AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-102-2-11-3
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: June 20, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/15: LOC-HAK-102-2-11-3
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM, OF CONVERSATION
Participants:
DOS Review
Completed.
Date:
Distribution:
Subject:
The Secretary
Under Secretary Sisco
Ambassador Vance
7/s-
Acting Assistant Secretary Mulcahy
Bremer (notetaker)
June 20, 1975; Secretary's Office
S, memcon book, LPB, NSC-Rodman
Africa
The Secretary: I really have few instructions to give you -- since I know what
I want. I on t really care what AF thinks. I just want you to do what I tell
you or there's no sense in your going.
I think we've mishandled Mobutu and the whole area. I have not given
too much attention to it, so it's partly my fault. Mobutu looks at the Congo
in 1960 and that what we're doing in Angola now where the Communist
influence is greater than it was in the Congo in 1960 and he must conclude
that we have written off the area. If we're letting Angola go, then in essence
we're letting him go. At least I think if he's rational, that's what he's
thinking.
Vance: I agree completely. I haven't seen him in ayear and a half but I.
agree.
handwringing, all right? Tell him my assessment of Angola. We have been
somewhat neglectful, and we would like his judgment of the situation and what
in Africa. Two, we consider him one of the two or three key leaders in
Africa. Three, we want to cooperate with him. Four, however, we will
not be pushed around. He will not win popularity by pushing us. I want no
should stress first that we consider Zaire one of the two or three key countries
The Secretary: If you add to that whole situation in Vietnam I don't find
what he does incomprehensible. Hinton is not easy to get along with. You
can be done, especi ally to support the non-Neto groups. He and Kaunda
would have to take the front row. We'd also be glad to send if he'd
like to talk to him. It's possible that we can't do it, but-get his best judg-
ment and come back and we'll get the President's decision.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
alt Cutler, AF
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/15 : LOC-HAK-102-2-11-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/15: LOC-HAK-102-2-11-3
SECRET/SENSIT'
I want no wailing. By the way, thank you very much for skipping your
son's wedding. It was a very patriotic thing to do.
Now do you agree with me on what we are trying to do?
Vance: Absolutely.
The Secretary: We slid into this mess. Mobutu I think is a semi-savage,
but I'm trying to see it from his point of view. You can say that we gave
Roberto $300, 000, but he didn't need money, but strategy. Does Mobutu
know strategy?
Vance: He's pretty shrewd -- if he's still rational and not too imperial.
The Secretary: Just let him and me get together (laughter).
Vance: But if he's still rational, that is exactly how he has to read the
situation.
The Secretary: Make that point too -- that we won't be pushed. I won't
yield on Davis. He must understand that. Davis will not follow Hinton.
Presidential endorsement, though it may be too late.
Vance: Even a year and a half ago he was lecturing us on Angola.
The Secretary: He was right. His foreign minister was here last summer
and I got talked out of it at the time. The strategy of this building is to
keep me from making any irrevocable decision. They were content as
long as we did nothing,, Now I've made a decision, aid I will ge t .the
Vance: I will add that I cannot predict the outcome on this, though I think
this will make us fairly pregnant.
The Secretary: In what way?
Vance: To say we're leaning this way and then to say we can't do it may
be a problem.
The Secretary: What real choice do we have? If Angola is taken by the
Communists, what conclusions can tt-e African leaders draw about the
United States. I know the AF bureau says they care about economic aid,
but there's no empirical evidence for that. I just don't think African
SECRET/SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/15: LOC-HAK-102-2-11-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/15: LOC-HAK-102-2-11-3
SECRET/SEISITIiTE' ';::
av_
leaders really-care about aid unless they're about to go bankrupt. They
can only conclude that we don't care. Do you disagree, Joe?
Sisco: I'm not sure of the judgment yet that the situation is leaning
in the direction of Neto coming out on top.
The Secretar : If not, this should tip it over. I think Neto will take
Luanda.
Mulcahy: In effect he's already top dog there.
The Secretar : I confess I didn't focus on it early enough. Mulcahy didn't
break his back getting my attention, though.
Mulcahy: We're a minority of two in our bureau.
Cutler: S/P feels very strongly about it.
Sisco: Your judgment then is that hands off leads to Neto winning?
The Secretary: I'm not in favor of the US involving itself, but in favor
of it making it possible for Kuanda or Mobutu to.
Mulcahy: The Africans are really schizophrenic on this. They all say
they want help for Savimbi but then they always talk about having no
outside interference in their affairs.
The Secretary:. I'm not sure we should switch to Savimbi. I would like
Mobutu's assessment.
Mulcahy: We double our chances I think by throwing a few bones to Savimbi.
Cutler: The resources required to keep Neto out are considerable. We
should be showing political support and perhaps arms to both movements.
The Secretary: I'm not sure we should goin to achieve a total victory a la
Vietnam. What we are going to do is break the psychological back of the
non-Nero people, since they see no US support.
Forget for a moment how important Angola itself may be. I am
concerned on the impact on Nyrere, and Kaunda and Mobutu when they
see we've done nothing.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/15: LOC-HAK-102-2-11-3
 Mulcahy: They will be issuing a communique in Kenya today. That will
be the latest so-called reconciliation. Of course it won't last long.
The Secretary: Oh, I'm all for it. We shouldn't break it, but we should
not kid ourselves.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/15: LOC-HAK-102-2-11-3
-Do it in the way which makes us the least pregnant, but most decisive.
Don't dither around and lecture him on reconciliation.. He must be puking'
when he hears that kind of stuff, I know I do. I know it won't come about
with reconciliation.
Don't push Mobutu. Just tell him we've had a rough year with other
preoccupations We want to know what his analysis is and what he thinks.
We could send if necessary.
Cutler: He's there now.
-4- i:,~,:rti!t
25X1
25X1
The Secretary: Then we could still use him.
Cutler: Well, we have used him in the past.
Vance: He personally may be compromised at this point.
The Secretary: Well, you work it out. Are you leaving tonight? And when
are you getting back: I'm leaving on Friday --- will you be back by then?
Vance: Yes, we're leaving tonight. Will you be leaving Friday night?
The Secretary: Yes.
Vance: All right. We'll try to be back Friday morning.
Mulcahy: Hinton should probably come back promptly.
The Secretary: Well, he certainly should not be part of the conversations.
Mulcahy: He wants a few days in Spain.
The Secretary: Of course, he should do that. Tell him that he'll get another
post, and that this is no reflection on him. Tell him to calm down.
Well, I'm counting on you two.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/15: LOC-HAK-102-2-11-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/15 : LOC-HAK-102-2-11-3
SECRET/SENSLTWWW?
Cutler: I think there's an advantage this time, since the last serious
talk we had with the foreign minister was last August and I believe after
that he seriously mislead Mobutu thinking we were already committed.
The Secretary: It is important not to give him the idea that he can kick us
around and get an emissary wh-- never he needs domestic support.
Cutler: One nice thing that might come out of this would be to get the
foreign minister out.
Vance: Yes, he's quite a guy -- a product of Lumvmba University.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/15: LOC-HAK-102-2-11-3