue. Also, he is capable of reason-
ably perceiving that a given course of conduct, such as increasing peaceful
relations with us, may be in the ultimate interest of China, as well as in
our interests.
Chou is well known as China's great administrator, and the calming in-
fluence in many of the internal differences, as well as the Chinese foreign
negotiator of the most ability and experience. It is noteworthy that the
survival-oriented and remarkably surviving Chou En-lai, during the 1966.-
67 Red Guard tumult all around him, attacked nobody personally and
pacified the mobs, on occasion, intervening in disputes.
A number of Chinese sources have explained Chou En-lai's ability to
survive in communist turmoil and among other sometimes violent rises
and falls, because of the following characteristics and procedures identi-
fied with him:
? Chou En-lai is exceptionally alert, charming both in the Chinese
and in the Western cultures, and an able speaker. He catches nuances
very quickly, and is capable of dropping skillful cl.plomatic hints and threats,
himself. In debate, he relies on facts; precedents; logic; and the socratic
device (questioning his opponent into a corner), and the syllogism (major
premise, minor premise, and then conclusion). Chou is well educated and
currently informed. He has a good and loyal staff, which he protected
quite successfully during the Red Guard turmoil, even sending many away
to remote-areas, to weather the storm. He is well briefed for negotiations.
And his general style is pleasant. One of my Chinese friends with Western
experience has indicated that Chou En-lai is a Confucian gentleman with a
Frenchman's charm and quick perception, with very mean and tough friends.
Choi:I was in France as a student, of course, and has been outside of China
on a?number of occasions, in Europe and elsewhere, but never to the United
States. Chou is reputed to be in the habit of trying to soften his debates by
"seeing the other man's view," and similar devices, and then trying to
demolish it. On the whole, he is a suave, clever and alert gentlemen with
very mean and tough friends, as some Chinese have remarked. Chou, him-
self must be charged with involvement in some of the blood baths around
him, but he always seems to have been "out for tea with a friend" when the
shooting started.
? Chou En-lai has avoided writing very many public articles, and so
has not left the broad ideological trail which was left by other now departed
colleagues of Mao Tse-Tung.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
- 12 -
? Most important, according to Chinese sources, has been the fact
that Chou En-lai since his return from the student days in France, had
always been -the steady "gray" administrator for the communists.
Obviously, he has competence in this field. Rather than taking part in
the contests and battles, Chou En-lai has usually been the man who sold
tickets, ushered, announced each fight, served as referee, announced
the winner, comforted the loser (or buried him) and wrote up the fights
for the Foreign Office archives. In his steady survivals as each new
episode of disappearances occurs, Chou En-lai is very much like the
nonchalant and ubiquitous Chinese prop man, who strolls around the stage
of the traditional Chinese opera while it is going full blast, dressed in his
plain blue work clothes. All the actors are in elaborate costumes, fully
made up with gaudy paints reflecting their various characters, and impres-
sive head-dress, variously as ancient lords, warriors and ladies. The
actors sing and shout loudly, as they bound about the stage, orating, fight-
ing and then collapsing in death. Whenever an actor is ready to die, the
prop man strolls up and provides a pillow to soften the fatal fall. If a
'warrior needs a spear, the prop man is there -with it. When lovers finish
with a flute, it is handed to the prop man, who takes it backstage, often
passing between the audience and the actors. The prop man is always
there; the battles rage around him; men die; and he helps them be com-
fortable in their death, in all administering the wild and colorful action.
The comparison is apt. Chou En-lai so far indeed has been the prop man
in the Chinese communists' Chinese opera. As with the prop man who is
not considered a part of the battles but is there, Chou has survived.
Another fa.ctor which contributes to Chou's influence and security is the
high regard felt for him by a large group of Liberation Army officers, some
of high position [ranks were abolished, but "positions" remain high]. Chou's
popularity with the officers stems in part from his early days as Political
CoMmissar at Whampoa Military Academy, where the officers learned to
know him and respect him. Some of those officers still survive, and by
reputation, Chou's close connection with the army officers continues.
Such friendships no doubt strengthen Chou's hand, today. There is no,
certainty as to tomorrow.
Chou En-Lai today probably is in some danger from any surviving colleagues
of Lin Piao. just by counting names and noting who is no longer around as
shown in the recent press photographs, a large number of highly placed
communists are now missing and in trouble, undergoing "reform," or
dead. It may be that Chou En-lai has sufficient support and enough of Mao's
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
- 13 -
blessings and approval to maintain a government stable enough to deal
with us. But the potential for change in China is great, and it is difficult
to estimate whether Chou En-lai can maintain a stable government; whether,
if not, who might succeed him; and what will occur upon Mao Tse-Tung's
death. If Chou En-lai remains and can hold the government stable, we
should be able to work with him in our dialogue.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X6
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
741f4
At:
?
'-v
THE WHITE HOUSE
INFORMATION
February 16, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: The Chinese Approach
Attached is an extract from an article
written by an Asian scholar at Harvard
who is a friend of mine. I think you will
find that it gives you useful insights into
the Chinese mode of operation.
Attachment
DECLASSIFIED
rcPer
(e-fitir 41/75/?J
By ___titz LC Date_5140
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
II cooly-174*
?
Chinese Principles and Assurutions
Chinese operating principles for the manipulation of "barbarians"
are not improvised like our policies of recent times, but are inherited
from a great tradition that comes down from centuries even before the
Mongols and Manchus conquered and ruled all China. From ancient
times the sedentary Chinese farmers and bureaucrats have always had
to deal from weakness with powerful, mobile, non-Chinese fighters
and conquerors. Today, Chiang deals with us from weakness, while
Mao deals with the Russians, also from weakness. Both are doing well.
1. The cardinal Chinese principle in dealing with a non-Chinese
is to use friendship as a halter. Admit the outsider to a guest member-
ship in Chinese society. Compliment him on his knowledge of aspects
of Chinese culture or of the Chinese language. Entertain him with
informality and frankness. Establish the personal bonds of friendship,
which in the old China were stronger than in Western urban life today.
Become really intimate friends and understand his unspoken assump-
tions and personal motivations.
2. Ask the foreigner's advice so as both to ascertain his aims
and values and to enlist his sympathy and support. (Both these prin-
ciples help to account for our Sinophilism. )
3. Disclose to him those Chinese vital interests which are allegedly
more important than life itself, so as to preempt a position ahead of time
and warn him it is. not negotiable.
4. Build up the peculiar uniqueness of Chinese values and conduct
(as I am doing here) so as to suggest the dangers of stormy unpredicta-
bility, preternatural stubborness, or other traits of the powerholder,
which present the foreigner with insuperable difficulties.
5. Find out the foreigner's friends, enemies, and other circum-
stances so as to avoid offense to him and also to know where to find
allies if necessary to mobilize against him, and so on.
6. Use the foreigner's own rules to control him, especially the
Western legal concept of sovereignty, the idea that diplomats are accre-
dited to governments (not to the local people), that domestic matters
are beyond foreign question, and so on.
cHytifbilvm,
7 , DECLASSIFIED
Per
JS( e
?t,Stalali
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
DECLASSIFIED
-2-
7. Stir the foreigner's conscience and sense of guilt so that he
hamstrings himself.
8. Use some foreigners against others, to secure Chinese ends.
Thus Chiang Hai-shek has cultivated American supporters of his own
military doctrine, and by putting one third of his forces on Quemoy,
with American help, he has made the defense of Quemoy probably neces-
sary to the defense of Taiwan. Meanwhile Mao Tse-tung has found a
staunch ally against Moscow in the state of Albania.
Behind these tactics, which are of course not really unique, lie
certain traditional assumptions of Chinese_politics that are rather
different from our own:
1. China is a political and cultural universe. It cannot be divided.
All Chinese belong to it.
Z. There is only one Son of Heaven. He and his dynasty (or party)
are the repository of final power. Popular consent is tacit.
3. Majority rule is mere mobocracy. Men are not equally endowed.
The elite should rule. Hence plebiscites are unsound and insulting to
dignity.
4. The ruler has a special virtue and prestige, which if maintained
prolong his rule. Hence face is necessary to power holding, and criti-
cism (as by a free press) is at once subversive.
5. Rule is personal. Law is not supreme, but a tool of adminis-
tration. It is loyalty that supports a ruler. Hence civil rights must be
limited and law subordinated to personal relations.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
October 1971
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
COMMUNIST CHINA: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ECONOMY
Conclusions
In the 1 970s, Communist China's growing economic strength will be
applied largely to industrial and military modernization, and its international
economic role is likely to remain small.
China's economic strategy for the 1970s calls for a strong push in
domestic investment. Indeed, this program is well under way as evidenced
by the surprising number of industrial projects at various stages of
construction ? for example, iron and steel complexes, petroleum refineries,
aluminum plants, and shipyards. Simultaneously, the leadership is faced with
the high costs of serial production and large-scale deployment of missiles
and other modern weapons systems. The agricultural sector, which must
feed a growing population at gradually higher standards, needs additional
support from industry and will be hard put to increase its volume of export
goods in the next few years. Since China's exports consist largely of raw
and manufactured agricultural products, the growth of foreign trade will
be relatively slow.
Japan will continue to be China's natural trading partner because of
geographical nearness, cultural ties, and a suitable offering of goods and
technology. If the Chinese become less sensitive to the presence of foreign
technicians, the Japanese can supply on-the-spot assistance in building new
industrial capacity and developing natural resources, notably petroleum.
Such a development would underscore China's subordinate role in the
international economic arena.
As for the United States, the potential for US-China trade is limited
by several factors. China's foreign trade is small in relation to total output
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated within CIA.
SECRET
MORI c03322007 pp
98-130
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X1
25X1A1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
SECRET
and is likely to grow only slowly because of Peking's policy of economic
self-sufficiency, its conservative attitude toward foreign indebtedness, and
its limited range of export goods. And China already has well-established
trading relationships with low-cost suppliers of its major import needs --
grain from Canada and Australia; and capital goods, metals, and fertilizers
from Japan and Western Europe. Despite these limitations there are obvious
possibilities for growing US-China commercial relationships because of a
US comparative advantage in high-technology industries -- such as aircraft,
advanced computers, petro-chemical equipment, and offshore drilling
equipment ? and the existence of a high-income US market for Chinese
luxury items.
In general, China will continue to depend on the outside world for
new technology and modern machinery in the 1970s. China enters the
international arena as a back runner in the technological race. To be sure,
China will draw rapidly ahead of other large low-income nations, such as
India and Indonesia, which lack internal momentum in investment and are
burdened by crushing international debts. At the same time, China will
be rapidly falling behind its neighbor Japan in total and per capita output
since the Japanese economy is growing at least twice as fast on a far larger
base. All the leading industrial nations will be devoting substantial resources
to research and development and to the modernization of their industrial
facilities. China with its heavy commitment to defense will be hard-pressed
not to fall farther back of the international pace-setters.
Purpose of the Memorandum
The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth the strengths and
weaknesses of the economy of Communist China as they affect China's
ability to project its power into the international arena. The memorandum
provides an overview of the Chinese economy ? its resources, its pattern
of growth, and its place in the world economy. Appendixes contain a
chronology of economic events in Communist China, estimates of key
economic indicators, answers to questions frequently asked about the
Chinese economy, and comparisons with other economies.
? ii ?
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
SECRET
CONTENTS
Conclusions
Contents
I. RESOURCES FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH
Page
111
Manpower Resources
1
Agricultural Resources
3
Industrial Resources
5
IL THE PATTERN OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
Trends in the Gross National Product
6
Agricultural Production
8
Industrial Production
11
Iron and Steel
12
Petroleum
13
Military Production
14
Industrial Technology
15
Transportation
16
III. CHINA'S ROLE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY
Foreign Trade
18
Foreign Aid
20
US-China Economic Relationships
22
APPENDIXES
A. Economic Chronology
23
B. Economic Indicators
24
C. Terrain Map
26
D. Administrative Map
27
E. Questions Frequently Asked About the Chinese Economy
. 28
F. International Economic Comparisons, 1970 ...... .
. 30
iii
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
SECRET
Population
1.%?Hr111.0.-,','I
512349 10.71
Persons per squere
2.6 ,:26 260 520
, /0 100 200
Persons per seuere kdometer
- iv -
SECRET
0
500 1000 Kilurrlu lore
NAMES AND ROI1NOARY REPRESEN IION
ARF rAn-r NDOESSAPII Y AUTHORITATIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
41:
1
1
1
1
411
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
SEC_K
I. RESOURCES FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH
Manpower Resources
China's huge manpower resources are uniquely suited for both military
and economic development purposes.
The government needs to draft only 10% of the 10 million males reaching
military age each year in order to maintain its three-million-man Peoples
Liberation Army (PLA). Thus only males in prime health and of unques-
tioned loyalty to the regime are inducted. The proportion of active-duty
military personnel in the total population is only one-quarter as great as in
the USSR or the United States.
China's abundant manpower is re- Estimated and Projected
flected also in the availability of tens Midyear Population
of millions of reservists, militia, and
members of the paramilitary Produc-
tion and Construction Corps,
engages in construction projects and
agricultural reclamation in frontier
areas.
In terms of suitability for eco-
nomic development, the basic char-
acter of the Chinese people is prob-
ably unsurpassed anywhere in the
world. The average Chinese is quick to
learn, industrious and frugal, reason-
ably healthy, and well-motivated to
improve his material lot. The popula-
tion is homogeneous except for the
6% made up of minority nationalities
living in the border areas. Communist
China for the most part has been
spared the racial and religious blood-
baths of India and other less de-
veloped countries.
whichYear
Million
Persons
1945
510
1950
547
1955
611
1960
689
1965
751
1970
836
1971
855
1975
937
1980
1,054
The geographical distribution of the population is extremely uneven, as
shown on the map. The river valleys, coastal plains, and low hills of the
eastern third of the nation contain 90% of the population.
Although the quality of manpower is a distinct asset, China would be
better off with fewer people. The enormous population growing at 2.2% per
year poses formidable problems of feeding and clothing ? even at the austere
levels which the Peking government has maintained over the past 20 years.
Birth control measures have been sporadic and so far have made no
appreciable dent in the population structure.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
SEC:Kt
Agriculture
'JONI
111111
,n;0111
1111111
III11111111001111.11
Percen( in m.111;?,..tioir
0 IC) :SO
Ill
IIIII
rorlfriii 0111111
rrrr.r1rVirrr,...1.]'111 411,
rr? rr11001rr.
----- Agricultural region boundary
91235Q 10-71
- 2 -
SECRET
000 1000 Miles
0
0()0 10.00 Kilorneters
NAMES ANL, HOIINO.Ano REPRESLNTATION
ARE NOT NECESSAHILY AIITHORITATIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
SEL_K.1-1,
Agricultural Resources
China's agricultural resources, while large in absolute terms, are small
in relation to the population and to the needs of the economy for export
goods and raw materials for industry.
Because of rugged terrain and lack of moisture in the western
two-thirds of China, cultivation is largely confined to the eastern third.
The eastern portion is divided into the predominantly wheat areas of the
north and the predominantly rice areas of the south, as shown on the map.
Only about 415,000 square miles -- or 11% of the total land area of 3.7
million square miles ? is under cultivation. The effective cultivated acreage
is increased by 50% through multiple cropping.
Additional land, perhaps 3% of the total land area, could be brought
under cultivation, but only at tremendous cost. At the same time, the
development of urban areas, new transportation routes, and military
installations is nibbling away at existing agricultural acreage.
Centuries of intensive agricultural use have resulted in the stripping
of China's forest cover, the exhaustion of much of the land, and the drop
in water tables and alkalization of extensive acreage through overuse of
water supplies. This has left the land even more vulnerable to flood and
drought. The Communist government has made substantial gains in
afforestation, control of water resources, and restoration of the fertility
of the land. Beginning in 1962, the government has provided increasing
amounts of chemical fertilizer, pesticides, irrigation pumps and piping, and
improved seeds to the agricultural sector. The recurring periods of political
upheaval have prevented the government from reaping the full benefits of
these policies.
Because of the continuing growth of population and the importance
of agricultural products as raw materials for industry and as export goods,
the government will need an even stronger effort to improve agricultural
resources in the 1970s. This effort will center on the increase in yields
from existing land through more fertilizer, better water management, and
improved seeds. These improvements in China's agricultural resources will
be at a relatively simple technological level appropriate to China's needs;
it may be a decade before China can achieve the more advanced technology
and higher yields of, for example, Taiwan and Mexico.
? 3 -
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
Industry
Major industrial area
latIU Oil basin
4-e- Main railroad
512351 10-71
NPMFS ANL, IINnARY HLYHFSFNTATIUN
ARC NOT NFC.F.SGA1,11_1' qIITHOMI I IVF
- 4 -
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
brA.J.K.r,
Industrial Resources
China has the energy resources and mineral deposits of a superpower
but lacks the capital plant and technological skill to compete with the
United States and the USSR on a global scale.
In energy resources, China has huge coal reserves, the world's largest
hydroelectric potential, and extensive oilfields which are being rapidly
developed. In metals, China's reserves of tungsten, tin, and antimony are
the world's largest; sizable deposits of iron, manganese, and aluminum ores
also have been found. However, reserves of three key alloying metals --
chrome, nickel, and cobalt -- are inadequate, and supplies must be imported.
Finally, China remains heavily dependent upon imports for its supply of
natural and synthetic rubber.
Most of China's modern capital plant is located in the major industrial
areas shown on the map. The concentration of manufacturing capacity in
the northeast (the former Manchuria) and in the eastern port cities is a
carryover from the pre-Communist era. Peking's strategy has been to build
upon this inherited base while at the same time developing -- for strategic
and "local self-reliance" objectives ? new industrial areas in the hinterland.
The region stretching northeastward from Shen-yang (the former
Mukden) to Ha-erh-pin is China's largest producer of petroleum, coal,
electric power, steel, aluminum, cement, trucks, and railroad equipment.
It also is a major producer of machine tools and armaments. Shanghai,
on the east coast, is the country's largest industrial metropolis and a leading
manufacturer of textiles, pharmaceuticals, chemical fertilizer, tires, steel,
electronic and electrical equipment, machine tools, and merchant and naval
shipping.
Peking has been extensively developed as a production base for missiles,
land armaments, electronic equipment, machine tools, textiles, and
agricultural machinery. West of Shanghai is the Wu-han area, important for
steel, heavy machinery, and naval shipbuilding. The Ch'ung-ch'ing region
produces steel, machine tools, and artillery. Representative of other
fast-growing hinterland cities are Ch'eng-tu (jet aircraft, electronic
equipment, and instruments) and Sian (jet aircraft, small arms, electrical
equipment, and textiles).
In addition to the large industrial plants controlled by central
ministries, the Communist government has supported the development of
small and medium-sized plants to serve local needs. These plants typically
produce cement and other construction materials, low-grade chemical
fertilizer, small motors and other simple equipment, and consumer goods.
? 5 -
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
SECRET
II. THE PATTERN OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
Trends in the Gross National Product
Overall economic growth under Communist rule has been fairly strong
but erratic.
China's gross national product (GNP) has doubled since 1952, reaching
a level of $119 billion in 1970, or $143 per capita. The severe economic
damage resulting from the Great Leap Forward (1958-60) -- a disastrous
attempt at instant industrialization ? shows up clearly on the top chart
at the right. In contrast, the damage from the political upheavals of the
Cultural Revolution (1966-69) was relatively mild.
The long-term annual growth rate of GNP has been about 4%. Since
population has gown at an average rate of slightly more than 2%, the growth
in per capita GNP has averaged about 2%. Agricultural output since 1952
has approximately matched the growth rate of population. In contrast,
industrial production since 1952 has grown at an 8% average rate, or 6%
if the larger 1957 base is used.
China is no ordinary less developed country with a per capita GNP
of $100 or less. Rather, it may be considered as an economy with, say,
a $100 "basic maintenance" sector and a $43 "development thrust" sector.
That is, $100 is needed simply to maintain the population at reasonable
minimum standards, with $43 left over for industrial investment and
development of advanced weapons. As the bottom chart shows, China moved
well above the $100 per capita level by 1957, fell back precipitously as
a result of the Leap Forward, and now is forging ahead with a slowly
widening margin.
Prospects for substantial economic growth in the early 1970s are good,
assuming no new flare-up of radical economic policies or a prolonged spell
of unfavorable weather in agriculture. Agriculture should stay abreast of
population growth, and industrial production should increase in the range
of 5% to 10% annually. The following favorable factors for growth have
been clearly identified:
O a vigorous program of construction of industrial facilities,
many in the interior provinces;
O a substantial flow of machinery and technology from Japan
and the leading industrial nations of Western Europe;
? a steady increase in chemical fertilizer and pumps and other
equipment going to agriculture; and
? the restoration of the purged administrative structure to
normal functioning together with the return to comparatively
moderate economic policies.
? 6 --
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
1
?I
411
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
SECRET
Gross National Product
Aggregate GNP
Billion 1969 $ US
104
107
119
1952 57 58 59 60
61 62 63 64
Per Capita GNP
1969 $ US
65 66 67 68 69 70
139 143
123 131 136
125 127 127 131
101 I I I 98 107110
1118 1 1 121 I
1952 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70
512362 10-71 CIA
- 7 ?
SECRET
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
SEC_KE
Agricultural Production
Since 1962, agricultural production has benefited from a combination
of favorable weather, larger supplies of fertilizer and equipment, and a
permissive attitude toward private plots and rural markets.
120
110
100
90
80
70
1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971.
Population Growth and Agricultural Production
Index 1965=100
512353 10-71 CIA
SECRET
The Communist leadership originally counted on collectivization to
boost agricultural production rather than on large-scale capital investment.
A sweeping "land reform" program which parceled the land out to the
peasants was only the prelude to forcible collectivization of agriculture,
and by 1957 the countryside had been organized into 750,000 agricultural
producer cooperatives. Collectivization was followed in 1958 by the
formation of 26,000 supereollectives ? the so-called "communes" -- which
were to mobilize China's vast labor force for industrial and construction
tasks as well as for agriculture.
The unwieldy nature of the commune plus three years of unfavorable
weather caused agricultural production to plummet in 1959-61. By the
winter of 1960-61, China was near starvation, and discontent had spread
even to the armed forces. As suggested by the chart, the already meager
ration was reduced by 25% or more over wide areas.
Threatened with the loss of control over China, the Communist
leadership moved quickly to restore the situation by:
? 8 -
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
btA._;.K1-1, 1
? opening food stocks and arranging for the
annual import of 4-5 million tons of grain,
starting in 1961;
? decentralizing agricultural decisions to smaller
organizational units, i.e., the production bri-
gade and the production team;
? restoring the small private plot and permitting
small-scale private trade in rural products; and
? initiating a program of investment which has
greatly increased the flow to agriculture of
chemical fertilizer, electric power, pumps and
other equipment, and improved seeds.
This dramatic turnabout in policy, together with favorable weather,
led to record levels of production in the late 1960s.
In addition to feeding the population, the agricultural sector is
expected to supply raw materials for industry and for export. One result
is a continuing competition between grain and cotton for the available
acreage. At present, sufficient cotton is being grown to provide a basic
ration of about five linear meters of cloth a year ? enough for a simple
outfit of tunic and trousers -- and to furnish a substantial volume of cotton
textile exports. As for food exports, China typically exports foods that
have a high unit value while importing basic grains, primarily wheat.
Over the next few years, agricultural production can continue to
expand gradually under the present policy of increased inputs to agriculture
and a reasonably permissive attitude toward private activity. Peking no
doubt will continue its efforts to reduce the amount of centrally controlled
resources used in agriculture by encouraging the growth of local industry,
by strengthening the birth control program, and by resisting pressures for
a higher payout to the peasants.
- 9 -
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
SECRET
Representative Industrial Activities
- 10 -
Feeder bell for blast furnace being machined by a
large vertical lathe at the Shen-yang Heavy
Machinery Plant (Northeast China)
Miniature bearings being ground to close tolerances
at a factory in Shanghai (East China)
SECRET
Nitrogen fertilizer being produced by a small
chemical fertilizer plant in Fukien Province (South-
east China)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
SLCKI 1
Industrial Production
The volume and variety of industrial products have increased markedly
since 1949, but China still is far behind the leading industrial nations in
most branches of industry.
In the 1950s, the new government gave priority to building up the
capacity and output of basic industrial fuels and materials. This priority
has been maintained up to the present as shown by the following estimates
of the output of key industrial products:
1952
1957
1970
Steel
(million metric tons)
1.35
5.35
17
Coal
(million metric tons)
66.5
130.7
300
Electric power
(billion kilowatt hours)
7.3
19.3
60
Crude oil
(million metric tons)
0.44
1.46
18
Cement
(million metric tons)
2.86
6.9
13
The groundwork for large-scale production of machinery and
armaments also was laid in the 1950s. Subsequently, the Chinese have
mastered the production of several types of precision machine tools, a
remarkable variety of electronics equipment (including computers, radar,
and communications equipment), transportation equipment (including
heavy-duty trucks and diesel locomotives), and modern weapons of both
Soviet and Chinese design. The expansion of light industry -- which provides
the Chinese with simple everyday consumer goods and is an important
source of export earnings ? has proceeded at a slower pace.
The organization of industry reflects the normal practices of a
centralized" command economy." The State Council, the highest government
administrative body, translates the policy guidelines of the Party into
specific directives; these orders are then carried out through a bureaucratic
hierarchy of planning commissions, industrial ministries and departments,
and industrial enterprises.
Large plants, controlled by the central ministries, account for most
of China's modern industrial production. A host of medium-size and small
plants, which process local raw materials at a simple level of technology,
are controlled by local governmental units. Supplementing the efforts of
the regular industrial plants is the activity of tens of millions of full-time
or part-time handicraft workers, who fill the interstices of the industrial
sector by satisfying those small needs that escape the planners' attention.
? 11 ?
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
SEC;RE
Iron and Steel
The rapid development of the iron and steel industry has propelled
China into eighth place in world steel production ? far behind the United
States, the USSR, and Japan but well ahead of India.
Soviet equipment and technical aid were instrumental in the rapid
growth of steel capacity and production in the 1950s. During the Leap
Forward (1958-60), however, over-intensive use of equipment and the
commissioning of 650,000 primitive "backyard furnaces" brought the
orderly development of the industry to a halt. Most of the "backyard"
product was unusable, and by 1961 many of the industry's major facilities
had to be shut down for extensive repairs. After the abandonment of the
Leap Forward, capacity and production were built up in rational fashion,
with output of steel reaching 13 million tons in 1966. Following another
sharp but short-lived drop in output during the Cultural Revolution, the
industry today is moving ahead with a vigorous program of expansion and
modernization.
The iron and steel industry is located primarily near major deposits
of iron ore and coking coal, which are widely distributed throughout the
eastern half of the country. The principal production facilities are located
at An-shan ? the old Manchurian center which produces 30% of China's
steel ? Shanghai, Wu-han, and Pao-t' ou. Other large facilities are being built
or expanded mainly in interior industrial areas.
China's capacity for finishing steel has grown more slowly than crude
steel production and does not provide a full assortment of shapes, sizes,
and qualities of product. China is particularly dependent on imports of
some kinds of tubing, sheet steel, and alloy steels. Moreover, in the last
few years China has changed from a net exporter of pig iron to a net
importer, evidence that crude steel capacity has overtaken and surpassed
its pig iron capacity. China also depends on imports for substantial amounts
of scrap because its industrial sector is still too young to generate much
scrap.
Since 1965, when most of the Soviet-designed construction projects
were finally completed, China has looked to the Free World for steel
technology and has imported nearly $100 million worth of metallurgical
equipment, including sheet and tube mills, heat treating and soaking
furnaces, ore beneficiation plants, and equipment for basic oxygen
converters.
? 12 ?
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
SECRET
Petroleum
With the discovery and exploitation of large new oilfields, China has
become self-sufficient in petroleum and may even be able to export
appreciable quantities of crude oil by the mid-1970s.
The priority growth of the petroleum industry has eliminated what
was once believed to be a major vulnerability in China's strategic position.
Whereas China could supply less than half its needs from domestic resources
in the 1950s, by 1965 it was essentially self-sufficient in petroleum products.
Output of crude oil has almost quadrupled over the last decade ? from
4.6 million tons in 1960 to an estimated 18 million tons in 1970 ? and
refining capacity has more than kept pace. In spite of this rapid expansion,
China is not a major producer by world standards ? for example, China's
total annual production would satisfy the needs of the Japanese economy
for only about 28 days.
The center of gravity of the industry has shifted markedly under the
Communists from the remote northwest to the industrialized northeast. The
Ta-ch'ing oilfield in the northeast now provides about 60% of China's crude
oil. Other major producers are the older Karamai and Yu-men oilfields in
the northwest and the Sheng-li oilfield in Shantung Province in the east.
Offshore fields are under investigation or development in order to acquire
new sources of supply.
China now is able to produce a complete range of petroleum products
and is moving gradually into the production of petroleum-based chemical
products. The effect of all these developments on the rest of the economy
has been most apparent in the substantial increase since 1965 in
petroleum-powered vehicles for military and civilian use ? aircraft, trucks,
tractors, and ships.
Production of crude oil in 1975 could reach 40 million tons. After
satisfying military requirements, as well as the needs of industry, agriculture,
and transportation, the Chinese may have as much as 10 million tons
available for export. At present world prices, this quantity would bring
in $250 million a year, a useful addition to China's present limited array
of exports and a substantial contribution to its earnings of hard currencies.
Japan, with its skyrocketing need for raw materials, is a logical customer.
Sales to various less developed countries also would be possible and would
contribute to China's political stature. Western Europe is a less promising
market because of high transportation costs.
? 13 ?
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
SECRET
Military Production
The industrial sector is supplying a rapidly expanding volume of
equipment to all branches of the armed forces.
In addition to surface-to-air missiles and short?range naval cruise
missiles, the Chinese have produced an unknown number of MRBMs and
IRBMs. They are also working on an ICBM program.
The Chinese are gradually strengthening their air force by the
production of Soviet-designed aircraft as well as a native-design fighter
bomber. Production in 1971 probably will include more than 500 MIG-19
jet fighters, some MIG-21s, about two dozen TU-16 jet bombers, and more
than 100 of the new F-9 jet fighter bomber.
Construction of naval weapons to date has been largely based on Soviet
systems. These include cruise-missile equipped destroyers, guided missile
patrol boats, and torpedo attack submarines. The Chinese have constructed
a large modern, native-designed attack submarine which is probably
nuclear-powered. They may also be developing a ballistic missile submarine
of their own design.
Production of ground weapons includes substantial quantities of small
arms, artillery, medium tanks, and ammunition.
In addition to armaments production, the Chinese economy contributes
a heavy volume of construction activity to the military effort, e.g., the
construction of shipyards, missile test sites, military bases, and airfields --
many with extensive underground facilities; the strengthening and extension
of road and rail transport routes in strategic areas; the building of costly
nuclear weapons production facilities in remote areas; and the construction
of air-raid shelters in the cities.
The resources used in defense include a large share of China's top-level
scientists, engineers, and plant managers and much of the modern machinery
produced at home or imported from Japan and Western Europe. In turn,
the armed forces provide support to the general economy by supplying
men and trucks at harvest time, building roads and railroads, training a
continuing stream of recruits in valuable technical skills, and growing much
of their own food on army farms.
- 14 -
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
?I
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
SECRET
Industrial Technology
China's rapid advance in industrial technology has still left China far
behind the leading industrial nations.
In the 1950s the USSR supplied the equipment and technical support
for the construction of about 150 modern industrial plants, including steel
mills, electric powerplants, machine tool plants, and armaments plants.
About 10,000 Soviet engineers, technicians, and production managers served
tours in China, and thousands of Chinese scientists and technicians were
trained in the USSR.
The abrupt withdrawal of Soviet technicians in mid-1960, combined
with the calamitous Leap Forward (1958-60), brought to a halt this progress
in industrial technology. After the Leap was abandoned, China turned to
Japan and Western Europe for modern machinery and technology with
emphasis on technology in the iron and steel, chemical, electronics, and
machinebuilding industries. The subsequent advance in industrial technology
was again delayed by the political turmoil of the Cultural Revolution
(1966-69).
In addition to the foreign sources of technology, China has benefited
from the extensive training and on-the-job experience of tens of thousands
of its own young scientists, engineers, and plant managers. Today, the level
of industrial technology lags behind the technology of Japan and Western
Europe from 5 to 20 years or more depending on China's industrial
priorities. Furthermore, within each industry, there is a striking contrast
between large modern plants and local plants which use primitive methods
and large numbers of unskilled workers. Peking preaches a doctrine of
self-reliance in technology, yet China must continue to rely on Japan and
Western Europe for much of its modern technology in the 1970s.
A special problem concerns the replacement of the 200 Western-trained
scientists and engineers, now in their 50s, who have pioneered China's
nuclear and missile and other high-priority programs. The on-going Maoist
revolution in education, with its emphasis on manual labor and the
curtailment of theoretical academic training, conceivably could block the
development of the most promising young technical people. The
government, however, is exempting a small number of talented youths from
the manual labor requirements and is believed to assign these youths to
technical institutes to work under top scientists.
? 15 ?
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
SECRET
Transportation
Rail transport is predominant in the modern sector of China's
economy, with water and road transport playing important supplementary
roles.
Railroads have borne the burden of increased economic activity,
particularly in industrial areas such as northeast China. Since 1950 the
Chinese have added more than 11,000 miles of main and branch lines to
the railroad network, which now totals about 25,000 miles, as shown on
the map. Chinese railroad construction has concentrated on correcting the
uneven distribution of the rail system. A striking example is the line linking
Ch'eng-tu in Szechwan directly with Klun-ming in Yunnan. This line was
recently completed after more than a decade of high-cost construction
through rugged mountainous terrain. Although China's railroad system is
primarily steam-powered, diesel locomotives have been introduced at an
increasing rate since 1965. China is presently experiencing the revolution
in railroad motive power completed in Western countries more than
10 years ago.
The Chinese road network totals more than 300,000 miles, about six
times the length of serviceable roads in 1949. More than half the system
consists of natural earth roads; the remainder is made up primarily of gravel
roads and a few thousand miles of bituminous-bound and hard-surface roads.
In most sections, truck transport provides short-haul service to the railroads
and inland waterways. Motor trucks are supplemented for local haulage by
large inputs of such primitive native transport means as wagons, carts, pack
animals, and coolie porters. The quality of China's roads does not permit
extensive long-distance truck haulage, except in the west where railroads
do not exist.
China's navigable inland waterways total more than 100,000 miles;
routes on streams suitable for modern motorized vessels amount to some
25,000 miles. Inland waterways supplement the railroads and carry bulk
cargoes for long distances when speed is not of major importance. Navigation
on the Yangtze River ? historically the great commercial artery of China ?
has steadily improved. Oceangoing vessels can sail as far inland as Wu-han,
while junks, barges, tugs, and large river steamers sail as far as Chlung-ch'ing.
The dense network of waterways in the populous eastern third of China
provides low-cost local haulage for an infinite variety of foodstuffs and
industrial goods.
Civil aviation is of minor importance in China. Air cargo is
characteristically made up of high-value, low-volume items such as expensive
machinery needed at remote construction sites or medical supplies required
on an emergency basis. Passengers arc mostly government officials and
foreign visitors.
? 16 ?
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
SELKE
Principal Transportation Routes
A14[1-:g
I 3
International boundary
Railroad, pre-0949
Railroad, post-l-b4e
0 100 202 ,392 .490 000. Miln5
190 200,X) 490 00. 1411nrnnters
512354 10-71 CIA
- 17 -
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10:1-1
34%
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
As.r,
j.
III. CHINA'S ROLE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY
Foreign Trade
China's foreign trade, rigidly planned by the central government and
controlled through a handful of state trading corporations, effectively
supports China's industrial and agricultural goals.
The total trade volume of $4.2 billion is small in relation to domestic
output, partly because a vast country such as China can produce a wide
variety of products for its own use and partly because so much of China is a
subsistence agriculture economy. Nonetheless, for some items ? grain,
chemical fertilizer, steel, rubber, and certain nonferrous metals and transport
equipment ? China ranks as an important purchaser; its practice of giving
single large contracts increases the impact on individual Western firms and
even individual countries.
China has made selective use of trade as a political tool, most recently in
placing all its wheat import business with Canada, leaving none for Australia.
On the other hand, Japan -- China's largest, most convenient, and least-cost
trading partner ? has been increasing its primacy in China's trade in spite of
festering political problems. And West Germany sells more to China than the
United Kingdom or France despite the absence of formal diplomatic
relations.
Trade
100%
Free World
Less
Developed
Countries
20%
66% 1
1960
4.0
512355 10-71 CIA
USSR
Eastern Europe
-----
Other Communist
Billion US $
1970
4.2
80%
19%
SECRET
In the first decade under the Com-
munists, China's total trade grew steadily
from $1.2 billion in 1950 to $4.3 billion in
1959; in the second decade the trend has
been cyclical, with trade dropping off after
the collapse of the Leap Forward and
during the Cultural Revolution and regain-
ing the 1959 level only in 1966 and again
in 1970. Trade in 1971 should move up to
a new peak. Along with these fluctuations
in the volume of trade there has been a
dramatic shift in China's trading partners.
In 1970, some 80% of China's trade was
with the Free World; a decade earlier
almost two-thirds was with the Communist
countries, with the USSR being the pre-
dominant partner.
China exports foodstuffs, textiles, un-
processed agricultural materials, and an
? 18 ?
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
?I
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
increasing range of miscellaneous manufactures in exchange for machinery
and equipment, grain, chemical fertilizer, metals, and other industrial
materials. China's trade in 1969, by commodity category, is given below:
Million US $
Exports
Imports
Total
2,020
1,835
Foods
615
350
Crude materials
450
310
Chemicals
90
310
Textiles
500
30
Metals
70
465
Machinery and equipment
25
240
Other manufactures
270
130
Machinery and transport equipment for China's industrial modernization
come from Japan, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe. Japan and Western
Europe supply the more advanced technology and also most of China's
imports of steel and chemical fertilizer. Canada and Australia have been
China's grain suppliers, with occasional shipments by France. Principal
imports from the Free World less developed countries include rubber from
Malaysia, Singapore, and Ceylon; copper from Zambia, Chile, and Peru; and
textile fibers from Pakistan, the United Arab Republic, and East Africa.
Hong Kong and the countries of Southeast Asia with sizable Chinese
populations buy large quantities of specialty foods, cotton textiles, and light
manufactures. This area provides China with hard currency earnings to
finance the substantial deficits in trade with the developed countries of the
Free World. For example, China's trade surplus with Hong Kong was $355
million in 1970. In addition, China obtained another $175 million from
remittances handled by the Hong Kong banks from Chinese residing abroad
and from business and investment profits remitted back to the Mainland.
China has followed a conservative international financial policy and is free
of long-term international debt. China's reserves of gold and foreign
exchange now amount to more than $700 million. Short-term commercial
credits have been extensively used to finance imports of Western grain and
fertilizer. Repayments have been prompt and outstanding short-term
indebtedness was about $350 million at the end of 1970.
? 19 -
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
Foreign Aid
China maintains a sizable foreign economic and military aid program
in selected Communist and non-Communist countries at an annual cost of
roughly $400 million a year.
North Vietnam is the largest single recipient of China's foreign aid,
having received by the end of 1970 $660 million in military aid and $945
million in economic aid. Military and economic aid to North Vietnam have
each been running at about $95 million a year in 1968-70. Military aid
is made up primarily of small arms and ammunition; economic aid of
foodstuffs, clothing, coal, and trucks.
China also is a source of aid to insurgent movements in Southeast
Asia - for example, the Pathet Lao in Laos and the Communist guerrilla
forces in northwest Thailand - but compared to its aid to North Vietnam,
Chinese commitments to these other movements are small. In an endeavor
to foster independence of the Soviet Union, China also has furnished
large-scale economic and military aid to Albania since 1961 and has recently
entered into aid agreements with North Korea and Romania. As for Cuba,
China for the last few years has been buying Cuban sugar at a price that
represents a subsidy of roughly $50 million per year.
In the period 1956-70, China extended a total of $1.7 billion in
economic aid to the Free World less developed countries, mainly in the
form of long-term low-interest loans. Only about one-third of this amount
has been actually drawn; thus the outpayments have been at an average
rate of $40 million per year. The most spectacular single aid project is
the $400 million railroad to connect Zambia's copper belt with the
Tanzanian port of Dar-es-Salaam. In addition to economic aid, China
extended by the end of 1970 some $200 million in military aid to
non-Communist countries, of which two-thirds went to Pakistan primarily
in the form of jet aircraft and tanks. The chart on the facing page gives
further details on China's aid to the less developed countries of the Free
World.
- 20 -
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
Economic and Military Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World
Extensions and Drawings, by Area
miLti6r4 US $
TAL FDR 196
tpiro,
1964 , 1
310.9 70,
138.2 24.7
18,0
16.5 172,7 '28,0
22 66 76
'766 1967 6 196? 1970
119,0 49.5 54,3 11.7 708.1
42.5 21.5 0.3 11.5 462.8
439
33,6 28.0 54.0 0.2 266,3
,
94 , 49 45
T 1 for 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968
T 6 0
MILLION LIS $
1964 3 ,196.5
74
Military xtensions
Total for
1956,60
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
512356 10-71 CIA
? 21 ?
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
US-China Economic Relationships
Over the next several years, US-China economic relationships are likely
to be overshadowed by the political issues between the two powers.
The US embargo on trade with China was lifted in April 1971,
permitting commercial transactions between US firms and Chinese trading
corporations for the first time in two decades. US importers have moved
quickly to initiate certain specialty imports through intermediaries in Hong
Kong and other countries. But Peking has been in no rush to expand its
trade ties with the United States, indicating that trade expansion with the
United States would follow, not precede, the solution of the Taiwan
problem, UN membership for Peking, and a US withdrawal from Vietnam.
At the same time, China has not been penalizing itself by refusing to
purchase equipment embodying advanced US technology. Where
advantageous, it has been procuring American goods through subsidiaries
of US companies or indirectly through third parties. It also is preparing
for direct trade by hinting to US traders that they may be invited to the
October 1971 trade fair in Canton.
The potential for US-China trade is limited by several factors. China's
foreign trade is small in relation to total output and is likely to grow only
slowly because of a policy of economic self-sufficiency, a conservative
attitude toward foreign indebtedness, and a limited range of export goods.
And China already has well-established trading relationships with low-cost
suppliers of its major import needs of grain, fertilizer, and machinery.
Nevertheless, there are obvious possibilities for commercial relations
between the two countries. Potential Chinese exports to the United States
include specialty foods, crude animal materials such as bristles and feathers,
and luxury products such as rugs, embroideries, silks, art objects, and curios.
China would have difficulty in achieving large-scale penetration of US
markets with its major exports of textiles and staple foodstuffs.
For the near future, China is most likely to be interested in US
industrial goods embodying advanced technology and not available from
other sources. And the key question for any sale would be whether or
not such goods would be licensed for export to China. Advanced computers,
petrochemical equipment, and offshore drilling equipment are prime
examples of such goods. China may also include US goods in its worldwide
search for commercial aircraft, trucks, truck components, and scientific
instruments. Finally, China may occasionally purchase US grain, steel, or
chemical fertilizers if it wishes to make a political gesture or if it faces
greatly increased domestic requirements for these items.
In summary, political uncertainties make any estimate of the future
volume of US-China trade highly speculative. Perhaps by the mid-1970s
imports and exports might each be in the range of $100-$200 million
annually.
? 22 -
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
i Appenam A
Economic Chronology
1949-52:
1953-57:
1958-60:
1961-65:
1966-69:
1970-75:
Rehabilitation: restoration of railroads, factories, and water
control systems to operation; provision of stable currency;
evening out of food supplies; establishment of economic law
and order.
First Five-Year Plan: successful Soviet-style plan for building
up capacity and production in basic industries ? steel, coal,
electric power, cement, simple machinery; good start on
defense industries; collectivization of agriculture with
emphasis on investment from local resources; import of
machinery and technology from Communist countries.
Great Leap Forward: attempt at instant industrialization
through frenzied increase in tempo of industry and
agriculture; backyard steel furnaces and other wasteful small
industrial projects; unwieldy supercollectives (communes) in
agriculture; ban on private plots; breakdown of planning and
statistical system; withdrawal of Soviet technicians in
mid-1960; poor harvests in 1959, 1960, and 1961; acute food
shortages especially in the winter of 1960-61.
Readjustment and Recovery: emergency measures to regain
tolerable food balance, including annual import of 4-5
million metric tons of grain beginning in 1961, restoration
of smaller collective units in agriculture, permissive attitude
toward private plots, and increase of industrial inputs to
agriculture; shutting down of wasteful industrial production
and concentration of industrial investment on weapons,
petroleum, electronics, and fertilizer industries; shift of trade
from Communist countries to Industrial West.
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: Maoist attempt to
revitalize revolution by reversing trends toward
bureaucratization, "expertism," and material incentives;
unleashing of youthful Red Guards with subsequent
assumption of power by army; damage to industrial
production in 1967-68 (down 15%0-20%) and foreign trade
(down 10% in 1967-68), but little damage to agriculture
which had good weather and might even have benefited from
lessened control.
Resumption of Regular Planning: general trend to political
and economic moderation and announcement of Fourth
Five-Year Plan for 1971-75; record industrial and agricultural
production in 1970; petroleum and armaments industries as
pace-setters; release of a few national production figures,
possibly foreshadowing lifting of 11-year statistical blackout.
? 23 ?
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
Appendix ts SLUR
Economic Indicators
1952
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
GNP (billion 1969 Us
$)
57
79
91
88
86
69
76
Population, mid-year
(million persons)
570
642
658
674
689
701
710
Per capita GNP
101
123
139
131
125
98
107
(1969 US $)
Grain (million metric
tons)
154
185
200
165
160
160
175-180
Cotton (million metric
tons)
1.3
1.6
1.7
1.5
1.4
0.9
0.9
Industrial production
index (1957 = 100)
51
100
130
163
160-162
103-105
106-109
Crude steel (million
metric tons)
1.35
5.35
8.0
10
13
Coal (million metric
tons)
66.5
130.7
230
300
280
170
180
Electric power (billion
kilowatt hours)
7.3
19.3
27.5
41.5
47
31
30
Crude oil (million
metric tons)
0.44
1.46
2.26
3.7
4.6
4.5
5.0
Aluminum (thousand
metric tons)
0
39
49
70
80
60
70
Cement (million metric
tons)
2.86
6.9
9.3
10.6
9.0
6.0
5.5
Chemical fertilizers
(million metric tons
of product weight)
Supply
0.4
1.9
3.0
3.1
3.5
2.4
3.1
Production
0.2
0.8
1.4
1.9
2.5
1.4
2.1
Imports
0.2
1.1
1.6
1.2
1.0
1.0
1.0
Trucks (thousand units)
0
7.5
16.0
19.4
15
1
14
Locomotives (units)
20
767
350
500
600
100
25
Freight cars (thousand
units)
5.8
7.3
11
17
23
3
4.0
Cotton cloth (billion
linear meters)
3.83
5.05
5.7
7.5
5.8
4.0
4.2
Foreign trade (billion
US $)
Total
1.89
3.03
3.74
4.26
3.97
3.02
2.68
Exports
0.88
1.60
1.91
2.20
1.94
1.52
1.53
Imports
1.01
1.43
1.83
2.06
2.03
1.50
1.15
- 24 -
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
?I
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
SECRET Appendix B
Economic Indicators
11110
1963 1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
79 87 95 104 100 97 107 119 GNP (billion 1969 US $)
721 735 751 766 783 800 818 836 Population, mid-year
(million persons)
110 118 127 136 127 121 131 143 Per capita GNP
(1969 US $)
175-180 180-185 190-195 195-200 210-215 195-200 200-205 215-220 Grain (million metric
tons)
0.9 1.3 1.3 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.7 Cotton (million metric
tons)
I 117-12 133-141 155-165 177-190 142-154 147-162 178-198 208-233 Industrial production
index (1957 = 100)
10 11 13 10 11.5 14.5 17 Crude steel (million
metric tons)
11 190 2" 220 240 190 200 250 300 Coal (million metric
tons)
42 47 41 44 50 60 Electric power (billion
kilowatt hours)
5.5 6.9 8 10 10 11 14 18 Crude oil (million
metric tons)
100 115 125 145 180 195 230 Aluminum (thousand
metric tons)
7.3 8.7 10.9 12.0 10.2 10.5 12 13 Cement (million metric
tons)
Chemical fertilizers
(Million metric tons
of product weight)
6.8 8.0 8.3 8.8 9.9 11.8 Supply
2.9 3.5 4.5 5.5 4.0 4.8 5.8 7.0 Production
2.0 1.2 2.3 2.5 4.3 4.0 4.1 4.8 Imports
16 26 34 47 34 31 66 75 Trucks (thousand units)
25 25 50 140 200 240 260 280 Locomotives (units)
5.9 5.7 6.6 7.5 6.9 8.7 11 12 Freight cars (thousand
units)
11 4.5 4.9 5.4 6.0 4.8 4.8 6.5 7.5 Cotton cloth (billion
linear meters)
Foreign trade (billion
US $)
2.77 3.22 3.85 4.20 3.86 3.71 3.86 4.25 Total
1.57 1.75 2.00 2.17 1.92 1.89 2.02 2.07 Exports
1.20 1.47 1.86 2.03 1.94 1.82 1.84 2.18 Imports
- 25 -
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
Appendix C SECRET
Terrain
512357 /0-71 CIA
? 26 ?
5?0 1000 Miles
500 1000 Kilometers
NAMES AND POUNPARY REPRESEN T ATION
ARE NOT NECESSARILY AO-I-MORITA I IVF
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
SEC _K ?appermut
Province-level Administrative Divisions
Province
itiag Autonomous region
MunicipAlity
Province-level boundary
Province-level capital
512358 10-71
- 27 -
SECRET
0
ADO
1000 Mlles
500 1000 Kilometers
NAMES ANT) ROLINDARY RErRFSFNTA 1105
ACE NOT NEC.F5SARII, AuTHORITATIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
Appendix E SECRET
QUESTIONS FREQUENTLY ASKED ABOUT THE CHINESE ECONOMY
Q. Is China likely to spill across its boundaries to seize the "rice
bowl" area of Southeast Asia?
A. No. The rice surplus in this area at the most is 5 million tons,
which is only 2%-3% of China's current grain production. Furthermore, if
the Chinese took the area, the surplus could well vanish because of disrupted
incentives; at the minimum, the surplus could not be procured and
transported cost-free. Finally, China could obtain 5 million additional tons
of grain at much less risk and cost by other means -- for example, by
buying additional grain or fertilizer abroad or by reallocating resources at
home. Of course, China's leadership could move into Southeast Asia for
political or military reasons or because of an erroneous assessment of the
economic issues involved.
Q. Are the Chinese people better off economically under the
Communist government than they were before 1949?
A. Yes. With the exception of 1960-61, the Chinese have had enough
to eat since the Communists came to power, and the stability of economic
life has been greatly improved because of the elimination of large-scale
famine, inflation, brigandage, civil war, and epidemics as well as of the
marked reduction in the effects of flood and drought. The majority of
the people lead more secure lives, economically speaking. The 5%-10% of
the people at the top in pre-Communist days fled the country, were killed,
or were dispossessed.
Q. Is the distribution of income egalitarian under the Chinese
Communists?
A. Yes. The distribution of income and perquisites is more nearly
equal than in any other major country. Distinctions in pay, dress, mode
- 28 -
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X1
is
1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
SECRET Appendix E
of transport, and life style are surprisingly small between the average worker
and the plant manager. Party members are enjoined to live frugally, and
opportunities for conspicuous consumption are few. The Cultural
Revolution was launched by Mao in part because he thought the cadres
were losing this egalitarian spirit.
Q. Does Communist China have an inflation problem?
A. No. Prices, wages, and rents in the modern part of the economy
are fixed by government fiat and effectively enforced. In the countryside,
much economic activity is contained within the household and another large
share is conducted on a barter basis. The "share-out" of the crop at the
end of the harvest season is largely in kind. Still another part of rural output
goes for taxes paid in kind to the government or as a quota sold to the
government at fixed prices. Inputs of fertilizer and equipment are paid for
by the collective unit at fixed prices. Local markets may have fluctuating
prices, but buying for resale is prohibited and prices far out of line normally
would be the subject of official action.
Q. How do the Chinese manage to have a balanced foreign trade
account?
A. State foreign trade corporations are authorized to contract for
only those goods which are covered by export earnings. When exports falter,
as happened during the Cultural Revolution, imports are correspondingly
tightened. The trade with individual nations does not necessarily balance --
for example, China uses its large trade surplus with Hong Kong and
Southeast Asia to cover its trade deficits with Japan, Canada, and Western
Europe.
Q. How have the Chinese Communists eradicated the opium
problem?
A. Stringent controls over opium poppy production and use were
adopted at the 21st session of the State Council on 24 February 1950.
Basically the statute prohibited the private importation, processing, and sale
of opium and other narcotics. However, government controlled production
continues and is reflected in the small quantities of raw opium and poppy
husks which are legally exported from time to time. The tight political
control exercised by the government over its citizens has probably made
the enforcement of these laws quite effective in most areas of the country.
Control over production and trade in the southern border areas
has probably been more difficult, and scattered reports in recent years
indicate that small amounts of illicit opium are produced and traded in
the tribal areas of the south.
? 29 ?
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
25X1
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part2010/01/14 : LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
Appendix F SECRET
International Economic
Comparisons, 1970
China Taiwan India Japan USSR
Land area (million 3.7 0.014 1.2 0.14 8.6
square miles)
Cultivated (percent) 11 24 50 16 9
Forested (percent) 8 55 22 69 37
Population, mid-year 836 15 550 104 243 2
(million persons)
Average annual 2.2 2.3 2.5 1.0 0.9
increase (percent)
GNP (billion 1969 US $) 119 5 47 186 508 9
Imports (billion US $) 2 18 1.52 2.15 18.9 11.7
Exports (billion US $) 2.07 1.56 1.96 19.3 12.8
Grain production 215-220 6 83 16 150 1
(million metric tons)
Industrial production 138 222 117 215 139 1
index (1965 = 100)
Hard coal (million 300 4 72 40 441 5
metric tons)
Electric power (billion 60 13 62 349 740 1,7
kilowatt hours)
Crude oil (million 18 0.09 7 0.8 353 4
metric tons)
Crude steel (million 17 0.3 6 93 116 1
metric tons)
Cement (million metric 13 4 14 57 95
tons)
Railroads (thousand 25 3 36 18 86 2
miles)
Highways (thousand 325 10 590 622 934 3,6
miles)
Telephones in use
(millions)
0.2 0.3
Radios in use 8.5
(millions)
1.2 23.1
13.0 1
1.4 9.3 23.2 49.1 3
- 30 -
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
0
2
5
8
2
6
7
9
0
5
9
8
4
8
2.
6.
II
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
The following descriptions of Mao's favorite novels reveal some of his
character traits: The stories involve military heroes, who demonstrate
acts of daring and cunning; a band of brigands who live in the mountains
and in Robinhood style, prey on arrogant and corrupt officials and the
wealthy, and are kind to the poor and helpless; wars and intrigue among
noblemen and their cohorts, in the early days of China; and a large
Chinese family, living in former days of the emperors, with all of its
members' daily happenings, romances, quarrels, happy and sad events,
intermixed with numerous mystical e,:rents and spirit interventions,
replete with symbolism.
Judging from the tales and from Mao's comments about them, from his
youth and still [recently, he announced he had just completed a re-reading
of one of the novels], Mao has been and is very much involved with:
a) - China's military conquests and ancient military traditions;
b) Physical bravery, especially in combat;
c) Solutions to various problems through use of force or cunning;
d) Robbing the rich and powerful and helping the poor and oppressed;
e) Mystical happenings;
f) Crude and often cruel humor, in human relations;
g) Life in the days of the emperors;
h) Merciless and hostile treatment of outsiders or foreigners;
1) An appreciation for nature's beauty, especially in the mountains;
j) Lust and lusty living; and
k) Delicate and often poignant human relationships, especially
between lovers.
Whether Mao Tse-tung reads and re-reads his favorite novels because
they are excellent Chinese "escape" entertainment and purely for
entertainment, or because he, himself, identifies with the characters
depicted, of course can be debated. However, when linked with his own
comments about some of the novels and his own writings, including his
writings about combat, and also in the light of Mao's record, we are
justified in concluding that Mao is not reading solely for entertainment
or to escape, but rather he identifies with the characters. As is true
of everyone and usually to a greater degree in national leaders who
have gained and held their power in large measure by force and device,
Mao is a complex man. He has all of the characteristics suggested in
the list of topics, a) through j), above. Of course, he has other
characteristics as well.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
But it is clear not only from his record and his own writings but also
from his favorite reading materials that Mao is a militant, devious
and brave (to the point of being rash) man, utterly without scruples
by western standards, and not only cannot be trusted to keep his word,
but can be expected to use trickery and to do whatever he feels is in
his or his side's interest and within their capacity. Mao not only is
willing to indulge in artifice, both in human dealings and in combat--
he prefers to do so and considers tricks and devices as the best
possible route to his objectives.
One theme which runs through two of his novels, above all, is the
winning of battles, cities or wenches, by trickery. Failing that, the
central theme is sudden force. Judging from his reading materials
and mainly from two of the favorite novels (Shui Hu Chuan, or Water
Margin, called All Men are Brothers in Pearl Buck's translation; and
San Kuo Chih, or Romance of the Three Kingdoms), it is fortunate for
us from the long-range view that Mao Tse-tung is now well advanced
in years. It may be hoped that the leaders of the People's Republic
who succeed him may at least in degree be men of some personal honor
by eastern standards. Of course, Mao's very traits described above,
under pressure from Russia and Japan against China at this time, may
be part of what has enabled him to turn to us for some sort of implicit
or greater assistance, notwithstanding-the fact that ideologically we
are not acceptable to him. In other words, the very traits in Mao
which are dangerous to us also are dangerous to Russia and Japan.
As with the heroes in the two novels mentioned, Mao will not permit
any ideological differences to prevent him from temporarily cooperating
with us. But we must not expect anything permanent from him in the
area of cooperation, unless it lies in his own interests and those of
China.
The Novels Which Mao Describes as His Favorites
) Shui Hu Chuan, or Water Margin, called An Men are Brothers
by Pearl Buck in her translation
b) San Kuo Chih, or Romance of the Three Kingdoms
c) Hung Lou Meng, or generally called Dream of the Red Chamber
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
Description of the Novels
a) Shui Hu Chuan (Water Margin or, All Men are Brothers.
The book originated with a series of orally told tales, and evolved
through many forms. In its present form it was probably written in
the early or middle part of the Ming Dynasty, in the fourteenth or
fifteenth century. However, written editions of portions of the book
?,--existed in the twelfth or thirteenth centuries.
The story is set in the thirteenth century at a period in Chinese history
When the Sung Dynasty was falling into decadence and disorder under
the reign of the Emperor Hung Chung.
The characters are 138 men, thirty-six of whom are chief characters.
For various reasons connected with unjust officials, oppressive
government and evil social conditions, the men variously have been
compelled to flee from society and take refuge on a great mountain
(Liang Shan Pt()) set in a lake and surrounded by a reedy marsh. The
mountain is situated in Shantung Province. Here the fugitives gather
and join forces as an organized group. It is believed that the story
is based on history, and that the thirty-six chief robbers were men
who lived at the end of the north Sung Dynasty and ravaged central China
and defied the state soldiers. They were popular with the poor people,
whom they never harmed.
The book was banned by the Chinese emperors, and its printing, sale,
purchase or reading were forbidden, for example, in the written
imperial mandates of the Ch'ing Dynasty.
The episodes are entertaining and lusty reading. In addition to being
good yarns, they manifest the traits and topics listed under the
Introduction.
1) Mao's Comments About the Story Shui Hu Chuan
A number of comments about the story by Mao Tse-tung have been
reported, all of course complimentary. Perhaps significant is the
following:
When Mao was a student in Changsha, and a group of his friends
and he were discussing ways of saving China from its decadent
conditions under the Ch'ing Dynasty and in a period involving
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
Western encroachments and internal disorders, a number of
suggestions were made by the other students, including going into
politics or teaching future generations of students to reform.
Mao is reliably reported [by a former friend, who at the time of
his report was on Taiwan] to have objected to the other methods as
taking too long. Mao then offered his own solution: "Imitate the
heroes of Liang Shan P'o." [the robbers' mountain hideout]1 The
probable authenticity of that report tends to be confirmed by a
similar report by Edgar Snow, who wrote that the fighting methods
of the mountain robbers of Liang Shan P'o were being taught to
recruits by Mao Tse-tung and his fellow revolutionaries, in their
Yenan training area. 2
2) Edgar Snow's Comments Abaat the Story Shui Hu Chuan
Edgar Snow, in his book Red Star Over China, 3 describes an episode
in Yenan, in which he was alarmed by sudden wild shouts near him
and saw recruits brandishing spears, pikes and rifles and uttering
fierce battle cries. He reported that later he learned that the
curriculum for partisans included the rehearsal of ancient Chinese
war cries, just as in the days of feudal tourneys described "in one
of Mao Tee-twig's favorite books, the Shui Hu Chuan. One is
reminded, also, of the wild war cries and constant bugle calls
reported of the Chinese communist soldiers in Korea during our
war there.
b) San Kuo Chili Yen-I, or Romance of the Three Kingdoms
The novel began its existence more than one thousand years ago4 in
the form of stories orally told. It progressed, in various segments and
in various forms, through a number of increasingly lengthy versions.
The one commonly read by the Chinese dates from the seventeenth
century. The work is an historical novel based on the-wars of the
Three Kingdoms which fought for supremacy at the beginning of the
third century A. D.
I. Stuart Schram, Mao Tse-tung, p. 43
Z. Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, 1st Rvsd. Edn, , Grove Press, p. 67
3. Ibid, p. 67
4. Arthur Waley in his Preface, p. x, to Hung Lou Meng, English edn.
translated by Chi-chen Wang, DouFfeday, Doran & Co. , N.Y. 1929
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
The three kingdoms were named Shu, Wu and Wei, and the period
covered is from around 220 A. D. until 265 A, D., when the last ruler
of Wei fell to the state of Chin (Tsin), and the China of that day again
became united under an emperor. The main outline of the events
related in the novel is historical, and the chief characters in the book
are all historical figures from China's past. However, most of the
hundreds of incidents are fictional, having resulted from centuries
of slow accretion and collection. Even hundreds of years before one
of the earlier written versions is reported to have circulated in the
fourteenth century, generations of popular storytellers, dramatists
and poets were adding to this epic.
The chief characters in the novel include. Liu Pei, the legitimate
heir to the fallen Han Dynasty throne, 'ho is idealized; Kuan Yu, a
brilliant and learned man; and. Chang Fei, who is plebeian and unlettered,
very human in the Chinese sense and, therefore, a man of warmth,
gusto, energy and humor. Another important character is Ts'ao Ts'ao,
the wily, cunning, treacherous and merciless "villain-hero" of the
novel. The story begins with the prologue, "Empires wax and wane;
states cleave asunder and coalesce." It then deals with the fall of the
Chinese Han empire, the adventures of the three central characters
(Liu Pei, Kuan Yu and Chang Fei, the wars among the three kingdoms
for control, the defeat of the Shu and Wu kingdoms by the Wei kingdom,
and Wei's eventual collapse before the emergent new Chin (Tsin) empire.
1) Keys to Mao's Character Traits, and to Those of His
Colleagues, Derived from This Novel
Frequently, an attempt to read a man's character traits by examining
his favorite books is a dangerous exercise. Many different motivations
either control or at least affect choices of reading material. However,
when it has been established that a particular book or group of books
have been read and re-read by the subject of one's scrutiny, and when
as in Mao's case the books are frequently quoted or discussed, the
possibility that the book, its subject matter and its characters at least
to some substantial degree mirror the reader's interests and leanings
becomes stronger.
Both novels illustrate a frank departure by their characters from the
noble concepts of Confucius, and a lusty passion for artifice intermixed
with violence, in dealings with all opponents, "allies," outsiders, and
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
even each other. In these novels, one finds echoes across the centuries
of such modern-day People's Republic attributes and procedures, as
? the sudden falls of Liu Shao-ch'i; Lin Piao; and others; and the Hundred
Flowers episode, in which criticism was invited and then the criticisers
were trapped and punished; and the sudden Korean attacks, with war
cries and blowing bugles; and the techniques of warfare, involving
extraordinary and dangerous night river crossings, attacks from
_3impossibleu mountain peaks, and guerrilla tactics; and the use of the
Red Guards to destroy or try to destroy a rival faction; and many other
things we have seen the Chinese communists do.
The difference between these novels and .our own approximately similar
stories (e.g., King ArthurrCharlethaVie; Richard the Lion Hearted and
the Crusades; John Paul Jones) involves two significant distinctions:
(1) Our leaders do not almost worship and constantly read our legendary
stories, and do not cite them and quote from them, at frequent
intervals, but the Chinese communists do exactly that; and (2) our
western such legendary stories stress courage, strength, the direct
and usually frontal assault on the enemies, and honor, in the sense
that artifice is not admired, but the Chinese heroes in Mao's favorite
novels almost always use guile and artifice, and are greatly admired
for using those devices.
One example from Romance of the Three Kingdoms is typical of hundreds
like it, and should be considered in connection with Mao Tse-tung's
boasts that he equipped his armies, sometimes by feints and tricks,
from the enemy armies. Consider this episode from Romance of the
Three Kingdoms: [Paraphrased to avoid undue length]
The great commander Chu-ko Liang's forces were short of arrows,
and needed to replenish them. He sent a force of some twenty ships
to feign an attack on the fleet of his powerful enemy; Ts'ao Ts 'ao.
The decks of Liang's ships were apparently covered with large
numbers of fighting men, but these in reality were only straw figures
stuffed into soldiers uniforms. On each ship there were only a few
sailors and some real soldiers with gongs and other noisy instruments.
Reaching their destination, as had been carefully calculated beforehand,
in the middle of a dense fog, the soldiers at once began to beat their
gongs as if about to go into action; whereupon Ts'ao Ts'ao, who could
just make out the outlines of the vessels densely packed with fighting
men bearing down on him, gave orders to his archers to begin shooting.
The latter did so, and kept on for an hour or more, until Liang on one
of his ships was satisfied with the enormous amounts of arrows by
then sticking in his straw soldiers.?So he passed the order to retreat,
again fully equipped with arrows for his forces.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
? 2) Contrast Between Confucian Teachings and the Views
? Reflected in Mao's Favorite Novels, and by Mao and His
Colleagues
The practices of deceit, artifice, guile, military action, force and
similar things so valued by Mao and his colleagues and with which his
favorite novels are filled, all were looked upon with disgust by
Confucius and most of China's other great philosophers and teachers.
The traditional Chinese teachings stress the moral qualities we
Westerners admire, although of course we ourselves are not wholly
moral, by any means. We are talking about ideologies, and what we
strive for, rather than perfect conditions. Under the teachings of
Confucius and most of the other philoso_phers, and pursuant to our own
Western codes of conduct, gie?characteristics shown in Mao's favorite
novels and in the expressions and actions of the People's Republic are
abhorrent. The People's Republic expressly and by its actions has
made heroes out of the villains in China's history, under the teachings
of Confucius and the other philosophers. And they have made heroes
out of the men in Mao's favorite novels. One example of the People's
Republic express and official reversal of a former villain into a hero
is Ch'in Chili Huang Ti, who by force of arms and guile between
255 B. C. and 214 B. C., unified China; re-established the empire, as
the Ch'in Dynasty; burned all books, ad executed any scholars caught
with the forbidden books; completed the Great Wall, with slave labor
and the deaths at the Great Wall, of hundreds of thousands of such
slaves; and ruled as a tyrant. Confucius held that emperor as an
example of the worst possible kind of emperor; and Mao and his
colleagues praise him, as an historic hero. He is praised for his
military ability, for his administrative ability, for unifying China, and
for his strength. His excesses are explained away, in effect as necessary
under the circumstances and as acceptable in the light of what he
accomplished.
In understanding the pre-Mao Chinese and what Mao is trying to make
them into, in the context of these novels and what they reflect, it is
important to note that during the periods of the Confucius and similar
impact on the Chinese, their ideals and goals involved a high order of
morality. Tyrants existed, but they were held in contempt. Actually,
as far as her rulers for the most part were concerned, during the
periods guided by the Confucius and similar ideals, Confucianism was
a noble procedural and ritualistic cloke, covering an absolute and often
cruel and militant emperor (and his cohorts). But the point is,
Confucianism had a moderating influence on the rulers, and did tend to
guide and deeply affect the populace. And as for Mao's favorite novels,
which also have been the favorites of most of the literate Chinese since
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
they were written, although they were read and hugely enjoyed, it was
with a sense of "oh my, how terrible--but that was in the ancient days,"
and not with the Maoist sense of candid, even exultant, delight and
admiration. The Maoists and especially Mao Tse-tung himself, recommend
that the heroes of the favorite novels be admired, praised and emulated.
c) Hung Lou Meng - Dream of the Red Chamber
The English title for this novel, although effective, is not a correct
translation. Actually, Hung Lou Meng literally translates as, "Dream
of the Two-Storied Red Building, " which of course is a bad title in
English, and not as romantically suggestive as the title, Dream of the
Red Chamber. It is possible that the Chinese title is describing the
home in which the family involved in the novel lived.
The novel is semi-autobiographical, and was written around 1757 by a
middle-aged gentleman named Tsao Hsueh-chin. He was a son of a
man of wealth and scholarship, and his family for generations had held
the Inspectorship of the Imperial Silk Factories in the Province of
Kansu. The author in his early life enjoyed luxuries and similar
advantages. Although apparently a gifted youth and an accomplished
poet in later life, the author failed at the Imperial Literary Examinations.
Without the political and financial success then going with success in the
examinations, he suffered hardship when his family experienced financial
and social reverses. He was in poverty when the novel was written,
and died at the age of forty-five.
Dream of the Red Chamber is extremely long, and in the Chinese usually
is published in 24 volumes, each of about thirty pages, or approximately
4,000 pages in all. Over four hundred characters are involved in the
story. Basically, the story is that of the author and his family, and it
is a panorama of life of a distinguished but increasingly troubled Chinese
family. It depicts the members' and their friends', lovers', enemies'
and servants' inter-reactions and daily relationships. The novel is also
a love story, full of humorous and pathetic episodes of everyday human
life, interspersed with short poems of high literary finish. The opening
chapters deal with the world of spirits and the supernatural. Then the
story unfolds on an everyday basis, but punctuated with the near
presence of spiritual influences.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
The novel is a good and detailed report as to the Chinese customs,
family life and thinking of the mid-Ch'ing dynasty. The People's
Republic-approved commentaries describe the work as of historical
interest, and as an example of the feudal and imperial periods.
Certainly, it is both of the things it is stated to be, but it is somewhat
difficult to understand the People's Republic's condonation of the
publication of any novel containing so much of the magic, supernatural
,and similar aspects of Chinese life in the "old days." Although replete
with symbolism, magic, fanciful and spirit-world ideas, and although
interesting at points in its depiction of what appears to be an almost
word-for-word history of a well educated and formerly wealthy family
in the recent imperial age, at least in the English version, the novel
sometimes makes difficult ieading..
Moreover, the work does not seem to dovetail with Mao Tse-tung's
other reading preferences, or with his speeches and writings, in that
it portrays tragic failures; some individuals who are listless; and a
sad spiral downward, on the part of the family and the two lovers.
Perhaps, Mao wants his people to read a novel showing the decadence
of the old system. Or perhaps, he himself enjoys the excellent
poetry which occurs throughout the work, in that Mao, himself, in an
accomplished poet. Or, perhaps,- it is-not a fact that this is one of
his favorite novels, as has been claimed by authorized comments by
representatives of the People's Republic.
The book is included on the PRC's "approved list" because it does
reflect against the way of life in the imperial days, because the Chinese
regard it as fascinating to read, generally, and because Mao enjoys
reading the story of a courtly family, within the imperial circle, in
some measure because he, himself, was raised as a farm boy and the
son of a peasant, and never experienced any of the gracious and courtly
aspects of Chinese culture in his youth. I believe that -although Mao is
against decadence and wealth, nevertheless he enjoys looking through
the windowpane at what is going on inside, to stare in amazement and
fascination before turning away in official disgust.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
on the People's Republic of China
Ross Terrill, "The 800,000,000: Report from China."
The Atlantic Month, November 1971.
. Ross Terrill, "The 800,000,000: China and the World."
The Atlantic Monthly, January 1972.
?
C. "Mao Tse-tung and the Party Debate on a Strategy for
China's National Development."
D. "Mao Tse-tung and the Sino-Soviet Dispute."
E. "Chinese Economic Gains in 1971."
Books
Dennis Bloodworth, Chinese Looking Glass.
C. P. Fitzgerald, The Chinese View of Their Place in the World.
Andre Malrau, Anti-Memoirs.
Stuart Schram, Mao Tse-tung.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
? Mao Tse?tung:
THE BANKRUPTCY OF?
THE IDEALIST CONCEPTION OF HISTORY
?
September 16, 1949
The Chinese should thank Acheson, spokesman of the U.S. bour-
geoisie, not merely because he has explicitly confessed to the fact that
the United States supplied the money and guns and Chiang Kai-shek
the men to fight for the United States and slaughter the Chinese people
and because he has thus given Chinese progressives evidence with
which to convince the backward elements. You see, hasn't Acheson
himself confessed that the great, sanguinary war of the last few years,
which cost the lives of millions of Chinese, was planned and organized
by U.S. imperialism? The Chinese should thank Acheson, again not
merely because he has openly declared that the United States intends
to recruit the so-called "democratic individualists" in China, organize
a U.S. fifth column and overthrow the People's Government led by
the Communist Party of China and has thus alerted the Chinese,
especially those tinged with liberalism, who are promising each other
not to be taken in by the Americans and are all on guard against the
underhand intrigues of U.S. imperialism. The Chinese should thank
Acheson also because he has fabricated wild talcs about modern
Chinese history; and his conception of history is precisely that shared
by a section of the Chinese intellectuals, namely, the bourgeois idealist
conception of history. Hence, a refutation pf Acheson may benefit
many Chinese by widening their horizon. The benefit may be even
greater to those whose conception is the same, or in certain respects
the same, as Acheson's.
What are Acheson's wild fabrications about modern Chinese his-
tory? First of all, he tries to explain the occurrence of the Chinese
revolution in terms of economic and ideological conditions in China.
Here he has recounted many myths.
Acheson says:
451.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
MAO TSE-TUNG
The population of China during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries doubled, thereby creating an unbearable pressure upon
the land. The first problem which every Chinese Government
has had to face is that of feeding this population. So far none
has succeeded. The Kuomintang attempted to solve it by putting
many land-reform laws on the statute books. Some of these
Jaws have failed, others have been ignored. In no small measure,
the predicament in which the National Govern -nent finds itself
today is due to its failure to provide China with enough to eat.
A large part of the Chinese Communists' propaganda consists of
promises that they will solve the land problem.
To those Chinese who do not reason clearly the above sounds
plausible. Too many mouths, too little food, hence revolution. The
Kuomintang has failed to solve this problem and it is unlikely that the
Communist Party will be able to solve it either. "So far none has
succeeded."
Do revolutions arise from over-population? There have been
many revolutions, ancient and modern, in China and abroad; were
they all due to over-population? Were China's many revolutions in
the past few thousand years also due to over-population? Was the
American Revolution against Britain 174 years agol also due to over-
population? Acheson's knowledge of history is nil. He has not
even read the American Declaration of Independence. Washington,
Jefferson and others made the revolution against Britain because of
British oppression and exploitation of the Americans, and not because
of any over-population in America. Each time the Chinese people
? overthrew a feudal dynasty it was because of the oppression and ex-
ploitation of the people by that feudal dynasty, and not because of
any over-population. The Russians made the February Revolution
and the October Revolution because of oppression and exploitation
by the tsar and the Russian bourgeoisie., not because of any over-
population, for to this day in Russia there is a great abundance of
land as compared with people'. In Mongolia, where the land is so
vast and the population so sparse, a revolution would be incon-
ceivable according to Acheson's line of reasoning, yet it took place
some time ago.3
According to Acheson, China has no way*out at all. A popula-
tion of 475 million constitutes an 'unbearable pressure" and, revolution
or no revolution, the case is hopeless. Acheson pins great hope on
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14 : LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
BANKRUPTCY-OF IDEALIST CONCEPTION OF II/STORY 453
this; although he has not voiced this hope, it has often been revealed
by a number of American journalists ? through the allegation that the
Communist Party of China will not be able to solve its economic prob-
lems, that China will remain in perpetual chaos and that her only way
out is to live on U.S. flour, in other words, to become a U.S. colony.
Why did the Revolution of 1911 not succeed and .why did it not
solve the problem of feeding the population? Because it overthrew
only the Ching Dynasty but did not overthrow imperialist and feudal
oppression and exploitation.
Why did the Northern Expedition of 1926-27 not succeed and
why did it not solve the problem of feeding the population? Because
Chiang Kai-shek betrayed the revolution, surrendered to imperialism
and became the chieftain of the counter-revolution which oppressed
and exploited the Chinese.
Is it true that "so far none has succeeded"? In the old Liberated
Areas in northwestern, northern, northeastern and eastern China,
where the land problem has already been solved, does the problem of
"feeding this population", as Acheson puts it, still exist? The United
States has kept quite a number of spies or so-called observers in China.
Why have they not ferreted out even this fact? In places like Shang-
hai, the problem of unemployment, or of feeding .the population, arose
solely because of cruel, heartless oppression and exploitation by
imperialism, feudalism, bureaucrat-capitalism and the reactionary
Kuomintang government. Under the People's Covernment, it will
take only a few years for this problem of unemployment, or of feeding
the population, to be solved as completely as in the northern, north-
eastern and other parts of the country.
It is a very good thing that China has a big population. Even
if China's population multiplies many times, she is fully capable of
finding a solution; the solution is production. The absurd argument
of Western bourgeois economists like Malthus3 that increases in food
cannot keep pace with increases in population was not only thoroughly
refuted in theory by Marxists long ago, but has also been completely
exploded by the realities in the Soviet Union and the Liberated
Areas of China after their revolutions. Basing itself on the truth
that revolution plus production can solve the problem of feeding the
population, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
has issued orders to Party organizations and the People's Liberation
Army throughout die country not to dismiss but to retain all former
Kuomintang personnel, provided they can make themselves useful
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
454 MAO TSE,TUNG?
and are not confirmed reactionaries or notorious scoundrels. Where
things are very difficult, food and housing will be shared. Those who
have been dismissed and have no means of support will be reinstated
and provided with a living. According to the same principle, we
shall maintain all Kuomintang soldiers who have revolted and come
over to us or been captured. All reactionaries, except the major
culprits, will be given a chance to earn their living, provided they show
repentance.
Of all things in the world, people are the most precious. Under
the leadership of the Communist Party, as long as there are people,
every kind of miracle can be performed. We arc refuters of Acheson's
counter-revolutionary theory. We believe that revolution can change
everything, and that before long there will arise a new China with
a big population and a great wealth of products, where life will be
abundant and culture will flourish. All pessimistic views are utterly
groundless.
"The impact of the West" is given by Acheson as the second
reason why the Chinese revolution occurred. Acheson says:
For more than three thousand years the Chinese developed
their own high culture and civilization, largely untouched by out-
side influences. Even when subjected to military conquest the
Chinese always managed in the end to subdue and absorb the
invader. It was natural therefore that they should come to look
upon themselves as the center of the world and the highest
expression of civilized mankind. Then in the middle of the
nineteenth century the heretofore impervious wall of Chinese isola-
tion was breached by the West. These outsiders brought with
them aggressiveness, the unparalleled development of Western
technology, and a high order of culture which had not ACCOM-
panied previous foreign incursions into China. Partly because of
these qualities and partly because of the decay of Manchu rule,
the Westerners, instead of being 'absorbed by the Chinese, intro-
duced new ideas which played an important part in stimulating
ferment and unrest.
To those Chinese who do not reason clearly, what Achcson says
sounds plausible the influx of new ideas from the West gave rise
to the revolution.
Against whom was the revolution.. directed? Because there was
"decay of Manchu rule" and because it is the weak point that is
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
BANKRUPTCY OF IDEALIST CONCEPTION OF HISTORY 455
attacked, it would seem that the revolution was directed against the
Ching Dynasty. 13ut what Acheson says here is not quite right. The
Revolution of 1911 was directed against imperialism. The Chinese
directed the revolution against the Ching regime because it was the
running dog of imperialism. The war against Britain's opium aggres-
sion, the war against the aggression of the Anglo-French allied forces,
the war against the Ching regime, the running dog of imperialism, by
the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom,4 the war against French aggression,
the war against Japanese aggression and the war again ;t the aggression
of the allied forces of the eight powers ? all ended in failure; hence
the Revolution of 1911 broke out against the running dog of impe-
rialism, the Ching Dynasty. That is modern Chinese history up to
1911. What is the "impact of the West", as Acheson calls it? It is
the effort of the Western bourgeoisie, as Marx and Engels said in the
Manifesto of the Communist Party of 1848,5 to remould the world after
its own image by means of terror. In the process of this impact or
remoulding, the Western bourgeoisie, which needed compradors and
flunkeys familiar with Western customs, had to let 'countries like China
open schools and send students abroad, and thus "new ideas were in-
troduced" into China. Concurrently the national bourgeoisie and the
proletariat were born in countries like China. At the same time, the
peasantry was bankrupted, and a huge semi-proletariat was brought
into existence. Thus the Western bourgeoisie created two categories
of people in the East, a small minority, the flunkeys of imperialism,
and a majority which is opposed to imperialism and consists of the
working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie, the national
bourgeoisie and the intellectuals coming from these classes. Those
in the majority group are all grave-diggers of imperialism, who were
created by imperialism itself, and the revolution originates from them.
It was not that the so-called influx of ideas from the West stirred up
"ferment and unrest", but that imperialist aggression provoked
resistance.
For a long time in the course of this resistance movement, that
? is, for over seventy years from the Opium War of 1840 to the eve of
the May 4th Movement of 1919, the Chinese had no ideological weapon
with which to defend themselves against iMperialism. The ideo-
logical weapons of the old die-hard feudalism were defeated, had to
give way and were declared bankrupt. Having no other choice, the
Chinese were compelled to arm themselves witli such ideological cap-
ons and political formulas as the theory of evolution, the theory of
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
456
MAO TSE-TU NG
natural rights and of the bourgeois republic, which were all borrowed
from the arsenal of the revolutionary period of the bourgeoisie in the
West, the native home of imperialism. The Chinese organized polit-
ical parties and made revolutions, believing that they could thus resist
foreign powers and build a republic. However, all these ideological
weapons, like those of feudalism, proved very feeble and in their
turn had to give way and were withdrawn and declared bankrupt.
The Russian Revolution of 1917 awakened the Chinese, and they
learned something new, Marxism-Leninism. In China, the Com-
? munist Party was born, an epoch-making event. Sun Yat-sen, too,
advocated "learning from Russia" and "alliance with Russia and the
Communist Party". In a word, from: that time China changed her
orientation.
Being the spokesman of an imperialist. government, Acheson nat-
urally does not want to breathe even a word about imperialism. He
describes imperialist aggression thus: "These outsiders brought with
them aggressiveness...." "Aggressiveness" ? what a beautiful name!
Having learned this "aggressiveness", the Chinese did not aggress
into Britain or the United States but only created "ferment and
unrest" inside China, i.e., carried out revolutions against imperialism
and its running dogs. But unfortunately they never once succeeded;
each time, they were defeated by the imperialists, the inventors of
"aggressiveness". The Chinese therefore turned around to learn
something else and, strangely enough, they immediately found that
it worked.
The Chinese Communist Party "had been organized in the early
twenties under the ideological impetus of the Russian revolution".
Here Acheson is right. This ideology was none other than Marxism-
Leninism. This ideology is immeasurably. superior to that of the
Western bourgeoisie, which Acheson calls a "high order of culture
which had not accompanied previous foreign incursions into China".
The clinching proof of the effectiveness of this ideology is that Western
bourgeois culture, which the Achesons can boast of as a "high order of
culture" compared with China's old feudal culture, was defeated the
moment it encountered the new Marxist-Leninist culture, the scientific
world outlook and the theory of social revolution, which the Chinese
people had acquired. In its first battle, this scientific and revolution-
ary new culture acquired by the Chinese people defeated the Northern
warlords, the running dogs of imperialism; in the second, it defeated
the attempts by another running dog of jrnperialism, Chiang Kai-shek,
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
?
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
BANKRUPTCY OF IDEALIST CONCEPTION OF HISTORY 457
to intercept the Chinese Red Army during its 25,0oo-1i Long March ;6
in the third, it defeated Japanese imperialism and its running dog,
Wang Ching-wei; and in the fourth, it finally put an end to the domina-
tion of China by the United States and all other imperialist powers
as well as to the rule of their running dogs, Chiang Kai-shek and all
the other reactionaries.
The reason why Marxism-Leninism has played such a great role
in China since its introduction is that China's. social conditions call
for it, that it has been linked with the actual practice of the Chinese
people's revolution and that the Chinese people have grasped it. Any
ideology ? even the very best, even Marxism-Leninism itself is in-
effective unless it is linked with objective realities, meets objectively
existing needs and has been grasped by the masses of the people. We
are historical materialists, opposed to historical idealism.
Oddly enough, "Soviet doctrine and practice had a measurable
effect upon the thinking and principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, particularly
in.terms of economics and Party organization". What was the effect
produced on Dr. Sun by the "high order of culture" of the West, of
which Acheson and his like are so proud? Acheson doesn't say.
Was it an accident that Dr. Sun, who devoted the greater part of his
life to seeking from Western bourgeois culture the truth that would
save the nation, was finally disappointed and turned to "learning
from Russia"? Obviously not. Of course it was no accident that
Dr. Sun and the long suffering Chinese people he represented were
all infuriated by the "impact of the West" and resolved to form an
"alliance with Russia and the Communist Party" in order to wage
a life-and-death struggle against imperialism and its running dogs.
Acheson dare not say here that the Soviet people are imperialist
aggressors and that Sun Yat-sen learned from aggressors. Well, then,
if Sun Yat-sen could learn from the Soviet people and the Soviet
people arc not imperialist aggressors, why can't his successors, the
Chinese who live after him, learn from the Soviet people? Why are
the Chinese, Sun Yat-sen excepted, described as "dominated by the
Soviet Union" and as "the fifth column of the Comintern" and "lackeys
of Red imperialism" for learning the scientific world outlook and the
theory of social revolution through Marxism-Leninism, linking these
with China's specific characteristics, starting the Chinese People's War
of Liberation and the great people's revolution and founding a republic
of the people's democratic dictatorship? Can there be such superior
logic anywhere in the world? .
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
458
MAO TSE-TUNG
Since they learned Marxism-Leninism, the Chinese people have
ceased to be passive in spirit and gained thc initiative. The period
of modern world history in which the Chinese and Chinese culture
were looked down upon should have ended from that moment. The
great, victorious Chinese People's War of Liberation and the great
people's revolution have rejuvenated and arc rejuvenating the great
culture of thc Chinese people. In its spiritual aspect, this culture of the
Chinese people already stands higher than any in the capitalist world.
Take U.S. Secretary of State Acheson and his like, for instance. The
level of their understanding of modern China and of the modern
world is lower than that of an ordinary soldier of the Chinese People's
Liberation Army.
Up to this point, Acheson, like a bourgeois professor lecturing
on a tedious text, has pretended to trace the causes and effects of
events in China. Revolution occurred in China, first, because of
over-population and, second, because of the stimulus of Western
ideas. You see, he appears to be a champion of the theory of causa-
tion. But in what follows, even this bit of tedious and phoney theory
of causation disappears, and one finds only a mass of inexplicable
events. Quite unaccountably, the Chinese fought among themselves
for power and money, suspecting and hating each other. An in-
explicable change took place in the relative moral strength of the
two contending parties, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party;
the morale of one party dropped sharply to below zero, while
that of the other rose sharply to white heat. What was thc reason?
Nobody knows. Such is the logic inherent in the "high order of
culture" of the United States as represented by Dean Acheson.
NOTES
The bourgeois revolution of 1775-83, known as thc War of Independence, in
which the people of North America opposed British colonial rule.
2 In their struggle for liberation in 1921-24 the Mongolian people, under the leader-
ship of thc Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, drove out the Russian Whiteguard
bandit troops and thc armed forces of the Northern wa, lords of China, both of which
were backed by Japanese imperialism, overthrew ,NIongolian feudal rule and founded
the Mongolian People's Republic.
37. It Malthus (1766.1834), Anglican clergyman and'reacrionary economist. In
his Essay on Popdation (179S), he wrote that "population unchecked . . . increases in
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
BANKRUPTCY OF IDEALIST CONCEPTION OF HISTORY 459
geometrical ratio ... [while] the means of subsistence ? could not possibly be made
to increase faster than in an arithmetical ratio". Basing himself on this arbitrary
assumption, he came to the conclusion that all poverty and all evils in human society
are permanent phenomena of nature. According to him, the only ways to solve the
problem of poverty of the working people were to shorten their life-span, reduce the
population Of stop Es increase. He regarded famine, pestilence and war as means
? to cut down population.
1 The War of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom was a peasant revolutionary war
waged against the ft udal rule and national oppression of the Ching Dynasty in the
middle of the Toth century. Hung Ilsiu-chuan, Yang Hsiu-ching and others, the
? leaders of this revolution, staged an uprising in Kwangsi in January 1851 and pro-
craimed the founding of thc Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. In 1852 the peasant army
proceeded northward from Kwangsi and matched through Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsi
and Anhwei and in 1853 it captured Nanking, the main city on the lower Yangtse.
Part of its forces then continued the drive north and pushed to the vicinity of Tientsin,
a major city in northern China. Because the Taiping army failed to build stable
base areas in the places it occupied and also because, after establishing its capital in
Nanking, the leading group in the army committed many political and military errors,
it could not withstand the joint attack of the counter-revolutionary troops of the
Ching government and the aggressors, Britain. the United States and France, and
suffered defeat in 1864.
5 See Manifesto of the Communist Party, Chapter I, "Bourgeois and Proletarians".
The bourgeoisie "compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois
mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their
midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its
own image".
6 In October 1934 the First. Third and Fifth Army Groups of the Chinese Workers'
and Peasants' Red Army (that is, the First Front Army of the Red Army, also known
as the Central Red Army) set out from Changting and Ninghua in western Fukien
and from Juichin, Yutu and other places in southern Kiangsi and started a major
strategic movement. In traversing the eleven provinces of Fukien, Kiangsi, Kwang-
tung, Hunan, Kwangsi, Kweichow, Szechuan, Yunnan, Sikang, Kansu and Shensi,
crossing perpetually snow-capped mountains and trackless grasslands, sustaining untold
hardships and frustrating the enemy's repeated encirclements, pursuits, obstructions
and interceptions, the Red Army covered 25,oco /i (xz,5oo kilometres) on this march
and finally arrived triumphantly at the revolutionary base area in northern Shensi in
October too.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
Reproduced from MSS collections, Lib. of Congress
Dpri iV?04114'111'111
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/14: LOC-HAK-115-10-1-1
-4,tithority '`I-c-/ I
13y NA RA Dat
?
C_ ONVIDENTIAL INFORMATION
February 16, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM t HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBIECT: Th. Chitteaa Approach
Attached is an extract from an article
written by an Asian scholar at Harvard
who is a friend of mine. I think you will
find that it gives you useful insights isto
the Chinese mods of operation.
Attachment
CONFIDENTTAL
HAK:WL:nris:2/16/72
No Objection to Declassification