TAIWAN'S FUTURE RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., USSR AND PRC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-113-3-42-6
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: September 20, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INFORMATION
September 20, 1976
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
SECRET/SENSITIV
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
WILLIAM G. HYLAND ky
WILLIAM H. GLEYSTEENJ
Taiwan's Future Relations with the U.S. , USSR
,and PRC
I think it would be worth your while to skim the following summary of
comments by senior ROC officials on Taiwan's future relations with
the United States, the Soviet Union, and the PRC. On the basis of per-
sonal acquaintance, I find the comments quite plausible -- though I
should point out that the ROC officials were talking to a foreigner (per-
haps Bob Scalapino) and probably knew that their remarks would be
reported to us.
ROC Estimates of the Likelihood and Consequences of Normalization
ROC Foreign Minister Shen and others believe that normalization of
U.S. -PRC relations will probably not take place for some time, if at
all, both because of political uncertainties on the mainland (making
negotiations difficult) and because of a shift in American public opinion
over the last three years towards greater concern for the security of
Taiwan.
Although there were denials that any detailed thinking had taken place
about the shape Of post-normalization relations with the U.S., it was
evident that the-"German formula" (one China, two governments) is
looked on with favor. (Discussion of the "German formula" has made
its way into the Taiwan and U.S. press from time to time in recent
months, quite obviously not by accident.)
Several of the officials predicted that normalization would do irreparable
damage to the Taiwanese economy and indicated this view was shared by
SECRET /SENSITIVE
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SECRET /SENSITIVE
Premier Chiang Ching-kuo. They pointed to a number of specific
technical and legal problems which would develop in maintaining our
trade and investment links. (The American Chamber of Commerce in
Taipei has sent us a remarkably similar list.) Eventually, the ROC
officials told their interlocutor, this would lead to erosion of confidence
in the Taipei government.
All officials seemed to discount the likelihood of an immediate military
threat against Taiwan by the PRC. The Foreign Minister also dismissed
as "totally impractical" Senator Scott's proposal for direct ROC/PRC
negotiations.
Regarding a possible Taipei-Moscow link, the Foreign Minister and
others said that consideration had been given to establishing some
relations with the Soviets, but that on balance it was felt this might give
the U.S. an excuse to abandon Taiwan and the idea was dropped. (Chiang
Ching-kuo has been quoted in the past as vehemently opposing a deal
- with Moscow.) However, they left the impression that once normaliza-
tion occurs, Taipei may feel free to change its mind.
The report suggests that the same holds true for a nuclear option.
That is, although U.S. restrictions are currently too tight for the ROC
to develop a nuclear capability, once the U.S. is no longer able to exert
a controlling influence over developments in Taiwan, Taipei might recon-
sider. (Given other information we have, it is evident that this protestation
_ of foregoing a nuclear option altogether was somewhat disingenuous at
least as far as developing technical/scientific capability is concerned.)
The Foreign Minister and former Foreign Minister Chou Shu-ktai in-
dicated that they would give increased attention to Taiwan's relations
with Japan.
SECRET /SEMITIVE
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