40 COMMITTEE MEETING, NOVEMBER 14, 1975 - ANGOLA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-102-6-30-8
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: November 13, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/01/06: LOC-HAK-102-6-30-8
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
DOS, NSS, Review
Completed.
The Deputy Secretary
AF - Edward W. MulcahyflA
INR - William G. Hyland' n
November 13 1975
40 Committee Meeting, November 14, 1975 Angola
The 40 Committee meeting has been called to
discuss pressing items concerning Angola (Tab A with
five annexes). These items come under two major
categories: the funding of future USG support to
Angolan leaders and groups, and the proposed US response
to the current Soviet escalation of weaponry, notably
their introduction of MIG fighters.
Backvround. On November 10, the Popular Movement
for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which controls
Luanda, did the expected and declared itself the
government of Angola. Simultaneously the opposing
National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA)
and National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola (UNITA), which control 2/3 of the countryside
and population, declared their own government, based
in Angola's Second city, Nova Lisboa (now Huambo).
In September the MPLA's military position ap-
peared relatively strong. It had commitments from
the USSR and other outside backers to continue sub-
stantial military assistance. It counted on its ability
to gain recognition from a considerable number of
communist and non-aligned nations. In fact, its
military position proved to be greatly over-extended.
A coordinated FNLA-UNITA counter-offensive, backed
by increasing amounts of US, Zairian, and, more
recently, South African military assistance drove
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MPLA forces back to present positions. These generally
coincide with the three movements' respective areas of
ethnic strength. Soviet assistance was stepped up greatly
after these MPLA reverses. An airlift began on October 31,
staged through Guinea and the Congo, and deliveries have
included sophisticated rocket launching systems and MIG
aircraft. In addition, 1,000 or 2,000 Cuban troops have
arrived in Angola and Cabinda.
Recognition of the MPLA regime has been slower to come
than expected; 17 countries have so far recognized it,
including 9 Africans. No state has recognized the FNLA-
UNITA.
The MPLA appears to be holding the Cabinda enclave
solidly after attacks mounted last week from Zaire by
forces of a Cabindan liberation movement (not recognized
by any of the three Angolan movements) with Zaire's support.
The MPLA, With Cuban support, is counterattacking against
FNLA's forces around Luanda. The UNITA/FNLA spearhead
from Southern Angola has probably gone about as far as
it can go. There will probably be further assaults in
eastern Angola as UNITA attempts to open up the last
MPLA-held stretch of the vital Benguela Railroad.
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Air Defense: Mobutu's Requests. Since receiving
information pointing to an early introduction of Soviet
MIG aircraft with Cuban crews into Angola via Brazzaville,
President Mobutu has made requests asking us for 15 fighter
aircraft, foreign pilots, a radar network to cover Zaire,
Cabinda and northern Angola. We suggest that you say:
We have reviewed Mobutu's request for air defense
equipment, including radar and combat aircraft, to
meet the threat he sees as a result of the Soviet
supply of MIG 21s. We are not, iicau-pul.,- ginw,4--ed
that there 'ty
wou d justify the provision of the equipment
MeinEu has said he wishes. We at present see no
serious threat of an attack on Zaire by the Soviet-
provided MIG 21s in the Congo. Cuban-piloted planes
in Angola would more likely be used in Angola and
not for strikes into Zaire, although we would not
discount the possibility of tactical strikes against
Zairian military staging areas along the Angolan or
Cabindan borders.
The introduction of MIG 21s in Angola will have an
immediate and seriously destabilizing effect. They
could upset the present precarious military balance
in the MPLA's favor and could contribute to forcing
UNITA and FNLA back from gains made over the past
difficult weeks.
Reivests to Intercede with South Africans. The South
Africans have been playing a very important role in recent
military victories, notably in the capture of Bengnda and
Lobito. The South Africans, however, may cut back their
active participation in the fighting, fearing criticism at
home that the government is sending troops to fight in
Angola while withdrawing support to Rhodesia. We suggest
that you make the following points:
We understand South Africa's reluctance to extend
its commitment in Angola, while at the same time, it
is unwilling to provide troops to the regime in
Rhodesia. Nevertheless, South Africa entered the
Angolan war rot own easl:511ff_gna-had-Tade a decision
ternffErffMmuttgfttilffrEhere again on the merits of the
case as the South African government sees it. We
49_222L_Ihiah_thal_Iha_g2.ah2111A-atus the Sout1T--
KriaTairis?.65-i-dontinueip ex ?a their involvement.
ey wi i e ihoo opera e o a con-
lnuing sense of national interest.
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Should the South African involvement lead to requests
for American assistance, we would have to look at the
requests on a case-by-case basis. We would keep in
mind, however, that there are policy and legal re-
strictions against our cooperation with South Africa
that cannot be lightly set aside despite the importance
? of the Angolan problem.
Political Moves. The CIA proposes discussing political
moves to deter further Soviet escalation (Tab A) and political
moves to foster a peaceful solution. These include diplomatic
initiatives with other governments, an approach to the Soviet
Union, including a possible message from President Ford to
Breshnev, diplomatic efforts to induce an embargo on arms
shipments to Angola, the recognition by the USG of an FNLA-
, UNITA government, and diplomatic efforts through intermediaries
to dissuade Castro from the continued deployment of Cuban
military forces in Angola. Concerning such a discussion, we
suggest that you say the following:
We have reviewed the CIA's recommendations on various
forms of diplomatic initiatives that could be taken at
this critical juncture in the Angolan war. We agree
that it is time to review our negotiating posture, and
a detailed negotiating scenario is being drafted in the
Department of State for consideration by the agencies
represented in this committee.
The scenario ma include a -..roach to the Soviet
Ut n o cont 4 It may also
inc u.e an approach to African states to encourage
them to promote a peaceful settlement and possibly a
coalition compromise along the lines originally
spelled out in the Alvor Agreement. The Scenario may
include other initiatives. It will be ready early
next week for consideration and comment.
.-- We regard a diplomatic initiative as essential to
our Congressional posture. As you know, several
memDers ot tne Senate Foreign Relations Committee
pressed Under Secretary Sisco hard on what steps
We were taking to negotiate an Angolan settlement.
Whether we will be successful either with Moscow
or in the African arena is difficult to predict. 25X1
The prospects frankly are not good. Should we not
be successful, it will then be necessary to decide
how we are going to continue and maintain our commit-
ment to the contending liberation movements in Angola.
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INR/DDC:Fderarr,
? Ar :RS trand
PaiVisner
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reprirtry.
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GP EYES ONLY,
MEMORANDUM FOR: The 40 Committee
SUBJECT
lotio
Items for 40 Committee Consideration
1. On 10 November 197 the Portuguese removed their
?
last remaining troops from Angola. The Soviet-backed
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) assumed
five
control of the capital and keUT or -ail of the 15 provincial
capitals and claimed sovereignty over all Angola. The
National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)
are setting up a. rival government based in Nova Lisboa --
-,
renamed Huambo.
2. In recent weeks the MPLA has been beaten militarily
and has had to give up control of several provinces. The
Soviets appear to be reacting to these MPLA setbacks by
sending the MPLA mote weapons, including rockets, artillery
and armor. The MPLA has already been reinforced with Cuban
combat troops and there is intelligence that the Soviets are
providing the MPLA with MIG aircraft to be flown by Cuban
pilots.
DO NOT FILE
RETURN BY HAND
TO: ROOM 6635
WARMING NOTI,
SENSMVE INTEILMENCURCTS
AD METIIJDS
EYES ONLY
2 NOV 1975
7. 5 14 COPY_L
STAT
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INF
EYES ONLY
3. Attacks by the FNLA assisted by 2airois forces have
been repulsed by the MPLA and Cubans outside Luanda. An
attempt by the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of
Cabinda (FLEC) assisted by Zairois troops to take control
of Cabinda has not proceeded as quickly and easily as
President Mobutu expected. But the overall position of the
FNLA and UNITA versus the MPLA has been greatly improved.
2
SECRET
EYES ONLY "
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