THE CURRENT STATE OF U.S. - PRC RELATIONS: PARALLELISM IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS; SHAKY BILATERAL TIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-111-10-16-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2010
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: December 31, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
-chi L9'.6L-,
-X
NATIONAL Si&CURITY COUNCIL
Scatrk-Z-cd Cop4 3_3(7)(t) )Sc1, ACTION
E--0- tztSs3
sEwarrtvr December 31, 197 3
MEMORANDUM FOR;
FROM:
SUBJ'ECTI
SECRETARY tassiNGER
RICHARD IL SOLOMON 1.015
The Current State of U.S.- PRC Relations;
Parallelism in International Affairs;
Shaky Bilateral 'Ties
A number of recent revealing.. reports, an concurrent developments
at ou.r Peking Liaison Office, lead me to summarize the current state of
U.S.- PRC relations.. Basically, while your discussions with the top
Chinese leadership over the past two and one-half years have developed a
certain conceptual consonsus which now imparts a parallelism to our
respective foreign policies, our bilateral ties are developing at best slowly
and have uncertain stability for the future. Events of the past six months
suggest that. strong political and bureaucratic forces within China are limit-
ing the institutionalization of a durable relationship between the Ti. S. and "
the PRC. Available evidence suggests Chairman Mao and Premier Chou
have found it difficult to get their views on U.S.- PRC normalization
accepted both ideologically and operationally by the Chinese bureaucracy.
thus raising for the U.S. the question of the survivability of our relation&
with Peking after Mao and Chou have passed from the scene.
In conclusion, this analysis suggests a number of actions you may wish to
take in order to strengthen the development of stronger bilateral ties with
the Chinese.
Official PRC Fears of U.S.-Soviet "Collusion"
A recen report confirms your speculation of last summer
that the tSUULTIEF oz rue erezhnev Summit in June (coupled with Congressional
action on the Cambodia bombing question) led to a cooling of Peking's
attitude toward as. What is surprising and disturbing about then.
report (Tab A) is its revelation that. the official in the Foreign Ministry who
articulated fears about our dealings with the Soviets was one ef Premier
Chon's closest advisers, and an official directly Involved in your discus-
sions with Mao and Chou -- Chang Wen-chin.
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/SENSITIVE BYAUTT3 Soc. Kissinger
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Last June, Chang asseseed the implications of the just-concluded
Brezhaev Summit in Washington in an official Foreign Ministry analysis.
1-le concluded that the U.S. had stepped up its collusion with the Soviets.
heightening pressure on the world's revolutionary forces. Chairman Mao
himself read Changts report and denounced its conclusion as "rubbish."
s .0 Previous.. reporting on this document also indicatcathat Mao at the
I" same time criticized the Foreign Ministry for bogging down the develop-
ment of China's new contacts with the U.S. in a. sea of daily trivia. which
could sour the relationship. Mao added that if his officials did not keep
in mind the major issues which required accommodation with the U.S..
then excessive attention to the minor issues would lead to internal
squabbling within the Chinese government.
One immediate outcome of Chang Wen-chin's criticized report was his
confession of error in "the application of ideology" and his demotion to
Ambassador to Canada. Then, in September 1973 after the Tenth Party
Congress -- an official Foreign Ministry document was circulated which
formally criticized Chang's analysis and reaffirmed the correctness of
Mao's "revolutionary line in. foreign policy," 'which vas admitted to he
matter of "struggle between the two lines" [of revolution versus "revieionisrni
within the Party. The document also stressed that the slogan, "We must
liberate Taiwan" had been changed deliberately to, "Taiwan raust be liberated"
in order to emphasize that China should not push the U.S. on troop with-
drawal from the inland as this would be advantageous to the Soviets.
The one difficult conclusion that must be drawn from the Chang incident is
that even officials closely identified with Chou -- and who presumably are
privy to your exchanges with both the Chairman and the Premier - - have
doubts about the direction of our policy and the wisdom for the PRC of
Mao's pre-U. S. policy. One can only speculate about the questions which
may exist in the minds of those officials further removed from the Chair-
man and Premier. The argument which we by implication attribute to the
late tin Piao -- that China can better preserve her security by mitigating
its conflict with the Soviets than by balancing the Russian threat with a
closer relationship with the U.S. -- may have more appeal than we are
aware, and is likely to have continuing attraction for those who do not share
Mao' 3 pathological hatred of the Soviets.
:The "$ea of Trivia" Which Continues to Impede U.S.- PRC Bilateral Ties
The above information tomes at a time when we have a worrisome record
for /973 of petty difficulties in developing smooth working relations with
PRC officials via our Peking Liaison Office, together with indications that
the Chinese are not prepared to deepen their exchange contacts ,or other
dealings with the U. S. in a way that would begin to build durable ties be-
tw on the two countries.
isEllsznirE
S SENSIIIVE
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In a recent cable (Tab 13) Ambassador Bruce has written of his "deep
concern" with "recmtpicayune incidents such as refusal to issue temporary
duty visas for USLO replacements, obviously exaggerated complaints over
the Marine Guard, long delays in answering requests for appointrnente
with officials, and various it2dications of a marked lack of reciprocity here
for our sensitive treatment of PRCLO represintatives in the United States'. "
To this evaluation must now be added concern about the implications of the
recent PAC dernand that we withdraw trout USLO one of our most effective
young ESOs who was involved not long ago in a fatal traffic accident in which
be was not evidently at fault.
In terms of substantive issues, concern should also be expressed e.bout the-
way the Chinese bureaucracy handled the claims/blocked assets problem.
Vrnile there was some basis for suspicion of our proposals regarding the
mechanics of a settlement of this issue, the ad hominem and uncompromis-
ing way in which the ascerbic Lin Psing (Director Of the American Di-visio-n
of the Foreign Ministry) presented the FRC poeition in the counterpart talks
during your November trip to Peking gives little confidence that the Chinese
bureaucracy is errthusiastic about promoting U.-S.- PAC normalization. Mao
and Chou apparently have good reason to be concerned about the Foreign
Ministry souring our developing relationship.
In terms of the exchange program, one can only add that available evidence
indicates great reluctance on the part of the PRC to develop meaningful,
longer term scientific and cultural contacts. They have shown little interest
in having additional American cultural groups such as the Philadelphia
Orchestra come to China to develop a positive public mood about our new
relationship. They have been equally unresponsive to our proposals that
they send their scientists or scholars to the U. 8, for periods of substan-
tive research, Indeed, one recent dip report indicates that a plan to send
Chinese physicists to American laboratories to do work on basic nuclear
science has been, scrapped in favor of closer cooperation with European
researchers.
There appear to be two reasons for the reluctant and at times self-righteous
posture the Chinese have taken in our bilateral dealings -- both related to
the continuing unsettled state of PRC domestic politics: One is a long tra-
dition of the bureaucrats and Party cadre -to be cautious about appearing
too enthusiastic in support of "rightist" policies. The-political struggles
of the pant two decades have taught them that "the line" always swinge
back to "the left"; and when it does those who were active supporters of a
less revolutionary stand become vulnerable to political attack. The
current indications of on-going political factionalism in the wake of the
MENstTivE
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Cu2tura1 P.4.woletion and the tin Pia? thorxgh appatcdt,nar
directed against "the left" -- suggest that the political atmosphere within
the Chinese bureaucracy would engender caution about actively supporting
the policies of aged leaders which eventually may be vulnerable to radical
eriticiern. The seeond reason is that the current debate in the PRC about
Corducius has a (strong element of crietC/0111 of the intellectual community.
U. S..- PRC exchanges involve, above all, Chines intellectuals; and it
seems likely that exchanges will have to remain at a tenuous level for a
considerable period of time, until (if at all) the Chinese sort out a positive
role for their scientists and acedernice that will permit this "bourgebis"
element of their societyhtpAreater contact with the "outeide."
The one area of our bilateral relations where progress has outpaced
expectations is trade. Even here, however, we have received reports of
frustration on the 'part of Chou En-lai about conservative and unimaginative
economic policies of the part of the bu.reaucraey which have hindered the
growth of China's export potential. This mituation Ted the Premier last fail
to sack his Minister of Foreign Trade and replace him with a man pre.eur2e30
more responsive to official guidan.co.
What Te To Be Done?
This .analysis has been based on the assumption
- that Chairman Mao and Prerm e r
eQcounter difficulties in bringing their bureaucracy fully behind the process
of U.S.- PRC normalization. What, if anything, can we do about such a
situation? White obviously we are in a position of largely having to
follow the lead of the Chairman and the Prouder, there are a number of
initiatives vie could take which might help them to confront bureaucratic
footedragging in their own house and identify a larger slice of their top
leadership with the policy of U.S. -PRC normalization than has been the
case time far;
State IS TIOVI considering a demarche to the: Chinese Liaison Office
At the Assietare Secretary level raising our concern about the overall trend
developments regarding our Liaison Office in Peking. I euggest that this
would be most effective if done in parallel with a. personal. message from you
to the Premier, transmitted -via Ambassador Bruce, which indicated in
general terrna your concern about recenttrends and their implication for bo
the vorkings of the Liaison Office and more generally for the prospect of
normalized dealings between the U.S. and PIC which will stand the test of
time.
-- The PRC is planning to send a trade delegation to the U.S. this
spring. You might personally invite an important high political official ?
/SENSETIV.E
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either Vice Premier Li lision-nien, or Minister of Foreign Trade Li
Ch'iang -- to head up this delegation.
-- During your next trip to China you should seek opportunities to meet
with a broader range of PLIC officials than has been the case in the past.
This might include a trip to several key provincial cities where you could
meet with key regional leaders.
Recommendations:
1. That we prepare a draft message from you to Premier Cbon expresaing
your personal concern about prospects for insitutionalizing normalized 'U.S.
PRC relations (to be coordinated with any State demarche to PLICLO about
recent developmentg regarding the functioning of USW):
Approve Disapprove
2. That we take steps to explore the possibility of inviting a high-level
FRC effial to head the trade delegation which will visit the U.S. this
coming spring:
Approve Disapprove
3. That we include in planning for your next trip to the PRC events Which
would hold the possibility of meeting with a broader range of Chinese
officials, perhaps including a tour of several key provincial cities.
Approve Disapprove
/SENSITIVE
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