CIA ASSESSMENT -- FUTURE OF SOVIET COMMITMENT IN ANGOLA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-104-1-4-0
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 28, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/05/24: LOC-HAK-104-1-4-0
.M MUKALNUL'M
WASHINGTON
THE WHITE HOUSE
SECRET / SBNStTIV E /XGDS
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Aln
Brent Scowcroft +i lam'
SUBJECT: CIA Assessment -- Future of Soviet Commitment
in Angola
.The Director of Central Intelligence has sent you (at Tab A) an Agency
assessment focussed specifically on how determined the Soviet Union will
be to support the MPLA in various Angolan contingencies in the near term.
Principal points are:
-> Moscow at present is willing to go a significant distance in support
of the MPLA.
..> Moscow does not yet see Soviet involvement in Angola as a real
threat to detente.
At the same time, consensus within the Kremlin for the current
Angolan policy is not deep.
>- The Soviets have probably not yet made up their minds on whether
to increase support for the MPLA or move toward a political compromise
if the Angolan conflict begins to settle into a prolonged and indecisive
stalemate.
The following paragraphs summarize the Agency analysis.
Back ro,xmd
>- Moscow's performance in Angola over the past several months
bespeaks a rather tough and unyielding cast of mind regarding its support
for the MPLA. Moscow seems to be saying, both on the ground in Angola
and in its public utterances, that it is willing to go a significant distance
to support an MPLA victory.
SECRETI~; SITIVE/XGDS
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/05/24: LOC-HAK-104-1-4-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/05/24: LOC-HAK-104-1-4-0
SECRET/SENSI 'IVE/XGDS
-- Moscow is also saying that appeals to the idea of detente will not
deter the Soviet Union from pursuing what it regards as itE, legitimate role
as a world power.
-> In their present frame of mind, the Soviets are unresponsive to
arguments that their actions in Angola will unduly complicate their broader
relations with the US. The detente atmosphere was palpably soured over
trade, emigration and SALT II before Angola became a political issue
between the two countries. The Soviets are skeptical that Washington will
step back from a SALT agreement or will refuse to market its surplus grain
in the Soviet Union because of Angola.
>- This kind of analysis would commend itself to Brezhnev because he
has strong domestic political reasons for pursuing a tough line now on
Angola. It is a place where he can demonstrate that detente not only
creates opportunities for "social progress, " but also does.not inhibit the
Soviet Union from taking advantage of them.
The Near Future
-- The factors which have contributed to Moscow's Angola policy could
chan a in si nificant wa ove
-- If Brezhnev gets through the Party Congress in good shape,
politically as well as physically, he may feel under less pressure to show
that he is willing and able to stand up. to the Americans in Angola. The
pain associated with the setbacks in agriculture and the economic retrench-
,ment may become less evident1 The Soviets may therefore feel somewhat
less defensive and less compelled to demonstrate that they are dealing from
a position of strength.
-> Any progress on bilateral issues such as SALT would tend to refocus
attention on the detente relationship and relegate? in the eyes of the world
as well as the leaders in Moscow, Angola to the wings. This would then
make it easier for Moscow to cut a deal on Angola.
SECRET/SENSITWE/XGD.S
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/05/24: LOC-HAK-104-1-4-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/05/24: LOC-HAK-104-1-4-0
SECRET/SENSITI'V'E/XGDS
-- As we move into the next year, the Soviets will also be paying more
attention to the impact of their actions on US politics. They may wish to
show some restraint in the interest of not poisoning the atr..-iosphere during
the elections.
Conclusion
-.. Whether the Soviets demonstrate "restraint" will depend greatly
on the situation on the ground in Angola. At one end of the spectrum,
the Soviets are unlikely to show much restraint if there is a serious threat
to the continued existence of the MPLA. Moscow cannot afford another
highly visible defeat. If this contingency threatened, the Soviets could be
expected to send in more arms, more Cubans, and more of their own
advisors, together with a token show of naval force in the area.
-- At the other end of the spectrum, Angola does not yet figure so
prominently in Soviet priorities that Moscow feels a strong imperative
for an early and decisive victory there. But Moscow is not likely to
apply significant pressure on the MPLA or the Cubans to refrain from
significantly strengthening their territorial position, or routing the
opposition if that seems possible with the forces and material at hand or
in the pipeline.
-- This does not mean that the MPLA has a blank check. A gradual
victory in Angola, which minimized the complications on the detente front
would be the ideal outcome for Moscow. If the Soviets judged that events
were moving in this fashion, they would probably resist pressures from
their clients to support a course aimed at a dramatic early victory.
-- If the conflict seemed to settle into a prolonged and indecisive
stalemate, strong MPLAA pressures would arise for an increase in aid.
But the situation would also probably lead other Africans to argue more
strongly for a political compromise. The Soviets probably have not yet
made up their minds about how to handle this possibility. If it confronted
them, the state of their relations with the US in general would be a factor
in their reaction and would probably lead them to accept some compromise
solution rather than holding out and pressing for a total MPLA "victory. "
If they had to make such a decision now, however, they would likely opt for
raising their Angolan stake, in the belief that the" US is not likely to take
effective preventive action.
SECRET/S ST,,.,,, TIV'E/XGDS
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/05/24: LOC-HAK-104-1-4-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/05/24: LOC-HAK-104-1-4-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/05/24: LOC-HAK-104-1-4-0