COMMUNIST CHINA: CONFLICT AT THE TOP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-114-7-6-1
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 98
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 26, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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'RECTO ATE Or
INTELLIGENCE
mmunist Osfra Conflict at the T
26 May 971
o. 3,60 71
73
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17
cground Use Only
d Mama
InTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ate of Intelligence
26 May 1971
nf.lict at the T
Two years ago the Ch.inee communiets held thcir
ninth party congress to eark the ?victorioue con-
clusion of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
and to announce the formati of a new ruling elite
ostensibly more responsive to Mao Tse-tung end his
heir-designate, Defense Minister Lin Ping. The sur-
vivors of the "revolution," who were named at the
? congress to fill all of the 25 seats on the polit-
buro, were not, however, a loyal phalanx of dedi-
cated Maoists. Instead, they represented an uneasy
conglomerate of disparate civilian and ailitarY
terent groups thrown up by the twists and turns of
the campaign launched in 1966 to purge and revitalize
the nation"s power structure. Their relations in the
? past had been marred by bitter personal quarrels and
rivalries, and despite the legitimacy conferred on
them by election to the politburo, it was clear that
,all but 4 few superannuated figures would wish to con-
solidate their political positions further in antici-
pation of the eventual passing of Mao. tor nearly a
year this fregile coalition presented virtually an un
changing public face. Beginning in March 1070, how-
ever, a native of unexplained shifts in the politi-
cal hierarchy in Peking strongly suggested that the
leadership was entering a period of extended t444i4A
and more direct confrontation--a confrontation in-
tensified by the process of reconstituting china's
party and government apparatus and promoting *eonomic
and social recovery following the turmoil that had
? disrupted national life during the Cultural Revolu-
port was p cored by the Offiaa at Cur
Z4genoe and dia *sad within CIA..
Control a
Mo Foreign Dies aground Use Only
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ANNIEVINIIMINEMENSISIBMISIMUMMICIMMINEMINISONEMINffattAk AM" kvit.
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m of the strug..Is or power at the nations).
and others that factional wrangling
was poising a major obstscle to rebu.ildshat-
tared Chinese communist party apparatus at the pro
vincial level. Since all decisions nn fin
party organs have to be taken in Peking, it appe
that the Leaders with wtsom Snow talked were referring
to bitter internecine quarreling within the ruling
politburo itself.
The sense of fluidity end absence of cohesion
El thehelite that is co spayed in the Snow inter-
add 'weight to the numerous indirect signs of
tags maneuvering and discord in Peking through-
e past years the persistent rumors that the
party plenum held early last autumn was stormy,
ar-long alumnae of politburo member Hsieh ro-
?flowed by his sudden resurfacing this Merch
peculiar circumstances, and the apparent polit-
idelining of politburo standing committee men-
en and Kang Shang, both of whom were
iii
t' Controlled
Foreign.%seem
ET
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SEQR.ET
No o ign ni /akgroun6 Use Only
Contp6lled Dissom
leaders f the radical Cultural Revolution Group and
associates of Mao, Beyond this, the steady
drumbeatof propaganda warning that the struggle be-
n Mao's revolutionary line and the -revisionist"
f his former party opponents is not yet over
ongly suggests that some elements in the regime--
and Mao himself?axe by no means satisfied
with either the new governing structure that is emerg-
ing frosa the Revolution or the direction in
which China'sreconstruction efforts have been moving.
in
broadly, the strains within the leader-
stem
a since the
s on specific policies and from the con
onai antagonisms and divisions car-
d over frcm the Cultural Revolution, To this ex-
ive miture thee been added an apparently deepen-
ing quarrel over the enhanced role of the People's
Liberation:Armvin political affairs and civil ad-
stratiOn.
4 4:
4Zn the past year both the power &nc li
s lines within the politburo seem to have been
,Hmore sharply drawn between the radical ideologues
who have been part of Mao's inner circle since the
' beginning of the Cultural Revolution and A Looser
grouping of proponents of relative "moderation in
domeetic and foreign policy, whose principal spokes-
Man appears to be Premier Chou Zn-lei. Although the
impression gleaned last fall by Solger Snow that "Chou
is running the country" may be exaggerated, there
hame been indications in recent months--such as the
breakthrough in forming provincial party committees--
that the balance of forces within the politburo is
winging in favor of Chou and some of the more ma-
te central and regional military figures who are
also responsible for day-to-day Administration. Con-
versely, the disappearance of Chen Po-ta and Kang
Control le seem
Dissem/ ckground Use On
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 IIMMMMML mmmilmmummamm.,;mmtmwWi,:'
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Use Only
d reports that the activities of e rem-
eing denounced in Peking aUqe5tJ a de-
litical fortuees of sone, if not
*dere hallow Mao and Lin moot closely
the exceeses of the Cultural Revolu-
Despite the. uncertain atmosphere in Peking, mao--
at 77?unquestionably remains the domlnant political
figure, and there is no reason tc oell?cve that he is
not still setting the tone and the general direction
of current policies, all of which contain an eclectic
mixture of the doctrinaire and the pragmatic. Although
Mao's prestige could be tarnished in the course of the
current complex infighting over difficult questions of
reconstruction policy and personnel staffing, and due-
Leg the accompanying political maneuvering within the
politburo, there is AO evidence that any concerted ef-
fort is under way to thrust Mao once again on the po-
litical sideline*. On the other hand, there continue
to be itigua that Mao's victory over his major opponents
in the Cultural *evolution did not gain him the license
to work his will unobstructed on all major policy and
personnel questions, and the shifts within the leader-
ship over the past year have demonstrated that the tenu-
ous equilibrium in Peking can be shaken even with Mao
at the helm.
ing any major leadership upheaval before the
f 1440t his post as party chairman presumably
U. pass uncontested to his heir designate, Lin MAO*
becsuse:Lin can have no assurance that his own
Os in Chinale top civil-military command
tura will be reliable, it can only be easumed
retain nis position he will have to secure
iescence of the conservatively oriented
erboldereas well AS the government bureau-
4 by 4hou,Dn-lei. It sees equally clear
will not be able to rule the country stle041116..^
'should persist in playing the role of an
Cted Maoist in all fields.
,moment, the influence of those leaders
inclined to acknowledge readily that much
volutionary dogma has premed irrelevant
vii
l'Controlled
asses/
,
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17
ground Use 0
4 Dissem
O China's problems in the modernworld seems on
the rise* If Mao again tempts to initiate drastic
revoluti ? actions it is possible that a mod-
,
orate opposition could coalesce to a greater degree
f-h*n before, posing serious challenges to Mao and
over major policy issue, and possibly even
their pimsoriptions for the succession. At this
re,*owevera it is probably erroneous to assume
I opponents are ready or willing to challenge
iopenly, to do more than try to moderate his
penchant for extreme programs, and to curb the influ-
ence of advisers whom Mao himself nay be temporarily
Wing to sacrifice. In any case, Peking's failure
'acknowledge any breaks in its leadership ranks
its continued reluctance to put forward An author -
ire prating order for the politburo reinforce the
ression that relations among the elite are still in
and that a oovert power and policy struggle of
iderable dimeneions is still being waged in Peking--
a struggle that not only presages a potentially nen-
fused succession to Mao but also loaves open to ques-
tion the precise limits of his present power and au-
thoritP.
Control 1e.
reign Dias kground Dee
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'slIrTNIMMUMMEMASMINUMFMMOISIMIIIMIMMIIIIPTIM4fIVARMIWRnfIr.....ANCTSIIr7-
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o ' "4.1,EW
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lr
kground uti Only
lied Diesels
face at least, the ferment in
t year appears to have had sur
prisingly little iir?t on the ravine's principal
Post Culturallution reconstruction efforts.
, Continued progress has been evident in restOring
Initiate order, rebuilding the Chinese Communist
I Party (CCP). apparatus at the provincial level and
below', staffing and streamlining central government
ministries, 1 working up a new five year economic
planpAmmar Most important, in promoting a, more ec.-
tive,frormignillolicY. For these efforts to take
place Ut allthere Oust be a degree of stability
AuurscAewillingness to comprmine within the lead
hip. Appearances can be misleading, however,
, AlNerthe paraC,tters of Peking's various programa And
policies--particularly it the domestic arena--are
tlalweys readily discernible. Thus, it eeems,
rtain that there are serious divisions at the
ithataccount for the instene* of often-embiguoui
cr guidelines, have a direct bearing on the un-
pace iwimplementing various programs, and
explain the Apparent discord between central
dIloosl leAderei.on many issues,
The'repeate4 delay in convening the much
d, MationalPeople's Congress?which is 53(_
be the capstone of the regime's efforts
lttionixe* the central government bureaucracy
rum for presenting guidelines on future
4 social politiae.--elso suggests that
ip cannot yet agree on matters requir.
a general oonsensus. The facts that no important
in Peking is making speeches on domestic *th-
at writing reports for attribution-..except for
incantations on major holidays and anniver-
-and that any article touching on sensitive
ntious issues usually is signed by an anon-
writing group* are additional signs that most
ls Are maintaining low visibility at e time
neions are high. Finally, MAWS admission
to Sftar Snow thAt his deliberate efforts in the
Cultural 'evolution to create *fluid conditions*
rn
ground Use Only
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 amimmunistrinsimr ;A?
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necessary for
"bittar finti
gest* that the
from within.
ET
okoround
Dieters
party purge had led to a much more
lism than he had anticipated sug-
urrent regime is still deeply troubled
nfinished Revolution
3. Despite MAO'S claim to Snow that be re-
the Cultural Revolution as 'successful," it
uld appear that the ripen cause of the over-all
tability at the apex of power in China today is
fact that the political outcome of the "revolu-
* la still in doubt. Indeed, the major themes
domestic propaganda over the past six months con-
vey the clear impression that the central issues of
the Cultural Revolution?the struggle against re-
visionism,!the fight to re-establish Mao's authority
within thimparty, and the attempt to preserve MA0iSt.
ideology as the guiding force in China's future de-
velopment--have yet to be resolved. Therefore, the
political maneuvering within the politburo today ap-
pears to be essentially another phase of the cr.sts
in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that precipitated
the Cultural Revolution., rather than a new and unique
power and policy struggle.
' I
over Power and xdooken
4.'
The Cultural Revolution,with. ta polit
tiirbulence rapid shifts of front, and confusing rani
fications,!was obviously an extensivevempaign that
affected every major phase of the Chinese Communiet
revolution: Despite the vagaries of the. revolution
414 prooess,however, its origins are not hard to die
,.joern..1 It is now,clear that beginning in the late
'!-19501 .an intense debate develpped,within the party
'onesity. important issues, that this debate led to
questioning!theapplictbility of a number of the
inajor tenets of the *thoughts of Mao Tse-tung' to
tb0;prebleme of -governing and. developing China, and
that a.Majer,struggle for power within the party
evolved around this question. A nuMber of leaders
d around 'Mao and supported by Lin Pis* advocated
rVationAind inculcation of the mrsvolutionary
'-2-
oiled
emia
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kgrourid Use
ed Dieser
enthusiasm evident in the early') .
Communi power, While. Others?identified)
r heed of state Liu. Shao-Chi?although .pay-
,aervicato Maoist ideals were more concerned
theiprecticeI problems of developing and govern-
stat., [Thie ?Oontrestin approach Created:40r
rit.eieteCilitereet in 'upholding Meco's
,.. ;and., for their putative opponents a vested
terestiinlimiting its applicationlo.prectice.1
" " ? i? ; .
The.: .differences in viewpoint, although ,
rather ?rowon the surface, had deep roots. In.1
Communists* long struggle to attain pownr in
the early 50s, they had emphesized. 01444t conflict:,
..and contradictions, protracted struggles, the: primacy
of man over material conditions., and the supremacy
of politicel work. :-These political doctrines which
'succeeded in enlisting wide popular commitu4nt,
served as guides in formulating policies on integrat-
ingaver i soci*I groups, party building, collectiviz-
ing the 4w:cony, and resolving inner party- amputee.
They were closely identified with Mao himself and,
contained, a built-in bias in favor of uninterrupted.
revolution .end of radicalizing the domestic prOgrame
of th* CCP. Mgt by. the late 1950s, *uninterrupted I
revolution' could only be applied in an environment.
of increasing popular desire for a measure of stabil
ity, rOUtinization, and individual economic better-
mint. ?? In particular the disasters growing out of
thw Ilreat Leap Yorward?en exempla of *revolutionary
fermene!in action?led dissident intellectuals?and
more Importantly senior leaders within the party,
government, and military structure--to question
whether the Maoist approach was still applicable: to:
the problems Of a developing, industrializing, and
?modernizing. society.. ?
HThe eaphaeis on Vass enthUaiee* and for:Sent,
ar, 444441 become so identified with the personality.
of Mao that to question it automatically became a
cries--at least in the. Chairmen's own eyes. articles
in the Med Guard prers have disclosed that Mao became
increasingly concerned that after the Eighth Party
Congress 1956) seme. members of the inner circle wore
-3-
Control d 'WA
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Only
hallenqing his bailie assumptions: with the intro-
duction of a program of economic retrenchmant after
the Great Leap Forward, he became convinced that
some of his associates were pursuing program* that
'in spirit ware conservative and evolutionary rather
than revolutionary. Indeed, in the period between
1959 and 1962, Mao's control over party affairs was
weakened to the point that veiled personal attacks
on him began to appear in the press. ?or MAO this
WAS an intolerable situation. In 1062 he began A
counterattack that culminated in the Cultural Hew
lution four years later.
7. Mee told Edgar Snow last year that it was
'leading to look for policy motives behind
tural Revolution. He said his challenge to
iperty opponents took the form of attacks on their
wrevisionist policies, but the real issue had been
the leadership plus the need to revitalize therev-
olution. These remarks are interesting not so much
because they, are avpatent distortion of history-
policy, differences were indeed an important cause
of the revolution-but because they suggest that Mao
hieselfle!probably lees concerned with specific
policies than with thejeatmof those who propose
them.i:He,bas shown, for example, a penchant for
uehingr.adical Progrems,:but he also possesses the
political acumen to recognise the necessity for
riods:of:cOnsolidation and retreat. '
,
MAIO felt threatened in the period prior
4 Cultural Revolution, however, because other
ra :began to doubt the validity of his basic
prescription"for:building al selfless and classless
China. Then and eince be has labeled the doubters
"reviiioniete who sought to undermine the goal of
achieving communism in China. He concluded that
revisionist ideas and schemes must be eliminated
from .the minds oi *dissident' intellectuals and
party leader., and he acted to remove the dissio
clouts:from power in the party and govornment. Ex-
tirpation of revisionism boozes the overriding issue
in the Cultural Revolution, and Mao's failure to
root out its influence has much to do with the po-
litical maneuvering in Peking today.
'
Controlle
ign Dies
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ET
ckground
Di leen
ndeed thecur-
rent high degree of tension
in Peking and the problems
obliquely hinted at in domes-
tic propaganda over the past
six months suggest that the
problem of rev dioniam is
far from settled. Although
he toid 'Edgar Snow that the
Cultural Revolution was suc-
cessful., China's leadership
is apparently still in flux
precisely because Mao's vic-
tory in purging his major
revisionist opponents in the
party was incomplete Sine*
nd pie um of the ninth party congress last au-
example mounting oempeign to have senior
cials re-stud; Mao's philosophy plus continuing con-
on of persistent revisionist trends in the eco-
social, cultural and political spheres all suggest
major issues that inspired the "revolution" in
place are still being debated.
10, One area of debate is the economic sphere.
course of effecting a recovery from the die-
a of the Cultural Revolution, Peking has made
ar that a major goal of future economic plans
?Adevelopment of small and medium-sised ineustries
al areas, primarily to support agriculture. This
unquestionably has Nao's blessing; it accords
with his known bias in favor of increasing decentral-
ed e0onomic decision-making, promoting the develop-
t of intermediate technology, and fostering self-
iance--a prime requisite, incidentally, for enabVng
ma to defend itself in depth" against foreign at-
Nevertheless, in implementing this program the
has continued to avoid past ads-takes such as
gement of indiscriminate capital construction.
rly, it has quietly abandoned certain disruptive
AtiVin agricultural policy that were attempted
' I !
/swim
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IMMCOlt,MASOr7
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ET
;Aground Use Only
Memo
the: ninth congreso--experiments that appeared
dy? snme of_the more radical notions put for-
during the Cultural Revolution--suth as efforts .
ce further the material incentives to peasants
iscating their private plots, to curb rural
markets, ancito make institutional Changes.. eilld
Spending decision-making at the commune 10Vel.
co. have been signs, however, that the present
cautioUlapproadh.bee not wan acceptance by?ide ?
!;?ologneesseociated with. the More radical meeSures,
who claim there are: those who are attenpting
toschievSeconomicrecovery by following a revision-
'ist-jpeth-e* they did in the early :4040s..U. .?
? [I
. .
Thus . a:recent Peking editorial raised. the
ionist;b4ayby declaring that continued existence
of bourgeois influence: is revealed .by emphasis on, the
???neeCiflprivete plots, material incentives, and so
forth. ! .The4ditorial lashed cut at 'those comrade*"
who argue that the struggle between Soots line and
line has been settled and it a dead
,I,Sionet4i This notion is wrongo it declered. In in-
idustrithere are still those Who place production
over politics and want to put "experts in Charge
of feCtOries; in agriculture there are those who
question the validity of a high degree of 001180-
? tivitationliand in commerce, some give priority to
Firofits, andadhere to capitalist interpretation* Of
the law of supply and demand. This editorial and
'otherildherging that the influence of the revision-
Lit thinkers persists seem to be warnings by the.
? ideologues on the politburo that sentiment is still
widespread in favor of insisting on an essentially
incorrect ideological approach to, economic: develop-
ment.i ?The failure to mention ?the fourth five- ear
applicability 0
are also many signs of continuing
the two lines in non-economic areas.
ties wore reopened this year and
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ir
ckgro
d Dissem
are'euppose ly implementing a series at ?radical?
reforms. including the abolition of entrance require
mente the introductior of more students with polit-
ice:11y correct worker-peasant backgrounds, and the
elevation to important academic posts of ordinary
workers and others with 'practical ? experience. All
this is designed to obviate the ?elitist mentality"
foetered by China's pre - Cultural Revolution univer
ratite and to reduce what the ideologues consider an
unacceptable gap between theoretical and practical
training. Regardless of the individual merits of
some of these reforms in a developing country, there
helm been repeated indications in the press that they
are being resisted in practice. Thum, denunciations
are frequently published of those who are still argu-
ing for the necessity of advanced theoretical training
and of bourgeois profeesors who have refused to mend
their ways despite being Chastened by Red Guards in
the Cultural Revolution.
Indications of debate also abound in tht
party-building?the regime's first order of
domestic oldness since the ninth congress. There
hos been a series of press denunciations since the
second plenum, for instance1 of unnamed comrades who
have been fropounding the theory of "inner-party
peace" and who have been attempting to play down
the need for prolonged ideological investigation of
candidate members, in particular of party veteran
being returned to responsible positions.
14! RtotAlting Criticism of the political per-
of the ,veteran party officials and military
114ollows the pattern of earlier attacks on
r party and state apparatus. They too have
their elitism and their penchant
organizing, and consolideting, which
th,Plao's notions of revolutionary
rticular, the People's Liberation
hamtaken on a wider range of civil
party functions than at any time
a of Communist rule?has been
mc attitudes of arrogance and corn-
widespread. These criticisms "
d, Use Only
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mum
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ground
4 Dissent
ologus. are concerned
anizational authority domi?
evolve into a techno-bureaucra
from the popUlece,and as un-
evolutionary dicti as the old
and state nary that was decimated in the
ltura
Since present the PIA Is the only fully
calming organ of ;tate power, these attacks on
e eiliterylraiee the possibility that Mao may once
again believe his personal authority is being threat-
ened!and, by extension, suggest that Lin Pile), who
had been Charged with molding the PLA into a reliable
political instrument, has not been entirely suocessful.
This notion seems to be supported by the unprecedented*
citation in China's new draft state constitution of
Mao end his heir designate Lin as the nation's per-
sonal rulers. Although the citation may be interpreted
am simply a dramatic reaffirmation of Mao's and Lin's
victory over their former opponents, it seems equally
plausible to view it as an attempt by Mal to stress
his personal legitimacy in order to compensate for
the weakening of his ideological legitimacy.
The theory that Mao cannot and does not
by fiat on many issues under debate in Peking
was supported in his interview* with Edgar Snow. Snow
the point that Mao should not be regarded as an
owerful'autocrat, adding that Mao himself said
at be formulated policy and issued directives but
left the details of execution to others. Moreover,
the inpression left by the Snow interviews is that
Mao has some serious reservations over the shape of
China's overlent post - Cultural Revolution party
and government apparatus.
, 17. ,Mao indirectly admitted thee* doubts when
ha,told Snow that it was wrong to judge his success
in renewing the leadership by referring to the na-
tional or provincial level, where many of the old
cadres were back in office and the army was strongly
represented. Zneteed, Mao told Snow, he should look
at the county level; it was here that the new leader*
Athrown up by the revolution were to be found. Accord-
ing to Mao, they would be the next generation of
ET
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9=11%4 UHS Only
d Wilton
? provincial and national leaders, and they would
reliable heirs to his ideals. Available a
however, shows that essentially the same far
prevail at the county and other local governing
levels as at the n4tienal levelLit would therefore
seem that Mao is either out of toilet% with reality
or straining very hard to rationalise what has been
in fact very substantial modification of his goals
in the Cultural Aevolution. In any cm Mao's re
fueallto claim success for himself in drastically
reforming the top levels of administration and his
strange Admission that his job now was *to convince
the county-level leaders that they had won the revo-
lution, wf convey the impression that not all of those
holding the principal levers of power in the country
are entirely responsive to him and his entourage.
mg the Inner Circle
lejAs long as be remains on the scene,
may,h4'tstpted to take further steps to meints
the authority of his dogma and to revive revolutionary
enthusiasm. But whether he now has the power to do
thiluie*moot;point. Be remains a consummate pcoli-
tielin.who, if unable to have his way on all matters,
is still-able to retain considerable leverage by
playing off opposing groups within the elite against,
one'anOther. Indeedi much of the leadership uncer-
taintyiinPaking today:may stem from Mao'e devotion
to this tactic--athat in effect *voids the,
risk of raising direct challenge to his pre
eminence.' ?
i
Mo remains a charieMatic figure
of enerinue prestige, such a Challenge seems highly
unlikely it this stage but the machinations within
the 104ershiplever the past year suggest that Mao
may be'pleying'the 514400 of palace politics under
mompressuxe than at any tine since his new polit-
buro was formed at the ninth congress. Os has at- ,
tempted to work his will by making timely concessions
to the more moderately inclined leaders while on
ether occasion* supporting the efforts of the more
radical 'Maoists* to improve their standing. The
cent shifting within the politburo, however, may
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n 'Assam/ ckground Use only
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Foreign DimBack.qround Use Only
Contr led Dissect
fragile balance val groupings
tipped? been . If so, it seems likely that th
shift was caused by an abortive effort by Mao's
radical'lleatenats to shore up their political
positions.
20. Although the various terms employed to
ibe the bToad leadership groupings--?radicals"
*conservatives," "extremists versus wmoder
*ideologues? versus "pregmatiste--are in-
sect, there is nevertheless a distinct group on
the politburo which rose to it. present position
because of proven loyalty to Mao and vigorous back-
ing of power and policy excesses in the Cultural
Revolution. Opposing this group is a perhaps
looser conglomerate of government bureaucrats and
oental and military regional figures whose polit-
ical status wee often in doubt during the Cultural
Revolution and who generally appeared to favor re-
straining its excesses. Although the members of
this grouping may be personally loyal to both Mao
and Lin, most seam to share an antipathy to the
lesser figures among the radical forces.
21. Apart from Mao And Lin, the wradioal"
group associated with the excesses Of the Cultural
Revolution includes the two leaders wivesj Mao's
peach writer, Chen Po-tas security specialist Xing
Shang, propaganda specialist Yao Wen-yuan; and Chang
Chun-Chiao, the political boss of shanghai. All of
these leaders?with the exception of Madams Lin--
belonged to the so-called central "Cultural, Revolu-
tion Group," an inner elite fostered by MAO and
charged withpurging the Chinese Communist Party
and pushing his "revolutionary ideas. Before the
Culture/ MavolUtion these people, with the excep-
tion Of Chen and Rang, were political nonentities
or lower echelon leaders, with no firm independent
base of support. Most, if not all, appear to be
, fanatical doctrinaire ideologues who share Mao's
belief' that it; is essential to maintain a high
state of teneios and ideological fervor in Chine
in order to Sustain revolutionary momentum and en
'pit! changet
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9d4linOut
? '22. Taken as a whole, the
turd. Revolution Croup have had on
base vrtheWcwn since the Culture,.
althoughilluring the more radical phasew?of the revo
lution?they appeared to be formidabl?.. figures both
.!'bevemsor?Ofilleove support and because they were &bier
H?to 'employ a nunber of powerful Red Guard ?group* ? H ?
throughout the 'country al their political ? instruments.
.:Dempitath* fractious nature of these, mass organise-
tionethey provided the CRO with e. major source of
lavaragmlIaga1ait entrenched party and military es?
tablishmantirin? the provinces. The "revolution" was
?:?!a tortuoiae proosicphOwever, one that alibied and
Jgzows4:.between periods of extreme radicalism. and
)periodel.of??,,,moderation,and restraint. In its later
Apteeeirthe???influence of the CRG in the councils at ?
't0m,;nagime**0 noticeably weakened.
' 1 v. ? ,
23irmuth of the subsequent inner tension in
regime ha. stemmed from the efforts of. the 'radi-
cals tofind4olitically secure positions in the
?face of countervailing moderate pressures. The sup
preesiOn?04 'revolutionary leftists' in the provinces
*tool late summer 1966 and the normalising trend evi-
dent in domestic politics mince the ninth congress.
almost certainly have further circumscribed the
CRC's room for maneuver. Once Mao goes, the, power
of the CRO is ?likely to diminish considerably since
its prosy/kir:tiller developing new sources of political
strengtksesgm.resote,-
24. Th. principal stratagems the CRG leadems
otoloyad.to improve their positions belie Changed
, since the group was formed in the summer. of ?
BefiCally they have sought to consolidate
power by toting as ideological 'watchdogs for
4 by trying to weaken their opponents within
tral and regional leadership. In practice,
,neant that.. they have led the way in sUbjeCt
Ovia policy proposals to, the test of ideol .
tude., They-have tried to insert revolutionary
responsive to their direction in, responsible
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Background Use Only
ed Dis*OM
position in the rebuilt party and governmentappa-
ratus, to win military support for their followers,
and to purge rival. leaders. On the whole, however,
these efforts have met with too little *woes* to
provide surety for their political futures.
23. In the arena of government and party re-
construction, for example, there are civilise, and
military cadres in nearly every *antral and provin-
cial organ who seem to have been promoted because of
their fealty to the ultraleftists at the canter. But
over all, the, new party and government unite are
weighted in favor of conservatively oriented mili-
tary men and veteran cadres who were strongly at-
tacked by the CMG or their led guard cohorts in the
past and who can be presumed to be reluctant to ac-
cept ultraleftist leadership in the future. Within
the PLA, the radicals have had some *lioness in win-
ning adherents within individual units, but the
'overwhelming majorlty of the PLA seems to be commanded
;by order-oriented officers rather than *revolution-
,? ary*,proteg6s of the CRO. Moreover, there have
been signs over the past two years that within ISOM
of China's 11 major military regions armies and di-
visions that supported local leftists during the
iheight of the Cultural Revolution have been politi-
cally; neutralised;
'
pyrotechnioa
?144. t By end large, the principal political weak-
of the CBG stems from the failure of its suc-
vs Oampaignsito undermine the power heels of key
central government leaders and some of the regional
litary Chieftains who it judged were against it.
the Cultural. Revolution, for example, the CRO
was,clearly behind at least two traumatic end abortive
rts to divide land weaken the military. The first
occurred in the immediate aftermath of the Mahan In-
, 1,oident:in the !summer of 13671 the second led to the
? izourgivof Irting1PLA:ohief of staff Yang ChengewU in
:ard

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0.
tAground,Use Only
d piasters
? , was precipitated in '
67 when the Wuhan Military Region Commander
d'Pehing's order to cease suppressing a rediril
' Red Guar&lfaction that was opposing his authority in
, the region. The commender was promptly disclosed,
and &subsequent series of editorials inspired by
' the radical* that called for the "small handful' of
revisionist leaders in the army to be *dragged out'
touched off a wave of Red Guard attacks on PLA
' leaders. At the same time, there were indications
that the notorious "May 16 Corps'--an ultraleftist
group beaded by second echelon CRG leaders, such as
journalists Wang ..t end Chi Pen-yu--was maneuvering
to oust premier Chou Rn-lai and several military re-
gion, commanders. All of this radical sound and fury
came to an, abrupt halt in September when a number of
important regional military leaders who feared for
their.political survival and who vented to restore
order apparently joined Chou Rn-lai in braking the
radicals drive to intimidate or purge their opponent'
in the central government and regional military hier
archies. This was not a revolt against MAO, but it
did ?demonstrate an increased ability and willingness
on the part of the conservative forces to coalesce
when directly threatened by the ultraleftists and to
attempt to deflect Mao's decisions to 4 course more
ceptable to themselves.
The end of the radical thrust was signaled
when the vitriolic Madame Mao (Chiang C)Ung) appar-
ently was forged to beat a retreat. She gave a major
speech on 5 September in which she praised the PTA's
political performance, denounced the "Mir 16 Corps,'
and demanded that leftist Red Guard fictions turn in
their arcs and cease criticising local military au-
thorities. At the same time, several CRG leaders
of the "kw 16 Corp.' were purged, and the group
ostensibly was dissolved. Thus, the When Inciden
earned the CRG considerable enmity within military
circles $ but it also probably convinced the CRG
leaders of the 31044)iness of their position and of
the political danger to themselves if China's prin-
cipal troop e0004440V4 were "flowed to e0441441004
against them.
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ckgr und Use Only
04 Mese*
29.: Atter the regional military leaders were.
authorised to use force if necessary to halt Rad
Guard fighting in September 1967, the Cultural Revo-
lution entered a brief revolutionary pause or a
'return to normality.? During this'franile pause
the ranke?of the CPG were considerably thinned, and
by February 1968 only five of the original 17 members
of the CPO still survived. The remaining leaders-
Chen Popta, Mean Shang, Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-
chino., and Yao Mani.Tuan--aust have felt that their
own future was at stake. They apparently did not
, cease their maneuvering against their opponents"-
maneuvering that was overtly demonstrated by a rash
of wall-poster attacks upon some of Chou Zn-lai's
prominent ,vice premiers in early 1968. Ultimately,
? the Machinations of the remaining CM leaders preked.
when the acting Chief of staff Yang Chenrowu, the
first political ?moister of the air force, and the
oommander'of,the critical Peking garrison were ousted.
The origins of .this purge are still shrouded in
tory.
lb. 'According to the official version,
der to enhance his own position had been
underminWthe authority of the CRC and was plan-
to purge majOr regional military leader* and
0:prenierRsiehtlru-Chih, head of the Peking rove..
ionarycommittee.' Tangle 'plotting * was allegedly
ovared Mao, and her importance 41009
atjof!the other CRO members appeared to be
d'by,the episode* According to the Rod Guard
Lin Piao at that time instructed several Units
erged with investigating political problems in the
to seek. advicefrom her, Chan Po-ta, and Tao
Men-yuan. The affair also was accompanied by call*
to stamp'out the threat of a new 'rightist. resurgence
and by renewed armed cleshes between radical Red Guards
and PLa units in s nuMber of provinces*
31 At. the time, the purge of Yang Cheng-mu
is colleague' appeared to be a major victory
militant terms in the Leadership. In retro-
spect, however, a case can be made that Yang's fall
marked yet another downturn in the CRO'a disruptive
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Dim*/
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led Discern
inanc.. Yang had faixty good
nti military officers who aye-
sod with, r at leant was willing to exploit
personal gain f the aims of the radical leaders.
had been handpicked to displace the disgraced to
ui-ching as "acting chief of staff, and had appar-
ently attempted to implement changes in the PLA that
emphasised the ?revolutionary? over the profeaaional
qualities of the army. Re also was firmly allied
With periodic attempts to promote systematic rotation
of PLA units to prevent military leaders from ally-
ing with local party and government bureaucrats who
might resiet the attempts by revolutionary activists
to mats* power in their bailiwicka. Theo. programs
supposedly were advocated by Aso and in and the CRO
militants, so there is, on the surface', little avi-
dance that Yang was anything but faithful to them.
32, If Yang's militant credentials were &da-
te, why did the CAO attack him? This question
a impossible to answer definitively, but it seems
likely that it Yang, as Charged, had been moving
against military region commanders--such as *Mang
Yung-Mang, Chan Hsi-lien, and HaU Shih-yu, who had
been under haavy radical attack for the preceding
year and a half--then his efforts probably had some
backing from the CRS. Indeed, the vigor with which
this CRO leaders denounced Yang strongly suggests
that he was serving as a stalking horse for the
radicals and that this was recognized by his in-
touldiad.VictiMe. In any case, it appears more than
likely 'that Yang's ouster was forced by strong, if,
not coordinated, opposition from (Attar Military
leaders opposed to the disruptive policies with
which hawse associated*
33.*: machinations of the radical leaders
in 1 167fiend 196S to ffact Changes in the leadership
of the revolutionary committees, to divide the mili-
tary,:and to porga or nautraliaa those who ware
attempting to MOderate the excessos of rovolution
generated powerful antagonises that subsequently
were Carried into the new politburo. This body in-,
oludadla nualbey of military and government figures
!lissom
ground Ott Only
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c ground Use Only
d Dispem
,who apparently had been the intended victims of the.
CRG end whose actions in the revolution may have
;Irelmed:doMbts,in Mao's mind about their responsive,-
+meal* tebiei:ideological predilections. HIlhethermr
nOtlthese men survived the political infighting of
the Cultural Revolution, because they ultimately, were
r(sible:tmproyetheiriperecnal loyalty to Mao. and Lin.
4r because they were simply. needed to run the country
!!!moy.ibejLmootpoint. Their admission to the inner
C,].. in any,event;wes *. recognition of the, existing
balan002.of political forces in the nation at. the time
Of theninthleongress. It also meant, however, that
becausieithek wars powerful figureein their own right,
their:viewelwoulotbe a counterweight to those Of the
A4a0iete4A,the decision-making process and, that sooner
or Later the radicals might feel impelled to make yet
ther,ettempt to shore up their power positiOns.
: : , .
, The:move by the radicals apparently came
sooner rather than later. As the reconstruction ?
,process moved forward in 1960, there were stuttered
warnings that the Cultural. Revolution was not yet,
over and indications in propaganda ? that the ideologues
were Maintaining theirwatchdog function.
Then,- in January 19704 in the capi-
brist pice UwU pop
euse of
dor of the year bore out
other round of battling between the
r,opponents had begUn.
fair
Lull ramifications of the May 16 in-
are by no means clear, but it apparently
central issue touching off the kalei-
'SUOMI within the
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Diets
Contr
Wm only
to weed out for
111111111111111111ks both
positions they had acquired
th mer May
since 1967 within various administrative organs-
including the governing committee of Peking Univer-
sity aid the Peking city government?and to prevent
them from joining the party committees that were in
the process of being reconstructed in these bodies.
that the
argent-
y small coterie of extremist
iii.., journalists, and prob-
ably erny otficera who hoped to promote their own
careers by undermining the position' of incumbent
central and regional officials. The group operated
behind the scenes in Peking and in several provinces
in 1967 ander the leadership of some members of the
original 17-man CRC It certainly could not halm
existed without the backing of than Po-ta, Mang
Shang. /and Madams mae, and it is equally certain
that it was regarded as a major threat by Chou En-
lai, whose vice premiers were victimized by attacks
instigated by the 'May l6,* and by such major re.
'gional;figures is Huang Yung-sheng, whom. bane prom*.
:ince of prengtung was * Selene of 'My 16" ectiVity.
oh
May le investigation apparently gen-
eriminstions at the top and produced
or political casualty a few month* ,
:after its incmptthn. In mid-March 1970 politburo
memberllIsieh Tu-chieh, a vies premier and public ,
security minister who was re ted to be in charge
otltbo4n s r
publicview.
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 AlMigMbillUminemm14110114avaiesmot ?
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d during the Cultural P,.voltk-
$ugsets that he could very we have over-
4 himself on the May 16' inVeatigation. Al
on occasion he apparently made accommodations
adical forces, he was more often on record
as an outspoken critic of militant tactics and was
himself attacked several times by non openly identi-
fied with the "May 16 Corps' and with redical Red
Guards at Peking University. Ryan Mao once said
that Hsieh wee one of those officials who was 614-
ways'being criticised, and Madame Mao--one of the
severest critics of the old public security opperat
publicly described Hsieh as a weak man who had made
serious mistakes, Moreover Hsieh, as a vice pror.,
worked closely with Chou En-lei?himself 4
target of the May 16* attacks,
With Hsieh 's die appearance t appeared that
leadli.41$ had survived 4 maneuver that was
up to be a major effort to circumscribe
r authority further. HU the murky political
ure in Peking failed to clear up. At several
rahip turnouts in May, for example, there were
some unusual flipflops in politburo rankings that
suggested that another of Chouis vice premiers, eco-
nomic specialist Li Rsien-nien, was being downgraded,
at least temporarily, Moreover, in June Poking gar-
rison commander Wen fu-cheng.--* post associate of
Chief-of-Staff Huang Yung-sheng--smddenly dropped
from public view, another development that could
man that efforts were being taken to realign the
political and military power structure in the capi-
tal. Whether or not these moves represented radical
initiatives is uncertain but it seems that Hsieh*s
setbaOk triggered sone intense jockeying for posi-
tion ,et the top,
'May 16" investigation
us in Peking after Heieh's
d in 191.0 when
h Habassy in August
which the tuderehip
Islam
ground Use only
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ir
ckground use Only
sd Dissent
still grappling. This wax
the 'May 16", its leaders, all
Ming Shang, were identified
? the perpetrators of the tux
sign Ministry and the Peking diploma
? duringAhat period. The most signifi
that the 'May 16" affair had not run it
however, was the fact that two more rankl,ni
buro nembers; Chen Po-ta and Rang Meng, dropped
ctiew between late summer and mid-fall
teY bad been censured for sup-
ivi ties during and since the
lesser *sten ,
,
at a Central Committee plenum last autumn. The e
, claimed that Chian Wes specifically charged with a
,dozen,"crimes4!, these included organizing the "May
16 Cerpe,7)attacking veteran cadres mistakes in
education ,reform, and advocating egLitarianism in
the economyi Most of the charges are consistent
with'what is known about Chin's views or activities
in gust 1967, for szexple?
Chen made a "self..confea n
of the "May 16," and one of the
rca later purged for leading the
tint; on Chin's orders.
42.`Sy implication, Chen
comaittad similar errors.
670 for sxample, indicated a a
role in the attacks on Chou En- ai. No dotails
he awes against him were divulged, however.
The? only information provided was that he had made
a self-critioism at the plenum, which may explain
why Ming continued to, make public appearances after
Chen had dropped from public view shortly before the
plenum convened. 'tang apparently gained only a tem-
porary reprieve, however: he was not seen in Peking
after 13 November, indicating one
cell sidelined.
Dissent
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d asses
43 At this stage it seems premature to con
audio that both men, lona close allies of Mao, have
been perranently divested of all tic
sibili hip. i. fact,
n and nal he
the provinces since they
ing. Moreover, the unexpected
of Hsieh Pu-nhih as first secretary of
d Peking municipal party committee
hsrl been out of the political limelight for
a year demonstrates how risky it is to describe
purges in Cbtna's present unsettled leadership coali
tion as final. Nevertheless, even if Chen and Rang
have only been reassigned for the past six months,
they *boost certainly have been at least temporarily
excluded from the highest councils of the regime
during this period.
!4*. The reasons for their demotions are not
fathom. NeceUin of their previous ties with
the bMfty 16 Corps," both men probably were, or be-
ts of the investigation--which reportedly
is still in progress and which, according to one
Irement,traveler's account is *till ?too dangeroua
to amine, at home," The oMey 16" issue appears to
be pertly a personal vendetta and partly a reflection
of deep-seated disagreement* within the politburo.
Thisse disagreements probably revolve around the
rIcautious tenor of :sone poet - Cultural Revolution
!!reconebruction policies and the staffing of China's
prebuilt party.andlovernment apparatus with military
it and veteran cadre* who resisted the power plays
ultraleftistseupported by Chin,. Kang, and the
,k
-20
'Cents Diesels
1On Dies gr
ir
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mmw
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Foreign ,bis
' Cost
ckground Use Only
issem
other CAO leaders Chen, for example had author-
ised !articles in August 1967 disparaging the army's
political performance, and it seems a distinct pos-
sibility that continuing criticism along these lines
by both Chen and Rang may finally have pushed mod-
erate forces on the politburo to coalesce against
them. "
CRC; 101 Newt Sot The/ Seats
45. Thus, in a broad sense, the machinations
of CMG leaders since 1967 appear to have gained them
little political insurances instead they have
strengthened the hand of their opponents. The radi-
cals' record since the ninth congress in particular
seems Car from impressive, and there are few indi-
catione that the CRO leaders have significantly
broadened their bases of power in the rebuilt party
and government organs. Effective authority in most
of the new provincial party committees, which began
to be formed in December 1970, is still in the bends
of leaders with conservative records in the Cultural
Revolution. In many cases, these are the same leaders
who in 1967 were threatened by th* attacks of the
'May 16 Corps.*
46. Xnsofar as the army is concerned, Chen
have been questioning not only whether
-21-
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rEnt,4,:172r,
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ir
ckground Use only
d Dissem
should continue to carry a heavy civil ad-
trative and political burden but also the man-
n which the army was performing its new chores--
in other words, was it supporting local leftists and
the goals cf the radicals in economic, eocial, and
political activity. In *tisanes, these were the con-
cerns that prompted cm attacks on selected army
leaders in 1967, and it seer* likely the criticisms
have continued because the radii:Ale believe that
the PLA as a whole is still not fully committed to
"Maoist' idaale?despite years of indoctrination
under Lin Piao--and because they 1001 that the ac-
ration of power by the army had progressively under-
cut their own political positions and those of their
lertist supporters in various localities. The po-
litical price the CRC has paid so far for its crit-
icism of "power-holderew is dreaatically underscored
the recent setbacks suffered by Chen Pa-te end
Shen.
47. ,Although the difficulties at thewe two men
caat doubt on the future prospects of other CRC lead
leftist voices in the regime have by no means
entirely silenced. In the press for example,
there are continuing criticism* of, *arrogant"' etti-
tudes in the PIA, attacks on those in the military
'who put professionalism ahead of "reVOlUtionary"
Acorns, and diatribes /against advocatee of eco-
apolicies that subordinate politics to the de-
lopment-of technology. Moreover, the recent ap-
pointmentof Cmo members Chang Chun-chiao and Teo
en-yuan to the top party posts in Shanghai suggests
conscious sffort!to "insure that these men will at
act retain some regional power bass.
;
S. it is also somewhat unrealistic to din-
'entirely the tole of leftist forces in newly
party organs. As was the case during the
ion of the administrative revolutionary cam-
tees, in many ofthe provincial party committdma
o far established there stens to be a deliberate
ffort by Peking to insert into a position of power
at least one military or civilian leader who had
upported radical elements during the Cultural
.22.
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"to
round
em
Revolution to serve as a political counterweight to
other more conservatively oriented officials. Finally,
the continued failure of Hsieh Fu-chih to be identi-
fied,in his previous positions as public ascUrity
minister or vice premier or even to appear in public
since the announcement of his appointment as Peking
party secretary suggests that some form of leftist
pressure may be preventing his full rehabilitation.
49. Despite these caveats, not only have the
local leftists made few inroads in the new party
organs, but it is possible those who retain their
positions have less room for political maneuver. In
fact, several provincial loaders wto were highly
praised by the Maoists in 1967?such as, Wang Usiac-yu
in Shantung, Liu Wo-ping in Shansi, and Li Tsai-hen
in Mmeich ed in the pa
ice
e left are unlikely to wane completely,
h there have been recent indications that the
" investigation may be reaching a climax.
nal tea press article by pro-Communist Austra-
lian journalist Wilfred Bnrchett, who recently re-
turned from Peking, he was officially informed about
an investigation into an alleged anti-Mao plot by
ultraleftists--almost certainly a reference to the
'Kay 16 effeir. Burchett's article discueses AR
extreme leftist shadow cabinet that tried to manip-
ulate itself into power during the Cultural Revolu-
tiOn,,The journalist claims that the names of the
plotters, who may include Chen Po-ta, would he re-
vealed when the investigation was completed. In any
case, the setbacks to Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng, the
forward 100Veigent in provincial piny building, the
' pronounced flexibility in Chinese foreign policy,
nsiah Fu-chit's appointment as Peking party boss,
and the continuing denunciations of the "May 16
Corps", are all signs that the political seesaw in
Peking has tipped at least temporarily in favor of
' theMcderates.1
iseem
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ISVIERK Ammr
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d Die
d Use Only
CUP on the Sees
04H Attaching political, labels to the various
f the politburo outside the ranks of the
CRC is 'titularly difficult, because of the paucity ?
of data.on:the actiVities of a nuaber of lesser, but
? onethelesslaportant, full, and alternate politburo
members,-such as 'the new head of the PLA General Po-
itialI'Department (GPD ) 14,741-sheng Even within
itheCEG?nemberShip,there may be differences in posli-
tiorgOorat least styles Thus it Is possible that
1.ChenCChun-chiao..,*ho showed a. distinct facility for
banding with the wind in the Cultural Revolution'
Imight-tbahetter Able to make a political a000rmtcd*-
tion with his enemies for example the radical
! qfireibrand ChiengVhing. Nevertheless,,
reactions
?
to, end,actIVitieli!in, the Cultural Revolution of the
:remaieing, friOn...CROLmembere suggest that the principal
HaiwiiNioVarnmentand military Isadore of the Wit-
bUrOLaXe? not mers,:opportuniets and cant. safely re-
vertWist opponents of those favoring further revolu-
ktionery.orA4eologital excesses,
, ?
.61. The military leaders who .anklust below
HPia0--Eueng YUng-sheng, Yeh Chien-ying, Chen Nei-
:lien, ..,and HIV Ehihyu00,-were all under heavy and pro-
jongbd radical attacks in the revolution which. un-
doubtedly generated bitterness and anxiety on their
-part. Ain?s then they have :Appeared to favor getting
on with. the business of reconstruction and probably
havo? sought to modify the: disruptive impact of left-
let-inspired social. and political programs. Their
?
basic inclinations are Apparently shared by the civil-
ian mini-Otter*, L ?Aelen-nien and Hsieh ru-chih,
52. The political affinities Of the lower rank-
Utility Wen on the politburo, who seem to play.
rtant role in 4*y-to- affairs
a.
since his 12th Army was ordered
1967 to curb Red Guard dia-
re doee not in itself explain
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kground Use Only
oiled DIAAOM
? 'why he was elevated to the politburo or the COP
idirectorship over men more senior than he, and it
:remain* debatable whether he should be regarded AA
representative of the conservative regional mili-
in a sensitive *ray politictl post. as a Pro-
of Lie Pilo, or as a favorite of the CRO leaders.
The records of General Rear Services Director Chiu
Rui-tso and navy political cc suer Li Tao-pang are
also mixed, although it is worth noting that the
navy lined up in province after province with radical
Iforces attacking senior army leaders during the Cul-
tural Revolution. The air force followed a similar
pattern and both Li Tso-pang and air force oammandsr
MU fe-b;ien appear to be good exaslea of military
'loaders who have been ready and a
lternate meabers
party veteran Li H.uab-fsng or new
!Te seems to play a politically
t role. Little is known about Chi except
be was ,personally praised by Mao for the support
he gave radical forces in ..Bonen Province through the
t_Cultural. Revolution. Defipit* this record, however,
L.Chtwai recently given a party post in Ronan below
several ordinary menberst in the local hierarchy; his
r'failure to move up to the top party post in. the prov-
i$!incimis alclearkleparture from long-standing party
?preCtioe? and may be taken as an interesting commentary
on the political weight leftist leaders are currently
pulling,inthWpolithuro.
, I ,
34 Min. With .. the uncertainties surrounding
of the lassies- figures on th*politburo, it is
able to infer that below Rao and Lin the major
e4n4thecomplex pattern of interrelationships
inthe elite are polarised into two mutually
antagoOletiO groupings, the ideologues and the nod-
:es
Dividing them are not only the broad DISUA
tinuinglvalidity of Mao's ideologioal pre--
also the narrower prOblems,reletive?to
SOX ,
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' WV
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oiled
LailinfilkdWaitAiDirectitig
and the Moderates
nly
the political future of
th* radical ideologues.
The ideologues are op-
posed?by seemingly
identifiable coalition
of top army nen and
civilian bureaucrats
who appear to be work-
ing for greater ration-
alization of the eco-
nomic and political
apparatus or at least
for the orderly pursuit
of a more pragmatic ver-
sion of Mao's romantic
vision. Th. principal
spokesman for this group
seems to be Chou Mn-lai.
who throughout the revo-
lutionary turmoil of
1966-1968 managed to pro-
ject at image of reason-
ableness, moderation, and
responeibility.
During the Cultural eVOlUtiofl, Chou b d
axiom*
responsibilities not only for the day-to-
day administration of tha central government but also
for oversifting provincial political settlements, a
task that Obliged him to win the confidonce and
ation of powerful local military satraps, such
Hai-lien and Hsu Shin- u
Ca s no as 1
excesses of the Cultural Revolution
e few a t the only lea
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ir
ground Use Only
Disaein
appeal. He ale? has a
le compromise and as
Thus, he is uniquely
Views of those opposing
ions of the CRO leaders.
. ! 56. Chou has shown considerable responsiveness
to the problem* of the top military and civilian ad-
adnietratore in the moderate grouping on the polit-
buro. Moreover, his political future, like theirs,
had bean pieced in jeopardy by radical onslaughts in
'the Cultural Revolution. as a direct result of their
'attacks on his Vic* premiers and other central govern-
ment officials, Chou'll personal power belle suffered
serious Attrition. Through his effort' to curb left-
ist:excesses, Chou apparently incurred the wrath o
principalthe CPO leaders
ly that Chou survived these
Awe* in the and he was able to
ce--although the key factor
enship may not have been so
t Chou was always loyal to him
at Chou,/ multiple talents were
ding the country together. but
ever of the Mac-Chou relationship,
? have been a; number of indications since the
ongr.ss that leftist pressure against Chou
be a.prine ingredient in keeping the Peking po-
tical cauldron boiling. In the weeks immediately
prior to the convening of border talks with Moscow
in the fell of 1069, for example, a series of Aesopian
cultural,pclemice appeared in the press denouncing
unnamed comrades who favored the "right capitule-
tionietN line of negotiating with the enemy. Since
AChou probably was instrumental in persuading Mao
to talk With the Soviets in order to reduce the bor-
der tensions, it seems probable that these diatribes
were directed at Chou to warn him not to go too far
and to cast aspersions on his fealty to Mao's doc-
trinaire,enti-Soviet position.
oiled sem
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Dies
Cont
d Use
Dissect
9. h'elearer sign at Chou continued to be
the object of radical machinations was the appearance
of the gall posters calling for his "defense early
" nvestigation.
Chou has played
t autumn de-
vered mevral majorflouncing the *may
16 Corps." Thus it is likely that in pushing through
the investigation Chou has successfully weathered
another test of strewth with his radical opponents.
Indeed, the sidelining of mon FO-ta and Xang Shang
has in *Owe ways given Chou even more freedom for
Political maneuver.
9. Chou 'e position in both domestic and for-
affairs seems to have been strengthened since
autumn, amembeweeinimail.lail Chou
tly stated ett-f--M-orm.ermeatewaan
ergo of rebuilding the party nachinery. This
revelation contrasted qith earlier reports that Lin
Piao WAS directly supervising the process and that
the CRO had formed a de facto party secretariat with
Kang abeng playing the principal role. Although it
still seems unlikely that Chou is in 'sole* command
of this sensitive project, the disappearance of Xang
Sheng and Chen Po-ta nay an that Chou's personal
authority in Overseeing party reconstruction hes
been enhanced at the expense of the CPO members.
This speculation Seams substantiated by the fact that
,Peking did not begin endorsing provincial party coo-
mittees--the most important party organs formed sine,
,the central Committee was produced at the ninth
party congress--until after Rang Sheng and Chen Po-ta
,had vanished from canter stage. The nailing of Hsieh
rift-chih as first secretary of the Peking party cam-
:mitteeney also be, at least a Piebolio victory for
'Chou since the two had appeared to be working closely
together until Batch's fall from grace last March.
Finally,fact that Chinese Foreign Ministry offi-
ciele4hVerenently made a point of telling visitors
that they do not condone 'extremist" activities and
the continuing enlargement of the image of "uodera-
itioflendreasonablenees" in Chinese foreign policy
fbothenggest that Chou does have increased rasponsi-
tlity
for:ftunningithe country,'
. ,
-29-
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. mmimmammEmmft. Amimmommrimmumw,y,
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k round Use Only
d D seem
t to recognise, oweVer, that
72, many burdens have de-
s apparently is the Only
irate with sufficient vigor
ay direction of the central
ot in itself mean that he
the regime or that he does
with both Mea and Lin on najor
parent persistence of radical
hi. position, however, it is not
*does or will always retain the
f Mao end lin. Nevertheless, he
tented hissalf over the years by
Mao that he was not adding his
possible successors to the Chair
u pegs, sor?
re seems to be little question that Mao
carefully weighed the possibility that his peso-
ting might occasion a protracted power struggle that
could thwart his revolutionary will in a number of
unforeseen ways. To avert this Mao has worked as-
siduously to arrange for an orderly transfer of power.
Thus the Position of Lin Piao as Mac's chosen sue-
ceseor has been affirmed both in the new party con-
titution and in the draft state constitution endorsed
t last fall's Central Committee plenum. Moreover,
e emergence of the PLA as the primary instrument
political and administretive control probably has
enhanced both the power fuld authority of lain vie-a-vis
other member* of the elite and has possibly improved
his chances of consolidating his position after Mao
'goes. Thus, on the surface at least, Lin appears to
be a formidable figure in the present power equation
in Peking, ,
62. Nevertheles
of China's leaders
enigma..
Die aim
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ssem
and pbyeical vigor. Lin's record, however,
t he is driving and aggressive, a tough and
mending troop commander, and a skilled political
infighter. His rapid rise in the military and party
hierarchy over more senior officers, his ability to
promote himaelf as Mao's foremost disciple and in-
terpreter, and hi* transformation of the PLR into
a model of Maoist organization in the early 1960s,
all indicate that it would be a mistake to discount
Linls political acumen and to dismiss him as only a
convenient instrument of Mao's will.
3. There are indications, moreover, that Zin
tempted to shore up his personal power base by
ncing in his favor the promotional pattern in
post - Cultural Revolution leadership hierarchy,
riy all, the military men on the present politburo,
example, have had their careers advanced notice-
y since Lin took over as Minister of National
nee in 195,.. The fact that more officers from
4th Field arby, which was commanded by Lin from
ts.inception in 1946, have been placed in key re
al posts than officers who served in China's
other former field army systems it' probably another
example of a deliberate effort by Lin to offer pre-
ferment to men who might owe him some personal loyalty.
Laminas the Papa After the Tischer Go&
307
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ckg ound Use Only
d Disown
hand, other aspects of Linl*
1959, particularly during the Cultural
raise serious questions about the extent
of support for him in important military
nid civilian circles. The major turning point in
LW* career cane in 1959 when he was charged by ,
Mao with improving morale and tightening up lax po-
litical practices in the army?a move that in retro-
pect: was part of Maca'a plan to exploit a rejuvenated
PL h under Lin as the major instrument for combating
the views of both the professional military leaders
and the party apparatus chiefs who war. opposing him.
5 Lin's effort* to put "politic' in command'
in the arMY, however, exacerbated strains between
officers oriented toward political action and those
more concerned with professional problems involved
in modernising the PTA. These strains have continued,
and polemic* against oZficers who insist on putting
professional considerations to the fore and on 'sep-
arating ermy building from building political power" ?
have been an important element in tha mounting crit-
icism since last fall of the MA's performance of
its civil administrative tasks. Lin himself is on
record Is stressing the importance of professional
training and of learning to deal with the growing
problems created by modern weapons but most of his
remark* on the subject hav* concentrated on individm
tial skills, such as hand-to-hand oombat, and on
small-unit ***Ault techniques. Thos. preoccupations
in th* past have been derided by officers who opposed
continuing the *guerrilla mentality* in FLA training
and who favored developing the sophisticated tech-
nique* used in large-scale fiold operations and coor-
dinated air-ground defense Oystema.
GE, Lin's willingness to push Maoist dogma at
point also casts doubt WI him readiness to
accommodate to the lnes doctrinaire views of some of
his present colleagues on the politburo. For example,
the differences in tone and content of many of the
speeches given by Lin end Chou during the cultural
Revolution, with Lin often supporting revolutionary
seem
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okeround Use Only
Di/1MM,
Chou seeking to liMit than. and dierup-
0'eng st a critical disparity in the fundamen-
tal of both men. There is also evidence
IMPIIMINM the "crimes of ' the 16
that Lin attempted to play
Corp*" in 1967, which suggests that he was not one
Of Chou's most stalwart defenders at a time when the
premier and hie colleagues were being seriously
threatened by radioal elements in the leadership.
2here were instances in the Cultural Revolution when
the responsibilities and concern* of Lin and Chou
more nearly converged, but the possibility temples
that differences between the two man over policy and
personal prioritise in. the reconstruction period
could have set,them=at odds.
= I
67. -During the *revolution, Lin's support of
Maies,purge of numerous cantor officers and his con-
t admonition that the PIA leaders consider them-
s the "targets.of revolution" Cos well as its
'flowers)=2eiee questiens about his ability to
am the loyalty of some of the PLA officers who
rs today's major power-holders. ?Leftist attacks
powerful Lin subordinates, Lin's demonstrated
oPensitY, for Purees* and his awn public statements
that "no; one oan be trusted" may all be more impor-
t factors in determining the future responsiveness
=Lin's colleague, than their working relatione with
him before the Cultural Revolution. Little in the
CulturarRevolution,demenstrates that Lin was ever
ready to risk his career to save a colleague, and
this knowledge may well have prompted some of hie
apparent proteg6s to seek new sources of support.
68. Moreover, it seems possible that the rise
of important regional figures?such as Huang Yung-
sheng-,-after the 3067 RUhan Incident was due as much
to the fact that these people had been leading spokes-
men for local military power-holders who at the time
were demanding that disorders be curbed and that Red
Guaira attacks on the PLA he halted, as it was to their
past ties to Lin NAO. In any case, some presumed
protegis of both Mao and Lin, each as Liu shao-chi
and Yang Cheng-wu, have in the past either failed
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Discern
pcliticl 5sntors Or *bitted their allegiances
crises, which suggests that in China the career
dentification of one leader with another is not
always. an accurate measuring rod of the depth, of
What may outwardly appear to be a monolithic *true-
ture., .
A final problem that casts doubt on the
surety of Lin's political position involves his so-
Called stewardship of the PLA and the reliability
Of the PLA as a maaoise politicel,instrument. Mao
and Lin had been industriously indoctrinating the
PLA--and on a smell seal*, purging it?after Lin
assumed command in 1959. But in spite of all their
et forts. the cohesion of the military establishment
was severely aireined when it was inserted into the
Cultural Revolution. And since than the PLA has
exhibited some of the same divisive left-right tend
enciee that ruptured the party and government, sug-
gesting that Lin was never the complete master in
his own house. Moreover, the problems of the civil
government that devolved on the provincial militory
commanders tended to? reinforce the PLA's natural
proclivity to espouse the administrative virtues of
order and rationality and to opt for an early return
to stability--a position that Lin, with his Maoist
predilections and loyalties often said had led the
military establishment to cZtemit political errors.
/0.. Moen though the army has emerged as the most
ant power system in China and seems heavily staffed
who might be termed Lin protegis, it ip still
continuously criticised for ideological and po-
cal failingr The criticisms probably emanate in
from the refraining CPO 'seders. Rut they may
also,be,easociated with Lin since they include com
laints of lapses within the army on the scope of
oyaltY to Mao's thought, stress the need for con-
ruing ideological revolutionisetion, and urge put-
ng politics in commen6-011 panaceas that lin has
trumpeted repeatedly since 19S9. If than are those
La the 'army who are still ?arrogant and Complacent,"
an their critics Charge, then it seems almost certain
th t'Lln may ,continue to feel sone elements in the
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sea
, or ere potentially, disloyal to him.
Us it ears that Din Pi4014 prestige and polit-
1 strength derive 44 ouch?or more--from Mao's,
denote in him as from a secure power base in
itary establishment,
73, Nevertheless, Linos position U heed of the
itary establishment is a vita one. While it is
true that politburo members, such as Chen
lien,Ssu'Shih-yu, and particularly Huang TUn
of whom have roots in the regional inili-
tary structure--are powerful figures in their own
right, they could hardly have risen to their present
Alminence without at least the acquiescence of tin
iand of Mao. Litel relations to these and other mil-
itaryfigures who not only 000mand troops but also
:have a major voice in local government adMinietra-
'tionCare likely to be crucial once Mao depart* from
the scene. For this reason it behooves Lin to fash-
ion a working relationship with these men, whose
? political views *re almost certainly 4 good deal more
"conservative* and pragmatic than his own--not so
ouch out of ideological conviction but out of prac-
tical necessity* Indeed, something of this sort may
already have occurred. The criticisms of the PLA
that have surfaced in the past months were probably
inspired not by Lint but by the CRO ideologues fight-
ing Akrear-guard action against the steady erosion
of their power. Such attacks may help cement an
alliance not only between the military satraps and
Chou in-lei ,and the civilian bureaucrats, but also
between the regional military figures and Lin. In
event there were enough cross-currents in the
Cultural Revolution to suggest that Lin and the ci-
vilian radicals did not always see *ye to eye, But
in forging any alliance with more conservative forces
in the eilitary, tin oust constantly look over his
shoulder at the Chairman?his ultimate source of
powar. This in turn closely limits his freedom of
Action.
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Outiodk or the Poet-Hao,Rra
72. Prior to the Cultural Revolution,it ap-
peared that the comparative stability of the Chi-
nese leadership and the unifying influence of Men
Tse-tung would prevent A protracted power struggle
until Mao's departure from the scene. The launch-
ing of the Cultural Revolution proved, however, that
for some time past mao had not been undisputed leader
of the party, that his own power interests and ideo-
logical predilections could prove a disunifying
factor, and that the struggle among his heirs was
already under way. This struggle continues to be
complicated by major questions concerning the limits
of Mao's authority, the capabilities of his desig-
nated successor, the persistence of deep-seated
quarrels over the proper mix of pragmatic and doc-
trinaire prescriptions in policy-making, and the
heating up of volatile personal rivalries within the
p7litburo. The succession problem is further compli-
cated because the probabilities are high that death
or ill health might scion strike down any or all of
China's top three leaders. Mao at 77 seems to be
Ln good health, but how much longer he will be around
is doubtful. Lin Piao although a mere 63, has a long
history of debilitating ailments and might not even
last as long as Mao. 'Chou En-lei at 73 seems full
of vigor, but the magnitude of his official burdens
may shorten the time he will be able to function
with the prodigious ,energy for which he is renowned.
1 73. The recent draft state constitution dra-
cally 'underscored the difficulties forting the
nes* leadership in coping with the nation s short
longer term succession problem,. Preaumably
use it was s product of compromise among the
competing forces the new draft in many respects
represents a series of looiely worded general prop-
ositions apparently almost deliberately designed
to be subject to varying interpretations. By
designating Mac and Lin as the uation'e Personal
rulers and noting specifically that they are supreme
commander and deputy commander, respectively of al
the nation and all the army, tLe constitution atte
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em
mao's determination to avert any possible chal-
lenge to him or to lin from other powerful figures
in the army, party or government apparatus. The
fact he felt the need for these designations, how-
ever, seems to reflect considerable internal tension
and a realisation that the $11000OsiOA could prove
difficult. Vinally, the highly personalised na-
ture of the constitution renders it a weak and
irrelevant instrument for coping with China's suc-
cession problem should both MAO and Lin die or
should tin predecease moo,
?A. Because of all the uncertainties surround-
mg the Chinese succession question, there can be
no definitive assessment of how the present leader-
ship is going to cope with the problem. At the mo-
ment, the influence of the comparative moderates
in the military administrator group on the politburo
seems stronger than that of the radical Maoists. In
assessing the political future of china's leadership,
however, the problem is not simply to determine which
leader is up or down at a given moment but also to
understand the manner in which compromises are made
between ideological and pragmatic considerations.
Will the leadership, for example, continua to toler-
ate the politically unpalatable but economically
essential institution of private plots and material
incentives? Will it recognise the limited appeal of
abstract revolutionary theory in motivating human be-
havior and instead emphasise nationalistic and per-
sonal goals, both of which are hotter understood and
generally supported by the people? These ars the '
questions at the root of the conflict at the top in
china today. At present, time seems to be on the
side of those leaders who are generally more con-
cerned with political, social, and economic ration-
alisation than with the pursuit of pure revolution.
75. ,There will continue to be manor unanswerable
questions as to how far Mao is willing to go in sacri-
ficing his principles VW Is to whether he will attempt
to reverse trends that he feels are contrary to his
evolutionary vision. There seams little doubt, how-
that those who succeed Mao will have to accommodate
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anging conditLons in a manner that substantia y
modi ism his L4eoioqieai, prompts. China will still
. remain a harsh and disciplined society, but it prob-
ably will b. run by man who, oven while elevating
Mao to tho pantheon of China's berms, will--by
or nomitoity?be diluting his thoughta.
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