ANGOLA (S/S-7506733)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-104-5-3-7
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 1, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

DOS Review Completed.i
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/29: LOC-HAK-104-5-3-7
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SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF,STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
MEMORANDUM TO AP - AMBASSADOR DAVIS
INR. 7-AR. HYLAND
S/P - MR. LORD
SUBJECT: Angola (S/S-7506733)
SS SENSITIVE AF
(S/S-7506894)
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The $0.0retary has approved the recommendation
contained in Option 3
The Secretary
---j7T---Meenal?T---------jt?norlOapprOveCYfOtaptiori 2 B on refugees.
cc: S
LSE
LPB
S/S
Frank Ortiz
Deputy Executive Secretary
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/29: LOC-HAK-104-5-3-7
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ACTION MEMORANDUM
S'S
SEC/TI? - NODIS
TO:
THROUGH:
FROM:
The Secretary
P - Mr. SiscoAf
.
AP - Nathaniel DavigklA
INR - William G. Hyland:etii-*
S/P - Winston LorduMr
Angola
I. The Problem
The shakiness of the truce between two
of Angola's principal liberation movements
(Zaire-based "moderate" FNLA and Marxist-orien-
ted MPLA) has pointed up the continuing
potential for widespread violence in Angola.
Portugal's role in such an eventuality is un-
certain. We must decide on a U.S. position in
light Of this situation. /
/At
what level, if any, should we become involved in
resettling Angolan refugees returning from
neighboring countries?
11. Background/Analysis
The Current Political Scene
The recent outbreak of fighting in
Angola between FNLA and MPLA re-emphasized
Angola's political fragility. On November 11 the
Portuguese are planning to hand over power to an
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independent government, the make-up of which is
still much in doubt. Three armed liberation
movements are now uneasily joined in a transi-
tional government, and are strongly tempted to
settle their differences by force. Agreement
on the pre-independence regime was reached in
January. The recent breakdown of order was
patched up with a shaky truce which established
some additional ground rules. The transitional
arrangements explicitly recognize the continued
existence of the liberation movements' separate
armed forces and, in effect, simply establish a
framework for political competition.
.The contenders for power are:
FNLA (Holden Roberto). Based on
Bakongo tribal areas of northern Angola, and the
strongest of the liberation movements in mili-
tary terms. Its principal external patrons are
Zaire and, to .a lesser extent, the PRC.
Roberto is a "moderate" in the sense of being a
pragmatist who is willing to take aid from any-
one, but he also has been accused of being
"racist" (anti-white) and "tribalist."
rinurban areas, with an appeal to intellectuals,
parties of similar orientation, however, the
has long received Soviet aid. As in African
foreign policy significance is difficult to measure.
but inferior to FNLA in military strength. The
depth Of the MPLA's Marxist commitment and its
MPLA is radical and Marxist in orientation, and
MPLA (Agostinho Neto). Strongest
MPLA sympathizers largely control the
media and are responsible for the tone and content
of its product. Highly unflattering stories of FNLA
atrocities are already an element in the interna-
tional perception of Angolan developments. (Attachment)
-- UNITA (Jonas Savimbi). The least known
movement, but perhaps the one with potentially the
most popular support, because of its strong base
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among the Ovimbundu of the central highlands.
UNITA is militarily the weakest of the three,
but Savimbi is a skillful politician who has re-
cently been moving closer to FNLA; he is unlike-
ly to accept a permanent secondary role, however.
Savimbi is a pragmatist, with no apparent deep
ideological commitments and of varied past
political associations, who wants to win. He has
Characterized himself as a "moderate African
socialist."
-- The Portuguese. Presumably a factor
of diminishing influence, although their role
will be of major importance until independence.
They have shown a bias toward MPLA in the past
but their major interest is to disengage from
Angola. By the end of April their troop strength
should be down to 24,000. Portuguese settlers
(about 350,000), once politically potent, now
seem to have no choice but to leave or throw in
their lot with the liberation movements. Many,
possibly a majority, favor UNITA.
Prospects
The recent clashes in Luanda may have
been intended by FNLA as a show of force to im-
press Portuguese officials and the MPLA and to
improve FNLA's security and bargaining positions.
Alternatively, they may have been the first move
in an attempt to destroy the MPLA's military
capacity. In either case, the fighting illustra-
ted the continuing willingness of the parties to
use force to improve or defend their relative
power positions.
In general, the outlook appears to be as
follows:
-- Further fighting in Angola is
probably inevitable and there is a high risk
of prolonad (though possibly spasmodic)
violence.
-- There is still a chance--however
, slim?that the struggle for.power in Angola
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will be political rather than military. The
willingness of the three movements to submerge
their differences long enough to negotiate the
Alvor agreement with Portugal was a major
achievement. Last week's cease-fire agreement,
with the implied intention of both sides to try
once again, is another in the series of
Portuguese initiatives that have so far held
off uncontrolled violence. If that violence
can be forestalled until the political process is
set in motion, elections might result in an FNLA-
UNITA alliance which might hold together long
enough to permit a relatively peaceful post-
independence political evolution.
The Portuguese probably still hope to
effect some kind of peaceful transition, but
are likely to limit their role. They are prob-
ably willing to continue to act as middleman
and mediator. They are probably unwilling to
enforce order through sustained use of their
own forces, which might prove unreliable in any
case. Lisbon apparently has considered inviting
the UN to perform some kind of peacekeeping (or
observing) role, in order to hasten its own dis-
engagement. In any case the Portuguese are not
expected to remain involved after independence.
-- If civil war breaks out, and barring
outside intervention, the FNLA may have the
military force to defeat MPLA. The Portuguese
could reverse the balance if they intervened on
MPLA's side, but their willingness to do so is
doubtful.
-- In a prolonged conflict between the
two mOvements, each would probably have to have
foreign military assistance. Civil disorder,
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therefore, will tend to draw in outsiders, al-
though the extent and effect of such involve-
ment is not forseeable at this point.
-- Roberto would probably approach
.Mobutu, the PRC and the U. S. Since Mobutu's
ability to provide substantial additional
equipment to the FNLA may be inhibited by his
deteriorating economic situation, he would
probably facilitate a request to the PRC,
which has already provided significant train-
ing and equipment to Roberto's recruits in
Zaire. Neto will probably turn to the USSR.
The USSR, most probably, would provide assist-
ance but will attempt to keep its involvement
indirect to avoid any prejudice to its
delicately balanced policy toward Portugal.
-- Outside influence could affect
developments in Angola in other ways. Zaire
is a key actor; Mobutu would undoubtedly play
an important role. Cabinda could be a major
irritant in Angola's relations with its
neighbors.
-- Prolonged civil strife might trig-
ger an African peacekeeping effort or. an UN-
sponsored effort that would be heavily influenced
and monitored by the OAU countries. The
Portuguese already have raised with Secretary
General Waldheim the possibility of a UN observer
or peacekeeping role in Angola. Such interven-
tion presumably would have to recognize a special
role for countries in the region, e.g., Zaire,
Congo, Zambia, and Tanzania.
III. Problem of Refugees
One area in which increased U.S.
activity has been proposed by Ambassador Hinton
is in helping to resettle refugees in Angola.
Over a half a million are now living outside
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their country. The UN is now developing a pro-
gram which, if the Portuguese Government and
the three nationalist movements comprising the
Angolan transitional government concur, will
help bring them back. Most of them are now in
Zaire, and most of these are believed to
sympathize with Holden Roberto's FNLA.
Ambassador Hinton strongly favors
overt U.S. assistance in the refugee effort
and has proposed that this take two forms: 1)
a U.S. contribution to an international
resettlement program headed by the UN inside
Angola; and 2) unilateral U.S. assistance (e.g.,
trucks) to transport refugees living in Zaire
and other neighboring countries back to Angola.
He argues that the latter program will enhance
the political fortunes of the "moderate" FNLA
by facilitating the return of several hundred
thousand of its adherents in time to register
for Angolan elections scheduled for October--
something the cumbersome UN Machinery cannot
accomplish. While Mobutu would probably like
to help Roberto return at least some of the
refugees, Zaire's tight financial situation
makes it difficult for him to do so on a
decisive scale. Further, movement of
refugees in the numbers suggested would create
serious problems of assimilation upon their
return. .
? XV. U.S. Interests in Angola
Angola is the most econorically promis-
ing of Portugal's African territories. It is
sub-Saharan Africa's second largest oil producer,
the world's fourth largest coffee producer, and
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is a major exporter of diamonds, cotton and iron
ore. U.S. investment totals about $400 million,
including some $300 million by Gulf Oil in
Cabinda. Gulf produces over 150,000 barrels a
day, half of which is exported to the U. S.
.Several other American oil companies have
promising concessions in off-shore areas south
of Luanda.
Regional and strategic interests must
also be considered. Events in Angola affect not
only southern Africa but central Africa as well,
where Zaire in particular, as well as the Congo
and Zambia, are involved with contending Angolan
political movements. Zaire and Zambia have
significant economic ties with the territory.
Our strategic interests are marginal.
U.S. naval vessels on rotation to and from
COMIDEASTFOR have found it convenient to call at
Angola ports for bunkering and ship visits.
While these calls have been infrequent (last
year there were four), the limited availability
of other ports of call in southern Africa, and
our reluctance for political reasons to call at
South African ports, make it desirable for us to
continue to be able to call in Angola.
V. Alleged U.S. Role in Angola
The United States has long been accused
of interference in Angolan internal affairs.
Even when we were being wrongly charged with aid-
ing Portugal's military effort there, we were
concurrently alleged to have been helping at
least one of the nationalist groups (FNLA) to the
detriment of the others. For its part, Gulf Oil
has been accused of political manipulation in
Cabinda.
Since decolonization began, these charges
have proliferated. Even well-meaning states like
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Zambia (which has played an otherwise construc-
tive role) have cautioned the U. S. and Gulf
against dabbling in Angolan politics. Ranking
members of the Portuguese Government apparently
believe we are supporting the FNLA. On March 27
a member of Portugal's Revolutionary Council
told a U.S. official that the recent fighting in
Angola showed a clear pattern of foreign inter-
vention, adding that Portugal would not tolerate
such interference. His clear intimation was
that the U. S. is supporting the FNLA.
VI. Actual U.S. Role
We have consistently maintained a public
posture of non-interference in Angola's affairs.
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2
Opticin 2:
Overtly Assist in Repatriating Amplan Refugees.
A. Unilaterally provide trucks, relief supplies,
etc., to Trove refugees back to Anola in time to reg-
ister 16r elections. (Ambassador Hinton's proposal):
Pro:
-- Would bolster Roberto's chances for gaining
political power through elections.
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-- Would increase our influence with Roberto.
-a
Would please Mobutu.
-- Would avoid the cumbersome UN mechanism for
refugee resettlement and possible obstruc-
tion of a UN effort by the MPLA and/or
Portugal.
Con:
-- Would compromise US posture of impartiality
and noninterference among Angolan factions.
-- Would require very substantial inputs to
'? assure refugees were adequately cared for
once they returned to Angola.
-- Might encourage Roberto to resist coopera-
tion with other Angolan factions.
-- Could increase chances of forceful reaction
by MPLA and thereby increase chances of
civil war.
-- Could serve as pretext or inducement for
other powers (e.g., Soviets, Portuguese) to
it:Crease aid to MPLA.
OmO..
Might not be liked by UNITA, thus lessening
our favor and influence with Angola's other
moderate faction.
-- Would be logistically difficult and expensive
? to mount a meaningful program in short time
available.
? B. Contribute to a longer-term UN refugee relief/
resettlement program in Angola.
PrO4
Would. help "moderate forces of FNLA more
than other Angolan elements, but under UN
cover.
SECRET/MOMS
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Would probably be acceptable to other Angolan
factions, including elements of MPLA, and to
Portuguese as well.
Would limit risk of political over-exposure,
and preserve US public posture of noninter-
ference and impartiality.
Might induce other governments to make
similar contributions.
Con:
-- Would be long-term process that would not do
much to meet Roberto's immediate pre-election
needs.
-- Would have less favorable impact on our rela-
tions with Roberto and Mobutu than would
unilateral US effort, since our assistance
would be submerged in international program.
-- Might in any case be blocked or seriously
impeded by MPLA, with or without Portuguese
help.
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No Objection to Declassification rn Part 2016)11-/29 :11(3-C-HAI-704.72377?
Department of State =mill
CONFIDENTIAL 3598 .
PAGE .01 LUANDA 40352 01 OF 02 0314472
51
ACTION 0.416
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'US3S.00 /004 W
R na5457 App 75
FM AmCONSUL LUANDA
TU SECSTA1E WASWX 33BI
#11 INFO AmEmbASSY K H
INSAsA
AmFMBASSY LUSAKA
AM"BASSY LUSAKA
AmFmBASSY LONuoN
AmFMBASsy pRgTpAIA
AmCONSUL LOuRtNCO mARUUES
AmFmSASSY FARO
UsmOs/ON Usuu NEn vORK
CINCLANT FOR OLAD
CINCEO FUR FuLAn
069602
CONPIDENTIALSECTION/OF 2 LUANDA 0352
Ea% 116522 US
TAGS: MIL1 PINT POEV AO
SUBJECT: ASSEZSHENT OF LUANDA VIOLENCE
SUMMARY,.FNLA AND mPLA'ACCuSF. .tACH OTHER OF PROVOKING THE
PErENT WAVE Of VTDLENCE IN LUANoA THAT TOOK OVER ?OW LIVES, FNLA
PERFoRMV, ,ADLY IN ITS ATTEMPTS TO TEACH KFLA A LESSON, ANO MANY
INNUCENT PEOPLE Re.RE KILLED OR HURT. P.NLA Has BEEN EDUALLY INEPT
IN: ITS PUBLIC RtLATIUNS FFFoRTS. SINCE THE CLASHES. THE PROSPECT
IS FOR CoNTI.NUn-YIOLENCE IN LUANDA, BUT CIVIL. WAR IS NOT IMMINENT.
ENO SUMMARY...
li IN THE IMMeDIATE AFTERMATH OF THE VIOLLNCE IN LUANDA MPLA FERVOR
AMONG GHETTO DWELLERS IS AT A RIrN PITCH ANI) STORIES ABOUND OF
-CONFIDENTIAL
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Department of State
IELEERAM
CoNFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 LUANDA 00352 01 OF 02 031447Z
FNI A ATROCITIES. MPLA HAS MADE THE MOST OF THE SITUATION BY TAKING
REPORTERS TO sEE SOME OF THE VICTIMS AND HAS ISSUED A COMMUN/QUe
GIVING ITS SIOE OF THE STORY (SEPTELl. MPLA MAINTAINS THAT
FAR FROM PROVOKIN(, IT NA s BEEN THE VICTIM uF MANY PROVOVWTIONS.
FNLA. MEANWHILE, hAS MAOF AN LFFORT TO PHI OUT ITS SIDE OF THE
ST(IRY, BUT HAS aHOWN ITSELF TO ae INEPT AT PUBLIC RELATIONS,
PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL_ HEMBmR JuHNNY EDUARDO TOLD THE FOREIGN PRESS
ON APRIL TO THAT ENLA wILL NOT TOLERATE LIES AdOuT ITS ACTIVITIES?
fmg mEANT STORIES ABOUT MASSACRES) ANC THAT Il HA THE FORCE TO
ExPet. ANY. OFFENDER FROM ANGOLA. FouARD0 CAME ACROSS To THE LARGELY
UNSYMPATHETIC AuDIENCE AS SOMETHING OF A bOONs HE SAL), "NE ARE
NOT MAKING THREATS, WE ARE TELLING You HO w IT WILL BE."
mpf.A HAS TOLD ME THAT THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE MASSACRED NEAR
tAXITO WAS SEVENTY, AND THAT A NUMBER OF OTHERS ESCAPED, WHILE.
411 ? 11THEPs WERE wuuNDED. MPLA DENIES ROUNoINGO GHETTO OwELLERS AND
Accuses FNLA OF. BREAKING INTO MANY HOMES TO SEARCH FOR EVIDENCE
? THAT THE INHAsTIANTS sYmPATIiIZED wITH THE MPLA. SUSPECTS WERE
? ARRESTED, BEATEN AND IN SOME CASES. KILLED, FNLA IS ALSO?ACCUSED OF
? KILLING INNOCENT PEOPLE TdROUGH /NDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS ON THE
.CHFTTOES 'WITH ...MORTARS, BAZOOKAS AND GRENAUES. THE NUMdER OF
DEAD IS STILL NOT KNOWN], BUT THE POPULAR PERCEPTION IS THAT
MANY HUNDRES HAVE BEEN KILLED. I HAVE HEARD ESTIMATES RANGING FROM
?FIVE HUNDRED TO. TWO THOuSANO. ONE SOURCE wHO CLAIMS TO. HAVE VISITED
tHR HoRGUES AND HOSPITALS USES A. FIGURE OF 450 DEAD. ? THE FIGURED
liSFu BY THE MPLA IS 200. SOmE REPORTS SPEAK OF THE METHOD USED
. DURING THE 19.81 SLAUGHTER NORTHFRN ANGOLA WHEN BODIES WERE
?? DISMEM,E040, THE $TuMACHS SLIT OPEN AND TmE Limbs INSERTED IN THE
COLT? AS A wARNING. A PORTUGUESE NEWSPAPER THE OTHER DAY .CARRIED
?? A STORY WITH THE HEADLINE THAT "UFA IS bA0(/". A REFERENCE TO FNLAIS
?FoRtiSit NAmE, JOHNNY EDUAROO TOLD REPORTERS THAT UPA HAS INDEE0
RETURNED ANU THAT FNLA IS NOT ASHAMED OF THE NAME. THOSE KILLED
.?By OA IN i964 WERE EaEm/ES OF THE PEOPLE w EXPLOITERS, IN WAR
...pEnPLE ARE GOING. TO Be KILLED.
4, WHATEVER THE FTs, MANY HAVE DIED AND FEELINGS OF RAGE,
'FEAR, AND FRUSTRATION EXIST IN THE GHETTOES. THE FACAOE OF
? COoPERATION AT THE TOP LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT IS GONE, TO BE
REPLACED BY OPEN HOSTILITY AND SHOTING MATLHES AT MEETINGS,
NO PROGRESS HAS BEEN mA0E TOWARD FULFILLING THE MARCH 28 AGREEMENT
40
TO RELEASE PRISONERS, DISARM OvIL/AN$ ANu WITHDRAW EXCESS
.CONeIGENTIAL
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Department of State TarieR
CONFIDENTIAL ?
PAGE 03 LUANDA 00352 01 OF 02 031447Z
? TrinUPS FROm LoANOA, MPLA SAYS THAT ITS PRISONS ARE OPEN FOR
? INSPECTION ANO THAT IT STANDS READY TO LET THE PRISONERS GO ANY
'TIME ENO oeclus TO CCUPERATt. JOHNNy EDUARDO SAID ON APRIL 2
THAT FNLA WILL NOT BEGIN AN EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS UNTIL MPLA
RELEASES MTGUEL SEBAST/A0, BROTHER QF JOSE PEORO, WHOM MPLA
? EXECUTED DURING THE VIOLENCE. FNLA CLAIMS MPLA IS AFRAIU TO
RELEASE HIM BECAUSE .HE KNOWS TOO MUCH AwOUT MPLA ATROCITIES.
? 5, ON THE QUESTION OF THE ORIGINS OF THE VIOLENCE, FNLA
CLAIMS IT WAS GoAUED TO ACTION BY THE CONSTANT PROVOCATIONS
OF MPLA9 THIS IS A CERTAINLY 1RUE IN THE wROAO sENSE: MPLA
HAS GIVEN FNLA CAUSE MORE THAN ONCE To TAKE REPRISALS, THERE IS
SOME EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, THAT FNLA MADE A OECIION TO ACT ON
? MARCH 72..23, FNLA HAS BEEN SAyING FOR u4ENS, IF NOT MONTHS,
THAT UNLESS MPLA CEASED ITS pRovocATIONs IT WOULD HAVE TO ACT.
411 THE MORE TImE THAT WENT BY WITHOUT FNLA ALTION, THE MORE
ITS LEADERS muST HAVE FELT THEY WERE LARN1NL, THE IMAGE OF
PAPER TIGERS. I IMAGINE THEY LEI THEIR FRUSTRATIONS GET THE
BETTER OF THEIR JuOGMENT.
?
B. IN ONE SENSE FNLA PROBABLY CAME OUT THE LOSER FROM THIS LATEST
putiro OF VTOLENCE, FNLA TROOPS DID NOT 0ISTINti-UISH THEMSELVES BY
T4FIR AdILITY TO SEEK STRATEGIC 015JEClIVEs ANO HOLD THEM,
NoR nul THE ORGANIZATION oEEm Ti) HAvE ANY OBJECT/VE OTHER THAN
TO KILL AS MANY MPLA ELEMENTS AS POSSIBLE. THIS MAY HAVE
BEEN ALL THEY WANTEO TO Do, BUT PPLA IRREGULARS SEEMED ON A
NUmdER OF OCCASIONS TO HAVE THE UPPER HAND AND FNLA WAS REDUCED
TO FITS OF RAGE ANO WILD ASSALJLIS RN ANYONE IN S/GHT, THE
GHETTOES PROVER TO EX HOSTILE TERRIORY FOR FNLA AND IN WHICH
IrS FORCES BLUNDERED ABOUT TRYING VAINLY TO SNUFF OUT REUSTANCE,
MPI.A SENTIMENT, ALWAYS STRONG IN LUANDA'S GHETTUES, HAS BEEN
RETNPURCED dY THE ACTIONS KUE FNLA TROOPS. FNLA THREATS To WRING
' MASSIVE P0RCEb TO EA ft IN THE EVENT OF FUTURE TROUBLE HAVE A WRAVE
? RUNG, BUT I n&UoT THEY WOULD i)E. CAPABLE ENTIRELY OF WIPING OUT
RESISTANCE, AND ThEY MUST REALIZE THAT IRIS IS THE CASE,
? STILL, THEIR STATC.0 STRATEGY AT THE mOME%T IS THE APPLICATION OF
? EVEN GREATER ookce UNTIL mPLA NO LONGER REPREsENTS A THREAT
TO FNLAIS FREiDuM OF OPERATIONS AND JUST AS ImPoRTANT, CEASES TO
INSULT THE FNLA LEADERSHTP. IF THE PNLA GuAL RAS TO INSTILL FEAR
IN THE POPULACE, THEY SUCCEEDED, IF THEY RULEU ALONE FEAR WOULD BE
'SUFFICIENT TO KEEP THE POPULATION UNDER CONTROL. UNFORTUNATELY
CONFIDENTIAL
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/29: LOC-HAK-104-5-3-7
?
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/29: LOC-HAK-104-5-3-7
"ow??
-Y"
Department of State ram
1/4
CONFIDENTIAL
POI 04 LUANDA 01352 01 OF 02 031.147Z?
FOR PNLA, THEY DO NOT HAVE ALL POWER AND AT SOME POINT IN THE NEAR
FUTURE, AFTER THE SENS! OP TEKROP PASSES N Wt CAN EXPECT MORt -SMALL
SCALE ATTACKS BY Kn.* ACTIVISTS,
CCP* 'DENT l'AL.
?
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/29: LOC-HAK-104-5-3-7
? No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/29: LOC-HAK-104-5-3-7
,
Department of State 'wpm nalerr,,, rt
CONFIOENTIAL 3595
PAciE 01 LUANOA 00352 02 OF 02 03171IZ
51
ACTION AF 06
INFO OCT.'01 EURI12 IO?.10 iso.ci OMB.?01 PM ea
58 -15 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-07 NSAEIIOO PA0.04 OSIA?05
PRS4.01 5AM-01 L-02 SCC1.01 SY.0* OPR-02 H,e2 A0.01
USS3-00 /084 W
NSC 05 SP 02
R 001845Z APR 75
FM AMCONSUL LUANDA
TO SECSTATE HAsH0C 3382
iNFO AMEmeASSY KINSHAbA
AMPmRASSY LUSAKA
AmFM9ASSY LOPOON
AMFmSASSY PRETOR/A
AHCoNsUL LOUPENCO NARQUES
AMFMRAssY PARIS
USHISSION )SUN mEw YORK
CINCLANT FOR POLAD
cINcEuR FuR PuLAD
093617
CnNEIDEATIALSECTION 2 oe 2 LUANUA 0352
7. MPLA, FOR ITS PART, IS FRIGHTENED. THEY HAVE SEEN WHAT IS /N
STORE FGR THEm IN THE EVENT OF RENEwEu HOSTILITIES ANO ALTHOUGH
THEY CAN COUNT ON THE SuPPORT OF HUNDREDS, PERHAPs THUUSANDS, OF
GUERRILLA FIGHTERS IN THE SLUMS, THEY ARE ALSO AWARE THAT MUCH OF
THE LEAOPPisH/P WOULD BE WIPEn ouT AnuSTINHu NETOIS HASTY DtPARTURE
FOR EUROPE A FEw OAYS AGO muST DE ATTRIcioTEu TO EARS FOR His
PERSONAL SAFEIY. THE mPLA CENTRAL COmNITTEE COmMUNIUUE OF MARCH
30, PuBLISMED ON APRIL 2, REITERATES THE STANUARD ANTI-IMPERIALIST
HASH AND ADOPTS A TOUGH LINE, EIUT AT THE VERY END APPEARS A
CALL FOR A NEw SUmN/T MEETING OF THE THREE. PRESIDENTS OF THE
LIRERATION mOYEmENT*.
' Re WITH RESpFCT TO INTRA-mPLA DIFF*RENCES, THE CURRENT LEADERsHIP
.HAS BEEN 5TPENGTHENEP, AT LEAST FOR THE SHORT RuN, bECAuSE THE
111M, RANK ANU FILE PERCEIVE AN IMmEDIAlE THREAT AND wILL SUPPORT CUN.4
CONFIOENTIAL
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/29 : LOC-HAK-104-5-3-7
-
No Objection to Declassification in Part2010/11/29 : LOC-HAK-104-5-3-7
??,..
A
4
4 4
Department of State
CONFIDENTIAL
? PAGE W2 LUANDA 00352 02 OF W2 b31711Z
FRoNTATION AT ALL LEVELS, FOR ThE LONGER TERM, THE PROSPECTS OF
TP, F ANORAuF FACTIONS, OR ACTIvE REVoLT, TO RESUHE ACTIVITY IN THE
WA Aft ENHANCED ANO THE CuRRFNT CONFUSION OFFERS Pit. HIGH
COmmISSIONER A CHANCE TO TR,' ANu NEWITIATE THEIR REENTRY INTO THE
? PARTY LEADERSHIP. THEY SEM UNSUITED TO ThE ROUGHT ANU TUMBLE OF
ANnOLAN LIBERATION POLITICS, HOWEVER. AND NO ONE mAs HAD MUCH
?SUCCESS TN GETTING THEM TO TAKE ANY INITIATIVES,
0, THERE EXISTS THF THESIS HERE THAT MPLA, Em8OLDENED BY THE
TURN OF THE LEFT IN PORTUGAL (LUANDA b303), INCREASED ITS EFFORTS
? To ppoVoxE A VIOLENT GONFkONTATION WITH THE HOPE OF GAINING TWO
THTNGO THE REMCvAL OF THE TOO IMPARTIAL mIGH COMm1SSIONER ANO
A REVISION OF THE ALVOR AGREEmENT, ACCOROING TO THISJHEORY, HELA
MIL;1APT COMmANDER IU C4RR.4RA RETURNEo FROM LISBuN WITH THE IOU
? NEWS THAT THE mPLA:COoLo txeEcT NO SUPPORT FROM THE ARMED FORCES
mOvEmENT AND TT THE PORTUGUESE TROOPS IN ANGOLA WOULD NOT COME
TN OM THEIR SIDE, DESPITE THIS kFPOKT, OR PtRHAPS BECAUSE OP IT,
THE MPLA ?LFADERsH/P DECIDED TO SET OFF A wAvE OF VIOLENCE WITH THE
TOPA OF FOPCING THE PuRTIAAJEse To TAKE A HAND IN MATTERS. THEY
NuPt0 THROUGH THE CREATION UF A ChAoTIC SITUATION TO wIN A NEw
HIaH comHigsIuNERs 6Hu CouLu NOT 6F. ANY WORSE FkOm THEIR POINT OF
WIFw. NO mATTER who HE AS, THAN GENERAL CAROusu, THEY MIGHT ALSO
RE ABLE TO NEUCTIATE A PDSTPONEHFNT OF EUXTIONS FOR A CONSTITUENT
? AsSEMbLY. TN *WItm THEY seLIEvE THEY WOoLO MAKE A POOR SHOWING,
IF THEY CAN BRING THE OTHER PARTIES Tu Tut ALVOR AGREEMENT TO THE
? BARGAINING TAbLE. THE REASONING GOES, THEY wi.L.L MA Ke SOME cuNcEss,
IUNS IN RETURN FOR THEIR DEmANDS, THEY w0uLu COUNT ON PORTGOESE
SUPPORT TO ACHIEVE THIS END. MPLA MIGHT, POk INSTANCE GIVE UP THE
minANIZATInks yNavoN AS POPULAR POE, WHICH Ib ANATHEMA TO .NLA
? ANO WhICu IS THE EASE OF MPLA PARAMILITARY SUPPORT IN THE GHETOES.
?THE CONCESSION WOULD BE MtANINGLESs, AS THE BASE WILL REMAIN INTACT
TINDER ANY NAME. IF THE FNLA AGRE,Fs TO A POSTPONEMENT OF THE ELECTIONS,
IT Is SAID, UNITA WILL GO ALONG IN ORDER NOT TO STYMIE A SETTLEw
meNT. EVEN IF NO SUCH MPLA PLAN Fx/STS, THE RESoLIS OF ALL THAT HAS
GONE ON MAY WELL 6E :A CHANGE IN THE FRAHEwORK WITHIN WHICH ANGOLA
WILL HOVE TaHARD INDEPENDENCE, THE ONLY WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE
WILL BE NEGUTIATIONS IN wHIe4 EACH SIDE WILL AGKEE TO GIVt OP
SOMETHING. FOkEIGN MINISTER MELD ANTUNES IS DUE TO RETURN TO
LUANDA APRIL 3 TO LENO A HAND., HE WAS DuOTED IN TANZANIA AS SAYING
41, HE WOULD RETURN Tu LUANOA BECAUSE THE TRUCE HE HELPED NEGOTIATE
,CONFIDENTIAL
1,01
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/29: LOC-HAK-104-5-3-7
No Objection to Declassification in -Part 2010/11/29 : LOb-HAK-104-5-3-7
g$v o.
Department of State tc.-
m
CONfIDENTIAL
PAGE 0 LUANDA 16352 02 OF 02 031711Z
suwAS NOT WORKIN6? VERY WELL"
10 ONE QF THE DANGERS Now, ASIDE FROm A REPETITION OF THE FNLA/
MplA CLASHFSi IS MOB VIOLENCE 8Y MPLA AcTOISTS AGAINST WHITES
ANn THEIR RUSINESSES. FNLA IS IDENTIFIEo wITH WHITE INTERtSTS IN
ITHF mINLS OF mPLA ADHERtNTS AND THE POSSIEILITY OF DEsTRUCTIVE
ACTIVITY IN THE EuROPEAN SECTLPS OF LUANDA IS NOW GREA'ftR THAN AT
ANY TIME IN THE PAST. SOME FNLA OFFICIALS HAV t MOVEu INTO NEIGH.
BORHOOOS WHERE MANY FORELiNERS, INCLuDING CONSULATE PERSONNEL,
Llvt AND THE OANGER OF PHYSICAL HARM Tn EMPLOYEES AND DEPENDENTS
HAS RISEN COPmESFONOINGLY,
If. CIVIL WAR IS ON EVENYONtIS miNo, BUT THE RISK IS PROBABLY NOT
ilkmurei HIGHER NUW THAN IT HAS BEEN THESE pAST FW MONTHS ANO DESPITE
THE CHARGE?) .41 SPHERE A tiENERALIZFO ARmEu CONFLICT IS NOT IMMINENT,
NETTHER mPLA NOR uNITA HAVE LARGF cONTINGtNtS OF ARMED TROOPS,
BOTH ORGANIZATIONS HAVE MANY HEcRuTTs IN TRAINING, eUr 1HEY DJ NOT
CONSTITOt EFFECTIVE E/GHTINe; F ORCFS. FNLA HA4 THE IRUOPS, dUT
? LACKS THE ABILITY TO TRANSPORf THEM OLICKLY AND IN LANGE NUMBERS,
414F. POLITICAL COCKPIT WAS AND IS LUANUA, IT IS MERE THAT MPLA HAS
OEmONSTRABLE NIL/TAY AND PARA MTLITAHY POWER AND IT IS HER THAT
MP 1A HILL AsseRT ITSELF. mpols BEST CHANCE TO NEUTRALIZE FNLA06
MILITARY MIGHT ANO UN/TAS mucT0RAL STRENGTH IS TO GAIN CONTROL OF
TF YNSTITUT/ONS IN ThE SOCIETY . KEY MINISTRIES, LABOR, THt
WIA, bANKS, TO ANHE A FEW . AND THE PRINCIPAL BATTLEFIELD FOR
TO'S STRUGGLE WILL dE LUANDA, mPLA CANNOT AND DOES NOT WANT TO
FIGHT A CIVIL wAR; uNITAiS POLICY TO WIN POwEN INCLUDtS EvENY
STRATtGEM ?UT CIVIL WAR, FNLA OFFICIALS CONSTANTLY TELL Mt THAT IF
PuSnE0 Ino FAR THEIR STRATEGY WILL OE To ASSUME INTERNAL SECURITY
FUNCTIONS IN AS MANY AREAS OF THE COUNTRY AS NECESSARY, THE
LESSON THEY LEARNED IN OIANOA DURING THE LAST DAYS OF MARCH IS THAT
ENUNCIATION Of THE POLICY IS EASIER, THAN 1HE EXECUTION, THE
nuTLooK IS FON CONTINUED TENSION AND RECURRIN6 VIOLENCE IN LuANuA.
KILORAN
- :CONFIDENTIAL
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/29 : LOr:-Haw_inn c ?