COMMUNIST CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL POSTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-114-6-5-3
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 12, 1970
• Content Type: NIE

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PMIEAVit
M:43 7J19
NIE 13-7-70
12 November 1970
NATIONAL JN1LLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NWASER 13-7-70
Communist China's.
International Posture
Submitteil by
UNflED STATES PNIEWOINcE BOARD
As indsolost comorleaf
12 November 1970
344
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rifir Wowing fallikerent erganizatioec participated
th iStfOOtiP
The Criorai Imo&graft Array rood tiro iriaillgooce 1i lOW. Mawr-
amok of Soto and Winos. ood tho NSA.
Coricurriata
ft.434on. R. E. Ctottmoo. tr., VAC..DuryMoe ler Orrerat freoltlesoar
Or. lay E. CUn. 4. DIrodor iifotolEaerat rood Illeroards, Doporuseoi of Slots
Oen. Donald Y. Ilecooff, Ike Director, Nkomo locoecanor Atorey
Or. Writ W. %Wok, for the Direrfor, Notioact Sari* Ateraq'
Mr. Owlet, X Somer. torlit irearroot Owned Aocineace, Atami %MEI ?HIP
Milling
Abotainiew
Mr. William O. Crow, ter dm teafetere to lie Diniciet, todatt loom of Irmo*
wok" rho *bald holing ouithie of far Welles/4
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?
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myr
CONCL 10
I. I
Five
4
PO AMON POLICY: SOMR PRINCIPLES AND PRIORITIES . ? .
A, 1E0 E1004100.,1 BUC ? ,,,,, , ? ......... ? . ? ? ? 4
5
i.0001.0010 Conitraints ARecting FoceIgn listE1stkeo ? ? ?
PROSPECTS ARO CONTOPCENCIFS .
Poldati #0****4 Pot* Policy
E. Sino4mtlert ItektiNfid
C. The Tringulir Relationalitk USIUSSIVOlgoto, . ..
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/06: LOC-HAK-114-6-5-3
COMMUNIST CHINAS
INTERNATIONAL POSTURE
NOTE
Chines mom to octiue diplomacy takes new q?tflkire about the
direction o fist foreign policy ?Altar fens years in which the totennd
preoccupatione of the Cultural fievolution thoroughly aeasulladowod
foreign rektione, Peking is now mooing to rep* it* international
keep and to esploit new opportunities. In attempting to estimate how
China will play thli new tole interantional politics ever the nem year
Or to, this paper lea examine Pekittes options in tants of thaw polksj
factors which are most likely to remain constant and those which am
subject to gnomes eoriMious in mamma to domestic or external sunset
It waist he acknowledged at the outset that we haus reanarWly
Little laformatiors 014 ale decision-ranking processes in Ptah& Ma,
'MMUS of shart-suts tactical moves are ariciptibli to condsleotshie
Wet Ag in the post, midden twists mid tarns in Chinese polietee will
peobably continue to surprise us. But in the broader perspective of
long-range goals and basic capabilities, this paper attempts to sat useful
guidelines on the course that China is liksh,o ID follow In adapting to
the outside semi&
CONCLUSSONS
A. WfththewgofladfrottheCuI
Wei Revolution, %Meg has substantially won
matio position and is moving to coumete for influence In new mem.
Its successes to dette?the in large part to the receptivity clothes nations
toe more normal mlationsidp with the Chinese?lave hum impressive,
especially in SOW of sumndary importance to Peking. In areas of prime
=morn, Le, the Soviet Union, the US, Southeast Asia and japan,
program hes been marginal mid Peking's policy Iwo sure.
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/06: LOC-HAK-114-6-5-3
I Many domestics and foreign obstacles stand in the way of salm-
is% Freitag's husk goals, whether these be Chine as e Peet power and
leader of the world revolution or as a more traditional but highly na-
tionalistic wrathy eoncerned primarily with Asiae interests.
C. On the domestic side, stability and steady growth in beak elc.
monis of siniegth--econointe? military, political?ere far from assured.
Even in the brat of drciallitiMbli, China's marginal economy will serve
to limit 10 Millaimusbility in foreign affairs. A peat deal of work
remains to he done to restore effective government administration,
and to rebrdki a communist party. So longer Mao lives, the possibility
of disruptive mama** exist and his death could otter in a period
of leadership uncertainty and intense preoccupation with internal
affairs,
Et Externally, China's aspirations tignabk blocked &reedy or in-
directly by the realities of the international scene incleding the vastly
supericrt power and hostility of the USSR, its most irnmediate threat
an well is rift] for ideological leadership in the Communist workh
the US pressmee and US comegtments around the periphery of China.;
and the growth in economic strength and self-rmafidence of another
traditional rival, Japan.
E. Even should the Chinese regime wish to alter ibS baste foreign
policy approach. and use its growing military for aggregates* In
peripheral areas, its options would be limited by the riir of provoking
me or another of the superpowers. From Peking's point of view, milt-
tary adventuree in Southeast Asia, spinet Taiwan, in Korea, or in the
Soviet Fox East would be needleasly risky and the potential prim not
worth the game. Peking dos, however, have room, men In present
circumstances for =Me maneuver dkeedy between the two great
powers as well as around their flanks or under their guard in South.
east Asia, the Near Fast Africa, and even in Eastern Europe.
F. At present, the Chinese lee the USSR as their rnejor military
threat By accepting negotiettons with the Soviets, cooling border
tensions, and improving their diploma* tmage? the Chinese apparently
fudge that they have reduced the tisk of hostilities with the Soviets
There is little pecepect, however, of a genuine rapprechement emerging
horn the present Sino-,Soviet UAL But both sides are apparently
concerned that their amine not end in a military test. Thus, as long
10 they both continue to manias the present; degree of reilitary b11130100,
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there is lately to be son* inprovemont In diphenatic and trade rola,
Liner but little movement in herdee talle. At long es Mee lives there
it almost no dunce of SigItiffiefillit corapromise on the ideological
Tendons,
0, With the US, Peking has moved frown its previous inhosigence
to a mem flexible appear& better dedened to exploit the Sino-US ft-
lationthip for Chinese purport. The Chteese hope to meet& the
Soviets by playing on their fears of a Sin:akin-leen rapprochement
as well as exploit the potential for chew. to the balanee of forces
M Rad Asia resulting from the drawdown of the US military presence.
pj:ting 1101/ flexibility, however, Pekine does not expect an
early =Jot improvement ia Shin-US relation and any small improve',
meads ave likely to be limited to waging loot
H. Jam poses epode/ problems to Peking because it too is an
Aden power, fa outstripping thine, in economic growth, and it strop*
resistant to Maoist sulwersion or Chinese threats. And the Chinese,
who remember japan's* bnperialism le China during World War II,
worider what deed the japenese may become to then' security over
the long term and fear Tekr, will one thy take on the role of pro"
tumor of Taiwan, The Chinese answer so far has been to continue
with a rather rigid and vituperative propaganda attack on Japan's
Indere their policies, and their alleged sabitios IP MIL While this
may impress the North Koreans sad some people In Southeast Ma,
It does little good for Chlea's cause in japan itself. Nonetheless, and
despite the he:posing growth in Stne.japanese nide, any lassie shift
in Chines approach La Apee seems unlikely in the preeent ideological
climate in Peking.
L In Southeast Asia. Pekieg's earlier fear that the Indochinese war
might epill over into China seems to have lessened. Indeed, the Chinese
seem to believe that the US is being fumed gradually to withdraw its
military presence from the region and that this process will eventually
Improve the prospects for Chinon lefluencia Wier than use Welt
military force to exploit possible detulopmenu in this ausa Peking's
more Maly coarse will 69 to increase its support to subversive and
Insurgent activity. The Chewer will sleek to soideCri their role as revo-
lutionary leaders wit/or exposing themselves to undue cost or risk
In addition they will rely on conventional dipkinacy when this suits
their needs. There is abundant evidence that Peking feels no need to
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?Agar
set deadline, end has no schedule to Mill; it is dearly revered for
the bag heel,
3. ht the longer run, if blao's successors follow a more steady sod
pragmatic emus% they are likely to have greeter /access than Mao
in aspasuling China's political millance and assooptssice,, Wo mono
be sure, of come. bow future ludas irdll see their situation, end it
le peetsible that they will be prepared to employ China's developing
power in a more aggressive manner, We think it more likely, however,
that they will continue to focus their foreign policy on cliplosnacy at
the mart level and on rubversice at the covert level. The open use of
ilitaxy force will probably be Judged needlessly risky.
I. While we do not doubt that China would fight tenaciously if
invaded, we lee no compelling factors moving Peking toward a policy
of osPeroaloolsro. Or *WO* higher level of rids.taking. For ell its verbal
hostility and Intent aggressivenese, neither the preseat net the probable
future leadership is MAY to me foreign edventurea as It *claims to
China's problem,
DMUSSICifi
L fOREKIN POtICY1 SOME
The ideelogical ease
l In past, hell% 011 pmcdveg the outside mold In tradidemi ways. The
Shmosobto view vi the Middle Fine= has sawdeval the advent of th* rem.
touoists. The pet century km WI residue of bitterness sad froutrittoe emotes
those Clietem--oarteiely the vie ankeltr?orkee mom of natimasto end
patriotism Ina beer mereged by what they am m oder isestment of Chloe
by lontoess, This belie IMO* Of IlltiNdOM and fontrotion Ism hoditeted the
people's toomplance if enormous sessilloa rod hes pesurdited aminvoodds
In sorry at seraistooso7 propose Wined it tresidng rename?dim on.
reolistio--gords. While popular sopertations Iowa been reprieedly dirappetteed,
the he& slymmiort of Odense retionsliare melte to be andaibad Melo and
seen. Unlike the ideologr, of Maclees, *Wok may not long mote* Its creator,
the traditional semi of Chines privileged sole the world etil psehalsly omen
mute* theme In tide end my foremehle Chinese govemment.
It Matta 1460106y, which emphasise; the ineviteldlity of clers conflict and
woad revoletke, adds ea legrodient at violence end itgilanoo to traditional
Chime drives. It etterepla to poled the tetbititioniory expatienes of the Chi-
nese del war mato the world stage by edvettemg tae Mee of the atfloecit
Iliernten russets through the nwhiliestion of the poor countrim to the world,
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.3014;11e?
Pelting tsittilm the hear of the revolutionary line, however, ised has accopteti
and developed a policy of prattbal cortaisteer-, tor applicants whom this tab
Its nada Arialogoos to the anent* entriel beet policy width served the eon,
maudiu well in the Chinese civil war, the panda] coexistence Ithe was cepapily
lotwoled lobe s temporary scoonowaladoe to tk norms of latinierienal conduct
which anal be replinced as alio tossettla falowed atlas revolaineary pith.
Bet as the prepersts far world revautien has dimmed, partial taesisteece
has assonned a larger role to Moat foreign policy, twat while prepapinda
area
an the more orthisan policy of revointionsup urns* reessists at a high
pitch.
8.isitalogy contanes to pay anaceptioesely hisportent rap hi the frensula
lien of Chinon forage paha, Aithotyth deciskaarases may hold varying
&grail at bath ha revolutionary dopier, all arir required to faddy their propmals
in Ni tetra lads artification hat become putioltriy Impotent as a roe& of
the Cultural Revattion atrial which the pap and coanorpingt of a divided
hoidaship was attroakstel by bah% internal politiced deviaticat with *tenet
karate& Many dosesta figura deposed anti the Cuitoad /Revolution, kw In.
4110110$ NW. WWII of Following Palace tha wens protoviat or *seas, ha.
penlaffer, As da Kornai of the Cultural llerehttion lave Inhaled, ago die
rettna to *ore conventional *knew how brat clothed in the Adak of
Maoist itheingy.
L Th Millhay Ingredient
4. Maltary strength lat beat a major preoccupation of a lativittbog it-
tuned to Meer datum that the lanai of a pon* was the mom of
power. Itlareciva, Lb. Chinese lave been or smiths to the wadi
they have ban to the role of violence as advacing world arenas& Politica
concepts and propane are coecatved In stsittgla end tactical military fano
and trartindnad to the Climate maws and the ma at the world to *rata
rhetoric The traditionally strong petition of the tallboy in Cearnerata Chia
has manned new ireparlace ate Rauh of its vita role to underpants% this
supine dieing the Waal Revoletka im a la-product. the ralitary appears to
troaresed its inflecnee over the hamoartion and eseautton of policy.
tf, Contorembt elhine's *Ilkley power it hoposoive by Alba 1401/411111 bat
resnalea markedly inferior to dot of the timiaporrat. The People's .1.0theratiois
Army (PLA), whose beat strength les In des lite and Aeons atitbty of its
Pima fano, baa the coPabilliY 62 Par tip a formidable defeat of the mike-
lend vilest any harden. Howstrer, wide persistent efforts ova the past in
years to strengthen and moderate the Chinese Armed Faces hive *tided
gene cleanable randts, 1,401110111iC and politica disruptions have hit the PL,I,
ye/eatable in WWII MIES agate* a miens opponent. Some of itt mons evi-
dent problems are an appererst doticsesoy in moterbed Inetspat and heavy
mentonsent,
an stir defense meant which probably lacks adapirie eastrarant-
dons end data panosaing espatatiffes, and e racy which MOW Title more then
e coastal defense fince.
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Wir. which Peking emddril
het renseined Immo* matiniss
expesisece lkidng appeared kliffekti*
betthor to fereigo policy oblectlots.
lairds to 1058 sad tho dollsosivo
1.962 both reiketed Pektog's cencort,
with the US, Even agate& the dereonetrably weaker
careful In 1952 riot to hem= tarindied ii i loss thy
eatidied to coda the point that, in spite of
Week Chime was etIll reedy sod able to tithed *NA
%things 153024C, in the ideoingleal Rolth the deployment of China's
militely femme nallatiON heticalty defensive. Maoist snaltary doctrine emphasises
Manse in depth and the mtgeomment of the entire civilian pepoletion to over-,
mem an attack. The fear of a US attack has eased, hi past Imese of a lemming
comma since 1946,4*X that the Southeast Asko war Might gat ON, bee
chine, sted it probably lower now timed any other thee to the past SO yea& The
Chinon now view the Socket Union to posing the most immediate milltsny -threat
and over the past you hive base coadadias an extensive compels? to propene
kr the pereibility of an eventual war. Ic sosordence with this shawl three,
them ere todicatiosse the* the Mow are to:lusting their etilitary deploymants,
ithhosgh there his been ao wholes& nomosemt of troops to the northern border.
S. Zee though tho main *prowls to the defame at China will emphasizes
Memo Iii sloptik?ssg,, Woes "poogicrs we?olsicks is NOT411 to Its railibsy pot-
tom them I mato* to finbt * pcoleaged, &hushes Wit wales Mr* no
Peking lesdership hat steady given a high priority m effrobing the Whew
symbol* of a great power, especially strategic weeperst, but elm ienventional
forces as well. Pei* probably wants the stratogio weepoce Mine* as a de,
terent avian e. Soviet ce US meek and to Mem* Maw huspdatig strength
OIL isiterniticual beam There is sm evidence that the sidtimeritont el a drat*
capability will recormarily snake the Chimes mon improseni. They swill simithrot
in be aetaffed by oveserhslatingly superior US and Sod* power bath frown oat-
di& attacks ord from esseginS ist 'Medea. hilmitnrair In East Mk. China
made its Arm I., have impact on the interaatined some sad it willing eo
peed memo MOWN= to achieve this sod, hut it am be exploded to contines
to exercise caution in entsleyieg US ectratational and mother arena* Peking
aspects its political leflueoce in Asia to grow, riot hose the open use Of military
pease, hot disotegh active ilipiemet-y and the enerneageomm and support of
subverdva mid oneleitimmly offivittee, all booked by the looming prommos soil
growing power of homemade' Chloe ea the Asian souse.
Domestic Constroirds Affecting froodge Inillothem
. lit addition to the ideologied and milittsy piratentittiesis cited above do.
samtio Wert detonator and often *merely restrict doe range of foreign ;oaks
tootles and tostrunteetalities ripen to Pc4log. Thum lacsastic constrainta operate
6
?weer?
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/06: LOC-HAK-114-6-5-3
Sicur"
...t : peelsoktgleal, and hurt auteatio restnewm mashie for.
selettona.
? economy throw the teeth rit4 ma evot approaris Ow high
grewtb rates of the liatt. A modshostion of...beton were responsible
? ? ? ? &Meted pleming blunt monegamit of the Garet
littetresd it the rod of the 19501; the ementien of &nig aids bid :acted,
torsditions in .tise tidy yam of the deosdei ted firselly, the iihroptions.
: thrintral fiewiliatem. At the mese time, the properness of imens/C44
voted to the military setter luesewed, addling to Chtea's techookogical capabilities,
but .fiwther develepromat of the dvui..iocorsomy.
11. Ms hawse to ersiterala rote of .montis ;in the civilian economy
Chia" wipabillity to not nosnoode homage fer? fangs patty gods-
Chteeri .thusgss Iii the early. Idges al the ettetereic modal foe Ada .has been
Urge* Slesitrosud.: The fabled. potential at ths. %lams side las leit much
elf As itheottim to would WAD" thereby teducieg the volition cononsions
Pekin am. wad In srmiseep for trading .ptiVilegoa
I. Polley ineptitude ,thso hinders the Chinese. ?If Peking's intatset potoecepe.
doe with Waned pelittes had paid off in tams ot rapid ec000tedk inWi, end
pollical domiegnient, the .atinsoo might now have a weeder .donstado base for
.the conduct tif forvign Jabs. In first, de major esperinseam designed to pods
'Chinn idissid, incleding hods the Quit Leap Forward awl the Wheal Revak.
tin% hies bum ditastens. Although the economy has Imply recovered, .party
otpushation read* disrupted, ehoil edorialsketion has been harapetiak led
lasting tennis* have hoes .esemsn within die .kulashipe a moult a the
Coburg Revelation. ..
13- :The foreign poky sosinstes proved es vulnerable as ether hureenonsue
orguss to the inmect. of the Cultural :Ilevehxdon, Fee oast* thee yaers, the
humulatton. and emotion at &mime policy woe* titioralyssert by .polithal.
tfgbtln lled 'Omni **Mem hi embemins ahead and within the foreign
htty Ittuif brought comitromive activity to * virtual stensinilL All sadwasadors
hut one: were retailed to PAiogo =Way shies were nissteatially scdnotd. and
militent pinewing was gamed as * mdatitutts for leadithmat diplomacy_
14. This: is not to .tay? of Nome, that Othes ?preemest was not felt in the.
ovoids ?votid dining the Chimed gavolatibm.. Trade .msd *id Pregnant cosse
dewed, as did support fix 'absentee to Southeast Ana. and elsesthem And
potendal as a great power was ernflEtti to the mom its the derejopineas
of nuclear weapons cominned depth demente mosedt. ?Nainstionlaw, it was
not until 1P au Chinese ambeasedom began to Kale bens to their posts,
arid the .tretreet Otertelete to retrieve Calla interniktietnil AW1*$ auth ininthenct
stoned to earetet.. The return to fre-Ctikuvel Etrovettotee diplomacy has bone
ind **Aft, and the beam* between radical arid more praginalle infirientor
reniehe &legs and pairithilly
7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/06: LOC-HAK-114-6-5-3
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/06: LOC-HAK-114-6-5-3
PROSPECTS AND CONTHOENCES
A. Peking's Activist ForeItas Policy
IL With Rs forage oaFals$ apparatus lately restared. Pah% is moving
middy to realty de letwOrltural Rev.:Attica dipkinatio puritan and to com-
pete for influence in now mu, nis drive hen emphasized paratefel madame
and hie sought inthsence throsigh eionwetteral, diplomatic mama itt gliedeStaV
to date?due la brie pert to the reeeptivity of other rations to a mom mamal
releticontrip with the Chown?hem boom Impressive, aspetally when con-
pored to the almost totel isoledoit at the height of the Cobsoal Resolurtioo.
Most of the gam boomuitrfr have come in MIES of kens- operant to Poking mod
ender einsearetthers which have made improrenent in ttilitidtn may arid rob-
thely chem. ?
10, Anal*. vi seem aimed to the Chinas, Mae" pokey he hese lit'.
sum %lovably ad monism emeriewermice have hem thoemerago of
relettime with the Stele UM" the US, Somehow Asia, and jepan. hi these
areas where policy decisions we boom eliffindk, differences widths the laiden,
ship soma* tome to this fere arid "Milo the estire deridon-auldng promo,
TN; WAS reperially marked le the thou*** of althorn valley toward the
USSR during OSP and the eartinuing tickling mainline pawed vieheir the
Soviets in 1970- Peuxes handling of the meat tumuli in Oesthadie?end its
effect on SineAreederia rotations?she Wowed it igaittat honouree width
undenmemd the tigiush tri formulatog pada on mow foreign
tame.
L Sirro?Savirri Relations
17, Though sane of the immediate doper he loom na,noved from the ilea-
deo. the Sine-Seviet divot* remain the *die meet hapenent bilateral con-
f' NtIng, At the same time, it madonna and demonther corny mixes
of the Chinese poistrue in &Clog with other COMMOIAlt stets, the Third
World. red the West,
18, Although relearns haulm Moscow end Peking had beat deteriorating
markedly over the hat decade. end the Solent hoop deployments raring the
Stine-Sovist Waft had been building Mum the se14-19401, the Mose* tweet
appear to [as die tbraoit of Soviet military amino seder* nista otter the.
lewastar of Omehosiovelea. Even than Peking sought to deter the Soviets by
adopting a hen* militant posture. coribining provocative behavior on the
border with strident premegrota end en intensive war prepenuiosoi 0OAP1411.
Sestet peenrare continued to pow In VA. howaver, sea sifter bloody clasher on
the Ussurt in Much and in &Adam during August, Soviet diplomats began to
drop hoed huts about a possible preemptive straw mph* Chinese nuclear
And onstegle weapons facilities. The Chews", *wane now that they might he
farad with the skies humors backing dews and risking their nuclear metelle,
data finally wood In September to the loader negotietions which everted
it Peking October SI
8
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/06: LOC-HAK-114-6-5-3
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/06: LOC-HAK-114-6-5-3
lit Tho stsposianca of tint Paso sessame moved the Mose to rrita.etnOak
bunko policy Wis. For *CID dotard% the Soviets, their millituat intairi Ind
net amity raised the possitility of tweed suellist with the Soviets to an meesasto-
*bin level, Mu the deepened Chios* diplomatic Widow Myr elan was ap-
parantly a prolonged debate early to the fall. tie leadership decided that boo*
talks offered the mot viable =WM of defusing die dregemosly tome Otinitico
At dm mom Woo, the derides was appeowstly tidal to lemmas a witiormaging
thpslorradic ciraptifge to sestme Clitsmei world days end talsonem, both as a
deterrent toil. Soviets cud to tamped of Mose chteedrei +meld, the bfiairiii
Sbsolloviet homework.
Slam the epodes of the bonier Wks, dein his been me evidence of
program OA ow of the hack hewn ccobanting dor nogottersca La Rite of the
stalemate, however, dere have beam no specific reports of mew border ciaalise,
which apses that the mere meow* of the talks los hod nen stabilising affect
Tor their pert, the Meese lova doseentnitol their concern for maintilriog
the talks at the lighest possible tool by vig000dy swatting any irut wkoh
might lead to thoir downloading. The Soviets mem to boa rosectied title
point, possibly become of then posocumpatice Pith evitels to totems Lamm eel
the White Zak mud I aomequerit orseillirectras for sow, it triwr now eon,
Amnions with Oise,
11. Despite the soothimg effect of the talks, the bailor Muslims moseys pato.
Sally mpledat The Soviets bore continued their fame Mild up slag do border,
Although the COW" bairn oat Ognificontly beefed up kayo iamb oar the
boo* dam is rose evidence tbat they lave deployed Pool* north hist arms
dam enough to be noddy imetishle ha int surergeory. They ore dm trying to
improve
the effrootivemets a their poramtilitary forma. Moen cPstl dames
earopsigeo to hallol oir said shalom, disperse porde:too and swap& Rad?
a of which an modal fee sieriestle reasons an well?remobt iii offcet,
21. There ben ban Apo of ems slow, hake nonnaliabom of Oitv rtim
lion; althcnagh the ideciogleal golf smombie as hand as ever and quotiorn of
prime* and roismossee are no door to satiation doom Woo After protracted
4W4ing no esaango of ambessedoss is to the final images or arroargessomr, Ltd
dtacussium forth. MVO Sim Soviet trade protocol have hem tompleted.
23. The prospect of a getup* tepoolemeot monies out of the SlmwSoriet
Wks mow seems remota As Imp is Mao lives there is oho* no dims; of
eigriliomot compromise on the ideologised questions. Peking, wing oa prospect
of a military savuoise ow the Smiths, somata committal to the loug-tena
process of lompleg bunions below the limb paha while attempting to pile op
political poise* In that comoremist world by embassaihog the Soviets at ovary
opportunity. Clio with a aaattaaatlaa of the dap naticeol motagenhat and the
ideologies' schism, both Oda ere eponym* croccrocd Ma the duputo mot
sod le it maim* tot. Over the last year bath sides hor had cause to estimate
tire costs of a prolonged reditery confrontsdon, prommably a prospect that
wider kiwis partioularty advaahlivana.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/06: LOC-HAK-114-6-5-3
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/06: LOC-HAK-114-6-5-3
?WILT'
Jar Relationship US/USSR/Chhto
Mow approach to the US has boot strongly affected by their polit-
witis the USSR. Tiek wee apparent earker thle yen when Po%deg
ts previous intnessigone against the US to intent Saab* approoeli
ed to Inning the Sino4,3$ reintionahip for Chinese perm% Vie
wen undoubtedly to tottettie the Soviet; by 1$1004 od tit* tests
reppreehterstent.Ily derneentrating their comern over tith possibility,
the have probably insured that the Chime eI1 ountinue to exploit
the "triangular reintiorold " wherever and whersroar suits their Deeds. Svcs
though events in Cane reused lb. Osesete to Ohs /oter liter against
the US, they hove clearly matranard this option to priturn to e nen gedbk,
venue when 4 won thdr intend,
1115. The potential for chimps in the kismet of forces in East inet reecittag
from the drowdown of US milker/ prasontre is another factor encouraging more
Steak Chinese tactics toward the US, The Chinese will hope to speed Areer*,
eon troop witbdressab from the tom especially from Taiwan. Al the reme than,
they oeu passibilitins for improving their relations with mates now keyed to rely
less on &swim gmenotese. Peking may Am hope that it can wort b in-
flow:0 to exacerbste frictions aussed by a reduction in ti*35velum The
Mine* sot** sec the us-wo relationship as patioularly vuhierible In
this reaped.
El Them aro no inrclicarions that Ming upon to being shout an early.
major Improvement in Sire-VS relations, The Chboss mobehly coped no far-
menhing US COIKUSICIDIF On TON** Mich MOW= the auto test he bits*
Nur are they Skely to give op the US as the whet teiget in their Ideological
offensive' now ties cepitidtet-imperiabst enemy.. Nonetheless, Peking will with
to ineentsin *Anent iloribility to exploit the triangular relation* and toluene
promptly In whatever direction often its masinston botefits.
27, For them remora my early improves/tato to Sino,US tektites is likely
to be limits& For movie *bough Dean US trade concessions have hem
moslicody ignored by the &nen in publics they hive privately *WA rome
Intact in how far the US might move to this direction, While Sleety to mint
any formal trading relationship, der Chinese MTh ready to soma mere subtle,
indirect trading through third tweet Menu* they ere lately to dove little
**vett to formal diplcintatic recognition to hog es the US remains ceemekted
to the CRC. At the same Lime, however, they will probably retain am introit
In keeping lines of mainstracotion open though connote mob as those at Warsaw.
The pow of Moen gestures will probably kr *low and ensile, sabiect to ves-
ture* felt in Eticiag frceo chugs In Sino.Soviet and Seeti*US nittkim
28. fraT ?00141 years to come, Sine-Sevin relations mil be Feldnfs major coo
-
seen in totalipt ash* Peking his already shown al sone eensitivity to the pas-
sibility Etat the US and the USSR might find onsideohle common ground in
opgoint% China. Ii reedits% Peking will aneeept to ernioerhate the *Wing
10 .,.stater"
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/06: LOC-HAK-114-6-5-3
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/06: LOC-HAK-114-6-5-3
ampleitess hennas !rioter:en and Weals irscrensenglY Pedal' iticli
before the meld el the innecent rictins of *oohs " banners the auperixtwore
stad will threw eel Ihies to other Western Powers rind the Third World In to
effort to skit now oupport The mere direct solatiOn would be for Peking In
sash a ropproctieroont with Moscow, but them meethitstikelihood that Mao
meld acntpt fhb 'hits required to moms istr aglow clew toward the Sorb*.
Thus, over the own few years, or unki Mork dank Poking will probably am-
castrate on /seeping the Sinci.U.S.USSIt relidloaship as Mid Ili possible its order
to prevent any sill:hum* egelrat CJIL
0. China's Regional Alm
Southeast Ark. Pekin(' early fermi that the heir:chewer wre
mur Into China seam to hove lessened to recent yews. Evan though P4444$
hew eopre.andVrirehalUg021 that US frustration to Menem might lead to further
escalation, the bade Wyman of the Chinese seems to be that the US is bogged
dawn In an helecisivo effort that Is moor likely to Iced to a withdrawal than
to further eeponsion of the lighting. Their coeftdmme in this ludgmeat mast
hero beessatalma tesoporarily by the US efelft Imo Cambodia, but their adage-
boa tri tikt Cenietng Patiestl Ce,ete for the US lieu probably persuaded the* that
it la Olt Witt molio, whet we believe to toe their kerning? entnne probably
manna ermistregods Le, In a protracted dreg& ifamers patience will contest
that of OM US,
30, As regards the likolihcod of the PLA being sent into Southeatt Ma for
offensive action, tho eridasos of the pet 110 yews suggests Paling maid be
hictired Is drew ritrestion wily If Cikina's mouthy hsear as tIsraramed, as on
Sas Stoo-Xoreon beoder hs 1053, or if China is provoked. u on the Slisroindens
border in Iget Thus, we esetbuse to believe that China would use its military
fame to prep up Neeth Women If it appeared that there was a zed danger
of that grarersoreet collapsing, Struderdy. Chine wookl no doubt react with the
PLA to a direct military dueet ebarbere islocg its soothes borden
3/. Patera some likety resporese?and abarat cartriely its laait4ai remssents?
to aggravitioe in this area would be to Mame its nipped to subsessius and
liworitaai acilyielA- The fact that ails coatirems its looverm instal:wawa of
its Inge& OsPehilhice along this bade, includists the mem road building
In northern Laos, girettates Beide& desire to Iwo tinware haute ready for
whatever contingrecies may develop The chenester of the facibties, operational
cionaidaations, mad recent history all suggest that Chteesio plans in this area
rotate to the dolmas of south Chink and the assistuite of nearby insurgancies
rather than to IL massive push by the FLA inik# 511Pultelft Aga. The objectiva.
as before, would be to bring into minima) Mangy goiernonents responsive to
Pelibvgit POWS" Wafts* and. In Manors view, this could he done better
by indireoliors?looleding diticarratie preteure?den sem aggression,
IR. ThaSsrei and Burma ere already targets lin a aulorrrelve effort Thelbant's
dare gee with the US guarantee Chines coothnsing hostility. Thus far. Pelting
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/06: LOC-HAK-114-6-5-3
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/06: LOC-HAK-114-6-5-3
has load little appotttinity to apply diplomatic Demme to II end hes
litrolt relying an * lotig.terti campaign to cocounige femoray it the gov.
mimeo. non is no waollen tint Feldwg lee! 111 an easy tasko ono that
can be acmes-A$*4 weekly oven if giwo a high pia*, Ore Ow contrary.
Peking h tonalstent in ieivecatta$ Wed ecif-rellemee and hte Oro* littlet mete-
rth lekt er the active inamorata Wield them be a substardel nabobs it the
US pram= In Snadwast Age, 10 O&M owy combine this low-koni activity
with more positive diploma* Nandkihmeate.
lo Surma, Moue propaganda It encoaraging reettictioaary eeH4ty nip-
Plotozolod bY eine41 ammo a rad In ontis and medals% to dinkirow est hide
mineritioa Bet diplomotto mods with this neutralist government Imre been
dameged Wiser than broker. Faints return kr moknalinn in ohm ere* of
$IA diphiy may +Nominal' to *tended to *dude Improved vitae* avith
Rangoon. indemtl,, le now appears dot both tidos are inspired to room retro
normal rellatIons it yen so, Peking is mot Wady to ithandett lIs suppert 01Bantiah
inaingeo*
34, iIisweltese le Southeast Alla, the Chigoe are ifiketty to mid toao toting*
loeal rancestiouswit* bot t. thew relatively IVIIN/415 UV" significant mamba
assimince Is taidikely to he provided, Tho Chinese will scoliame to find it Mb
-
tali to refuse requests for mid hum any swam that theirtn ea insurggot or MONA-
!dowry cepelatkity? but they will anoticee to %ego ialf.reliance rather dica dc.
pagan* outside aid. Thus, the Clideete will maintain (het role se revale.
Weary bettors hot without esposing themmlyes to owing cart or Tisk, TIM*
Ii shuandiet evict*** thet Peking hols to steed to wit &Whore and hat me
eehetheleto fIftll. it to clearly geeptomi far the lug haut,
8outis Asia. Mat *toren in Indio, his & stisdioly low tank on Poklages
lade of prieettles. China la concerned with SIno.ladian border issuer, with pot-
Atait stables with the Soviets over ham.* tot South Ma, and with *Aro
ttrattag that iota* t. tetivelge of, playing tiro re* of a leading 4W* power,
Toward these ends Psidog bus sought to moberreat 04 *Abingdon Nen Dell,
but widiaut becoming deeply lowileed in the effort. For botenor, Peking Las
propeganitaid and prowlded knitted arms and umlaut; to Nage end Mb* tabo-
os= outent bail* without. however, ettriopting to tura thit Into irasp*
OilelF41110.
NI On a lama no*, Paints military aid tti Pakten?the major sicavann-
entertist sectiplant of such Chlono tikt?atutt been out oi common enmity kr Ind*
la the pettel2 the Pak:Wolin Nom boom to* arms ni dln china* and Yaws
mE proisily InOit to preserve and inerture this talatiesuldp moo if Simi-Indiart
relation, should hoproye tomowitat hi the caning ymws. Thrthwite *alas between
Peking ead New Uhl suggest both parties may be ready Ice a sewn to CM.
VerntiOrda viirdoinaLT. While (otos] den may ha mowed, In INC with Peldees
current eflort to beater lb diplomat* image, the relatiorteingi wIll tinclonlitedly
remain ouitiouie and toot few wee tine to mac
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/06: LOC-HAK-114-6-5-3
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/06: LOC-HAK-114-6-5-3
eovirder
37. The Aries Communists, Ming now wow &twinkled to consolidate the
aoricenlY Worm's(' *a with bath North Vietnam and North Korea. If way
brume of the primacy of the SituSoviet conflict. Peking is likely towo to soma
lengths to improve ita relations with Preagmagind RoiotprehillOWY it Moscow"o
eimesue, Thc ennr of mashing Pyongyang and flatlet, whether ideologically es-
politically, now seems to he clan to Peking and ie tedikol?v to be repeated in
the aentogram forms as during the Cuitusei Revolution
38. Cisinall pow* coil for "militant untie is mobil* designed, in the first
instanot? to squeeze out the SO'4414 Union. It also serves to give the impreesion
OE 4 MOW active role in the *sioti-impestalist* struggle then chimes asisiimis
mellow %wan, xndbeitIi 3eCal likelY taut Mu wilt continue to tailor its role
toward pasgsgesids and material support of those on the front lines tether than
expose inelf to greater risk. Tlds apparent effort to evrite itself belatedly Into
any peatible settlement lu Wm:Nu, together with its sponsorship of gibumisk
wilt sem*, careful diplasnacy flit is not to alleimbe Erma Having boom the
burden of the flyitittug, the Vietnamese sae likely to be especially semithe to
any Chinese attempt to dictate strategy or tactics. Carmody the Chinos am
moving with Reeve but their minuet beet toward olmunniartt is nearly as likely
wupt against the Vietnamese as against Westerners
31 Arpin reps:resets a vowel case for Peking. Became of Japan's reemrlabla
acessomie perkeeriance and US ansouregemant for it to imams a more active
role in Asia, Peking is showing concerti over imparts potential mil1tu7 power,
mod its posit& &sips on smother Greater East Ade Coopossperity Sphere,
Tide mown woj heightened list fit by the 4iming of the Ninces-Sate ram.
esistilitimi
on the reversion of ?knave% Peking has ilways beau apprehensive
mit Japan's comendleg influence in sIn, garticullarly in Taiwan, sod hes tikee
the view that the NbioaSato communiqui signaled i MOM 4$4OrliwO and direct
tole foe the Japanese in the area Peking's reanioe hu beta rearIcal by lmdhgns
don and by an umettling 4414%4%00 that as the US diseagagea from MIs, apen
will fill the void both economically arid math,* iod wi. sinamst the lead role
in countering ChM& Adding to Peking's dilenune is the awintoem that its
Patina mute and leverage in lapin have markedly dwindled and its lenge
has suffered from the term= of the Cultural Revolution.
40L thisiene its liraitaticine?aud past figoses.?Poldos mood to hove jeddioi
to continuo on a dense of limited meddling to japans interne affairs. Peking
has also launched an intensive prepigude campaign which raises the specter
of a remilitarized, impetialistic Japan, a footto Impel Pk/ designed to fan
traditional Mien fens and to undercut Japanese idluence. Morcever, the Cahiese
Ito atimapdrig to bnilds rase against US-USSE.Japossese 'collusion, which
is elso Intended to strengthen Peking's hand la its conniettion for infhtence in
A414, So ler this ipproach has boot successful in helping trapmve CUnits whom
with North Kores, hut has eat had a significant impact on Peidoes meeetam
*mitt ocighbota Furthermore, the camptign his net been aimed to effete
...Otter 13
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/06: LOC-HAK-114-6-5-3
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/06: LOC-HAK-114-6-5-3
, which is orpootod tmad;
8)4'0
41. 'Tiditsso, 1 tose?oit the ?Nettoririlin
Chinese Covamonent ta Trewon remainsg motel eniein Chinese (sesta :044,
1th synths:a of the mitalithed malt:ion thowers a Way ernatiteril teem Wert
itfter boo tocadee, The :Peking :thadlr.rship hew the rparicnil finstration of beireing
that thm eestnat take Teistrati by forth, that It wtnet to them 14. delOolt.
Hid diet the .grtheing strength d indepondencensiodsri TohveneSe
worker; Peleinge ditins to the Island and prepetruite: the issue boa efthitely. The
etnithithltitistsgrittion of the CPC ter many teuerries la the world end its: presence
::: the ON end odor internantniel Widths blocks :Pelting from fa intemational
:partpation god romito. A InAjOr initstet to the 0.1.0,. Comthantat
iiIIy dur 'Pawee limo i i omplex Auto* to topoorod mien:rine with both
:the US end Agee thus nverdy ihettiog Peking's freedom to resinetever
interiettenal WOOL
41 Korea continues to etIe nes tome bemuse of tao kitnitte;fe pok
of the pentrotala,.. the spindribiteral scanpritation for tamer there, end the
Adage solteliondap bytivosoi the north end the smith, Poking hes worlend
siatiouslyto regain: its Wheatley to .rytanzeiiats. and :hes theyeadith iwhips
wen* rikiiairi of friendship.. While sitterapting to limit the role of ti. US, TIM
lopert, however, Peking will also *Oh to: limit North :Kormai adventertere,
Tb.outlook is for tough pointed suggest: for be ,0-sisties propaganda co:t-
histle combined with greet manse= co his militatry iiKCOSSet to aimid darning
aloe .hdti soothes ortilitiry toofrootation on Or
P. China and :the World Coramunity
a Whore Peking's security: insemett are not directly engaged,: Clooete ,tilplo?
standre activity over the Int Imes hes involved far mons terthil fhelbdlty than
hes heat shown:vied-via the US and the USSR, The feet shown the world once
,agal* brawny zokessiblft: INA ,diapleond prior to the Cithood liemiletice? esue-
fully enthiled row of rildain.bleirteaji. but entailing: Little or no change to heag.
tam goalie. Sintegesiet rionsiderationi are mut of the equetioet :hi moot Of this
Ilpheetie amtivity, and to some mom orstatily he Potent ?Etaropei Med to
dosnicatis the Chthese WOOL
44, Eisterri Komi* hoe become an artioetIve WO for :Peking because Soviet
problem theft MOM to draw Soviet anansien away from china, fn aitaigtaa
to Its dose nes:torlidi Aihartia, Peking hat been uetleuly matitostiog the Porearstass,
and more smolt, he. 111KOWO reel flexibithty In th.hieu idostrigy aria hyproving
liernOrId. relations with "Ifttgeslivia...Antheaessiors base :returned th thingery?
Petered, and tart Germano, .Paking la clout! :preparing for Ion:0mm compolitirei
with the Peeks Union and for this meson elthe IF likely to give greater ettentiOn
In the East Ethopents, Moth will of MOM depend on the satiety and ;finnan
of: PekinifS apponeoh, bet at thic paths the :Chistriet have apporendy araosaml. the
14 )1B:Sier
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/06: LOC-HAK-114-6-5-3
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/06: LOC-HAK-114-6-5-3
oppationities u crt1i pursuing In thist often as In 464 Oip tic endeavors
now tersdarway,Pcsking will likely roomer ground itot during the tund Reedit-
don, eat, It It min hold to itS raw Prognostic dlidustressy, *there some forwed
matteesest
43, Elvesthent to the world, Peking is showing reeved Mtwara in fostming
batter yeastioes whme the Cost is eheiti: end the appeared** temptir.g. This
dee not rule tot support foe revoisitiontry anevity, as is eland to the Near
Eel, In =Rend 10 the leenvy arms sir) from the Soviets ro the drab world, the
Chinsio wpirvelay hope to any the Arabs by cantenbatang that aid no the
focisoyent" Tido will leohohly be mainly prop.sgando on -pimples war- with
some tralniog mid smalbrams old. Thu also serves to keep the po boiling and
the Smiths &emote& But aide denouncing the mesethe si en American-
instigutoci "Airmich end ricelaing gent& support for the frilayeen in the /or
-
draw mirk, the datinesa have carefully rettetoed hem attach on the droll
governments involved, ripproondy unwilling to compromise future stem sesdlons
00 ittries.
48. lo Akio% the Chew sell be concerned to mem" diplanustu looms to
MIC lo recent yenta. This wid require MOM PrIt1111404114 dipkenacy and kis
phiselythiole, Nuked, Mies Foreign! Money already seam to have socessand
this serest NAB MiZar relsairoary work. For the most port, aid prof** Oro
lthakr to mean unsdet hut with allot-lel efforts to snake thant prictirel sod
idghly vble, The oesetrectiou a the IWO million Tarousestiaseohto nod NO
lit3Ptati to be asks pcmellg 1.12Vied for Africo; the Chinos Opium* else
love, thrftgb the provision cliy aki, to come Tanzania hue imajor
beachhead to Meet
a
In an effort which nay he intended mat* to spotlight Peking's ratan
to the world wear, the Chinese hoe also been dupierring unprecedented in-
twee in UN moudiireh4p o whim- ean, Peking put precondidoes on its nem-
hership which warn dowdy onocceptable to the Intemstirsosi bedy. More senenity,
Odome officials how dropped their extrema demob& and have mot out
comber of cautious keel foe topped to the UN. Whereas Chime dipiomots
formerly spurned stub support, now they go out of their way to express appne
daion (44 It, Despite all of this activity, Peking hoe not softened iis opposition
to any Iwo-Charm' formalothsa owl hos ecetirinest to make it door the the
CRC must tithe withdraw or be &mimed before Poking would imps: UN
ovrenhorstip. Widened dtploosette recognition of Poking, suth as by Canada end
ItaIy iss steadily improving the elvances for Its admission to the UN; web an
outcome assent likely within tho nest few :more
48, to general, and herring the centingency of militesi mark by the USSR,
Chines future Iseternettreal pasture is likely to depend mum err Chinese trostanid
developments then on entereal fawns, U demesne political said ecomesie
posiblems stemenotatc, so will the panne to givo them even higher priority,
15
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/06: LOC-HAK-114-6-5-3
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/06: LOC-HAK-114-6-5-3
emoormstiarit lessoning in fords]] listsreols. lodws tug reracins the key
t 69 long as ha misled his dominance within ilso leodorship, Mao (void
rovarre rhos Fremont rointiterly froodtrator trumak dult ?wt. Me
impaduma hes growls ao tato goat for Chine base been footnoted by economit
reek and nocalcitmot boom nature His ohiNty to retreat and tonsolldate
Ottli ovidont, bi it b questionable erhotkr his ago sod health will pemoit
amebic rooter pub toward his visionary Wats, In any smelt, despite his deep
imorsora crow the ideologicol conflict with the SOVittS, Nines latent** likely
to remain primarily on developments within China.. Nu is he likely to abandon
We cautioto mod !ilk the dirotnictian of China by pormeadve mows spinet miler
dm US or dm ME
goo', death shoring this period could mate itliODU*101problemattliat could
giro rekirog Kamm to protect a low potture cm the international scene for mote
time, Almost any formiscoble coothinalien aretesscesooreen preurrastily hard.
tom hie:Asti like CM Aso. the dernitaniod stwoessoc?worild Probe* Play for
the* to oomolidato their positions nod to ittiongsheo Clops to Tepee passible
eloadirsigra In dm longer run, as thors wive follow Ilse face up to the needs of
Chino, the Mend is likely to be away bum the ideological moults or Maoism
to*urde MOM realistic adttoonent to tiro diffleultios?in wlI as the vomits-
altles?facing Chins. Indeed, if the mocormes pallet itk the piastre noverrnent
toward grata Bettibillty mud pragmatism they ase likely to have scooter Am-
oco than Mao in uploading Mimes political influence abroad. And for the hatere
ran, Mimeo terclitional edwoorrotrirm will continue to fuel an asiedive and
pateottilty iggrtodott natkondisin
Prouniably they will coutioue to form their foreign policy arg diplomacy
at the ?volt level mod no subversion and imirotodoo at the covert levet MIS
could Melo& "oar by pouf or well as cficats to csacietbste US relations with
lb A.stom lollies sod to musket inoseord Minion within .isese 000ntaioaWe con-
not be rut of tonne, bow bingo Madam will ow their situsticw. and It Is Na-
rita" that they "Mil be prepared to employ Chino's developing piswer In a
more OWlitiVII it41100Z h WV omens likely, however, that th,. ups and oU?m-
abe of military power will contimm to be loidgod goodie* risky and
douched Woodarprialtretive Ewan the direelopowat of an oporatiottal strategic
ewnepoal *Yakilt may rehlialior Chime eurtiOn rather than cocci/nap a more
realms polity. Mato we do not &orb* dist China would fled tenaciously if
invaded, or if dowirtigoid directly With invasion, we toe no compelling factors
moriog Peltiog ***old ? policy of expansionism, or town a laighcr level of rialr-
blcinik Por all its verbal hastility sed !stork oggrarivonase, Tadthai the preens
our 11w probroblo future karlentlp Ia likaay to ana foreign adverrtures at a solo-
('toe' to China's probloma
16
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/06: LOC-HAK-114-6-5-3
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/06: LOC-HAK-114-6-5-3
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/06: LOC-HAK-114-6-5-3
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/06: LOC-HAK-114-6-5-3
CENTRAt INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DaehtINATION NO110E
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Ft far de in motion eimi 1.14 of laws roglivatit and of pentad vadat foriothation on a
fitimido.ffnaw hog. Additional alarmist distongoation 644yii.04111416k1141*4h.141SOW.
Ina affIcialt .vela dodo. Namara floparioreatts
a. Dingier of Initiktonto and kassarch. Ear tha, Deportment at Slats
Dirlic1a4. Dafaaw fratligenm Agency, for Offko of /ha laaawlary of
Delaimar and Oa organisation qt It 441111/ C444 of 50e
4404aal CIAO al Staff far ironlitgonoo, Dtipattnitot of dot Army,. iho
Doparantat vif the Attliy
d. AnIgani OW of Naval Oporoolons Iligolliwints.), for Aft Dapoilmant af
Navy
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f. tirtdw ctrit4,11144f44, Ate, far lh4 Aiaink Envoy Carottlfgan
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I. Dirarrar a f4d, for gat Iffatfonal Social," Army
I, Director eti Cererei Dienewe Sonnot, CIA. far otlY DOpatiaall
1494ifiCr
may ba adabloici rsiestarygd by kanaliva grdoma aftil
pogasotora, or voluratd l di* Central 1.0.010aara Aorowy by
a 6411 blooms Sendai. C}A.
1. 'W1wm dids dila I ?Ui,PJ 14V4611441I 144 444144641 614.114,4144141 may
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meordanatuh
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/06: LOC-HAK-114-6-5-3
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/06: LOC-HAK-114-6-5-3
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/06: LOC-HAK-114-6-5-3