RESPONSE TO NSSM 224 UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD ANGOLA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-104-6-3-6
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 89
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 13, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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RESPONSE TO NSSM 224
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD ANGOLA
Prr..parc i by tip, :dat.iornal
ccuri.ty Council. ntorot ,-.ar,raentai
(irc: tq) for Afri a
view ComRie~
June 13, 1975
SECRET/N40 0Ri i is DI 'SEy1/CONTROLLED DISSEM
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EDITOR'S NOTE:
in 0-f pages 24 and 25 of NS5M 224
The number g
are in reverse order.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Introduction and Summary... ...........
1
and Outlook ..........................?.........
6
Angolan Political Movements .........................
6
1. National Front for the Liberation of Angola
(FPILA)............... ....................
f
i
6
~?
on o
2. Popular Movement for the Liberat
Angola (MPLA)......... ..................
d
11
ence
3. National Union for the Total Indepen
of Angola (UNITA) ..........................
14
4. Coalitions ....... ....
16
B.
C
Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of
Cabinda (FLEC). .....................................
Portugal ............................................
17
II.
Decolonization Process ................ .......????~??-?-?-
21
A.
Situation at the Time of the Portuguese Coup........
21
B.
Independence Negotiations ..................
21
C.
Transitional Arrangements ...........................
22
D.
Violence Endangers Transition ............ ......
25
E.
Assessment of Recent Fighting and Political
6
26
Developments ........................................
F.
G
A New Summit? ........ .....................,........
Cabinda ...................................
29
IV.
.........
Economic Assessment .................. ....................
V.
External Inf'uences and Interests....... ...............
42
A. Neighboring States
42
1. Zaire ..........................................
2. Zambia............
44
46
3. Peoples Republic of the Congo ....... ...
SECRET/NO. FOREIGN DI3SEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
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 ra,g~
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.....,.......
4. Tanzania ................... .........
8
.... .?
5. South Africa ................... 48
USSR and Olhet Comn1urgist Couriti:icS . .... .49
52
............................. ......r........... 2
D. OAU and UN..... ........54
VI. General Conclusions and Prospects.. ................ ??????
1.. Transfer of Power .............. ..... -..*. 55
2. Violence ....................................... 57 ,
3. Longer. Range Prospects ........................... 58
US Interests and Objectives ............................... 60
..................... 60
A. Poiitical ....................... 61
B. Economic ........ ....................................
63
C Strategic ...................... ....................
Viii. Key Issues ....... ................................ 66
A. implication of Continued Violence on U.S. interests.. 66
B. implications of victories by the Various Parties'..... 68
C. What Can our Courses of Action ce Expected to Achieve? 71
D. Implications of a Cabinda Breakaway.-I''.,..6 ...........
............??-?--?.................
Options ................
Annex
Neutrality ..... ........ .............................
77
79
B.
Promote a Peaceful solution ..........................?
81
C.
Map
Actively Support One or More of the Liberat,_on Groups.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUNIIMARY
In response to NSSM 224 this study analyzes the current.
situation'in Angola and attempts to project the future
trends in. the soon-to-be independent territory. It weighs
US interests and objectives, the involvement of other third
countries, and sets forth options on which United States
policy could be formulated.
The study finds the situation in Angola unstable, with
continuing factional strife between the contending nationalist
parties probable. The presence of Portuguese military
forces and perhaps also the recognition of the need to
appear ready or independence have kept the contenders from
pushing the conflict to the point of full civil war. The
point-of greatest danger in this regard will be immediately
after independence wi n the
Portuguese forces are withdrawn
and before the gover?i!,icnt in power has had opportunity to
consolidate its hold.
Neither of the major liberation movements, the National.
Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) or the Popular
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Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) commands
military superiority over the other.. The FNLA has been the
stronger throughout most of the period of insurgency, but
during recent fighting the MPLA has more often come out on
top. The third movement, The National Movement for the
Total Independence of Angola, (UNITA), is militarily mu,,.w
weaker than either of the other two groups.
Of the three party leaders, the MPLA's Neto, a Marxist
poet, has the greatest intellectual stature. Jonas Savimbi,
of UNITA, has appeared of late to be the most pragmatic and
practical of the three and is also reputed to be the most
articulate and well-informed on current events. The FNLA's
Roberto is an anti-communist and close associate of
Zairian President Mobutu. Roberto refuses to go back
into Angola from Zaire, where he has long lived in exil-
His prolonged residence in Zaire appears to hurt the FNI.'s
chances.
Portugal's primary objective seems to be to cut her
losses and to get out of Angola completely and as rapidly as
African :_cs have provided financial
and military assistance to the liberation
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Movements. For ideological'reasons, Congo supports the
Marxist-oriented MPLA,.while Mobutu has backed the FNLA.,
Both the Congo and. Zaire have their eyes on the Cabinda
enclave, primarily because of its petroleum riches and
strategic location.
The Soviet Union has long backed the MPLA,.and there
is evidence it has lately provided-the movement with considerable
new military equipment. China has had some associations
with all of the movements in the past, but is now most
closely associated with the FNLA, to which it has supplied
military equipment as well as some training.
Because of its important petroleum deposits and large
coffee production, Angola is one of black Africa's richest
countries. 'the country's agricultural potential is great--
two-thirds of its arable land is not now being cultivated--
and significant doposits of-other minerals add to the promise
of a bright economic future for the country. Angola wr-i1,
of course, need do v~l ,_:::~nt assistance for many years to
come, primarily because it has such a small pool of trained
manpower.
Them:: may r,e a rnl o for the OAU or the UN in promoting
internal si ability in -.r;gola or in helping resettle reru.joes,
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particularly with respect to Roberto's efforts to move
three-quarters of a million Angolan Bako;1go back. into the
country from Zaire where they now live in exile. It should
be noted, however, that it is unlikely that the OAU--which
strictly avoids interference in the internal affairs of its
members--will want to take on the Angolan problem, and so
far only UNITA has shown any interest in appealing to the UN
for help with their troubles.
A FNLA and/or a UNITA-regime would be somewhat easier
to deal with than a MPLA government and would probably more
readily encourage an interest in mutually beneficial ties.
even so, Savimbi and Roberto are nationalists, who would
want to control (or even nationalize) Angola's resources,
practice non-alignment, and accept aid from all countries,
and support Third World causes.
An MPLA regime would probably try to put the party's
socialist doctrines into practice. But practical nationalists
might postpone the ;pj;1ication of some. measures, since rwn
a socialist Angola well accept foreign investment.
Political relationships would not be very cordial; we would
probably have the arms-lencfth relation:hio we have with,
say, Algeria or Somalia.
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In spite of considerable press coverage in Angola,
little public fee.iing on the subject seems to have been
generated in the United States. Congress has shown some
awareness of the situation in the former Portuguese colonies
as they approach independence and has appropriated modest
amounts of assistance for them. As yet there is no
substantial Congressional sentiment regarding US policy
toward Angola. It can be assumed, nevertheless, that
there would be strong Congressional opposition to any US
involvement in support of one of the contending factions.
The study presents three options for US policy:,
--Neutrality, under which we would make no commitment
of US prestige or resources to influence the course
of everts in Angola.
----Active promotion of a, peaceful settlement which,
by.reducing the chances of a continuing armed confLict,
would create a --.tuation in which we believe the
able
FNLA and UNITA r,?i c;ht: bettor bp7 o compete with MP".'-.
---Providing supp-it designed to help ensure the
continued viability of the FNLA and UNITA, with a
view to preventing the MPLA from gaining power.
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II. SITUATION AND OUTLOOK
A. Angolan Political Movements. Angola's contemporary
political history began with the 1961 rebellion, although
two of the present contenders--FNLA and MFLA---date from
the 1950s. .Both began armed resistance to the Portu-
guese in 1961, and both have.been bitter antagonists
almost from the beginning. They were. joined by a third
movement, UNITA, in 1966.
1. FULA. Holden Roberto' s National Front for the
Liberation of Angola (FNLA) grew out of the political
ferment among the Bakongo people during the 1950s.
The Bakongo, who inhabit lower Zaire and northern Angola,
are FNLA's base of support, and the movement's tribal
ident'fication has limited its popularity. FNLA
attacks in northern Angola in March 1961 signalled the
real begir,n:inc, of the.rebellion, and the bloor"y initial
actions gave Roberto a reputation for "barbar.,=sm" that
persists to thr1 Jay among many Portuguese. The FNLA
traditionally has had close ties with Zaire. The OAU
recognized it as the "Revolutionary Government of
Angola in.Exile" (GRAS) from 1963 until 1971, when
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recognition was withdrawn in an effort to promote
unity among the Angolan movements. The loss of OAU
recognition and the attrition of the long guerrilla
war combined to bring the movement into decline by
the early seventies.
At the time of the Lisbon coup, FNLA fortunes
were beginning to improve. With encouragement
Zairian President Mobutu, who was attempting t.,
improve his credentials as an African nationalist and
broaden Zaire's relations with other powers, Roberto
visited Peking in January 1974 and secured a pledge of
military assistance. Mobutu increased his assistance
to the FNLA, especially in logistical support and train-
ing.
With' this support, the National Front has been
able to move troops quickly into northern Angola and
Luanda, and is thus establishing a major military base
in northwestern Angola to replace the training .'
support facilities the FNLA has long maintained .:-. Zaire.
The FNLA probably already has about 10,000 troo _,
inside Angola, and Roberto hopes to bring in an
additional 8,000 Angolan recruit` from Zaire within
the month. Angolan refugees in Zaire constitute a
substantial reservoir for FNLA recruitment.
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The FNLA.may be :~trenrthened by the support of
Daniel Chipenda, the former vice president of the.MPLA
who defected from the MPLA earlier this year. Chipenda
controls some 2,000 well-trained troops in eastern
Angola.
The National Front is operating under marked
disadvantages, however. It has less support in
Luanda than does the MPLA or even the UNITA; it has
virtually no following south of Luanda--an area that
includes about three-fourths of the country. More-
oven, the FNLA is not likely to gain significant new
support from whites in the near future. Unlike its
rivals, the FNLA has never sought to attract a broad
multi-racial base of support. Moreover, many whites
in Angola have not forgotten the indiscriminate attacks
on them by the FNLA when the insurgency broke out in
1961. .As a result, the Front has been tagged with a
racist image that will be.difficalt to overcom
Roberto's refusal to appear in Angola, bc::`:-.use
he fears assassination and realizes-that he probably
cannot "turn out the crowds" as his rivals have been
able to do, has hurt his own political image, and he
has found it difficult to coordinate his group's politi-
cz,1. i,nd rmi ,t-ir.y operations from Zaire.
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Over the years, Roberto's highly personal leader-
ship and his unwillingness to compromise have produced
chronic friction within the heirarchy of his organization.
The Front's close relations with Mobutu are a
political liability for Roberto in competing with the
other two groups, which accuse the Front of being
tool of Mobutu, who, they suggest, has territorial
designs on Angola, and particularly the oil-producing
enclave of Cabinda. The Roberto-Mobutu connection is
viewed with particular suspicion by Agostinho Neto,
leader of the MPLA.
The FNLA"controls the Agriculture, Interior, and
Health and Social Affairs portfolios in the Transi-
tional Government and has ambitious plans for repatriat-
ing perhaps as many as 750,000 pro-Front refugees currently
living in Zaire in time for them to vote in the con-
stituent assembly elections that are scheduled ~o be
held sometime bofore independence next Novembe;
Future Pr^:-p,,:~cts. Having consolidated it',- forces
in its Bakongo uriaa]_ strongholds in the extre.,':e north,
the FNLA will not. allow itself to he pushed any further.
Despite its threats of retaliation, it will need time
to recover'from its recent losses and to rethink both
Its `C.rati_ ,-ic_s. Barring any
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serious reverses to MPLA fortunes, it may be difficult
in the near term fnr theFNLA to regain recently lost
territory.
Despite its current financial difficulties, the
FNLA probably will be able to gain enough backing to
maintain a credible military threat to the MPLA. The -.-
reported. rift between Mobutu and Roberto is likely to
be short-lived, since their common opposition to :Veto
provides a strong motive for continuing their long-
standing alliance, notwithstanding their differences
ever Cabinda.
Perhaps the most important step to strengthen the
FNLA position would be for Roberto to return to Angola
and take over direction of the FNLA organization in-
country. Until that happens, it is unlikely that the
otential
ll
f
it
.
p
u
s
FNLA will achieve
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2. Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)
The MPLA originated as a part of urban intellectuals
with a pronounced mestizo characterand a strong Marxist
strain. It began its insurgent activity in 1961 in
northern Angola and Cabinda from bases in Congo, but did
not become a significant military threat until-late in the
decade after it had shifted its.headquarters to Zambia and
was able to make substantial advances into eastern Angola.
A key to the organization's effectiveness over the
years has been the ability and high motivation of its
well educated, Marxist oriented leaders. They have sought,
with some success, support from.all segments of the Angolan
population--including whites--by stressing that the movement
is national and multiracial rather than tribally oriented.
The leadership itself has included mulattoes and reportedly
some whites, although nearly all the rank and file have
been black Africans.
Agostinho Neto, a Portuguese-educated physican and
poet, became MPLA President in 1962 and has attempted to
fashion a strong, centralized party.
The Popular Movement enjoys strong support from
labor unions and other urban elements, particularly in
~.. -.i1 c~~ ~i La!. ;pats long eri.oved wide
support among Angola's predominantly white class of
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4
intellectuals and professionals, who were careful to hide'
their sympathies during the Salazar and Cactano re(limos.
These sympathizers comprise an important part of the Angolan civil
service and are apparently prepared to use their positions
to boost Neto. Many journalists also support the Popular
Movement, an important factor now that it holds the
information portfolio in the transitional government.
.Long considered militarily weaker than the FNLA,
the Popular Movement has recently made significant gains.
With only a couple of exceptions, it has bested the FNLA
in the numerous clashes that have occurred between the two
groups in recent months in Luanda, northern Angola, and
Cabinda. The MPLA probably can field as many troops as
the FN LA. MPLA troops appear better trained and motivated
than their rivals. Moreover, the MPLA can mobilize large
numbers of civilians it has armed, particularly in Luanda,
which gives it a major advantage. The MPLA's training .....d
recruiting facilities apparently are not as extensive
as" those of the FNLA, however.
The degree and significance of Soviet influence
on the MPLA is difficult to assess, but r..iitary and other
support from the USSR and other communist countries has
been of major importance to the party. Lately, the MPLA
to c. Y. ,elop ties wi.Lh Pekinq.
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Neto's avowed Marxism and close relations with the
Soviet Union limit his general appeal throughout Angola
and with neighboring African leaders.
Prospects for the Future
The MPLA probably will not press its current military
initiatives to the point of all out civil war and will
take time to consolidate its recent gains. The MPLA
will find it difficult to win significant new political
support or to translate military successes into permanent
political advantage. Deficiencies in the quality of the
MPLA's political and military leadership and internal
differences over strategy and tactics will probably continue
to be significant short-term handicaps.
One possibility that cannot be discounted entirely
is that the MPLA might attempt to gain exclusive control
in Luanda and its immediate environs and then, with the
help of the more militant non-aligned countries, seek
international recognition as Angola's legitimate government.
Such a move would be extremely risky because it would provoke
vigorous military opposition from its rivals and their
backers, and because of the great uncertainties as to whether
the ,!nr,7\ could receive sufficient outside political and
:!~ (OUj .
i,ll11 I tel.] Y :;U po t to :;UU Ucl1Tl L.4
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3. National Union fur Life ToLul indepunduaicc ut Aiiy.ola t,' d ITA'1 _
The least powerful of the three groups is the National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA),
established by Jonas Savimbi in 1966 after a split in the
FNLA...
Since the coup in Lisbon, Savimbi has emerged as the
most active and politically skillful of Angola's three
nationalist leaders. This is a significant gain for
Savimbi who, throughout the period of the Angolan insurgency,
had achieved little notice as the little-known head of the
territory's smallest and seemingly least effective nationalist
group.
It was largely because of Savimbi's service as an
intermediary that Roberto and Neto agreed to the negotia-
tions that
:d to the independence accord. Savimbi is
reputed to be the most articulate and best informed of the
insurgent leaders.
Savimbi appareen:Lly believes that his organization can
attract enough supp,.'- give it a strong'voice in a
coalition government, but it is far from certain that his
political skills can win him a leading role in an independent
Angola.
Savimbi's nopularity is based on tribal ties with the
U, i_1i_ l .it-'?j' ., .. uiic lid in ho ten:
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the densely populated and prosperous central highlands,
and who constitute about one-third of Angela's population.
These tribal ties give Savimbi a potential political base
15
out of proportion to the size of UNITA's military forces,
which number approximately 3,000 trained troops. UNITA
has had no difficulty in attracting large numbers of recruits
and now has an estimated 6,000 troops in various stages.
Savimbi maintained his headquarters inside Angola
during the insurgency and operated without significant
outside support. This has enabled him to claim he. is not
obligated to or under the influence of foreign powers.
Savimbi's ability to survive inside Angola has prompted
his rivals to charge that he made a deal with the Portuguese.
This accusation has not hurt him so far, however, and
seems unlikely to do so in the future.
Future Prospects.
.It will be difficult for UNITA in the short term to
translate its real popular support in the highlands into
a. military capability sufficient to ensure-its survival
against possible attacks by its rivals. Savimbi will
therefore continue his delicate balancing act in an effort
to prevent the outbreak of full-scale hostilities that
might engulf and overwhelm his organization.
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if the worst occurs, Savimbi will almost certainly seek
accommodation and.collaboration with whatever group gains
predominance in Angola rather than risk the destruction of
the organization he has worked hard to build for nearly ten
years.
Savimbi probably will have increasing success in
winning African and other outside political support for this
organization and possibly for his ideas about containing the
conflict in the territory (e.g., an arms embargo).
4. Coalitions:
UNITA is the key to the formation of any twoparty
coalitions. An FNLAMPLA alliance is clearly out of the
question. The most likely combination is one that would
link UNITA the FNLA, since both Savimbi and Roberto
share a deep distrust of Neto.
As a pragmatic politican of demonstrated flexibili,.y,
Savimbi could conceivable decide at some future point t'. t
an alliance with the against Roberto is in his best
longterm interm interest. For the present, however,
Savimbi. will continue to resist being into ironclad
alliances with either group because he fears that any such
alliance could in'itself precipitate civil war.
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B. The Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda
The Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda
(FLEC) re-emerged last summer after almost a decade of
inactivity. Rival factions of the front have established,
headquarters in Kinshasa and Brazzaville. Although both
factions maintain representatives in Cabinda, the bulk
of their military forces--probably no more than several
(FLEC)
hundred each--are in various stages of training in Zaire
and the Congo. For both Mobutu and Ngouabi would appear
favor an independent (oil rich) Cabinda over which
they could exercise strong influence. Thus, Zaire and
Congo are each backing a FLEC faction, although this hardly
squares with their support,. respectively, of the:FNLA and
MPLA, both of which insist on Cabinda's remaining an
integral part of Angola.
0
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Future Prospects. Despite its desire to achieve
Cabinda's independence from Angola, FLEC is in no
position to drive out the liberation groups. FLEC
leaders apparently believe, however, that over the
long run, fighting among the Angolan liberation groups
and continued support from Zaire and the Congo will
eventually put them in the dominant position in Cabinda.
C.. PORTUGAL
Portugal's principal interest in.-Angola is peaceful
disengagement, preferably with retention of cultural
and economic links to the former territory. However,
the deteriorating security situation in Pngola threatens
to become a major contentious issue dividing both the
Portuguese Armed Forces Movement and the civilian
political parties. Already, some Metropolitan troops
are refusing transfer to Angola.and Portugal's willing-
ness (and ability) to guarantee internal security in
the territory is an open question.
Even without the spectre of open warfare, the
Armed Forces Movement (AFM), was not of one mind on how
to deal with the Angolan problem. Many AFM members-
the most prominent of whom is Admiral Rosa CoutinhO-
are sympathetic to the MPLA. Perhaps an equal number
`savor town re! the contending liberation
groups. In Anggola, AFA representatives are sir;i? a i
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divided. The High Commissioner, who has maintained an
even-handed position toward the groups, is under
heavy pressure from many of his colleagues in Angola
and Lisbon to favor the MPLA.
There appears to be little the MPLA's sympathizers
in the AFM can do for the MPLA in terms of tangible
assistance. The AFM is preoccupied with political
problems at home and its own resources are too limited
to allow substantial diversion of arms or money to
the MPLA.
Most AFM representatives agree that Portuguese
troops in Angola will not intervene on behalf of any
of the liberation groups and that they cannot be counted
on to restore order if an all-out war between the MPLA
and the FNLA occurs.
Portugal maintains about 24,000 troops in Angola,
most of which are stationed in and around Luanda..
Those in the countryside are stretched thin. In t.
recent fighting in northern Angola between the .~_
and the FNLA, Portuguese military officials in Luanda
had difficulty moving troops into the area and
restoring order.
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 cxru1m/Nn FnRFTC.N DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
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Future Prosnects.
The major Portuguese Government objective in
Angola is to get out--with honor if possible, but,in
any case to get out. Subject to this overriding goal,
the Portuguese are doing what they can to maintain the
peace and to compose differences among the liberation
movements. Both Portuguese will and capacity with
respect to Angola are limited--and diminishing--and
Lisbon crould not impose a settlement that was not
acceptable to the parties.
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III. DECOLONIZATION PROCESS
A. Situation at the Time of the Portuguese Coup. At
the time of the coup,-the liberation was stalemated. In
the east, the MPLA was badly split.between Neto's supporters
and the "Eastern Revolt" faction under Daniel Chipenda.
Chipenda had withdrawn his forces from Angola to Zambia,
seriously impairing the movement's effectivenes.. UNITA's
action was largely confined to thinly inhabited areas away
from the major centers. The FNLA insurgency had been
brought under control in the north. The FNLA, however,
had just struck a deal with the PRC under which the Chinese
agreed to train and equip about 5,000 FNLA troops in Zaire.
The Portuguese were unable to defeat the insurgents,
but were able to keep them in check. The situation was not
comparable to that of Mozambique in 1974, where the area
of rebel activity was clearly expanding.
B. Independence negotiations.
The military leadership which ousted the Caetano
regime on April 25, 1974, at first promised Angola self-
determination but not necessarily independence. It was
thought that Angola's economic importance,the disunity
among its liberation groups, and the presence of 350,000
white setters would make the decolonization process slower
than in Portugal's other African territories. By July,
however, political. changes in Lisbon had begun to accelerate
.l c. r C~.c l_L.i' har,,J antaocnism5 S 4': en
t'.: .isL(_2
the liberation movements and the internal disunity of
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the MPI.A. Angola's neighbors .(Zaire, Zambia, Tanzania,
and the Congo) pressured the liberation groups in vain,
to bury their differences, and negotiations among the
groups in I3ukavu (Zaire) in July and in Lusaka in August
failed to create a basis for agreement between the move-
ments. Differences in Portugal, which culminated in
President Spinola's resignation in September, continued
to hamper forward movement as well. Nevertheless, UNITA's
Savimbi eventually negotiated separate cooperation agree-
ments with Roberto and Neto and persuaded the two to sign
a nonagression pact with each other.
At Mombasa (Kenya) January 3-5, 1975, the three
nationalist leaders agreed to forma common front-to
negotiate with Portugal. On January 15, after five days
of intense negotiations between the Portuguese and the
liberatic_-: movements, an independence agreement was signed
at ,kivor in southern Portugal. The agreement:
--set November 11, 1975, as the date for indepen.- eve;
--provided. transitional government under h
Portugal d the three movements would jointLy
administer the territory until independence;
--declare'1 th t Cabinda would r...:,:a.in part of Angola; and.
--provided for the integration of the military forces
of the three movements into a national army.
The transitional administrative structure outlined in
t:he Alv~cor agrec~p., ., a complex and delicate mechanism so
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23
designed as not to give one movement an obvious advantage
over its rivals. None of the movements' leaders participate
directly in the government.
The agreement also calls for each movement to con-
tribute 8,000 men toward the national army; Portugal is,
to provide 24,000. Portuguese troops in excess of the
24,000-man limit have been withdrawn. The remaining
Portuguese troops are scheduled to leave between October 1,
19.75 and February 2, 1976. The agreement does not pre-.
vent the liberation movements from maintaining their own
separate forces in addition to those they must contribute
to the national army.
General elections for a Constituent Assembly are to
be held by October 31, 1975. Only the liberation movements
will be permitted to run candidates. The Assembly is to
draft an independence constitution, which will outline the
procedures by which Angola's future government will be
chosen. An electoralcan)mission, on which each liberation
movement will have equal-representation, is to dram':. an
election.law.
The fact that the four parties were able to reach
any agreement at all was a major achievement. But making
the complex arrangement work has proven even more diffi-
cult than the negotiations which produced it. The com-
chr cks onL' ccs, w. w.lishr-r7 to prevent inde-
i
pry ~a u-i
pendent action by any one group, also virtually
effective action on the ruyriad problems confronting the
? .. 4- r7 f ri r
r. . l r?. t Z t. 1 C 1 t 1. Llt i 1.1 l y j r
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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
--None of these ideas,is likely to win favor with
either Roberto or Savimbi, both of whom have insisted.
that the elections be held as scheduled. But both
are aware that Neto could delay the elections simply
by tying up the joint commission which is charged.
with drafting and implementing an election law.
They may,in the end, acquiesce in a compromise.
Savimbi has indicated that he might counten,"ice a
continuation
of the present coalition government,
provided its decision-making procedures were
modified and its legislative authority greatly
expanded.
--Both Roberto and Savimbi will pressure Neto to
abandon his disruptive tactics--the stepped-up
importation of heavy arms; the arming of civilians;
and the attacks against the FNLA. They are likely
to underscore their warnings with the threat of a
military alliance against the MPLA.
----Savimbi will probably demand that both the ZNPLA
and FNLA comply fully with the Alvor agreement's
provisions on the integration of military forces,
which hf_ sec: as one means of diluting the partisan
influence of the movements over their troops and
reducing the threat of civil war. Both Roberto
nl(l Nob "-free, Lut their compliance
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decisions on the modalities for constituent assembly
elections.
D . Viol(-.,nce E, n 1a n g o rs Tr nsition .
Meanwhile, the FNLA and MPLA?have been trying to
settle their differences by force, and efforts to achieve
a meaningful "integrated" or national army have met with
little success. Major outbreaks of violence during the
past three months all but destroyed earlier hopes
that the Alvor agreement would provide anadequate
framework for a peaceful transition to independence.
Sources of Tension. All three movements, the MPLA
and FNLA in particular, have pursued-their own political
and military interests without regard for, and frequently
to the detriment of, the Transitional Government. Other
factors which will continue to contribute to the rapid
escalation of tensions are:
--The buildup by all three movements of their
..military forces in the territory.
.--The introduction of new and heavier arms into
the territory, especially by the MPLA and i";L.A.
---The arming of civilians, particularly by the
MPLA. Recent agreements to disarm civilians
will be virtually impossible to enforce, even
if all parties make a serious effort..
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--The movement's inability or unwillingness to
exercise effective control over their own fo Zcos.
--The aggressive use of military force by MPLA and
FNLA to secure and expand their territorial bases
to independence. With independence scheduled
for November 11, the pressure of time is forcing
each movement to stake out and defend its
territory now.
Uncertainties surrounding the continuing power
struggle between leftists and moderates in Lisbon
and its likely impact on Angola; and very importantly,
--The provisions of arms and assistance by outside
powers.
E. Assessment of Recent Fightin and Political Developments.
MPLA. The MPLA deliberately provoked confrontations
with the FNLA in Luanda in March and April in order to:
--dispel rumors that the moverr'ent was on the verge
.of collapse;
--force the postponement of cancellation or the
elections, which many believe will reveal the 'move-
ment's limited popular support; and
--possibly induce the rFr-1 in Lisbon to intervene
militarily on its behalf.
The recent fighting has improved the MPLA's fortunes
While it cannot
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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSE_? -D DISSFM
claim to have won any decisive victories in the Luanda
fighting, it was more than able to hold its own against
more numerous F-NLA troops. The MPLA also initiated the
fighting north and east of the capital in late May, and
successfully regained previous MPLA areas of influence
that recently were occupied or infiltrated by FNLA forces.
In Cabinda, where it has numerical superiority, the
MPLA successfully drove FNLA forces out of Cabinda town
in early June.
Most of the recent fighting has occurred in areas
where the MPLA has strong popular support, Cabinda being
the notable exception, and the MPLA has been unsuccessful
in areas where FNLA has equally strong local support.
FNLA. The clashes in Luanda, as well as the
.fighting north and east of the capital, have tarnished
the FNLi,' s image as Angola's most effective figi..ing
force. FNLA forces have failed to distinguish themselves,
partly because they found themselves operating in hostile
territory in and around Luanda, but also because c f- ta:e~ir
own inability, despite superior numbers, to"organize an
effective military operation.
The FIdLA's attacks on civilian: during the Luanda
fighting and its inept public relations have also damaged
the image of moderation and responsibility that Roberto
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has attempted to project'in recent mo:iths. Moreover,
the FNLA' s hopes of winning new support among the Cvi m-
bundu have not yet materialized. Also potentially
damaging to the FNLA*are its current difficulties in
obtaining adequate financial backing and Roberto's
reported differences with President Mobutu of Zaire
over the question of Cabinda.
Despite its recent setbacks, the FNLA remains a
credible force over which the MPLA cannot hope to pre-
vail in the near term. The FNLA easily drove MPLA garri-
sons out of the two predominantly Bakongo districts of.
Uige and Zaire in the north and has reinforced its posi-
tions with troops from its camps in Zaire.
UNITA. The escalating violence between the MPLA
and FINLI: has made it increasingly difficult for UNITA
to remain above the fray. Both the FNLA and the MPLA
have sought UNITA's cooperation in schemes to eliminate
its chief rival. But as the weakest of the three mot'e-
rents militarily, and lacking the outside backing
available to the others, UNITA continues to believe that
its interests, and Angola's as well, will be best served
by a political solution and the avoidance of all-out civil
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Both the MPLA and FNIA are eyeing UNITA's turf in
the populous and economically important central highl'ands
as an area in which they would like to win new political
support. Savimbi has' tried, thus far without apparent
success, to persuade both the MPLA and FNLA to limit
their military presence in the highlands.
Nevertheless, UNITA still seems confident'of its
ability to maintain firm political support among the
ovimbundu and related tribes.
F. A New Summit?
A number of contraints have thus far induced the
movements to maintain at least a facade of cooperation
and prevented the. increasingly frequent and violent
flareups from escalating into full-scale civil war:
--a general desire not to delay independence and
the final Portuguese withdrawal;
--an eagerness to avoid being held-responsible for
a bre:aKcowr of order;
--the uncertainty of all three movements about their
chances of emerging victorious in a no--holds-barred
military struggle;
--the continued, though diminishing, presence and
influence of Portuguese troops and the.even--handedness
of the Por.'tuc uese ttigh Commissioner, notwithstanding
in Lisbon and Angola for the MPLA;
--fear of movement th,it brc,:~l.-iown micjhL
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`.,~F'rt..~L T/Nt;) x ()tcr.J %. LV L1~:.7L,a?t/ tva7 ~r v+r++++?+
bring increased foreign involvement on behalf of
its rivals (e.g-, Zaire and possibly the US and
PRC on behalf of the FNLA; the'Soviets and other
communist countries on the side of the MPLA);
--UNITA's willingness to use its forces and influence
to maintad4i.wa rough equilibrium between the MPLA
and FNLA.
There'is no assurance, however, that these con-
straints will continue given the new tensions and'the
now greatly increased potential for-conflict in Angola.
The three movements evidently agree that a major new
attempt at reconciliation is required and have tentatively
agreed to hold a new summit meeting in mid-June. This
.would be their first joint meeting since the Alvor
negotiations in January.
Each leader will be pursuing radically different
-objectives:
---Veto, who first proposed the idea of a summit to
discuss iro ifications in the Alvor agreement, will
probably arr--uc for a postponement of the scheduled
constituent iw embly elections until after inde-
pendence. Failing this, he may put forward his
case for a single combined candidate slate that
would include representatives of all three move--
t;; rc,Ftriction of the voting to the
larger. Lorii-s.
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in the future is unlikely to differ from their
evasive performance in the past.
A new summit meeting offers some hope for a temporary
reduction of tensions, but odds are greatly against
any new understanding among the three leaders that would
significantly improve prospects for a peaceful transi-
tion. The pattern of intermittent., but limited, fighting,
edging toward the brink of civil war, is likely to con-
tinue until independence. It is highly unlikely that
any one group or combination of groups will be able to
gain a decisive advantage during the next several months,
because of the entrenched support each has in different
parts of the territory. The period of greatest turmoil
is likely to come immediately after independence, when
virtually all_ Portuguese troops are scheduled to be with-
drawn and the movements will be left more or less to
themselves to sort out Angola's troubled political future.
G. Cabinda.
1. The Prize. Separated from the rest c,,. Angola
by the Zaire River .and a Zairian corridor: forty miles
wine, Cabinda has a total land area of 3,800 square
miles and an estimated population of 80,000. Gulf Oil
discovered substantial offshore reserves there in 1966.
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32
--Initial estimates were that the Cabinda fields
contained at least 2 billion barrels.
---Gulf's. production rose to 150,000 bpd in 1974
.(half of that shipped to the US), accounting for
87 percent of Angola's total production and making
it black.Africa's third largest oil producer aster
Nigeria and Gabon.
---In 1974, Cabindan oil accounted for 40 percent of
Angola's total export earnings and 48 percent of
its tax revenues.
2. Separatist Groups. The modern Cabinda
separatist movement dates from 1959 and is now organized
into two principal rival factions of the Front for the
Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave (FLEC). one faction
is supported by Zaire, the other by the Congo. Both
factions lacked military force until very recently.
Several-hundred FLEC troops are being trained in Zaire,
possibly by North Korean instructors who arrived :r, March
to train Zaire's army. Others are based in the :10
and since March have received weapons and militaxI equip-
ment from the, USSR. Both factions have been strengthened
by the addition of Cabindan former paramilitary troops
in the Portuguese army who gained experience fighting
the MPLA in Cabinda.
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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/ CONTROL"U VJ r,l:l
3. The Liberation Movements. The otherwise
divided Angolan liberation groups are united in their
4
denunciation of Cabindan separatisn.. The MPLA, which
established bases in the northern tip of Cabinda and
was the only movement to conduct operations in the
enclave during the mid-sixties, holds the preponderance
of military force. Both UNITA and the FNLA have estab-
lished smaller garrisons there since January. Relatively
peaceful coexistence among the three groups in the enclave
was abruptly ended when MPLA forces drove.FNLA troops
from Cabinda town in early June.
4. ` Interested Neighbors. The Congo and Zaire,
at the risk of damaging their respective client relation-
ships with the MPLA and FNLA, have openly endorsed
Cabindan independence. Both the Congo and Zaire believe
they can more readily exert their influence over a Cabinda
.separated from Angola, and both look covetously at
Cabinda's oil. Both countries have stationed troops
along their bor. ders with Cabinda. Following the ss:access-
ful MPLA attack or, FNLA garrisons in Cabinda city, zaire's
President Mobutu :_portedly offered to support a combined
FNLA-FLEC counter-offensive and to augment their forces
with Zairian troops. That counter-offensive appears to
have been deferred pending the outcome of Portuguese
c0ffort.s to r:.. to:T? order in the enclave.
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SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTRULLt;u 34
Mobutu and .Congolese President Ngouahi have assured one
another that neither will move to annex the territory by
force, and these assurances have formed the basis for their
joint campaign to sell the idea of Cabindanself-determination
to the OAU. Nevertheless, the possibility clearly exists for
an eventual Congolese-Zairian clash over Cabinda.
Of the two countries, Zaire has the greater stake in the
future of Cabinda. Mobutu fears that an unfriendly independent
Angola might interfere with Zaire's access to the sea. if
the opportunity arose, and the risks could be minimized,
Mobutu no-doubt would prefer a Cabinda joined to Zaire, or.
.failing that, an independent Cabinda under Zairian tutelage.
There are substantial deterrents, however, to any Zairian
of for L to change Cahinda's political status.
---T e OTU's attitude. Direct political or military inter--
vention wculd almost certainly bring OAU condemnation.
The traditional OAU position has been that inherited
colonial boundaries should not be changed. Recent meetings
of the OAU Council of Ministers and heads of state
responded icily to Congolese-Zairian efforts to win support
for Cabi_ndan self--determination.
1,1r_,Izitions c?: it:,h = ngolNTTA. t!
has also exerted diplomatic pressure on
Portugal to abandon its tilt toward the MPLA.
In recent months, Zaire's own financial straits
have limited Mobutu's ability to commit material
resources to pursuit of his objectives, but
he remains committed to excluding Neto and the
radical wing of the MPLA from power in Angola.
d. Mobutu's policy of supporting Cabindan inde-
pendence is a source of strain in his relations
with the FNLA and UNITA. He continues to pro-
vide financial assistance, training, and
equipment to the FLEC army.
2. ZAMBIA
a. Although Zambian President Kenneth Ka-nda has
played a more even-handed role in Angolan develop-
ments than Mobutu, Zambian interests in Angola
are no less great. Zambia is more dependant
than Zaire upon Benguela Railroad for transport the
of much of its only important export, copx er.
6-.aunr2a has repeatedly str ssed the need for
unity among the Angolan nationalist movements,
and, above all, his desire for a peaceful
t.ra.n5....: Lea 1 ^.`dCn _ :. GPit ch
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delays on the railroad and eliminate current
labor problems at the port resulting from
politicl-11 uncertainty and unrest in the
territory.
b. During the insurgency, Zambia lent its support
to both the MPLA and UNITA. UNITA, because of
its occasional attacks on the Benguela Rail-
road, was barred from Zambia in 1967 and was
not permitted reentry into the country until
after the 1974 coup in Lisbon. There was,
however, no disruption in Zambian support to
the MPLA, which received material aid, safe-
havens, and permission to conduct operations
into Angola from Zambian territory. Despite
this consistent support, Kaunda has developed
a personal animosity toward Netc, and in recent
months has come to view him as a devisive
factor in the Angolan equation and not the
man to lead an independent Angola.
c. As his cii. senchantment with Neto and the X11' :.
crew, became increasingly impressed
with UNIT]. President Jonas Savimbi. Savimbi's
"hands-off" policy in the NPLA-FNLA conflict,
der!cnstrated popularity and his pragmatic
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46
approach to Angola's problems-probably con-
tributed to Kaunda's apparent switch in.sympa-
thies. Although Kaunda holds no personal
dislike for the third major contender, FNLA
President Holden Roberto, he distrusts Roberto's
association with Mobutu and believes Roberto
has only limited support among the populace
of Angola. Thus, Kaunda--together with
Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, and perhaps
Mobutu as well-now seem to view Savimbi.as
a compromise leader who might be able to reconsile
or accomodate partisan interests and bring off
a peaceful transition to independence.
d. Despite Kaunda's preference for Savimbi, he
recently has told Savimbi that Zambia cannot
meet an earlier commitment to provide UNITA
with cne-half of its arms requirements.
Kaunda explained that he is taking a leading
role ir: c,Cforts to affect an arms ernbargc r
Angola , and it would be embarrassing to him
if it were discovered that Zambia was con-
tinuing to supply weapons to UNITA at this time.
PLOPILE'S 7ErUB LIC OF THE CONGO
a. President Ngouabi would like to see Cabinda
inciep er.~' nt F;tate u.n.c.c r 1
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SECRET/No F01I.EIGN DISSE^:, .: _
leadership influenced by and beholden to the
Congo. Eventually, Ngoua.bi believes, this
could lead to a political union between the
Congo and Cabinda. To achieve this end, the,-
Congolese actively support a faction of FLEC,
the Cabindan separatist group, and have a
former Premier of the Congo, Alfred Raoul,
ready to step in as the first President of
Cabinda..
b. The Congo has also assisted the MPLA, giving
it safehaven bases, air and sea logistical
support, and financial assistance. The MPLA
has relied heavily on Congolese help and in-
fluence to maintain itself as a viable organiza--
tion_ and a contender for power in Angola. The
Congolese in turn see the MPLA with which it
shares a Marxist orientation, as the most
sympathetic of the Angolan groups. The
principal difference between the two is t:,:
Congo's support of the MPLA is obviously
incompatible with its support for FLEC in Cabinda.
Nevertheless, it continues to support both.
4.? TANZANIA
~. Tnn:r i nr,F; been a continuing element in the
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r7JJ%_Z%J:0J./ arv a'J -- ----- ., ---V-------- ---, --
PNyerere's personal interest in Angola,. his
inclusion as one of the four African presidents
appointed by the Organization of African Ur',ity
to deal with Angolan problems and, by extension,
his efforts to bring the nationalist movements
together.
b. During the Angolan insurgency, Tanzania
directed its support primarily to the MPLA
and, specifically, to serving as a pipeline
between the USSR and the MPLA and to pro-
viding some training facilities for MPLA
forces. Despite Tanzania's longtime support
for the MPLA and its president, Nyerere has
recently indicated that his sympathies have
swung to UNITA President Savimbi. Nyerere,
like Zambian President Kaunda, has become dis-
enchanted with Neto. His switch to Savimbi
is motivated by considerations similar to
those of Kaunda.
5. SOUTH AFRIC
a. South i\f ..can interests in Angola focus
the Angolan-Namibian border, on the separatist
activities of the Ovambo be which inhabits
both sides of that border, and on South African
economic investments in Angola which include
thc, ?-,,none hvdroe'ie 'itri c . chcine and
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SEGM:1'/ lvv r vr`.i 1 '.. 1~ ,. ~.,..:..
private investments in Angolari diamonds,
minerals,. and the Benguela Railroad. The
South Africans also maintain a consulate in
Luanda. Pretoria is concerned that a communist
or otherwise unfriendly` regime in Luanda
might support guerrilla activity in Namibia
and foster serious problems along that border:
However., South Africa does not seem to be
planning action to counter this threat and,
an fact, gives little indication'that it
sees any need to formulate an Angolan policy
at all.
USSR AND OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
The USSR has backed the MPLA since 1956 when the
movement was founded with the aid of the small, clandes-
tine Angolan Corununist Party. Competition with_.the
Chinese has now become a factor in Soviet support for
the MPLA. Other communist countries, such as Yugoslavia
and Czechoslovakia, are also now giving military assistance.
During the early years of the insurgency 'J.oscc
provided the MPLA with a steady supply of financial and
r.' i l i tary aid, most of it channelled through the Congo,
Zambia and Tanzania. In about 1971 or 1972 Soviet
interest in the MPLA appeared to wane because of the
;cu~~1.C)11~5 f~;