STATUS REPORT ON THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-1-3-12-3
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: April 8, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Status Report on the~,,I\TigerianfGivil War
There may be some break in the du l-atalemate that has hung over
blem in mid-February.
pro
the Nigerian war since the NSC considered the '
It is still too early to draw any conclusions, but I thought it would be
useful to pull together a picture of where various developments ..< military,
diplomatic, and our own relief policy -- now stand.
The Federal Offensive
The Federals have been trying for more than a year to mount a
"final" push to overrun;'~the 70 x 40-mile Biaf ran enclave. They have
been stymied by their own inefficiency and dogged Biafran resistance
fueled by the French arms supply. But the political pressures and
frustration have been building steadily inside the Federal coalition.
General Gowon and his colleagues are clearly afraid (and justifiably so)
that if Biafra survives to celebrate its second anniversary of independence
on May 31st, it will be a major diplomatic and moral victory for the rebels.
Operating on that timetable, the Federal First Division apparentT25X1
launched a major attack last week from the north side of the Biafran
perimeter They seem to be
striking directly. for Biafra's capital of Umuahia, though a secondary target
would be the airstrip 20 miles to the west of the capital where Biafran arms
and food come in by night airlift. There are few hard facts so far on the
progress of the offensive. First reports had the Federals moving against
very heavy resistance to within 12 miles of the Biafran capital. Federal
105 Howitzers could have been within range of the capital over the weekend.
Destruction or capture of Umuahia would be a major Federal victory and a
serious blow to Biaf ran morale.
Today, though, there are Biafran claims that the Federals are being
pushed back. Judging from the slim evidence we have, our intelligence
people now think the Federal offensive has been stalled.
There are just too many imponderables here to predict the outcome.
For example: (1) Federals have taken much of this ground before only to
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be repelled or outflanked by the Biafrans; (2) Biafra is still getting
be
enough arms by air -- about 100 tons a week -- to support a credible
defense against the larger Federal force; (3) the other two Federal
divisions on the line -- in the went and south -- have not been able to
move, yet their breakthrough is probably essential to make possible
a sustained advance by the attacking division in the north; (4) finally, even
if the Biafran capital should fall. the rebels would have their forces largely
intact and could regroup to a new defense line.
On paper, in sheer numbers and materiel, the Federal offensive
ought to be successful. As throughout this bitter little war, however,
the issues will probably be decided by factors of Biafran morale and
ingenuity that no military manual could measure. In sum, this latest
Federal offensive might alter the fighting line, but the odds are still
against a quick end to the war and suffering.
Prime Minister Wilson's Visit to Ni
Predictably, Wilson has returned empty-handed from his flying
visit to the Federal side last week. He was given a polite but cool
reception by the Nigerians. who understood the trip was mainly designed
to soften Parliamentary criticism of the P. M.'s pro-Federal stance.
Wilson did push General Gowon hard on Federal bombing of civilian targets
in Biafra. He did get a promise of a tighter rein an the pilots, which
probably means little with the very uncertain Federal. discipline between
Lagos and the front. The Prime Minister also went on to Addis Ababa to
see Haile Selassie and boosted the OAU as peace maker. So far as our
reports indicate, that tote was a polite exchange of familiar views with no
real impact on events.
Wilson's plight was most obvious in a last minute effort to schedule
a meeting with Biafran leader Ojukwu. Ojukwu turned him down flatly.
But the refusal was managed with the usual Biafran propaganda skill,
allowing back bench critics in Parliament to charge that 'Wilson himself
had r ia-handled and, s4ualched the meeting.
The British domestic benefits of Wilson's visit are likely to be short-
lived. 1-Us policy of support for the Federals will make him fair game for
the critics as long as the war lasts -- and even afterward, if he is still
in office.
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Other Diplonaacv
Meanwhile, there are others anxious to play a diplomatic role -- none
of them with reasonable prospects. President Houphouet-13oigny of the
Ivory Coast (undoubtedly with de Gaulle's blessing) is trying to brim the
two sides together "without pro-conditions. " Yet the Fedrals don't trust
pro-Biafran Houphouet even far enough to respond to his pleas.
The OAU is trying to get talks started in Monrovia, Liberia. at a
meeting of its Consultative Committee for Nigeria on April 18. But that
effort is foundering on tragic-comic obstacles so characteristic of this
war: (a) Gjukwu won't come unless Gowan stops the bombing and conWe
himself; (b) Gowon won't stop the bombing for military reasons, and
won't come because he is getting married on the 19th with plans for a
honeymoon rather than negotiations with the rebels.
This diplomatic minuet means nothing while the Federal offensive
3s in progress. Both sides remain convinced that victory lies on the battle
field rather than at the conference table. Until events persuade them
otherwise, there is no chance of authentic negotiations.
The U. S. Special Coordinator
Against this background, Clyde Ferguson, our Special Coordinator
for Belief, has just returned from a 3-week swing through the area, including
a visit to Biafra. Ferguson got generally sympathetic but evasive responses
to his urgings to expand relief. Biafra still rejects both daylight flights
and a land corridor on military grounds. They seem to be getting just
enough food by the current night time airlift to avert a major disaster.
They veto any relief arrangement that might offer a military advantage
should the Federals violate the exchange point.
Ferguson is quietly pursuing one outside chancel -- a river corridor
running up from the coast and entering Biafra on the extreme east side
of the perimeter. This would run through an area which has been relatively
free of fighting and of no strategic concern to either party. Even if the
military obstacle is cleared away, however, there are still major problems
of politics and logistics. Ferguson obviously has his work cut out for him,
and plans to go back to the area next week to do some more quiet bargaining.
Meanwhile, the Ferguson appointment seems to have satisfied amply
its public relations role here at home. The Congressional critics and public
lobbies on Bit.fran relief have been tolerably quiet for the first time in
months..
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All this adds up to a probable continuation of the war at lest
through the spring and summer. If the Federals don't force a military
decision now -- and the odds are against that -- the rainy season
corning in May and June will forestall another gall-out push until late
summer.
One general prospect at least seems clear: every passing day
increases the war weariness and political unrest on the Federal side,
while it strengthens Blafran morale. And though there is no real sign
of it now, a lengthening war is also bound to give Federal backers -- the
Soviets as well as the harried British -. second thoughts. The least
vulnerable party in the Nigerian tangle is the one who has invested iesO
and influenced more than anyother -> General de Gaulle.
RMorris:lw
4/8/69
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