STATUS OF OUR CONSULATE GENERAL IN LUANDA

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
LOC-HAK-102-5-15-6
Release Decision: 
RIPLIM
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
9
Document Creation Date: 
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date: 
December 2, 2010
Sequence Number: 
15
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 29, 1975
Content Type: 
MEMO
File: 
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PDF icon LOC-HAK-102-5-15-6.pdf359.53 KB
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C;,,,r o Z~ +~~ No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/02 : LOC-HAK-102-5-15-6 ACTION MEMDRANI~-L1M SECRET NdAI5 Status of Dur Consulate General in Luanda _.___. - T0: The Secretary F~ktOM: , ; AF. -Nathaniel ~~~ ~~ The Prohlem The security situat%on in Luanda is deteriorating and will get worse after the Portuguese withdraw from Angola on November l1 Leaving Luanda and a considerable hinter~.and under MPLA control. Added pressure an MPL~, is likely to develop if FNLA and L'NTTA are able. to follow up on recent military gains. There is a definite anal increasing potential threat to the safety of official Americans in Luanda. The immediate problem we face a.s whether or not to maintain our Consulate General there. A subsequent paper will address the problem of recognition 'l of a successor,regime in Angola.. Background/Analysis One 'element in our policy toward maintaining our post ~in Luanda has been the expectation that it might prov~a..possible to continue. to maintain a resence there eva~n after the partu u i 25X1 ~t Was also a:n our ma.nds when we agreed to requests from the UK and Canada to represent their interests in Angola., This expectation no ].anger .appears valid. Xn the months fallowing the outbreak of open hos~- tilities between the MPLA and its rivals last April, ,the MP~,A has taken control of Luanda and of about 30 percent of A.ngola's territory and population., It has rejected No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/02 : LOC-HAK-102-5-15-6 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/02 : LOC-HAK-102-5-15-6 arty ~.dea of political 'accommodation with FNLA and UIVI,TA and will very probably lay claim to complete sovereignty dace the Portuguese depart. These two movements are giving'consideratxon to forming a rival government 'to that of MPLA outside of Luanda, Last minute efforts may be developed by the Portuguese to br~.ng the three .movements together, and an OAU initiative to achieve this has'also been undertaken; but we expect these efforts to feria.. The shaky military equilibrium that .followed P+IPLA successes in July and ,August has collapsed in recent weeks as FNLA and UNITA forces have advanced into previously-~ held MPLA territory. FNLA and UNxTA may lack the capability (ox even the intention? to reoccupy Luanda ~.n the imme- diate future, but they do intend to beseige the city and keep it under pressure. The security situation in Luanda is going to deteriorate further when the Portuguese. with- draw grid as MPLA comes. under further military attack. Under these circumstances our Consulate General's ..position needs to be reassessed. After the l~ortuguese leave it will have no legal basis and would survive at the sufferance of MPLA. If, as seems likely, the MPLA ex- p~riences further reverses, and particularly if FLEC or ~aix+e moves into Cabinda, MPLA will very likely blame the United States (i.e., CIA) and focus its hostility on Darr post,and its. personnel. There would be nothing tv preolude MPLA from harrassing or .arresting Consulate. General personnel or making a surprise off-hour raid on the~Gonsulate. It~has no Marine guards and sensitive material there would be very vulnerable to seizure. Consul General Killoran has stressed in a recent telegram the increasing risks to personnel security that appear to lie immediately ahead, and he urges that. he be authorized to .close the post and evacuate all personnel, preferably on the last .flight of our airlift leaving Luanda on November 3. We have reason to believe that closing our post would spark the departure of most of ~.he remaining Americans, British and Canadians. resident in Angola. No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/02 : LOC-HAK-102-5-15-6 ~~? No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/02 : LOC-HAK-102-5-15-6 would be difficult to maintain an official ~ t. - presence in Luanda after November 11 w.ithout~having offi- c3,al contact with the MPLA+s illegitimate minority reg3.me. It is likely that the MPLA would try to parlay such contacts into implied recognition. Even if we made clear that maintenance of our Consulate in no way implies' recpg~ttion, its very presence could serve to attribute. a der~r~e~of legitimacy to an MPLA regime and thereby have a negative impact on the poI'~.tical aspirations of the FNLA and UN1TA and any rival regime(s) they might 25X1 establish. Yf We close the post we would wish to inform certain interested governments in .advance, e.g., Portugal, U~, and Canada. Dur decision as to what government should be asked to assume protective powers would have to wait until,we determine what countries intend to retain repre- sentation in Luanda following independence. Some countries-UK, South Africa and Zaire-have already closed their consulates. Countries currently maintaining consulates, though wa.th reduced staffs, are Italy, Germany,' Brazil, Belgium and France. We do not know the plans of these countries, but we understand that the Group~of Nine plans to discuss a common policy on Angola in a meeting on actober 3Q, .SECRET NDDSB. No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/02 : LOC-HAK-102-5-15-6 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/02 : LOC-HAK-102-5-15-6 f c ~,cant or rein a signs f We have weighed the. pros and cons of ~tssuing a nt eXplwining our departure in._terms o~ just the .. stateme 'security situation cir in terms of our unwiZ~pinpnregime lend authora.ty to an illegitimate minaWetYbElieve on by ,our continued presence in Luanda. cala:ta.ca7: b$Zan,~e that a departure statement without a p message would probably su~~ice to underscore far other.,, By not go~~rnmerits the significance of Werwau].3~Iessen possible attacking the MPLA as we leave, future difficulties if wwhil.chetheeM~PLA has~ma,naged ton embassy in an Angola rn e ' Close down our Consulate General, preferably 1 'The ~ tions gri.,or to November l l ? ~idvarita es -~ Would avoid exposing our Personnel and sense-five material to risks posed by MPLA rule. Would underscore our opposition to an MPLA minority ;.government. -~-- Would be favorably viewed by the other two move- b Mobutu,.. and perhaps by Kaunda and other moderate meritsr y Af~'ican leaders. _- M3.ght serve to d~,scourage some other governments .from recognizing an MPLP, regime. Tf we depart before N~LA takeover, w~: would be ex 3ain our departure a.n neutral terms thate ~~ht ....,able to F pave_the way~for our return to Luanda evenosi~iMP~' ~,?.,,n the war in a strong p W luo d curtail our ability to communicate with Ln.e ~-, No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/02 : LOC-HAK-102-5-15-6 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/02 : LOC-HAK-102-5-15-6 SECRET NC)DTS -~- W4uld preclude protecta.on of the few remaining - American citizens (about.. SO are there .now) and, invest-- ments ($250,OOO,D00)? Ma.ght induce the MPLP. to retaliate .against US or investments. 2, Maintain the Consulate, General Advantages ~~. ~--~ We would continue to be in a position to maintain some contact with the MPLA without necessarily recognizing it foirmally. We would be in a position to exert efforts to protect American lives and property. Da.sadyantac~es -- Would.expase our personnel and sensitive material to risks posed by MP LA rule. -~ Could be interpreted bX some as tacit U5 ccansent to an~MPI,A assumption of power, thereby encouraging some governments to recognize MPLA regime and weakening the .position of ENLA and iJN1TA. _ bureau views AF believes that the greatly increased risks to the safety of official US personnel outweigh the advantages which would accrue by keeping them there, ,and that we should therefore make preparations now to close the Consulate. SECRET N4DIS No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/02 : LOC-HAK-102-5-15-6 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/02 : LOC-HAK-102-5-15-6 APFxove Disapprove Tf you approve of the above, that you approve our a.nforxnng the Governments of Portugal, Canada and the U~ beforehand. Approve Disapprove' ALTERNAT;IVELy, that we maintain the Consulate Genera3`~`an~' request Consul, General Killaran's views as to hc~w best to diminish the risks to personnel safety that .seem to lxe ahead. Approve Disapprove Drafted:' E~'~'ugit/WLCutler/RAndrew:lar x21637:1Q/29/75 Clearances: EUR:ERowell INR:Mr. Hyland P:Mr. Wisner S/P:Mr. Petterson No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/02 : LOC-HAK-102-5-15-6 SECRET. NODIS I~crammendat.ion : ~~ That you approve the closing o~ our post~`in Luanda and the evacuation of its personnel prior to November. ll.` Option 1). No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/02 : LOC-HAK-102-5-15-6 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/02 : LOC-HAK-102-5-15-6 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/02 : LOC-HAK-102-5-15-6 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/02 : LOC-HAK-102-5-15-6 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/02 : LOC-HAK-102-5-15-6 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/02 : LOC-HAK-102-5-15-6