THE FUTURE OF THE SOVIET COMMITMENT IN ANGOLA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-104-1-5-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2012
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: December 24, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/03/19: LOC-HAK-104-1-5-9
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
I asked my analysts: to consider
how determined the Soviets will be in
support of , the MPLA in varioUs Angolan
.contingencies. The results--not at all-
cheerful?are attached. ,
Attachment
MORI/CDF Pages 2-5 per C03213721
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: The Future of the Soviet Commitment in Angola
1. Moscow's performance in Angola over the past sev-
eral months bespeaks a rather tough and unyielding cast of
mind regarding its support for the MPLA. The Soviets have
been unflinching in the face of the countervailing pres-
sures that have arisen, both in Africa and the US, during
those months. Moscow seems to be saying, both on the ground
in Angola and in its public utterances, that it is willing
to go a significant distance to support an MPLA victory.
2. Moscow is also saying that appeals to the idea
of detente will not deter the Soviet Union from pursuing
what it regards as its legitimate role as a world .power.
Angola has become the occasion, perhaps intentionally, more
likely fortuitiously, for the Soviets to make a point
that they have been anxious to assert since the brouhahas
over Vietnam and Somalia, namely, that the Soviet Union
will not allow the US to establish the ground rules of
detente. This means that if the US, for domestic reasons,
cannot bring its power to bear in a given arena, then it
will be compelled to accept the consequences. The Soviet
Union will not, out of a magnanimous spirit, forego op-
portunities to strengthen its position in the world or
use its influence to protect US interests.
3. In their present frame of mind, the Soviets are
unresponsive to arguments that their actions in Angola will
unduly complicate their broader relations with the US. The
detente atmosphere was palpably soured over trade, emigra-
tion and SALT II before Angola became a political issue
between the two countries. The Soviets are also likely to
view as hypocritical complaints about the incompatibility
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of detente and Angola in the light of extensive US publicity
over Chile and assassinations and against real US gains at
Moscow's expense in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East,
as well as Portugal. The Soviets are skeptical that Wash-
ington will step back from a SALT agreement because of An-
gola, or will refuse to market its surplus grain in the
Soviet Union because the MPLA strengthens its hold on Luanda.
The Soviets probably calculate that real interests of the
two countries are at the heart of the actual rather than
the rhetorical detente relationship and that the impact
of Angola is not likely to be of lasting consequence.
4. This kind of analysis would commend itself to
Brezhnev because he has strong domestic political reasons for
pursuing a tough line now on Angola. It is a place where he
can demonstrate that detente not only creates opportunities
for "social progress," but also does not inhibit the Soviet
Union from taking advantage of them. Angola, to some extent,
offsets Cunhal's reversal in Portugal, the disappointment of
Helsinki, the policy debacle in Egypt. With detente providing
few concrete gains, and the Party Congress approaching, he
probably finds it politic to stress orthodox ideological
themes.
The Near Future
5. The factors which have contributed to Moscow's
Angola policy could change in significant ways over the next
few months. /
6. If Brezhnev gets through the Party Congress in good
shape, politically as well as physically, he may feel under
less pressure to show that he is willing and able to stand
up to the Americans. The pain associated with the setbacks
in agriculture and the economic retrenchment may be less
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obstrusive. The Soviets may therefore feel somewhat less
defensive vis-a-vis the US and less compelled to demonstrate
that they are dealing from a position of strength. Any prog-
ress on bilateral issues such as SALT would tend to refocus
attention on the detente relationship and relegate, in the
eyes of the world as well as the leaders in Moscow, Angola
to the wings. This would then make it easier for Moscow to
cut a deal on Angola.
? 7. As we move into the next year, the Soviets Will
also be paying more attention to the impact of their actions
on US politics. The Kremlin will, of course, want to avoid
giving the US reason to believe that it has significant
leverage because of Moscow's desire to abet the electoral
fortunes of the supporters of detente. But Angola is the
kind of place where the Soviets can afford to show some
restraint in the interest of not poisoning the atmosphere
during the elections.
8. But whether such "restraint" will be forthcoming
will also depend greatly on the situation on the ground in
Angola. At one end of the spectrum, the Soviets are unlikely
to show much restraint if there is a serious threat to the
continued existence of the MPLA in Luanda. Moscow cannot
afford another highly visible defeat, particularly between
now and the Party Congress, and particularly in a situation
like Angola where the "victor" Will be seen to be the US.
If this contingency threatened, we would expect the SovietsN
to send in more arms, more Cubans, and more of their own
advisors. We strongly doubt that the Soviets will commit
their own ground forces in Significant numbers. The Soviets
are likely to assert a presence with a token force of a few
ships out of the Mediterranean, and respond to any larger
US show of naval force.
9. At the other end of the spectrum, Angola does not
yet figure so prominently in Soviet priorities that Moscow
feels a strong imperative for an early and decisive victory
there. But Moscow is not likely to apply significant pressure
on Neto or the Cubans to refrain from significantly strengthen-
ing their territorial position, or routing the FNLA and Unita
if that seems possible with the forces and material at hand
SECRET
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0-CA-AVE.,
or in the pipeline. The dynamic of the patron-client relation-
ship is such that the Soviets would have a hard time keeping
the MPLA reined in if victory appeared to be ahead. The
problem is made worse by the Cubans who would make league
with Neto in arguing that the Soviets should not rob them of
the fruits of their efforts for reasons unrelated to Angola.
Under these Circumstances, it would be very hard for Brezhnev,
or any other Soviet leader, to actively thwart the MPLA,
(for example, by constricting the supply flow) at the behest
of Washington.
10. This does not mean that the MPLA has a blank check.
A gradual victory in Angola, which minimized the complications
on the detente front while giving the Soviet Union what it
wants, would be the ideal outcome for Moscow. If the Soviets
judged that events were moving in this fashion, they would
probably resist pressures from their clients to support a
course aimed at a dramatic early victory.
11. If the conflict seemed to settle into a prolonged
and indecisive stalemate, strong MPLA pressures would arise
for an increase in aid, but it would also probably lead other
Africans to argue more strongly for a political compromise.
The Soviets probably have not yet made up their minds about
how to handle this possibility. If it confronted them, the
state of their relations with the US in general would be
a factor in their reaction and we believe would lead them. '
to accept some compromise solution rather than holding out
and pressing for an MPLA "victory? over vigorous US counter-
support of the FLNA and UNITA. If they had to make such a
decision now, however, it looks as though they would opt
for raising their Angolan stake, in the belief that the US
is not likely to engage sufficiently to prevent them.
4 -
SECRET
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MEMORANDUM
()If-
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET /SENSITIVE tXGDS
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Mr. Clift
ACTION
8438X
December 24, 1975
CIA Assessment ? Future of Soviet Commitment
in Angola
On December 24, the Director of Central Intelligence sent the President
an Agency assessment of how determined the Soviet Union will be to
support the MPLA in various Angolan contingencies in the near term.
The memorandum for your signature to the President at Tab I would
forward the text and a summary of the main points of the Agency report.
RECOMMENDATION
That you forward Director Colby's assessment with the memorandum
at Tab L
cc: Hal Horan
SECRET/SEN TIVE/XGDS
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