THE SHORT-TERM OUTLOOK FOR ANGOLA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-102-5-28-2
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: October 31, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret-
Intelligence
The Short-Term Outlook For Angola
Secret
DCI/NIO 2232-75
31 October 1975
Copy NO
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INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
THE SHORT-TERM OUTLOOK FOR ANGOLA*
NOTE
This paper assesses the likely trend of events in Angola
between now and independence on November 11.
PRECIS
After almost 500 years of Portuguese rule, 13 years of anti-
Portuguese insurgency, and more than six months of sluggish civil
war, the territory of Angola is facing the unattractive prospect
of independence on November 11 without having a formal successor-
government to Portugal in place.
Portugal's leaders agree that the date of independence for
the territory will, not be postponed and that sovereignty will
not be transferred to a single liberation group. Their only way
out may be to transfer sovereignty to the "Angolan people" or
to the territory's three warring liberation groups simultaneously
and without formal ceremony.
In either event, the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola, if it has not unilaterally proclaimed
Angola's "independence" under its own banner before Independence
Day, will be ready to declare itself the territory's legal gov-
ernment. The Popular Movement is the only liberation group in
place in the capital of Luanda and it has established a shadow
government ready to assume responsibility for running the cen-
tral government.
The Popular Movement's rivals -- the National Front for the
Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total Inde-
pendence of Angola -- excluded from political participation,
This memorandum was drafted by CIA with active participation
by State/INR and DIA. It was reviewed by representatives of
CIA, INR, DIA, NSA, and the Services.
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will be forced to establish a rival regime and compete for in-
ternational assistance and recognition. There are no foreseeable
circumstances under which the three Liberation groups can be
brought into a coalition until they have spent their military
energies.
The Popular Movement, by virtue of its presence in Luanda
and its well-established international contacts, particularly
with Communist and third world countries, would most likely take
the lead in the international recognition sweepstakes.
The current see-saw pattern of military operations is likely
to continue well beyond November 11. All three liberation groups
have their own battle plans designed to increase their territorial
control, but none of them can hope to win a decisive military vic-
tory. Thus, the fighting is likely to continue as a war of at-
trition with the staying power of the three groups directly re-
lated to the level of external support they can obtain.
In order to prevent the Popular movement from maintaining
its control over the oil-producing enclave of Cabinda, from which
a new Angolan government would derive significant financial bene-
fits, Zairian President Mobutu apparently is prepared to force the
Popular Movement out of the enclave using troops of a small
Cabindan separatist group supported by Zairian forces.
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DISCUSSIO14
Portuguese Political options
1. With about two weeks to go before independence, the
Portuguese still have not been able to find a satisfactory
formula for transferring sovereignty on November 11. Never-
theless, Lisbon is determined to grant Angola its independence
on that date.
2. Portuguese officials now accept the fact that a coali-
tion government consisting of Angola's three liberation groups
is unattainable. The unyielding rivalry between the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National
Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) precludes any sharing
of political responsibility between them. Moreover, the FNLA's
withdrawal from Luanda last July and its subsequent military
setbacks have led Portuguese officials to believe that the FNLA
is not a viable national political organization.
3. Thus, some elements of the Lisbon regime -- still hope
to put together a coalition between the MPLA and the National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Such a
coalition would represent some 80 percent of Angola's popula-
tion, as well as three quarters of the territory's land area
and most of its important political, commercial, and indus-
trial centers. It would be sufficiently representative to pro-
tect Portugal from charges of "selling out" the territory to a
single liberation group. At one time, it appeared that UNITA
was keeping open the option of a last-minute agreement with
MPLA. The surprise attack by the MPLA on UNITA in Luanda in
July, however, made Savimbi highly distrustful of MPLA inten-
tions.
4. So far, however, the Portuguese have been unable to bring
MPLA and.UNITA together despite weeks of intense lobbying in Lisbon
and in Angola with leaders of the two groups. At the present time
the two groups are engaged in heavy military operations against
each other. An MPLA-UNITA coalition is thus most unlikely unless
(1) UNITA obtains enough territory before independence to signifi-
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cantly enhance its bargaining position vis-a-vis the MPLA, and
(2) the MPLA is convinced that it needs broader domestic sup-
port and international acceptance than it can expect to obtain
by itself and offers UNITA substantial incentives to join it.
5. In the absence of a coalition, Angola will reach inde-
pendence day without a successor government in place. The
Portuguese, however, are still trying to avoid a situation in
which they will be forced to deed Angola to a single liberation
group. They have raised the possibility of requesting the UN
to assume jurisdiction over Angola if they cannot set up a
government in time. It seems unlikely that the UN would ac-
cept the responsibility or could discharge it if it did accept.
There would be heavy pressure from African and Third World members
to keep the UN out of Angola. Moreover, the MPLA has threatened
to seize power before November 11 if Portugal asks the UN to inter-
vene.
6. Portuguese officials have made repeated avowals that
they are opposed to a turnover of power to the MPLA alone. How-
ever, Lisbon will have only about 3,000 troops in the territory
by November 1. All Portuguese troops will be withdrawn by Novem-
ber 11, leaving Lisbon unable to resist a seizure of power by the
MPLA.
African Reconciliation Efforts
7. Recent attempts by individual African leaders and the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) to convince the Angolan
liberation groups that they should establish a coalition gov-
ernment have had no effect. At this point, it is doubtful that
any African leaders actually believe a coalition can be ar-
ranged. Their past involvement with the three liberation groups
shows that they often place their own partisan support for a
group over Angolan unity.
8. General Amin, the OAU's current chairman, is stepping
up his efforts to play the intermediary in the Angolan conflict
at the request of Portuguese President Costa Gomes. It is un-
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likely that the OAU, which acts only in an advisory capacity,
can exert any influence on the liberation groups, however.
An MPLA Takeover
9. The MPLA is now hard at work setting up a shadow govern-
ment that will be ready to assume responsibility for governing
the territory when the Portuguese withdraw on November 11.
MPLA officials who remained in their posts following the col-
lapse of the transitional government last July go about their
business as if the Portuguese had already left. The Movement
also has access to the territory's finances, including substan-
tial oil revenues from Gulf Oil in Cabinda, through its nation-
alization of the banks in Luanda last summer.
10. An MPLA takeover would force the FNLA and UNITA to es-
tablish a rival independent government in order to compete for
international recognition and support.
International Support and Reco nation
11. The MPLA enjoys a diplomatic advantage by virtue of
its well-established international contacts, particularly with
Communist and "progressive" countries. It is more widely recog-
nized and supported than either of its rivals. Some African
countries have been showing uneasiness over the MPLA's Soviet
ties, but by and large the relationship with Moscow has not yet
seriously eroded the MPLA's standing in Africa as a nationalist
movement. The FNLA is regarded by many Africans as an instru-
ment of Zairian and "imperialist" ambitions in Angola. For the
time being at least, it seems likely that FNLA and UNITA would
be more damaged by disclosure of Zairian and South African in-
volvement on their behalf than would the MPLA by revelations
of its dependence on Soviet aid.
12. The MPLA will also have a strong psychological advantage
in controlling the capital, a factor which might well outweigh
any losses the Movement may suffer in the countryside between
now and independence. Its foreign supporters will take an ag-
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gressive role in promoting the MPLA's legitimacy, as they did
at the recent Non-Aligned Conference (NAC) in Lima and at the
Afro-Asian People's Solidarity organization meeting in Mozambique
in September.
13. The MPLA counts on gaining immediate recognition from
between 30 and 40 Communist and "progressive" governments. This
figure is probably too high, but in any case fewer governments
probably would be inclined at this point to recognize a rival
UNITA-FNLA regime headquartered outside Luanda. (The Africans
especially would regard this as encouraging partition.) The
MPLA strategy is to get a diplomatic bandwagon going, parti-
cularly among African countries, by getting the strong support
of even a small number of countries. A major obstacle to the
MPLA's plan will be the inclination of many countries not
firmly committed to either side to delay a decision on the recog-
nition issue pending the clarification of Angola's internal situa-
tion and an assessment of the international alignments. UNITA
and FNLA lobbying efforts with African governments may also check
MPLA support.
14. Until they feel confident of a large margin of support
for recognition of the MPLA, the MPLA's foreign backers will
attempt to keep Angola from becoming an issue in the United Nations.
They probably can block any proposed UN action by either the
General Assembly or the Security Council. If Angola is placed
on the agenda, MPLA backers will use the occasion -- probably
with considerable effect -- to promote the MPLA's legitimacy and
to discredit its rivals.
Politico-Military Assessment
15. The MPLA controls large and significant areas of Angola,
including
-- the capital of Luanda and its immediate environs;
-- the Cabinda enclave;
-- much of the coast southward from Luanda; and
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-- large enclaves in eastern and central Angola.
The MPLA bases its claim to political power on its control of most
of the territory's major cities.
16. Although the MPLA has considerable support among urban
Angolans and by most of the one million Kimbundu who inhabit north-
central Angola, it does not command widespread support among the
territory's predominantly rural population. UNITA is favored by
an estimated 2 million Ovimbundu and related tribes who inhabit
the central highlands. The FNLA claims the support of roughly
700,000 Bakongo (including an estimated 100,000 Bakongo refugees
recently returned from Zaire) but has virtually no popular appeal
outside of Angola's two northern districts. Were it possible to
hold reasonably free national elections among Angola's 6 million
people, UNITA and the FNLA together could expect to poll a clear
popular majority. Under present circumstances, however, this is
unlikely to affect international perceptions of the MPLA as
Angola's preeminent political force.
17. The MPLA not only will find it difficult to make ad-
ditional military gains between now and November 11, but may
lose more of the territory it now occupies. Both the FNLA and
UNITA have been stepping up their military pressure on the MPLA
in the wake of increased assistance from Zaire and, more re-
cently, South Africa. The MPLA now appears overextended in
central and southern Angola, despite the substantial Soviet
support it has been receiving, and has suffered significant
setbacks in recent weeks. Moreover, it is beginning to show
signs of weakening morale, particularly in Luanda. Continued
military strains could weaken morale even further, but it is
difficult to forecast a "breaking point."
18. The FNLA appeared to be on the verge of collapse fol-
lowing the MPLAs'momentary victory at Caxito in early September.
President Mobutu's decision to commit two battalions of Zairian
troops and the FNLA's increasing reliance upon white Portuguese
ex-officers enabled the FNLA to recapture the town and mount an
offensive toward Luanda. As of late October, however, that of-
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fensive had become stalled -- at least for the time being --
because of a lack of supplies and MPLA defenses. Since it was
forced to withdraw from Luanda last June, the FNLA's plan has
been to try to discredit the MPLA's claim to control the capital
area by mounting a siege of the city rather than by fighting its
way back in. It may have once again changed its plans, however.
The FNLA'S prospects appear to be good in the sparsely popu-
lated northeast, where MPLA garrisons are more isolated and
vulnerable.
19. In southern Angola, UNITA appears to have blunted,
at least temporarily, the MPLA sum-ulti-pronged drive against Nova
Lisboa, Angola's second largest city and UNITA's political
headquarters. Now that the refugee evacuation from Nova Lisboa
has been terminated, UNITA hopes to turn the airport into a major
logistics base to support its planned offensive to recapture the
coastal towns of Lobito and Benguela. UNITA's forces have been
joined in that offensive by a large contingent of FNLA troops
trained by South African advisers in southeastern Angola. With
the capture of the port city of Mocemedes on October 28, UNITA
and FNLA now have a major resupply point to support their ad-
vance on Lobito.
20. Despite the recent improved performances of UNITA and
FNLA forces in southern Angola, it is still uncertain whether
they can achieve their military objectives by independence. The
MPLA has had ample time to consolidate its hold on the coast.
It still has access to four major ports in southern Angola with
the capacity for accommodating ocean-going vessels. The MPLA
will redouble its efforts to take Nova Lisboa before UNITA and
FNLA have time to complete their own offensive. It is by no
means certain that the two groups could withstand a concerted
MPLA campaign.
21. The current seesaw pattern is likely to continue with
each movement making some modest gains at the expense of its
rivals. The fighting will continue well past independence and the
staying power of the three groups will be in large measure deter-
mined by the amount of external assistance they obtain. The MPLA
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will remain in control of Luanda and presumably much of the coast,
as well as of significant areas in the interior, thus maintaining
a decided political advantage over its rivals in gaining outside
recognition and support. No matter how much territory any one
group claims to control, the eventual political outcome in Angola
will not be decided until one group or a pair of groups wins un-
contested military victory over its opposition, or, as is equally
likely, the three groups fight themselves to exhaustion and agree
to a political solution.
External Support
Zaire
22. President Mobutu attaches great importance to preventing
a takeover of Angola, particularly Cabinda, by the Soviet-backed
MPLA. Substantial Zairian support was needed for the FNLA to
recapture Caxito. In order to sustain an effective military
campaign against the MPLA during the dwindling days of Portuguese
sovereignty, or to continue it after November 11, the FNLA --
and UNITA -- will need continued Zairian support. Mobutu is
ready to give that support and already has some 800-1,000 troops
in place in Angola.
23. Mobutu apparently intends to intervene in Cabinda, using
the Cabindan Liberation Front (FLEC) as a cover and as many of his
own troops as needed. The Zairian Army is currently training FLEC
soldiers for such an operation. As many as 600 of these troops
have infiltrated into northwestern Cabinda but have not yet under-
taken any military operations. An outbreak of fighting in Cabinda
would force the MPLA to fight on a third front. Mobutu could not
hope for military success there without committing a good number
of his own troops to bolster the Cabindan forces, most of whom are
completely inexperienced and at best only partially trained.
24. The presence of Zairian troops in Angola in large num-
bers, particularly if they were heavily involved in an attack on
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Luanda or Cabinda would bring widespread criticism of Mobutu
in Africa. Many African states would regard Mobutu as a spoiler
and would probably apply public and private pressure to get him
to withdraw his troops. In light of his past disregard of African
criticism of his Angolan policies, however, Mobutu is probably
prepared to accept African censure in defense of what he con-
siders his vital interests. He may also believe that he can
successfully defend his actions as the only reasonable response
to Soviet imperialism in Angola.
25. The possible domestic repercussions of deeper Zairian
involvement in Angola -- especially if it proves costly or un-
successful -- are more serious. Mobutu's prestige in Zaire
already has been seriously undermined by widespread discontent
over his mishandling of the national economy. Within the mili-
tary there is a general sense of unrest stemming from economic
grievances and the ongoing purge of personnel suspected of dis-
loyalty to Mobutu. At the present time, however, it appears un-
likely that Mobutu's involvement will become so great that it
will spark resistance to his Angolan policy on the part of the
Zairian Army.
South Africa
26. In the context of its ."outward" policy, South Africa
hopes to establish cooperative political and economic relations
with the neighboring black African states. Its concern at the
prospect of an MPLA-dominated Angola -- heightened by MPLA's
military inroads into UNITA's southwestern territory near the
Namibian border -- has caused Pretoria to reconsider its ear-
lier non-involvement policy.
27. In August South African troops crossed the border to
protect two installations of the Cunene River hydroelectric power
project jointly financed by Portugal and South Africa. The troops
are still there.
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28. South Africa now appears to have decided to risk covert
assistance to the MPLA's rival movements by:
-- Agreeing to supply petroleum and arms to UNITA
and the FNLA.
-- Permitting military advisers to go along on
operations in central Angola in a rear-echelon
support capacity. Some of these advisers re-
portedly have been killed while engaged in
fighting.
-- Providing military advisers at a newly created
base in southeastern Angola near the border.
29. Beyond trying to protect Namibia's borders by supporting
opposition to MPLA incursions into the south, South Africa may not
yet have decided how much further to go.
30. Exposure of direct South African intervention will
jeopardize South African efforts to achieve detente with black
'Africa and damage UNITA and FNLA in efforts to gain African
support. We expect, therefore, that South Africa will continue
its material assistance but will not increase the number of South
African personnel in Angola and would hope to withdraw its ad-
visers now there as soon as UNITA and FNLA begin to show momentum.
Portugal
31. The liberation groups are also acquiring large amounts of
supplies and equipment being abandoned by the Portuguese as they
withdraw. This equipment has been grabbed up by whichever lib-
eration group is nearby.
32. In a recent withdrawal from Nova Lisboa, the Portuguese
officers there turned over to the FNLA and UNITA sizable quantities
of arms and ammunition, fuel, and vehicles. Many individual army
commanders apparently have siphoned off supplies to whichever
liberation group they favor, although most military officials
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currently in Angola appear to favor UNITA, and apparently hope
that by continuing to divert supplies to it they will help its
chances to increase military pressure on the MPLA.
33. Moscow has cast its lot firmly with the MPLA in antici-
pation that the latter will dominate whatever government emerges
from the present conflict. The flow of Soviet arms clearly has
been an important factor in the MPLA's military successes. In
Soviet terms the magnitude probably is not great, but for the MPLA
it is of. major significance. The MPLA has received a variety of
infantry weapons and equipment, and recently has received heavier
equipment (armor and artillery) of Soviet origin.
34. The Soviet Union, Cuba and other communist countries have
also provided political and military training for MPLA cadres
since 1961. They are also providing advisers to the MPLA in
Congo. Cuba has advisers in Angola as well. Several hundred
Cuban "volunteers" recently arrived at an MPLA-controlled
port, and will probably be used in support and advisory roles.
They probably have orders to avoid combat. In addition, several
hundred Cubans are providing rear echelon support for MPLA forces
in Cabinda from the Congo-Cabinda border.
35. A friendly or pro-Soviet regime in post-independent
Angola could offer some political advantages to Moscow. The So-
viets may hope through such a government to exert a major influence
on the liberation drive in southern Africa. Support for Angolan
liberation also contributes to Soviet credibility and influence
with other clients in the region. As always, Moscow has a par-
ticular interest in Chinese and US influence in Angola and other
adjacent areas of Africa.
36. The Soviets would gain considerably prestige on the
Africa and world scenes by showing how they could successfully
contribute to installing a minority liberation group in power
through force of arms. They could further enhance this prestige
by the establishment of a military base in Angola as they did
in Somalia. From a strategic military point of view such a
base would not be of great value; but politically, a Soviet
presence with clear military symbols would be seen by them as
most desirable in this area of the world where Soviet influence
has been minimal.
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37. The Soviets are likely to become more deeply involved
with the MPLA the longer the issue of ultimate control of Angola
is unresolved. During a protracted post-independence war, the
Soviets will be faced with an increasingly costly aid role if
they are to underwrite an MPLA-dominated regime in the future.
For its part, even if it tries, MPLA will find it difficult to
avoid dependence on Moscow.
38. Soviet aid has been vital to the MPLA's present military
dominance and has also encouraged the MPLA to maintain the firm
stand it has taken regarding its assumption of political power in
Luanda on November 11. The expectation of continued substantial
Soviet and other Communist assistance will encourage the MPLA
to take a hard line and to seek to crush its opponents and
establish its own regime in Angola.
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