LETTER TO DEAN ACHESON FROM HENRY A. KISSINGER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-1-4-27-6
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2009
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: May 7, 1969
• Content Type: LETTER

No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/01 : LOC-HAK-1-4-27-6
U !
May 7, 1969
Many thanks for your fine piece on
Southern Africa. It adds za perspective that
would never come froxri the bureaucracy.
I have sent your paper on to the President,
and will also see that your arguments are cranked
into the NBC review of Southern Africa now in
progress. Cnce we have an NSC paper in
relatively good shape, I would like to send it
out to you for comment if that is agreeable.
With warm regards.
f.enry A. Tip issiager
STAT
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/01 : LOC-HAK-1-4-27-6
 No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/01 : LOC-HAK-1-4-27-6
April 30, 1969
Policies Toward Southern Africa. Require Change
U.S. policies toward southern Africa -- that is,
~a.rd Portuguese Angola and Mozambique, South Africa,
Rhodesia. -- as designed to align this country among
adversaries of those regimes --- should be abandoned.
They were developed largely between 1961 and 1969
the United Nations with the Afro-Asian group -- plus
I-;tian in the case of Rhodesia.. Broadly speaking they
=a;s to force on the states of southern Africa the prin--
cie of majority rule (one ma.n one vote) in their in-
.: pal polity. Subsidiary aims are the independence of
and Mozambique from Portugal, of Southwest Africa.
:a South Africa, and the subjection of Rhodesia. to
?:=tish colonial rule until local majority rule is es--
-?,dished ("majority rule before independence:').
The United States participates in this policy by
,fining in harassing action in the United Nations, in-
uding resolutions encouraging subversion against the
!.:?;ernments in power and embargoes against imports of
-1~s (even arms essential for domestic defense against
? terma.l aggression) in two cases and against all trade
Rhodesia..
The reasons for abandonment of these policies are:
1. Because they are impossible of achievement.
2. Because they are contrary to our national
interests.
3.
Because they are frustrating the common
interest of the United States and of both
the black and white nations of southern
Africa. in the stability and development of
that area..
1. These policies are impossible of achievement
5Ie rule has been undisputed since the sixteenth century.
(a) In Portuguese Africa
The Portuguese discovered Angola..a decade
1'_~re 'Columbus discovered the Western Hemisphere. Portu-
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 No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/01 : LOC-HAK-1-4-27-6
W 2 - W
In the last decade bloody incursions from the Congo have
created terror in northwest Angola. These, aided from
both Soviet and Chinese sources (as in the Congo) have
been bloodily suppressed by considerable additions to
local Portuguese forces. They have little or no indige-
nous support. If outside force sufficient to defeat
Portugal in southern Africa (which would possibly involve
defeating South Africa also)-was supplied, the result
would not be one man one vote but a, bloody Nigerian=tSrpe2
shambles. The United States cannot meddle with revolution
in Africa with impunity.
(b) In SouthAf rica.
South Africa is the strongest, toughest, most
stable power in Africa, possessed of immense resources,
advanced technology, and controlled by a population as
stubbornly attached to the autonomy of South Africa as
William the Silent was to that of the Netherlands in his.
Britain at the height of her imperial power and even after
a punishing war was unable to bend the Africaaners to her
will. SouthAfrica, with the support of the International
Court of Justice, does not recognize the authority of the
United Nations unilaterally to alter the mandate agreement
with the League of Nations, which put in its present form
her authority over Southwest Africa, originally derived
from conquest from Germany. That authority, subject to
the trust of the mandate, includes all the powers of sov-
ereignty . She would resist with all her military power
any encroachment upon them in this territory of vital im-
portance to her.
(c) In Rhodesia
Thus far the economic sanctions that the United
Nations Security Council has induced its members -- or
some of them -- to impose on Rhodesia (such as stopping
commerical intercourse, blocking funds, and various other
forms of economic warfare) have affected Rhodesia's in-
ternal political policy only in a counterproductive way.
For the first time in Rhodesian history constitutional
amendments have been proposed based on racial terms. These
would have two voting rolls, white and colored, with lit-
eracy and property qualifications. The blacks would be
given a minimum number of members in the parliament, which
might increase as the black percentage of taxes paid but
not to exceed one half.
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 No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/01 : LOC-HAK-1-4-27-6
Sanctions have weakened the effectiveness of the
moderate white elements and strengthened the advocates
of a. South African policy. They have not harmfully a.f-
fected the economy, except to decrease employment (chiefly
among the blacks engaged in such a.gricultura.l work as
tobacco farming). They have also decreased employment
in neighboring black states. They have transferred US
'purchases of chromium from Rhodesia to the Soviet Union.
Sanctions have, however, increased a. sense of isolation-
ism and persecution in Rhodesia.
2. These policies are contrary to our national
interests.
The United States has important interests in soiern
Africa. The Cape abuts on one of the three maritime ap-
proaches to the Indian Ocean. Another approach, the Suez
Canal, is closed. The Russian fleet has moved into the
Eastern Mediterranean. All the harbors and ports in
Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean are under the con-
trol of South Africa or Portugal. They are of vital im-
portance to the private ships of the western powers. In
time of trouble'the naval base at Simonstown, South Africa,
could be of importance to our public vessels. Yet we do
our best to alienate these nations.. Our naval vessels
demonstrate moral displeasure by standing off-shore and
having Rhodesian beef and other supplies lightered out
to, them.
The time was when our relations with a foreign power
were determined by its foreign policy and our interests.
The empathy or hostility of groups in the United States
to the domestic policy of foreign nations was regarded
as irrelevant. It still is where the foreign power is
a great power like the Soviet Union.
Only the deluded believe that today there are unim-
portant states. Consider North Korea.
These policies harm the stability and develop-
ment or -Southern Arica.
Southern Africa is Africa's most stable area. This
condition in itself is valuable and most important to
preserve. South Africa and Rhodesia are more productive
than all of the rest of the continent. Together and with
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 No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/01 : LOC-HAK-1-4-27-6
4_
Portuguese cooperation they could do far more than the
United States could do to aid the development and sta.-
bility of the whole area south of the Congo and Tanzania,
and, perhaps, farther north. South Africa's "outward
policy" recognizes this and demonstrates a willingness to
give both help and a lead. Dr. Banda, of Malawi is willing
to cooperate and the black-ruled former High Commission
territories of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland have shown
sympathetic if cautious interest. President'Ka.unda of
Zambia is playing an ambiguous and ambivalent game. He
takes a permissive attitude to those who foment terrorism
and advocate British military action against Rhodesia..
But he is cautious in keeping Zambia out of the line of
fire. Basically Kaunda, will change attitudes and sides
as the economic warfare against Rhodesia fails.
Present UN and British policies are sterile failures
and should be scrapped. The United States would 3o a.
good turn to both its own and British interests by quietly
dropping its embargoes and turning instead to a creative,
hopeful, and viable sub-Saharan Marshall plan, based on
the cooperative efforts of the new black states of the
south aided by the technological guidance of Rhodesia and
South Africa and financed by a, regional consortium with
United States minor participation.
One does not need to comment on the sanctimonious
immorality; of those who argue in favor of continuing
economic warfare upon friendly states to force a change
in their internal policies because to stop would cause
some criticism in some quarters and to continue may not
do much harm.
No Objection To Declassification 2009/09/01 : LOC-HAK-1-4-27-6