US OPTIONS ON RECOGNITION IN ANGOLA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-102-6-5-6
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 3, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/02: LOC-HAK-102-6-5-6 21733
V ?.
SECRET EXDIS
To: The .Secretary
NOV 3 1975
From: AF Edward W. Mulcahy, Acting ~G voles
US Options on Recognition in Angola .
The Problem
Assuming no decisive military reverses between now
and November 11, the MPLA can be expected to declare
itself the sole government of Angola on or before that
date and to seek widest possible recognition. There
are indications that FNLA and UNITA may set up a rival
government, or governments, at the same time. We
should be considering whether to recognize any of the
movements and what influence our decision might have
on.FNLA and UNITA.
Background/Analysis
The MPLA has made clear its position as the sole
legitimate claimant of sovereignty and has rejected
any idea of political accommodation with FNLA and UNITA.
The Portuguese have tried without success to bring the
three movements.together before independence. They now
appear resigned to handing over sovereignty. somehow to
all three movements without insisting that they form a
coalition again. There is currently an OAU initiative
to achieve peace and unity in Angola, but we as yet
know relatively little about its progress. It has so
far produced a call for a cease fire from Field Marshal
Amin and a reported OAU suggestion that the Portuguese
transfer power to all three Angolan movements. We
believe that only a major defeat, including the loss of
Luanda, would deter MPLA from declaring unilateral
independence and seeking international recognition as
the successor to the Portuguese.
SECRET/EXDIS
XGDS--1
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SECRET/EXDIS
FNLA and UNITA
are making plans to establish a provisional government
of their own, probably to be based in Nova Lisboa,
Angola's second largest city. Such a rival government
would give substance to FNLA/UNITA's claim that together
they control the majority of Angola's population and
territory and at the same time would underscore the
MPLA's minority position. Its existence would provide
.hesitant governments with a reason to go slow in deciding
on recognition of an Angolan government. A rival
FNLA/UNITA government could be psychologically bene-
ficial to FNLA and UNITA fighting forces, and could
provide a basis for closer cooperation between the two
movements. It would also strengthen their position for
eventual negotiations with the MPLA. The absence of
such a. rival government would fortify the MPLA's claims
that FNLA and UNITA had been reduced to outlawed
guerrillas.
The reported FNLA/UNITA plan would have some draw-
backs as well. While we would expect most communist'
governments to recognize the MPLA regime fairly soon
after independence, as would certain "progressive"
governments in Africa and elsewhere (possibly some 25
governments, at a guess) there would be few governments
willing to recognize an FNLA/UNITA regime set up outside
the capital. The contrast with recognition extended
to the MPLA government-would be politically damaging
to FNLA/UNITA's cause.
US Options on Recognition
The recognition question could pose difficult
decisions for the United States although our general
policy in Africa of letting OAU governments take the lead
in matters like, this should provide us with a time cush-
ion. This is based on the assumption -- which we believe
to be correct -- that a significant number. of African
governments will delay recognition of any Angolan govern-
ment. Our public position on Angola is to favor a nego-
tiated solution 'giving all groups representing the Angolan
people; a fair role in the country's future. We therefore,
could not recognize a minority MPLA regime, and by the
same token it would be difficult for us to recognize a
SECRET/EXDIS
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SECRET/EXDIS
rival FNLA/UNITA government which totally excludes the
MPLA. Furthermore, few other states would join us in
recognizing FNLA/UNITA, and our move would probably elicit
criticism from other countries and at home.
Our position, therefore, would logically be to withhold
recognition from either rival regime pending the formation
of an Angolan government representing all three movements.
This is a position that many African governments are
likely to take, at least at the outset. Our position
should probably be conveyed to Mobutu very soon, and in
any case before November l L,so that he, Holden and Savimbi
can take it into consideration when formulating their
plans. We are inclined to believe that he will not be
surprised but will count on us to try to dissuade other
non-African governments from recognizing MPLA.
Our position if FNLA and UNITA should decide to estab-
lish tw?o separate regimes to rival the MPLA would still
logically have to be to withhold recognition from either
one. Such a decision on their part would probably favor
MPLA. Their collaboration thus far against NPLA has served
to underscore MPLA's go-it-alone approach and pro-communist
orientation. The establishment of separate FNLA and UNITA
seats of government would lessen this collaboration and
provide opportunities for MPLA to play the two regimes'
off against each other.
Our position in the seemingly unlikely event of an
agreement between MPLA.and UNITA to form a government would
be difficult. Such a government would presumably be
opposed by Mobutu but would stand a good chance of gaining
early recognition by many or most African countries. We
would probably wish to consider recognizing it if it'showed
signs?of durability. We doubt that such a link-up will
happen, but it is conceivable. Efforts by Neto in this
direction ceased months ago and he and Savimbi now appear
to be definitively estranged. If Neto were to lose power
in MPLA, however, a rapprochement with UNITA might occur.
The scenarios and options that follow lead us on
balance to conclude that we should be in no hurry to
recognize a successor regime in Angola.
SECRET/EXDIS
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Scenario A:
MPLA declares UDI; FNLA and UNITA continue fighting
without jointly or separately establishing rival govern-
ment(s).
O Lion 1: Recognize the MPLA regime as the legitimate
government of Angola.
Advantages:
-- Would improve the potential for establishing
amicable relations with an MPLA government.
-- Would facilitate protection of American citizens
and investments in MPLA-held areas of Angola.
Disadvantages:
-- Would be contrary to our publicly-stated policy of
favoring a government representative of all three
movements.
--- Would be politically damaging to the other two
movements.
-- Would damage our relations with Zaire.
-- Would present an image of US weakness and undermine
our global prestige.
option 2: Refuse to recognize an MPLA regime.
Advantages:
-- Would underscore our opposition to an MPLA minority
government.
-- Would be viewed favorably by the other two movements,
by Mobutu and perhaps Kaunda, and by other moderate
African leaders.
Might serve to discourage other governments from
recognizing an MPLA regime.
SECRET/EXDIS
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Disadvantates:
-- Would place us in an unfavorable position with the
MPLA should circumstances require us to deal with
their regime. at a future time.
Recommendation:
That you approve a policy of not recognizing an MPLA
Approve Disapprove
Scenario B:
MPLA declares UDI; FNLA and UNITA jointly proclaim
their own Angolan government and continue the war.
Option 1: Recognize MPLA as the legitimate regime;
refuse recognition to FNLA/UNITA.
Advantages:
Would improve the potential for establishing amicable
relations with MPLA.
Disadvantages:
-- Essentially the same as for option 1, Scenario A on
Page 4. However, the political impact on FNLA
and UNITA, our relations with Zaire and attitudes
of. other governments, would be much more negative.
2: Recognize FNLA/UNITA; refuse to recognize MPLA.
Advantages:
-- Would further strengthen US relations with Zaire.
-- Would strengthen US relations with FNLA/UNITA.
Disadvantages:
-- Would not be consistent with our public policy of
favoring a government representing all three movements.
SECRET/EXDIS
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SECRET/EXDIS
-- Could trigger MPLA retaliation against US citizens
and investments remaining in MPLA-controlled terri-
to ry.
-- Would probably not be followed by many other
governments, thus isolating us on the Angolan issue
and limiting our influence.
Would risk African charges that we support the
Balkanization of the continent.
-- Would reduce prospects for future amicable relations
MPLA.
Option 3: Recognize neither regime.
Advantages:
-- Would be consistent with our public policy
--- Might discourage other governments from recognizing
a separate regime.-
Dis'adwantages:
-- Could be construed by FNLA, UNITA and Mobutu as
inadequate political support for FNLA/UNITA regime.
-- Might cause MPLA to retaliate against remaining
US. citizens and investments in MPLA held areas of
Angola.
Recommendations:
That you approve a policy of not recognizing a separate
FNLA/UNITA regime.
Approve Disapprove
That you approve of our informing Mobutu of this policy
as soon as possible with appropriate explanation.
Approve Disapprove
SECRET/EXDIS
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Scenario C:
MPLA and UNITA establish a JOINT Government that
appears viable.
Advantages:
--- Would be in line with the likely recognition by
most other African and European powers.
---- Would facilitate protection of US citizens and
investments in areas controlled by the regime
(80% of Angola).
--Would forestall charges that the US is supporting
'Balkanization.
-- Would put us on the side of the likely victors.
'Dis'advantages; Could severely damage our relations with Zaire..
--- Would be inconsistent with our policy of favoring
a government composed of all three movements.
Option 2: Refuse to recognize this regime until FNLA
is inc
Advantages:
Would help our relations with Zaire.
--Would be consistent with our policy.
Disadvantages:
-- Would be viewed by the Angolan regime, most
African governments and the OAU as interference in
African affairs.
SECRET/EXDIS
Option 1: Recognize this regime; break contact with
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SECRET/EXDIS
-- Would commit our prestige to a losing cause.
Would jeopardize our investments and future economic
ties with Angola.
Recommendation :
AF considers that it is too early to make a recommen-
dation concerning this scenario becuase it is still fairly
hypothetical. However, if a union between MPLA and UNITA
did show signs of viability we would probably wish to
consider following the lead of the moderate African states
.on recognition.
Scenario D:
All three movements establish separate governments
in their areas of control; fighting continues.
Option 1: Recognize MPLA; refuse recognition to the
other two.:
Advantages and Disadvantages:
-- Same as Option 1, Scenario A, Page 4.
tion 2: Recognize the FNLA (or UNITA) regime.
Advantages:
Would give political support to FNLA (or UNITA).
-- Would please Mobutu (or Kaunda).
Disadvantages:
-- Would not be supported by many other governments,
leaving us exposed.
-- Would elicit widespread criticism at home and
abroad as US support for Balkanization of Africa.
-- Would be inconsistent with our publicly stated
policy of favoring a government representative
of all three movements.
Option 3: Recognize none of the competing regimes.
SECRET/EXDIS
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SECRET/EXDIS
Advantates and Disadvantages:
-- Same as Option 3, Scenario B, Page 6.
Recommendation:
That you approve a policy of not recognizing any
single movement as the legitimate government of Angola.
Approve Disapprove
Scenario E:
The OAU makes progress with its announced peace
keeping plans and gets sufficient cooperation from the
three movements so that separate governments are not
proclaimed by any movement or movements. A coalition of
the movements takes power in Luanda on or soon after
November 11.
Option 1: Quickly recognize the coalition government.
Advantages:
-- Would offer possibility of maintaining a presence
in Luanda and protecting US lives and investments.
-- Would put our policy in line with the OAU's.
Disadvantages:
-- Such a coalition might prove shaky, and if it
collapsed our personnel could be caught up in the
subsequent street fighting.
--- In event of breakdown of regime, MPLA would be
likely to emerge on top, at least in Luanda,
'placing us in the position of having to continue
recognition of MPLA or break relations with an
MPLA rump regime.
Option 2: Delay recognition of tripartite coali-
tion until it appears reasonably steady on its feet.
SECRET/EXDIS
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Advanta s:
-- Avoids risk to our personnel.
--- May give added weight to our recognition once we
decide to accord it.
Disadvantages :
-- Could be interpreted by Angolan or OAU authorities
as US hostility to new regime.
-- Would reduce our ability to protect US citizens
and investments.
Recommendation:
This scenario is almost as hypothetical as Scenario C.
We would be inclined to favor Option 2, but political
factors we cannot foresee might alter this view. We
make no recommendation at present.
xt/WLCutler/RFAndrew:lar
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Clearance:: S/P : Mr. Petterson (Z-&-
INR:Mr. Hyland (Intelligence assessments only)'
S/NM:Mr. Vance (Draft) iw. i -
SECRET/EXDIS
Drafted: AF/C:
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