LETTER TO BRENT SCOWCROFT FROM GEORGE BUSH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: April 10, 1976
• Content Type: LETTER

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01-..Ln?i-L
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON,D.C. 20505
Honorable Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Brent:
10 April 1976
Enclosed is a summary of the position I am taking o
current impasse involving termination payments under the
program. Hopefully, I will be given an opportunity to present
it to the Defense Subcommittee prior to the Easter recess.
In that connection, if the occasion presents itself, it
would be most helpful if the President could cover this matter
with any of the members of the Subcommittee. (Membership list
attached).
We are in the process of pulling together from our field
stations the total listing of all obligations involved. A
detailed report on our finding will be transmitted as soon as
possible.
In the event I am unable to persuade the Subcommittee of
the merits of our position, it may be necessary for the Admini-
stration to proceed without their approval. There appears to
be no question of the legality of such action and it is imperative
that we fulfill our obligations.
I would welcome any suggestions on the attached draft.
Sincerely,
Enclosure
As stated
Geo
Direc or
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11, IIP
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS
DEFENSE SUBCOMMITTEE
George H. Mahon (D., Tex.), Chairman
Jack Edwards (R., Ala.)
J. Kenneth Robinson (R., Va.)
Jack F. Kemp (R., N. Y.)
Elford Cederberg CR., Mich.)
(ex-officio member)
Robert L. F. Sikes CD., Fla.)
Daniel J. Flood (D., Pa.)
Joseph P. Addabbo CD., N. Y.)
John J. McFall CD., Calif.)
John J. Flynt CD., Ga.)
Robert N. Giaimo (D. , Conn.)
Bill Chappell (D., Fla.)
Bill D. Burlison (D., Mo.)
May Contain Congressional Material
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.111: 111
es V."0.? De( - 3049
D I Lot.
PM-REFUGEES 12-30
LUSAKA, ZAMBIA (UPI) -- REFUGEES ATTEMPTING TO ESCAPE FIGHTING
BETWEEN CUBAN-BACKED GOVERNMENT FORCES AND REBEL GUERRILLAS IN
SOUTHERN ANGOLA ARE FLOODING INTO NEIGHBORING ZAMBIA, HOME AFFAIRS
MINISTER AARON MILNER SAID TODAY.
1 MILNER SAID NEARLY 16,000 BLACK ANGOLANS HAD FLED SOUTHERN ANGOLA
SINCE FEBRUARY AND IF THEY CONTINUED TO ARRIVE SEEKING SHELTER,
ZAMBIA COULD BE FACED WITH "A VERY SERIOUS REFUGEE PROBLEM."
THIS MONTH, ABOUT 1,000 REFUGEES ARRIVED IN SOUTHERN ZAMBIA AND
WERE TRANSFERRED TUESDAY TO THE MAKENI TRANSIT CAMP, SOUTH OF LUSAKA.
AN ANGOLAN STUDENT, HUDSON PETEPEET, 21, TOLD REPORTERS WHO
VISITED THE CAMP WEDNESDAY, "WE HAD TO FLEE BECAUSE FJGHTING IS STILL
GOING ON IN OUR COUNTRY AND MANY PEOPLE ARE DYING."
A GROUP OF ABOUT 700 BLACK TRIBESMEN FROM SOUTHERN ANGOLA FLED
INTO SOUTH WEST AFRICA (NAMIBIA) THIS WEEK AND ALSO REPORTED
CONTINUED CLASHES BETWEEN GOVERNMENT TROOPS AND GUERRILLAS OF THE
NTIONAL UNION FOR THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA.
MORE THAN 8,000 REFUGEES HAVE BEEN HOUSED IN TENT CAMPS IN SOUTH
WEST AFRICA IN THE PAST 10 MONTHS.
SINCE FEBRUARY, UNITA GUERRILLAS HAVE BEEN FIGHTING A BUSH WAR IN
SOUTHERN ANGOLA, WHERE THE GROUP HAS WIDESPREAD SUPPORT AMONG THE
RURAL POPULATION, AND HAS VOWED TO CONTINUE FIGHTING UNTIL CUBAN
TROOPS AND RUSSIAN ADVISERS HAVE LEFT THE COUNTRY.
uN/TA, WHICH HAD WESTERN BACKING IN THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR, WAS
DEFEATED BY THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA FOR
CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT FOLLOWING THE WITHDRAWAL OF PORTUGESE
FORCES. THE SOVIET ADVISERS AND THOUSANDS OF CUBAN TROOPS BACKED THE
MPLA.
PETEPEET SAID THE GOVERNMENT FORCES WERE USING ARMORED CARS, TANKS
AND HEAVY MACHINE GUNS AGAINST NITA FIGHTERS, WHO ALSO HAD
"SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS."
ANOTHER REFUGEE, A FORMER CIVIL SERVANT FROM MAVINGA IN SOUTHERN
ANGOLA, SAID HE AND MANY OTHERS HAD TRAVELED ON FOOT FOR HUNDREDS OF
MILES TO REACH ZAMBIA. THE GROUP HE WAS WITH LIVED MAINLY OFF WILD
FRUIT AND KEPT AWAY FROM VILLAGES.
"WE HAD TO BE CAREFUL BECAUSE WE DID NOT KNOW WHICH VILLAGES
SUPPORTED THE GOVERNMENT," HE SAID. "VE WERE FRIGHTENED ALL THE TIME
OF BEING STOPPED AND TURNED OVER TO THE SOLDIERS."
UPI 12-30 07:00 AES
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Co/Oast:4ot
Marque, who het
to Cabe ill AS POW WO
friesdle with 'Citation
Fidel Cants has write&
acmes* of Cuba's
gold eased ea usonsroluu
Clubs, An aerwred
Mare" et
one of Xotio Anterices.
writers.
Ifia -.Mak is, In e
Coboo:oothorieed version.
golos civil war. Yesterday
Cuban sews coney
diatributed amend
it ie MOM, The
Th. "frOshilOSolg Post
rights lts' This
three extracts.
In 1343, a feniale slave ?
Carlotabad taken machete
lead a slave umiak* at
rato *ill, In tb
andlion. tit 4101101de tts
solidarity to Angola
ation Carlota.
It taitn with the
for battalion
made up of 850 men.'
over a span of 13
tary Section of Jose
Havana to the airport
occupied by Port
Their Weston sr
offeedvs so the
wouhf notlell into
fore tiles
keeir
merits eanid
But the men o
were lure they
and the ?nil bore the/
that trwy might be able
lade.
The fiest contingent lett* 4
Nov. 7, On a *Pedal 41.1t*Ctgettlit
deAriscion, on one at the
Bristol Sritania Boisa
that the Baldish MatrAtfelltittt"
with intellectual pursuits. So the fic.
tion of Sunday civilians should not
have seemed a novelty to them.
But in their brief cases htesr carried
machine pistols, and in the amp hold
of the plane, instead of WPM* there
Was a substantial load of light artil-
les% mall arms, three 75 mar?crIallens
and three 82 mm mortars. The only
change that had been made in the
Plane, Which carried two regular ste-
wards, was a door cut in the floor so
the weapons could be reached from
the passenger compartment in case of
tonerdetel-
The fifth from ?1'fiteatta , to 1.411010.1
Was *edeltritX a stoPin-Banbadoi to
take woo; al ths.intood ***lea
Atom, and i five-hour stop In Guinea.
Bissau, mainly' to wait for eight
(Just as the first two planes arrived
in Angola], three shies were leaving
uba bringing an artillery regiment, a
mechanized battalion and recoilless
would land-in Angola ?Nrer.
Gil the other hand, the columns of
Heiden Roberto [head of the National
/rent for the Liberation of Angola, a
*iv& of the ultimately vieterieue Pop-
ular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola] were so oloee that only hours
before they had shot and killed an old
native woman who was ?UAW to
reach the headquarters at Gran Fend,
where the Cuban forces were &Amen-
So the7nien arriving On the two
pleats had no time tolest: They put
on their oliVigreell indfireres, _Seined.
the ranks' of the MPLA Pine PoPiliss
Movement] and went into bottle.
During nine months. the;mobiliza-
? tion of human and material resources
was a drama of daring. The decrepit
Britanias, patched up with brakes
from Soviet-made liyushin 1St kept
up a steady and almost unreal traffic.
? Although their normal load Is
000 pounds, they often flew with
194,000, which is of all the charts.
The pilots, who normally fly 73 tours
a month, sometimes. flew more, than
900. In general, emit af thetheste art-
ludas in service etirrieeLtwe
'crests, who look L'
but..
themost dangerous stretch, there was
no alternative airport to fall back on.
On top of everything else, the troops
traveled with their weapons leaded
and carried their artplosives without
their pretictive wrappings to 'cut
? down on weight.
.? The United States noted the Brita-
ides' weak point: their range.
When Washington got the Barbados
to bar refueling stop., the Cubans set
up a transatlantic flight from Holguin,
at the eastern end of Cuba, to the le-
land of Sal, in Cope Verde.
It was a higlimire act without a net,
for on the way out the planes arrived
with fuel for Only bra more hours of
flight and on the way back, because of
headwinds, with only one hour's fuel
left
But Oen -that Orem Onto
changed, "to avoid eildarigerbig
fenseless cape Verde.
Then the cabins, of the planes were
itnalifiect 4o-take ferie supplementary
gasoline tanks whieballevied nonstop
flights but with 20 tewer passengers,
from Holguin to Brazzaville.
An intermediate solution, of making
a stop in Goland., did not work out for
two reasons:
First, the runway was very short;
second, Texaco, which holds the fuel
contract in Guyana, refused to sell the
fuel. Cuba tried to resolve this by
sending a shipload of gasoline to Gu-
yana, but through some incomprehen?
sibie accident the fuel was contami-
nated with water and dirt.
? Despite these bitter setbacks, the
? government of Guyana was firm in its
solidarity toward the Cubans until the
, sembeiesitinenf the United States, per.
With, the ? bcark
naranteenriathasetritettott of,''the cl
port at Georgetown.
Maibijiiksbee .d.ono in, less than
half the usual time, and a :pilot,' res
members flying without radar sesteral
times; ifthaugh no one rdealls any in-
strument failure. 'Under those incon-
ceivable conditions, the Cubans made
101 flights until the end of the war.
The sea route was no less dramatic.
The only. two pas.enger ships, of 4,-
000 tons each, Wound up with dormito-
ries in every open space, and latrines
were set up in the lounge, the bars,
the corridors.
The normal loading ? of 226 passen-
gers was tripled on some voyages, and
? cargo ships designed to carry crews of
80 eventually were loaded with more
than a thousand troops with armored
cars, weapons and explosives.
Field kitchens were put up in holds
and staterooms, and to save water dis-
posable Altos were_ used and yogurt
eontsdeete :Served as '? ,The
Isilges were used for .waste, name
e set up en :Steck.
eItthery or the older
glv out after Six
shd this wee the
_a the first troopi to
come back: Their long-awaited return
was delayed for several days because
of clogged filters on the (Cuban
troopship) Viet Nam Heroic?.
`itie other ships in the convoy had
to wait for bet-, and some of the pas-
sengers then understood what Che
Guevara meant when he said that the
march of a guerrilla band is deter-
mined by the slowest man.
The problems were all the more an-
noying because ships were the target
of all sorts of provocations by North
American destroyers, which followed
(See INTERVENTWN, Pg. 11-F)
tient
ried Fidel Castro and
Cube to launch a
healthy look of t
Caribbean sun. Their
clothes, with no
caeriet behrfainetil
ports with their'real
tification.
The members ?,
Ion,
moo 41, nal litpttrii -Or
flight. "There comes a paw') he said
with no attempt at .nerniee, "that you'.
re so tired theryou draft' tire any
more."
The route from Haven to Luanda
itempty and unused. At the Britanias'
cruising altitudeOshetereen .18,000 and
20,000 feet?there is no information
abolit winds *lids dorsi the jet.
The pilots sit riff without knowing
the weather eking their course, flying
at unusual altitudes to save .fuel, and
without the slightest idea, of landing
Conditions.
Between Braestiville and Luanda,
10-F
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Part 11 -- Main Edition
WASHINGTON POST
(PARADE) 9 JAN 1977 (10)
WOMIWINE Pour
women
Members.
of the
U.S. Bevy have filed suit
in a class action They
allege that the legal'pro-
hibition against their
assignment to sea duty
deprives them of ''the core
experience of Navy life.'""
Navy Women are,Otrrently
permitted to -serve on hos-
pital ships and harbor
vessels like tugboats
but not on destroyers,
cruisers, carriers and the
rest,
WASHINGTON POST
(PARADE) 9 JAN 1977 (10)
iffm The Soviet
Union has been
trying for months to pur-
chase from Great Britain
its most powerful aero-
engine, the Rolls-Royce
RB-211, which provides,
50,000 pounds of thrust to
the jumbo jets.
The Soviets are building
their first wide-body
airliner, the Ilyushin 86,
which will seat 350 pas-
sengers, and they want to
study the RB-211.
The British are willing
to sell a flock of the
RB-211's to the Russians,
but they want to control
their production under
license by the Soviets.
They don't want to sell
two or three and then have
the Soviets pirate the
engine with modifications.
In 1947 the British
Labor government under
Clement Atlee made the
mistake of selling 55
Rolls-Royce Nene engines
to the Soviets against the
advice of its intelligence
experts. The Soviets im-
mediately began reproduc-
ing the engine illegally
for their fighter's sOd,
bombers. It was *tette
fighters and lOibers that.
were subsequently sent to
North Korea to fight
against U.S. aircraft in
the Korean war.
The British are deter-
mined not to make the same
mistake again. If they
sell Rolls-Royce engines
to the U.S.S.R., they want
to provide substantial
orders to the British air-
craft industry. Otherwise
--no deal.
10 January 1977
Jack Anderson WASHINGTON
9 JA.NUARY 1977 (10) Ps
. _
A Coup Against
Mao's Memory
HONG KONG?The struggle for
power in Peking, apparently, had all the
Ingredients of a Chinese opera. The par-
ticipants in the drama behaved more as
If they were engaged in the petty in-
trigues of a bygone dynasty than in the
power politics of a modern state.
For an account of these fascinating
events, we consulted Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger and some of his top ad-
visers. Then we flew to Hong Kong to
talk to the China watchers on the scene.
What appears to have happened, as
we reported in an earlier dispatch, was
a posthumous coup against Mao Tse-
tung. The old revolutionary was an un-
predictable ruler who periodically
sought to purify his own government
with disruptive, revolutionary cam-
Indfam
The most chaotic was the Cultural
Revolution of 1966, a confrontation be-
tween the Red Guards and the Old
:lunch. Encouraged by Mao, young ide-
lists mocked and mobbed senior gov-
ernment leaders. Some of the most pow-
erful figures in China were subjected to
public humiliation. Mao evidently
thought this was good for their revolu-
tionary souls, but the experience report-
edly left them deeply embittered.
Mao used similar tactics to hold the
military down. In 1971, he accused the
former defense minister, Lin Piao, of
plotting his overthrow. The army com-
manders suffered a severe loss of public
prestige.
Thus, the senior bureaucrats and mili-
tary commanders were left to stew in
private. They would later join forces
after his death. But meanwhile, in sub-
tle ways characteristic of the Chinese,
they resisted Mao's disruptions. They be-
lieved that practical policies and orderly
development, rather than sheer ideolog-
ical zeal, would be best for China.
By 1974, the bureaucrats had regained
control of the government machinery.
But Mao continued to crack the ideolog-
ical whip through his wife, Chiang
Ching, who exercised rigid, stifling con-
trol of the nation's cultural activities.
Some analysts believe the present Pe-
king line that the ambitious Chiang ma-
nipulated Mao. But our sources are con-
vinced that the ideological impetus, at
least, came from the incurable old revo-
lutionary He also used Chang
ati0100, the *et political officer of
-4he *mod leseas,46 seep the military -
under submiadOn, our sources report.
The late Premier Chou En-lai, the wily
old pragmatist, groomed Teng Mho-
ping to be his successor. This would
have left the government in the hands
of the senior bureaucrats, including vic-
tims of the Cultural Revolution and
their sympathizers. Tong himself had
been an ideological casualty.
But Chou was outmaneuvered in the
backrooms of Peking by Chiang and her
cohorts. Again, it is uncertain exactly
What role Mao played in these manipula-
tions. Some observers believe he had
grown too old and incompetent to call
the shots. There is evidence, certainly,
that he suffered lapses. But
believe he was lucid enough
control. In any event, they
Chiang tried to carry out the
mandate.
Thus Teng was brought d
and time. In his place, Mao
Kuo-feng and sealed it with a
ten note, declaring: "With
charge, I'm at ease." The a
prestige was too enormous fo
to challenge the choice.
The sudden, surprise selee
last Amil, say our source,.
triumph for Chiang. But it
long. As Mao began to fade,
room intrigues intensified.
The top bureaucrats and,
commanders, who had been
by Mao in the past, began
gather. The deposed Tong, to
was consigned to a totsp
outside Canton. Intelligence
claim he get together there
fense Minister Yeh Chien-ying. '
Mao had always taught that
power came out of the barrel
So Chiang, according to our
also sought the allegiance of th
She made her play reportedly '
the chief political offiaer,
chiao.
According to one account, sh
tried to use her daughter., Li N
promise the army. Chiang
complained to Defenee
that her daughter had been
Milt by an army man and d
that his son marry Li Na.
But by the time Mao died on
Hua reportedly _recognized
power was on the side of the
reaucrats and military,
actively joined the opposition
Maoists, who had brought him to
The contentious Chiang, a
a reliable report, telephoned H.
want to throw me out when
Mao's remains have not yet
cold," she complained bitterly,
the way to show your gratitude
kindness rendered to you by -
Mao, who promoted your
The coup came less than a
after Mao's death. It was carried '
the Peking garrison on the night
6. Members of Mao's family, who
been closest to Win; were arrested
Thezkilitait.political 'officer,
Clum-chiao, was arrested. So were
other loyalists who, together with
widow, have now been vilified
China as the "gang of four." Our
describe this group as Mao's true
logical heirs. The move against
say our sources, constittited a
coup against the dead Mao.
There was strong personal h
they say, against the Maoists. The
phant bureaucrats and army
era,, therefore, sought revenge a
the young party workers, who had
militated them and, in seine cas
placed them 10 years ago.
OWMUWWIreatiaiMixikawhc
.....????????.?????rsano.
9-P
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IP 1111
-- Main Jattuary 1977
i0BOINgrai Pan -li MOM x977?u
/1fripe-
This is the second of three tetrads from an article
by the noted Latin Aselleteset miter Gabriel Core=
the fir0
Wile!
Marques, a Cm*
authorized awn*
ride' Castro
the smallest
? doff for ',0atth
'wettitcall
at, the Colson&
thefi,sPeeial foram
flifht,, and drove
hinfleviet-made int*
every one of the Other,
an envy for those going
By then, there
gola that he co
land that he did
and ,meticulously
could cite any statitie,
tog about Cuba. Ng
to and its people
lif
P to date on
M. was in the sen-
ft *Ped he
:theater
of
ent on the first
of the Fdane in
e that then and in
Castro bad to hide
tea war he could not be
on the map of .nota elOrk of the
heart
fallow the So intensely
war that he
AngoLosto if he were, talk-
Angeles tides, its ens-
he had lived there all his
At the start of. the war, w ep the situation was
eePeetallY pressing, 1 tsd hi the genera staff
Command roma it ls aa 14 hours at it? stretch,
without eating or sleeping, as if hewer. on the cam-
paign.
Ile followed the progress of battles, using colored
indicators on was in.
constant tnefield high command*
lot the,BopularAftelmientior aherldberatientii
An-
g&a, which Culla Nel% allied itself with].
Some of his NOON* daring those days of doubt
reflected a certain* of victor, as when an UPLA
a bridge to delaY the
ed columns.
bridges," Castro said in
won't have any way to
unit was forced,.
advance of Sou
- ? 'Doe blow
message.
;pursue them."
; He was right: weeks later, the Ango-
lan and Cu brigades had to repair
is bridges in to jest& the retreating Invad-
ers :
, The difficulties December were due in the first
place to the tremeidoas firepower of the enemy,
which by this ved More than $50
mu-
:lion in military *it *tan the Iletted stoles. In the
*amend Pine% they Were *le to Angola's delay in
'auridng for help and the,Altoe it took to get the help
:te_ttssgola.
rinally, they were due to the miserable conditions
and cultural backwardness left by half a millenium
of Senile= That, even more than the
first two -greeted obetaele to a de.
Cuban troops and the
-Ruors-a-TbienuottrAmbst lattlftituguese, were
hostile to the white Cubans. Many times, especially
In Cabinda. Cuban somas felt betrayed by the primi-
tive tel of the talking drums, Whose thumpT
tirehiP be heard or as sorb as 20 miles.
South Africa's white trooPs, wit fired on arabu-
lancet with 140 MM. cannons, threw up intake-
screidni on the batti afield to - collect their, white
deeds but left the black bodies for the vultures.
Ist-Cuba. all the news coming from Angola was
bed.
On Dec. 11, iftHengo, where the NIPLA's armed
Sahth African invaders; a Cuban armored car
with four officers in it set out along a path where
sante mines had been found.
Atbough four others cars had already Passed
tbrOtiell_ agar, the scouts ;advised against the route,
atedch cut only a few unnecessary minutes off the
p. Ignoring, the advice, the ear was almost in
stoutly blown Up. Two special forces battalion corn-
aliatelers were gravely wounded, and Centmandant
Val4 MaZ Arguello--;commander of international
mations in Angola, a hero of the struggle against
tietn and a man widely loved in Cuba?died in-
? That was the bitterest news for the Cubans, but it
as not to be the last. The next day came the dims-
at Catofe, perhaps the worse set back of the en-
'tom wa ,r? .
South African column had managed to repair a
e under the cover of the morning mists and
the Cubans; Who were in the Midst of
"1-
a Avithdralear The analysis of this defeat showed
the* it Wavle* to an ewer on the Cabana' pert...
hit Dec. 22; at the closing of the party congress,
Cube gave its first official indication that it had
troops In Angola.
_Vie war was still not going well. Fidel Castro, in
closing speech, reported that the invaders in
tblnda had been defeated in 72 hours .that on the
arern front the troops of Holden Roberto (leader
e National Front for the Liberation of Angola)
bad been only 15 miles from Luanda on Nov.
l0 bad been forced to retreat to more than 69 miles.
mean and that South Africa's armored columns,
vihrett had advanced more than 490 miles, had been
baked more than 120 miles from Luanda. The de-
tailed report was comforting, but it. was far from a
victory
Caen aid reached such a level that at one point
there were 15 Cuban ships on the high seas bound
for Luanda. The unstoppable offensive of the NIPLA
461k11 fronts turned the tide Once and for always, in
Its favor. , In January, it was conducting opera-
tions originally Planned for Mull.. ? ?
(With a great disadvantage in air power) Angola
did these a acitiati Of ,3407# With Cuban
butse were he in reserve by the high military
command to be used only for the defense of
LAM**
Mkr Meech, ,thelieuth African troops began
The
ful, modern r lo live in, with
grass bul1dlng stores with loge electric Bios.
But these wieWelthes **whiten like those the grin-,
'gm; built arottitit Obi Havana . Beneath the Mask
.civilitathou lilt a v4tat and rich land of misery:
;The natives',sta4ar4 of living was one of the low-
est4n the
.plidated
TheAu-
woldd
superstitions net only com-
a hindred the war effort.
convinced that bullets
te shin, they feared the
refused to go into the
were fielY for the dead. .
* which one had to watch
to for mercenaries? as much
Cuban Contmalidatc
Into an elephant trap.
ans, conditiened by gener-
trending.
mut
for
Ist the
At
of *elle
commandant
Lee,poido Charge Pries arrived the darnat
Rau-
cans, neat to the ehicken-wire fence marking the
frontier with Namibia. An hour and a quarter later
the SOW* African governor of Namibia, . .
accompanied by two of his officers, asked permission
to cross the border to beggin talk, with the ltfl3LA.
Commandant Vintraa' Tries received them in a
wooden shed in the 4litYard444e neutral strip
be-
tween the OM conadidlie,,n7d the two groups gath-
ered around a large di* table . .
Agreement took only two hours to reach, but the
meeting lasted longer, for the South African gen-
eral ordered a sucealent dinner, prepared on the
side. As they dined, he offered several
In beer
See CASIliCIS ADVICE, Pg 12-P)
11.-F
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-4K-104-3-9-3
Part II
? Main EditiOtt ?,.11 January 1977
MINIM SCIZNCE VIONITOR - 7 JANUARY 1977(11) Pg 3
re '??keeps. Jabbing
at tabri.0 ? OILS,. alliancesH ?
$y Seaga C., lime
The biggest , challenge facing the United States and- Its
friends and alba &Nag the year ahead, will continue to *So-
viet pressure On the fehdc of the Ow* If anything, that
pressure Is like* to Increase in scope aril in intensity.
The litaddatleel of the alliance, by whatever means, Is Otir
Aohollf the Ad* *wear rewlid Meet Ube to have hapites...
Were It to bliPPoo, Moscow would to king of the castle. It. will
would be the strewed single thing in the world.
. But if the aRiance grows in vitality and security Moticow will
continue to be what it is now, merely the second power In the
world ? and a fairly poor sec-
ond at that. After all, it has
no willing friend Or ally any-
wherein the wield.
? The United States is at the
hub of a network of sued-
aliens, friendships, and al-
liances which embrace all of
the Americas except for
Cuba, the lion's 'share of Africa, most of Islam, the Philippines,
Jarmo, and, for the moment at least, China.
Strong* sr waiter
The serious question is whether the fabric of that system of
associations, Mandeb** and alliances will grow stronger or
,weskorfkote&IP-Thooelitirfhe-noidail*PuitAtt,
^ oval ittralfobliOloritti itc41.ft*? torkii?
sann *
year ago. Preident-Elect Carter has, been handed the task of
carrying.on the good watt of preserving and strengthening it.
still farther.
The WWI of pressure most obvious at the moment is the
continued buildup of Soviet weapons. Most milked by Eu-
ropeans is the enmity increase in the number of Soviet tanks
deployed In Eastern Ear* and presumably available for a
possible thrust across the north German plain.
Naval authorities notice the steady rime in number of attack
submarines which could in theory be used to cut the sea-lanes
vital to American support of its allies in Western Europe and
PATTEN
OF
DIPLOMACY
in Asia.
Ballistic missile*
Strategic warfare specialists notice the continued deploy-
ment of new types of long range ballistic missiles. These in-
clude many presumably aimed at 'targets in Western Europe,
The Seders are also beginning to dealloY Movable
CASTRO' S wan - corTimED
Afterward, the program of the withdrawal of Cu.
ban troops from Anpla was agreed to by Castro
and (AgostinholNeto [leader of the 12PLA1 during
their meeting in In Conakry, after Victory
would 55 nflate OHM* as 74
needed would- remain in Angola as long as needed
to build a modern and strong army, able to guaran-
tee the future internal security and independence of
the country without outside bele ? ? ? ?
For security reasons, the Cuban press had not
published any mention of the participation in An.
gola. But. as usually happens in Cuba, even with
military subjects as delicate as this, the operation
was a secret carefullykept by a million persona. The
first congress of the Cuban Communist Party, which
was to be held late in December and which was a
sort of national obsession all year, took on a new
dimension. , ?
The volunteer units were formed was private mes-
sages to members of the finit reserve, made op of
all males between 17 and 25 and those who had been
And there is much discussion over the extent to whit
Imes built Up defenses -epithet nuclear attack. '
Solna of the hint* American experts insist:.
Fortieth's** can protect, most of their working
,against MOW u?oapons. II true dde would mann that,
on the nay len "first strike" capability. v1
? Perbsnectbelnest-daanerens, thing about the.
up is -thai dinibt it'sowshiBa Modica the. allies about
icon ability sad willineimis to defend them. Is Moser*
log neapons with an adttakeyerto war, or as a form O
chological warfare which could in theory give themth
without a single ,blow being struck? If it is the 1st
American hawks are playing directly into the hands of ,
otot Proluielmdloto, Europeans, listening to the "biotin
aster" enthusiasts of Washington hawkdom, must sire
an lnclinetion to head for Moscow to make what te
Can. .
A Ong way to go .
The dominant opinion both in Washington and lb m
Dance capitals is that the Soviets are a long way
"first strike" capability and have a long way to go to
match the overall strength of the United Sties and its
However, there Is no doubt that Soviet inferiority
turned into effective superiority overnight if the alliance
to ton *art either from neglect, or from internal dine
or fromlitar?frear is perhaps the greatest single danger;
?
pensive B-1 bomber and bagel another super aircraft
Or should it start balding fleet of fast, small ships de
to defend the sea-lanes and put its main reliance for
rence on "cruise" missiles, The "cruise" mantle is
manned, long-range, self-directing rocket which can c
ther conventional or nuclear warheads. ,
Confidence of the allies in the ability and will of the
States to support the alliance system will certainly be
financed by the sounded* And convincingness of Mr. C
moves. To be effective they must express both ftronnesa
prudence in military matters, and a proper awareness of
nomic factors as well. Thealliance could be destroyed bY
nondc folly as quickly as from insufficient weaponry.
It it therefore a .good first step that the year has
.opened with the graining of a loan to the British. This is
tended to tide them over until the flow of North gee ail
redress their imbalance In trade.
members, of. the Revolutionary' An/1011E0race,
were summoned hat telegoira to report loa the
oriole military comnettees, with no word of
they were called. /he reason was so bvicus
everyone Who helietTSSlo tarY
hisinnedin hit
Itar*
nits
order.
Insofar as the emergency permitted, selection cri
ria were quite stringent: Not only were grata
goolidestlotte allict Ordeal and mom; condi
taken into account, bat also work background a
political education.
Nevertheless, there wore innumerable eases
volunteers trYing to weak through the filter
promo. A qualified engineer tried to Om hints
off as a truckdtiver, a high official pretended to
a mechanic, a Wallin almost got away With passi
herself off as a recent any recruit.
A youth whoa itined without his father's p
slop met his father 111 Angola, because his fa
had also gone without telling his family.
124.17`
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3
,olyw
-111W .711ve; 40419"411"114,
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3
This Is Ow lest
from an. article by
Americas loiter end proinaierne-Cones
meeirt 6abriel Garcia ?illediguez?. gas
-
mg the first Cavineetthertaid
of the Angolan civil wen
Cuba's act of tiolidinike With Angola
was far from a emitter* ive
act, but rather the
coutinuons policy troeMet Africa by
the Cuban revolutko, ^
There was only Me:Or
k element in this
This time it was not only :et-question
et sending What Ed it mead, bt# ink-
on a large nvout
6,000 miles from ite WY,
With the cast in b ure
Incalculable and cense-
quences unf
The possibility
States might intAwv
than through arid
for
of the
a
t least
about
OST
2,JANUARY 1977 Pg 12
he Planted
IMRE
(110.10AUSig .
uth Afrita sLIme time, was
eat disturbing
analYsls sugg
a*bingLon
dOgao
It had juatfre,. aditilat
ram of Vietnere
scendia. It had a
elected. The CIA
Congress and.
opirtion.The
avoid seerain
of African no
the eyes of Arnerloall,(`
itself with racist,
all this it was las
tion remPainn
year.
Flirthermare,
could count on
aid frOM the
Sedalia Mon
also aware Of
?
Might held
peaceful comistetele
detente.
It NM.*
sequences, too
be resolved in
the leadersin
Party of Cuba
decide, and it
hag, in a ig
3. Far froai
said, it was a
sign act of C
sion Was raed
vie* Union
Contdet
(ion and the
the Liberation
boon very In
gen
vara fo
,he CO
IOLA leadiE
wit went to
Endo, the
APIA, who
.hen .
In May
mere getting Y
tfrican eel
Tao WashinstoO Post
Where Angolan guerrillas were trained
to
on Nov.
'been
'skiver'
e deci-
was the SO'
revolu-
for
LA) had
first be.
In
at
to him-
by
of the
d in the
Portainime
1,1,9 their
ffi
help
asked
riber more
Commandant
vifisa Cu-
ban delegation to Luanda three
months later. Nato was more precise
? He asked Cuba to selul imbuc.
tots to open and ren four military
tndning camps. _
Although the IOLA, *high began
1956,' was Anugotees older liberae
tion rooirement and the only one with
broad popular bask and although it
offered a? .social, political and eco-
prigram that exited the coup-
* conditions, it was nonetheless
the one in the weakest military posi-
tion. It had SmaA arme? but lacked
trairred'to use theft).
There was no assurance that the
Portuguese military wanld let the Cu- -
ban instructors cliseinbark. Only on
July 16, "WM when Cuba had received
the first aid request from the liePLA,
did Castro tusk Portugal's c 01. Otelo
Saraiva de Carvalho (then a leftist
master Of the. junta in Lisbon) to at-
range- Portuguese ion fin. Cu-
ban aid to Angola. that visit to
Havana, Carvalher premised to see to
It, but his answere had not let erri-
ved.
So when the (Cuban he/Op/tip) Viet
Nam Iterate? arrived in Puerto Am-
beim at 6:30 a.m. Oct. 4' and the Coral
Island arrived on the 7th and the La
Plata at PIMP -*ere on the 11th,
they docked **EA ..fineanies.Permls.
Eon ? but also;orittiont anyone's op-
potation.
The cusikothoitreetere were met by
the liPLA and hinisedittely set up the
four training (waters: one in Del-
atando, which the Portugurese had
called Salazar, 100 utiles east of
Luanda; the second in Benguela, the
Atlantic seaport; the third in San-
rime, formerly Enrique de *wrath%
in the remote deserted eastern pray-
lime of Lunde, where the Portuguese
had had a milltterY llWie that On de'
stroYed before abandoning it; and the
fourth in the enclave ed.Cabinete.
Holden Roberto's troops of the oln
g-F
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3
Posing National Front (FNLA) were
then so close to the Angolan capital,
that a Cuban artillery instructor giv-
ing his lAtdents their first lessons at
Delatan4,.. saw the armored cars of
the rnerchanized brigade of regular
South African troops crossed from
Namibia, and three days later they
had occupied the towns of Sa da
Bandeira and Idocamedes without
meeting any resistance,
It was a Sunday stroll. The South
Africans had tape casettes of lively
music in their tanks. In the north, the
leader Of a mercenary column di-
rected operations from a Honda
sports car, beside a blonde who looked
like a movie actress, They advanced
as if they were on holiday, with no
scouts out ahead, and they probably
knew where the rocket came from
that blew the car into bits. In the
Woman's overnight case there was
only a party dress, a bikini and an in-
vitaidon to the victory. party Holden
Roberto was already planning in
Luanda...
By the end of the week, the South
Africans had penstrated more than
350 miles into Angolan territory and
were advancing toward Luanda at the
retool more than 40 miles a day. On
Noe. 3, they attacked the WAIF man-
ned training camp for recruits in Ben-
Plebe The Cuban instructors, there
had to break off their classes to lead
their appreetice soldiers against the
Invade" teaching them during lulls
in Battle ? ,
The 3IPLA leaders, prepared for
guerrilla war but not for largeecede
conventional battles, then understood
that their combined neighbors, equip-
ped with the most rapacious and dev-
astating resources of Imperialism,
could not be beaten without an urgent
appeal to international solidarity.
By then there as not a Angie Aft!-
can liberation movement that had hot
counted on the- solidarity of Cuba,
sometimes in the form of arms and
war materiel and other times in. the
form of training for military and civil-
Jae technicians and sPecialists. MO-
zambique since 1963. Guinea-Bissau
since 1666, Cameroon and Sierra
Leone all sought and received some
expression of solidarity and aid from
the Cubans at one time or another.
Guinean President Sekou Toure
threw back a mercenary landing with
the aid of a Cuban unit . . When
Neto called on Angolan students in
Portugal to go and study in socialist
countries, Cuba welcomed many df
them. All of them are now involved in
the construction of socialism in An-
gola, some in very prominent posi-
tions (including ,the finance nihnster,
head of the military academy, etc.).
_
Nothing demonstrates more clearly
the length and depth of the Cuban
presence in Africa than the fact that
Che Guevara himself threw himself
into the battles of the Congo at the
peak of his career.
On April 25, 1965, he gave Fidel
Castro a farewell letter resigning his
reek as a commandant and everything
(CUBA IN AFRICA, Pg 10-F)
lmi---x471111114
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3
'
Part
Friend!'
Would
Would Cost Carter No
Main Edit int Attot1.2*Jattua
BY MOT CONINE
Reports keep cropping up that the Castro
government in Cuba would like to reduce its
role in Angola and concentrate on solving
severe economic difficulties at home. If this is
true, the stage may soon be set for a resump-
tion Of efforts to normalize U.S. relations with
Cuba.
The two countries were edging cautiously
toward negotiations until the Cuban dispatch
of several thousand troops to Angola in the
autumn of 1975, and Washington's understan-
dably stiff reaction stopped the movement in
Its tracks.
In the context of time and circumstances.
the U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba and the
attempt to isolate the Communist regime from
normal contacts with other countries in the
hemisphere made sense in the early 1960s.
As time went on, however, it became ob-
vious that. the Castro government would not
go away; that danger from Havana-supported
guerrilla movements in other Latin American
countries was fading, and that U.S. policies
actually were forcing Cuba into an ever great-
er dependence on the Soviet Union.
The Castro regime, for its part, could not es.
cape the economic facts of life. The estrange.
ment was denying Cuba advantageous access
to American marketoand-Anierieratieclmoloo.
gy that was needed for its development ef-
forts.
The first signs of a thaw came in 1972, when
Washington and Havana negotiated an agreed
ment providing for the extradition of Ameti.
can skyjackers landing in Cuba. But the real
breakthrough came in the first eight months
of 1975.
Premier Castro, on the occasion of a visit by
Sen. George McGovern (D-S.D.) and a party
of U.S. newsmen, talked a tough line?but
made it ummistakably clear that he would
welcome better relations. In his words, "We
wish friendship. We belong to two different
worlds, but we are neighbors. One way or an-
other, we owe it to ourselves to live in peace."'
Within weeks thereafter, the United States
joined 15 other members of the Organization
of American States in voting to remove the
organization's collective sanctions against
Cuba, and eased the restrictions on tales to
Cuba by foreign subsidiaries of American
'companies.
Realists. didn't expect that normal trade and
diplomatic ties would be restored overnight,
but it did appear that the two governments
were nearing direct negotiations.
Then came the revelation that 15,000 or
more Cuban troops had landed hi Angola to
insure the victory of the Marxist-oriented, So-
viet-backed MPLA in that country's bloody,
three-cornered power struggle.
President Ford called Castro an "interna-
tional outlaw" for intervening in Angola, and
warned that continued Cuban meddling in
Puerto Rico would be considered an "un.
friendly act." Castro called Ford a "vulgar
liar," and announced his intention of extend-
ing military and political support to "progres-
sive" movements wherever and whenever he
chose.
In October, professing to believe that the
United States was involved in the bombing of
a Cuban airliner in which 73 people were
Ernest Conine is a Times editorial Writer.
~mow
kilted, Castro announced his intention of
int up the antiskyjacking agreement.
point out, however, that in that
very speech the Cuban leader was 'careful to
suggest an interest in discussing a new agree-
ment with Washington this year. Earlyin De.
ember, Raul Castro?minister of the armed
forces and Fidel's younger brother.'-made a
speech extending what was regarded as an
olive branch to the incoming Carter adminis-
tration.
These cautious signasif they are indeed
signals?coincide with reports of severe eco-
nomic difficulties growing frmn a disastrous
drop in sum prices to little more than a tenth
of the level prevailing two years ago. Despite
attempts to diversify the economy, sugar ac.
counts for 86% of Cuba's -> earnings.
The consequences are. felt in the form
of tighter ratkidrig, drastic 0,, on inrigetti
also-called lam grade and a dragandelido
(Went Plans.
The economic situation is Went to be
creating pressures for a withdrawal $t
least a big reduction?of the Oho MOO*
II, southern Africa.
It is assumed that the Soviet Unbaa footri
most of the bill, in money terms, for moisten+
ance of 14,000 to 1000 Cuban soldlen
roughly 10% of the Cuban army?In Mark
But thaw soldiers possess4echnissilakille, Oar*
though extremely valuable to the new Iratelti-g
goverranent in Angola, are badly needed ha*
home.
All the talk about a significant redaction fa
the Cuban role in Africa could turn cat to ha
poppycock, of course. Cuban soldiers may yet
end up fighting' in Rhodesia or South.West
Africa, in which case U.S.-Cuban relations
will obviously become worse rather than het*
ter.
It could turnout, to that while Cohn
uinely wants improved Mations and theses.
110Mie advantages that such a movement
would bring, he wants normalization only on
his own terms. If taken at face value, -soma
Cuban pronouncements me? just that.
The Commission on United States-1410i
American Relations, a )Jigh-level group that
in a recent report urged Army Carter to seeic
better ,relations with the Castro regime on a
CUBA IN AFAICA corm=
else that tied him to the government
of Cuba. On that same day, traveling
alone, he took a commercial flight, us-
ing a false passport and a false name
but not altering his aPPearenee
carrying with him an attache ease
filled with literary worts and Inhalers
for his incessant asthma, and killing
his empty hours in hotel mem With
interminable solo games of chess.
Three months littok 10 the Congo,
he joined 200 Cuban troops who had
traveled from Havana in an arms
ship. Che's mission was to train Suer.
rillas for the National RevolutionarY
Council of the Congo, then battling
1Vioise Tshombe, the puppet of the old
Belgian colonists and the baterna-
tional mining companies . . .
For greater security (Che) was not
listed as the head of the mission so
he was known by the noodleirm;rre
of Tatu, Swahili for the number 2.
Che Guevara stayed in the Conga
from April to December 1005, not only
training guerrillas but also directing
10-F
12 JANI.1
GROUPS A
TO BAR B-1
WASHINGTON, Jan. II (u
national organizations asked
crout today to blockadditional
the supersonic 8-1 bOmber, all
the Defense Department and )
had faield to satisfy an enviro
pact study required by law.
The suit, in District Court,
environmental-impact statement
by the Air Force did not consid
fives to the controversial bo
gave only superficial attenti n
plane's impact upon ' air qualit
levels and ozone levels in the
sphere.
The Administration anno
month that it was going ahead
liminary contracts on the born
the understanding that Presi
Carter will make the final deei
the plane's fate when he takes offl
The court order sought by thre
ronmental organizations and fon
groups could force suspension of
merit spending for Ihe project a
the awarding of additional contra t
The suit was filed by the Environ
Action Foundation, Americans fo
cratic Action, the Federation of A
Scientists, the Oil, Chemical and
Workers International Union. Fri
the Earth, council on Economic P
and Environmental Action Inc.
gradual and reciprocal
note. ?
Havana, theum
ttued to expect Wastdngton to lift
embargo and curb the activities of mg
terrorists based in this cotintry. In
however, the United States has a right
peat the Cubans to restrain their
ventioniiii appetites?both in Africa
Western Hemisphere.
It isn't clear what priority Carter wilt
to an easing of the Cuban si
deed, to Latin America generally.
Mating the long - -"At at the
States and cube is itt interest of
country.
The new President would lose
risk nothing by *Veil letting Castro I
that his administration is readicinal
LLand.
work sten by stalk toward a
.1 Then the next signal
14+10 in Holm
them in battle and, fighting slough
them,. His personal ties with ,
Castro,'about which there, has
mach speculation, did not
at any time. The two kept up
and cordial contacts through very
dent systems of eommuniention.
When ktoiseTshombe was der
the Congolese asked the '; Cubans
withdraw, to make the armistice
ler. Che Guevara left as he had caul
without fanfare. ,
He took a commercial flight
Dar es Salaam, capital of Ta
haying his face in a book of che
problems during the entire six bouts
of flight. In the next seat his Cuban
adjutan was kept buoy entertaining,
the Political ecantnissar of the army o
Zanzibar, Who was an old admirer
Che and spoke tirelessly of hi
throughout the flight, asking for
latest news of him and saying over
and over how much he would like to
see him again.
That fleeting, anonymous passage of
Che Guevara through Africa planted
a seed that no one could uproot.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/10: LOC-HAK-104-3-9-3