SAUDI EFFORT TO OVERTHROW SOUTH YEMENI REGIME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-11-5-40-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: February 5, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/12: LOC-HAK-11-5-40-9
SC RI T/N011I Februa
k. ORA 1)I7M . 'Ok DR. R133INGER
FL OMs Harold H. Saunders
SUBJECTi Saudi Effort to Overthrow South Yemeni Regime
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
You are aware that the Saudi government is planning an effort to over-
throw the regime in South Yemen (the .Peoples Democratic Republic of
Yemen -- PDRY). As you know, this is the subject for intense discussion
between -te and Ci.A. You have a steed for my views.
The Saudi operates The nature of the operation would be for the aaudisa
to support two sets of South Arabian dissident forces, one operating into
the eastern provinces of South Yemen from Saudi territory and one operating
into the western rovi ces above Aden from the Yemen grab Re ublic
ee 25X1
'I'he issue. Since the Saudis bays not asked for cooperation and seem bent
t-ax ;vtng dhe*d an their own, the issue in some respects boils down to the
question of whether we just keep hands off or whether we help the fiasudia
to minimize chances of failure which could backfire on the stability of
the Saudi regirxte. Ambassador Tbacher initially suggested trying to dJ
MORI/CDF
C05079043
suede, thorn but changed his position when he realized how far along and
how determined they are.
State position. Our ernbassy in. Saudi Arabia has made two main arguments:
that the operation was almost certain to fail and that there was a good chance
of provoking the Russians to play a more active role in South Yemen. The
embassy's latest telegram indicates that the embassy sees greater, evidence
of possible Saudi effectiveness than it initially did. The ornbassy is Inclined
to believe fighting will drag on in "typical tribal rebellion style: and the
soviets will face a serious decision whether to move with major support of
the P1 Y regime. The embassy assu:rnees the Soviets will feel compelled
to provide at Least some aid. in view of the Saudi determination to go ahead,
.;ECRL'T/'NOD
" "'" No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/12: LOC-HAK-11-5-40-9
 ?conciusion is as follows: There stoma little chance -- according to
most judgments -_ that this operation can actually change the government in
1-:outh Yemen. There also seems little difference that we could make in
changing that outcome at a realistic level of involvement. `Those being the
case, I have difficulty finding a strong argument for U. S. involvement,
peciaily since even the suspicion of clandestine U. S. involvement would
encourage fu*ther Soviet involvement.
T b* one argument made for the Saudi operation to that over an eight-year
period of tribal warfare the :kaudis did succeed i orcing a fairly moderate
solution in Yemen. The same could happen in i uth Yemen.
the counter to that, of course, is that the 1970's will probably be the
decade of change in Saudi Arabia with Faisal going and internal dissidence
quietly increasing. : ince a protracted operation without decision could
cause: the Saudi regime to be blamed for failure, the possible gain is uncertain
enough to be outweighed by the possibility that the Saudi regime itself would
be weakened.
(n short, ? do not see much advantage in U. S. involvement.
SLCRET,N LS
HHSaunders:imp:2 / 5 /7l
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/12: LOC-HAK-11-5-40-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/12: LOC-HAK-11-5-40-9