MEMO TO HENRY KISSINGER FROM WALT ROSTOW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-1-1-50-3
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2009
• Sequence Number: 50
• Publication Date: February 22, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/12/08: LOC-HAK-1-1-50-3
To: Henry Kissinger
From: Walt Rostow
(Feb. 22, 1969 WWR)
Mutual Withdrawals: Major Issues
My specific comments follow the headings of the paper of this title.
General comments at the end.
1. Preconditions for Allied Withdrawals
Option b agreed if, but only if
-- Allied withdrawals are accompanied by an agreement for long-term
monitoring of re-infiltration;
_ This agreement goes into effect as troop withdrawal schedule
reaches not more than half-way point;
-- Hanoi accepts, implicitly or explicitly, Japanese, Indonesian, etc.
roles in monitoring peace settlement;
-- All of Laos included in monitoring.
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
Comment: This paper has nothing to say about long-term monitoring of
settlement in Vietnam and Laos -- only inspection and verification of
withdrawal. There is nothing to prevent a strategy of six-months' relative
quiescence and then re-starting infiltration and war when our troops have
departed. Iiis no answer to say: this matter is dealt with in another paper.
2. Phasing of Withdrawals
Option b agreed if, but only if:
-r There is an agreed schedule we can check, month-by-month;
-- monitoring of re-infiltration is as above, in comment on question.
. Residual U . S. -Forces
Depends on over-all solidity of deal, especially firmness of long-term.
inspection arrangements.
Don't be impressed if Hanoi wishes U. S. bases and some effective forces
to remain:
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/12/08: LOC-HAK-1-1-50-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/12/08: LOC-HAK-1-1-50-3
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to guarantee former VC against slaughter;
-- asItedge against Chicom pressure on Hanoi,
4. Composition of Other Side's Withdrawals
I think we can live with option b (regular forces plus fillers) and do not
require the regroupees as in option c. They are southerners. If they
wish to stay, we would be in the position of forcing men to return to
a Communist regime when they did not desire it -- always unpleasant.
They would, of course, have to be watched closely.
5. Relationship of Withdrawals to Laos and Cambodia
Option d agreed.
6. Inspection and Verification of Withdrawals
The critical issue is not addressed here; namely, long-term inspection
and verification arrangements concerning re-infiltration. If we get and we must get - - the latter, then we can be fairly relaxed about the ~- _, .?.
a tal inspection verification of withdrawals except for mews u es to
a.~s`~sur that North Vietnamese regulars are pulled out of VC units.
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7. US-GVN Positions on Mutual Withdrawals Wc.1. =
Option c, which is recommended in the paper, is most dange-Y4aus because
it signals a fairly thoroughgoing misunderstanding with Saigon, covering
much t`' ore than the withdrawal issue itself. The recommendation does
not belong in this paper but relates to the whole pattern of US-GVN relations.
8. Relationship of Mutual Withdrawals to Negotiations on a Political Settlement
In South Vietnam
If a withdrawal agreement can be negotiated with long-term inspection,
including Laos as well as Vietnam, then aHanoi willingness to move along
this.line is, in effect, an abandonment of the VC in the south. It would
leave the long-term status of the VC up to the GVN and would not even
achieve guarantees against slaughter. Therefore, I tend to agree with
Thieu that Hanoi will not go this route. If it did, and if (repeat if)
we get long-term effective monitoring arrangements for Laos and Vietnam,
then option C is all right.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/12/08: LOC-HAK-1-1-50-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/12/08: LOC-HAK-1-1-50-3
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Response to Unilateral NVN Withdrawals
I would support an option not listed
,,until we get long-term monitoring
against infiltration into Laos and South Vietnam; namely, keep the
military heat on.
Comment: You already know the thinking which lies behind these
specific comments:
-. I incline to the view that Hanoi will go for a political settlement
negotiated privately with Saigon rather than merely abandon the VC;
w.. there are two possible exceptions to this view which might even
be combined: they might pull forces out of South Vietnam, let the
situation remain very quiet and peaceful while we were pulling out,
avoid any formal commitments against re-infiltration, and start the
war up when we were gone; and/or
-.. they might do this in South Vietnam while continuing to press into
Southeast Asia via Laos and Thailand. Our objective must be a
permanent going-home of the North Vietnamese forces in Laos as
You sho l`d be aware that a part of the reason h'storically in this
town for therdiscussion of troop withdrawals was the ew that our objective
should be to get our forces out, with as much honor !s possible, and
then leave Southeast Asia to its fate. This explains how it could come
about that the troop withdrawal paper is so casual about long-term inspectioncz-(-
Laos,axrt en a p a xca se errt.
-- President Johnson's acceptance of the Manila formula did not have
this background. It arose from GromykoTs suggestion that if the ultimate
withdrawal of U. S. forces were clear, there was some chance for
entering a general negotiation. From the time of the Manila meeting itself
I have always held that our protection against its ambiguities lay in the
commitment it contained against infiltration. So long as we convex t
that commitment from the other side into long-term arrangements which
.embrace Asians, as well as the ICC (using modern sensor devices,
helicopters, etc.), the Manila formula is viable.
I 'am aware that various formulations of the withdrawal issue are
designed to be fuzzy because men are uncertain about what our military
position and negotiating power will be over coming months, including the
steadiness of U. S. public opinion. I am not going to begin doing something
I never do; namely, pose as a domestic political expert. That is why
we elect Presidents. I would, however, say that we shall only confuse the
other side and give them hope, if our position on mutual withdrawals, as
presented in the weeks or months ahead, does not signal a clear and firm
intent-to achieve a solid peace in Southeast Asia, including Laos as well as SVN.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/12/08: LOC-HAK-1-1-50-3