U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN GUATEMALA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-01448R000402010001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 6, 1995
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 :CIA-RDP99-014488000402010001-1
A[_ `It.`
1W lF
FOR
PROGRAM
DATE
SUBJECT
New York: 212-309-1400
Chicago: 312-541-2020
Detroit: 810-344-1177
Boston: 617-536-2232
Philadelphia: 215-567-7600
San Francisco: 415-395-9131
Miami: 305-358-3358
Washington: 301-656-4068
Los Angeles: 213-466-6124
PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
The Diane Rehm Show
April 6, 1995 10:05 AM
STATION WAMU-FM
Washington, D.C.
DIANE REHM: Hello and welcome to the Diane Rehm Show on 88.5-
In public testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee
yesterday, acting CIA Director William Studeman denied his agency's
complicity in the murders of an American and a Guatemalan rebel.
While defending the agency's conduct, Admiral Studeman admitted
that Congress should have been told earlier of the CIA's
involvement with a Guatemalan colonel who is now implicated in the
killings.
Last week President Clinton ordered a broad investigation of
U.S. actions in Guatemala.
Joining me to talk about implications of yesterday's testimony
and recent developments in the case: Jennifer Harbury, an American
lawyer and widow of the slain Guatemalan rebel leader; and Melvin
Goodman, professor of security at the National War College and
former senior analyst at the CIA. Former CIA Director Stansfield
Turner joins us by phone.
We'll take your calls during the next half-hour. Join us on
202-885-8850.
Good morning to all of you. Thanks for joining us.
MELVIN GOODMAN: Good morning, Diane.
JENNIFER HARBURY: Good morning and thanks for inviting us.
REHM: Jennifer Harbury, first of all, let me say how sorry I
am of the news that you have now learned, and that is that your
husband is dead. What did you learn from the testimony yesterday?
HARBURY: Unfortunately, from the testimony itself yesterday,
I was not able to learn very much at all. I, of course, have been
While Radio TV Reports endeavors to assure the accuracy of material supplied by it, it cannot be responsible for mistakes or omissions.
AA..re.:l .~~ _I:eJ 1.., D,.J:.. T/ D,..... _. __., 1.,..._..J L__ L:I_ _-J __I.. i. __.. __ L_ __ 1 i i ... .
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP99-01448R000402010001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP99-01448R000402010001-1
informed by Congressman Torricelli that my husband was ordered
executed by Colonel Alpirez, a School of the Americas graduate, the
man who also ordered the killing of Mr. Michael DeVine, a U.S.
citizen, back in '89. And also, Colonel Alpirez was on the CIA
payroll for a long period of time, and certainly at the time of
both killings. I have not able to learn where my husband's buried,
when he was killed, or how I can obtain his remains.
REHM: Mr. Goodman, what was your reaction to the testimony
that was taken yesterday? It was extraordinary in and of itself,
in that it took place in public.
MELVIN GOODMAN: Yes, it was. The problem is we've learned
once again that the world has changed but the CIA hasn't. The CIA
has a great deal of difficulty in acknowledging that the Senate
Committee on Intelligence is there for oversight purposes. And, of
course, there was nearly a four-year period when the CIA was not
reporting to the Oversight Committee.
We also see that the CIA was very slow to respond in terms of
making their own judgments. They asked the Justice Department for
a reading of the situation. They waited four or five months for
the Justice Department to come back with a determination and still
could not cut themselves off from an informant who they knew was
involved with the use of terrorism.
And finally, we see once again the CIA hiding behind this
mantra of "sources and methods." I don't think outsiders are
interested in sources and methods. We're interested in how the CIA
is doing its business. And when we look through windows, like the
Ames affair and the Guatemalan affair and the politicization of
intelligence, we see a lot of evidence that suggests they do not do
their business in a fair way.
REHM: Admiral Turner, CIA does not, or does, do its business
in a fair way?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, normally I agree with almost everything
Mel Goodman says about the CIA. He's a very informed person. I
happen to feel in this case that, from what I've learned, the CIA,
once they determined that the colonel was in involved in the
killing of Michael DeVine, broke their ties with him. Though they
did, as Melvin says, referred to the Justice Department and wait
for a ruling from the Justice Department, because the Justice
Department did not want them to sever their total relationship with
the colonel until they determined whether they were going to
prosecute the colonel in this country for breaking our laws.
They determined, in four or five months, that they could not
bring him to trial here, and therefore they told the CIA to go
ahead and sever their relationship with him. And it's my
understanding that that relationship was severed. They did pay him
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP99-01448R000402010001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP99-01448R000402010001-1
the money that he had previously earned and had been put into a
reserve escrow type account for him. But that was not paying him
for any more services from the time they broke off with him.
REHM: Mr. Goodman, do you want to comment on that?
GOODMAN: Well, yes. I have some problems with that.
DeVine was killed in June of 1990 and the CIA didn't break its
relationship with Alpirez until the summer of '92. That is a two-
year period. I don't think the Justice Department ever recommended
breaking this relationship. This was a decision that the CIA made
serendipitously, perhaps, about the time that Mr. Bamaca was also
killed in the summer of '92.
My problem is that the CIA is so tightly involved in
repressive regimes, in El Salvador, in Honduras, in Guatemala --
we've seen it historically -- that I think they have a lot of
knowledge of the events that go on in these situations. I'm not
saying they knew in advance or they knew at the time of, but they
have ways of finding out intelligence in a very quick fashion in
these regimes.
REHM: Ms. Harbury?
HARBURY: And just the fact that a large lump sum payment was
made to Colonel Alpirez by the CIA approximately during the period,
either just before or just after, but during the time period that
they're telling me that my husband was executed without a trial,
when he was a prisoner of war. That has very disturbing
implications.
It's also very disturbing to me that, given those very serious
implications, no one will tell me the date that that order of
execution was given. When was the order executed? Right before or
right after the money was given to him? I want to know.
REHM: Senator William Cohen said yesterday that he believed
that the information was not merely withheld but that the agency,
CIA, intentionally misled the Senate Intelligence Committee.
Is that your view Mr. Goodman?
GOODMAN: Oh yes. I think it's the only conclusion you can
come to. If you look at the CIA's human rights report in '92, it
is very misleading, and I would have to say dissembling, in the way
it treats information it learned in Guatemala.
REHM: Admiral Turner, what is the balance that needs to be
maintained with the public's right to know, or indeed the Senate
Intelligence Committee's right to know, and the need for secrecy on
the part of the CIA? How do you balance those two things?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP99-01448R000402010001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP99-01448R000402010001-1
TURNER: Well, they're quite different with respect to the
public and with respect to the Congress. Because what we did in
this country in 1976 was establish a system whereby the Congress
acts as surrogates for the public with respect to the secret,
legitimately secret activities of the CIA. And there certainly are
legitimate secrets there. I think they exaggerate those secrets.
I think they often take advantage of what Mel Goodman referred to
earlier as the protection of their sources and methods to fail to
say things in public that they could say.
But, given that, there's no excuse for the CIA not adequately
informing the Senate Intelligence Committee in secret sessions
about any of this material.
As to what they could say in public, it's very difficult for
you and me to judge what that would have done, perhaps putting at
risk the life of some of their own agents down there. So what you
can tell the public is quite different from what you can tell the
Senate. There's no excuse for not keeping the Senate or the House
Intelligence Committee adequately informed.
GOODMAN: Well, I generally agree with Stan. And he's written
a very good book on this subject. But the problem is you only put
a source at risk if he is a sole source and an obvious source on a
sensitive subject. In the case of Guatemala, we had multiple
sources and it's clear that there were many, many CIA informants in
the G-2 and in the Guatemalan military. So I don't think any
specific agent would have been put at risk.
REHM: Can you talk briefly, Mr. Goodman, about why the CIA
originally developed these informants and these covert liaison
relationships?
MR. GOODMAN: Well, the pattern in Central America is clearly
oriented toward Fidel Castro, and the obsession is with controlling
Fidel Castro and controlling Cuba. And this is where the world has
changed, but where the CIA has had difficulty in making changes.
Most of the informants, most of the agents are organized around a
principle of limiting the Marxist revolution in Central America.
Therefore, there's a tendency to ignore terrorism, to ignore
repressive regimes, to ignore situations in Guatemala where you
need severe land redistribution. This is what is important to
American national interests, not the kind of so-called intelligence
collection we were doing in Guatemala.
REHM: Jennifer Harbury, you have undergone two hunger
strikes, you have succeeded in at least bringing this information
to the front pages of the nation's newspapers and getting the
Congress to at last focus on it. What do you want to see happen
now?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP99-01448R000402010001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP99-01448R000402010001-1
HARBURY: Well, first of all I would like to see all documents
in my case and in a number of other very key cases declassified
immediately, with necessary protections for those informants or
those contacts who are not implicated in criminal acts. Because I
don't think national security should ever be used as a shield to
criminal behavior. After those documents are declassified, I would
like to review them very carefully. I would invite the House and
the Senate to do the same, and then hold intensive hearings on the
misconduct of CIA and the State Department in Central America for
the last 20 years. I think that very terrible things would be
uncovered, based on my own experience for the last decade in
Guatemala and based on my knowledge of things that came out of the
Truth Commission in El Salvador. There's enough evidence already
to warrant very intensive hearings.
I also intend to proceed legally against both institutions if
the documents warrant it after I've been able to see them and
review them very carefully. My goal is to make sure that -- given
that there are 150,000 civilians dead or disappeared in Guatemala
at the hands of the death squads that our government put into power
in 1954, trained, funded and sheltered, often, as in the case of my
husband's situation, and also given the 440 Mayan villages that
have been wiped off the map, I intend to see that this never
happens again.
REHM: Mr. Goodman, can you comment?
I would like to see the Aspin Commission, which is looking at
the roles and missions of the CIA, set up a special subcommittee on
the Directorate of operations to scrutinize how they do their
business, how they recruit their agents, and what are the
objectives in terms of this recruitment and intelligence gathering.
And also, I think we should give serious consideration as to
whether we need to have CIA representation in Central America. We
have national interests in Central America, in Guatemala. But I
don't think these are national interests that the CIA is needed to
address.
REHM: Admiral Turner, the CIA is already under a certain
amount of scrutiny and even attack. This situation surely cannot
help the outlook for the CIA.
What's your own reaction?
TURNER: My own reaction is that the CIA is being scrutinized
by the Intelligence Committees, it's being scrutinized by the Aspin
Commission, and that I'm glad it happened that these events have
come to the surface and Ms. Harbury and others have brought them
out at this time, because we do need to review the whole
perspective of the CIA and where it's going and what it's doing.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP99-01448R000402010001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP99-01448R000402010001-1
And I think this will add to that. And I believe out of the fact
that we we'll have a new Director coming in and these commissions
and these investigations taking place, that we can over the next
year or so develop some new ground rules, some new procedures for
the CIA that will shape it in better directions.
REHM: How serious, Mr. Goodman, do you think these charges
and these accusations that have recently come to light, how serious
are they for the future of the CIA?
GOODMAN: Oh, I think they're extremely serious. Because what
they have done is to remind us once again of the pattern of deceit
we saw in El Salvador in the 1980s, when there was also a cover-up
of very sensitive information. And also it now gives John Deutch,
who will be confirmed later this month or in May, essentially a
free ticket to come into the CIA and really change the way the CIA
does its business and move out many of the people who were involved
with this pattern of deceit in the past. That is extremely
important.
REHM: I guess that's the question. Considering the long
history of the CIA and the entrenched pattern of secrecy and the
cloak of security, can the operations of the CIA truly be changed
by any one person, Mr. Goodman?
GOODMAN: I think they can be changed by a powerful leader
who's willing to make very severe changes in the organization. He
will have to move people out of the organization. Director Woolsey
did not do that.
TURNER: Well, I'm biased in this because we didn't have any
of these scandals on my time and Jimmy Carter's time, and I think
it can be done. I think we did do it. The Director of Operations
has got to be brought under control. I made a strong effort to do
that and was resoundingly criticized by the press, by the CIA and
lots of others for having tried that. But it was what was needed
at that time; it's what's needed today.
We're going to open the phones in just a moment, 202-885-8850.
REHM: Let's go first to Annapolis.
Michael, you're on the air.
MICHAEL: Hello, Diane. I'd like to thank you for bringing
enlightenment to the area.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP99-01448R000402010001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP99-01448R000402010001-1
REHM; Thank you so much.
MICHAEL: I want to talk about the National Security Agency,
located at Ft. Meade, Maryland and operating out embassies and
military missions in Central America. Admiral Studeman was
Director of the National Security Agency at the time they
intercepted messages about Jennifer Harbury's husband. And now
he's Acting Director of the CIA. He's culpable on both sides.
REHM: All right, Michael. Thanks for your call.
How do you feel about that, Jennifer?
HARBURY: I think it raises very, very serious issues. And
again, I wish to see the documents. Why have they not been given
to me?
REHM: To what extent to you believe those documents will be
forthcoming, Mr. Goodman?
GOODMAN: Well, I don't know about the link between the NSA
and the CIA. I think that we tend to overreach when we talk about
the destruction of documents at NSA. I think that is a very
difficult thing to do with the procedures out there. But I think
there's going to have to be a lot of White House pressure on the
CIA to get timely release of documentation. That is extremely.
REHM: Good morning, Larry. You're on the Diane Rehm Show.
LARRY: ...I worked at the agency covering Central America
from roughly '86 through '89, wound up as the senior analyst out
there. And I've got to really disagree with what Mel was saying.
Mel's quite qualified to comment on the coverages of the Soviet
Union. But in this case it was not the preoccupation with Fidel.
There were really two preoccupations.
Number one, the military's threat to the civilian democracy.
I know from what we were covering both in terms of the human
reports as well as the analytical line that was being taken, there
was no concern about the insurgency. That was not an issue.
REHM: Mr. Goodman, do you want to respond?
Well, that's clearly not true. The obsession that the CIA had
on the operational side -- the operational obsession. I'm not
talking about an intelligence analyst, such as this caller. I'm
talking about the operational role, which really has less to do
with intelligence and more with policy, was clearly oriented
towards stopping so-called Marxist revolution. And again, this
Marxist revolution concept is an overarching idea that in the case
of Guatemala really had no meaning whatsoever.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP99-01448R000402010001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP99-01448R000402010001-1
LARRY: Mel, I challenge you to give me any evidence of that.
Because I've traveled to Guatemala, I've been there both on TDY, I
was in the station, I've talked to the people. I know what was
being covered. I know where the focus was.
Now, clearly there's an element of Casablanca going on here
with, you know, like the inspector who was just shocked and
dismayed to find out that there was gambling in his establishment.
For people to resurrect this image of the rogue elephant running
about is, you know, frankly, I think, a little nonsensical.
Because the shift -- you know, the CIA's not doing what it was
doing in 1954 in overthrowing Arbenz. The CIA shift was in keeping
track of what the military was up to.
There was not an insurgency problem in Guatemala, since at
least '86. I mean the UNRG and the other groups had basically
retreated into Mexico and were very inactive.
REHM: Mr. Goodman, last comment. Or Jennifer Harbury.
HARBURY: Well, I have been in and out of Guatemala now for a
decade and I lived there for 2 years, '85 and '86. I heard the
Guatemalan army nonstop reporting on the threat of the communist
invasion from Cuba. You know, the Marxist uprising, etcetera.
etcetera. I've also heard very similar language about the Marxist
problem, etcetera, etcetera, from State Department officials and
other U.S. officials. There was clearly always that obsession in
Guatemala by our government. It was obvious. It's always been
there. There's also obviously been a clear paranoia of the URNG
forces.
Now, I assume, sir, that you have never been up to the volcano
to actually visit any base camps. I have. I've also been
throughout the underground interviewing different people for my
books that I've written and the one that I plan to write on. And
the idea that they've all retreated into Mexico is somewhat
laughable. They have carried out combat far from villages since
the mid '80s, since they learned in the early '80s that if you do
combat near a village, that village will be massacred. For human
rights reasons, they've fought farther away. As of 1990, they were
very close to the capital, as a matter of fact.
REHM: In Germantown. Sam, you're on the Diane Rehm Show.
SAM: ...I have a question and a comment.
My questions is, specifically, how much U.S. taxpayer money is
being spent on payoffs and training of military personnel in South
America?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP99-01448R000402010001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP99-01448R000402010001-1
And secondly, I wanted to make a comment. I would like to
express my disgust with the vile and morally reprehensible practice
of supporting murderers and anti-democratic and anti-American
personnel in South America. I don't think you support -- you
oppose communism by building up fascist dictators. That's not the
way that you build up South America. And I think a lot of the
problems of illegal aliens coming into the U.S. stems directly from
our own practice of creating such a difficult and dangerous
environment in the Central America and South America region that
these people are forced to come here
REHM: All right, Sam. Thanks for your call.
Admiral Turner, do you want to comment?
TURNER: Well, I think I'd like to reemphasize the point that
it is my understanding that when the CIA learned of Colonel
Alpirez's involvement in the DeVine murder, it was October 1991;
and they stopped their relationship with him, put it on hold until
the spring of '92, when the Justice Department cleared them to
sever that relationship because we were not going to take legal
action. I think the CIA's record here is not quite as bad as we're
portraying. I don't want to try to condone it in its entirety
because it's clear, and they have acknowledged, they've made a
number of mistakes here.
When you are dealing in this underground world of intelligence
agents, you're not always going to find the most upstanding people.
What the agency has the difficult job of doing is sorting out those
who are sleazy in their own way but are still useful to us and
still are not below the standards that we can accept. The colonel
clearly was. And I think that when they found out that he was,
then they dropped him.
REHM: What about the matter of direct U.S. financial
assistance to the Guatemalan military? Apparently, the overt
assistance stopped after the killing of Mr. DeVine in 1990, but the
covert financial assistance from the CIA continued even in the face
of that.
GOODMAN: Right. This is a problem that's going to require a
solution. The overt assistance stopped in under what the CIA calls
a liaison relationship. They continued covert payments. Under the
special understanding between the CIA and the Senate Intelligence
Committee, the CIA does not have to brief the Oversight Committee
on liaison accounts. This makes no sense to me whatsoever. And I
don't know why the Oversight Committee would give up its authority
in one of the most sensitive areas in which the CIA does business,
especially when the Oversight Committee has no confidence that the
CIA is acting with good judgment.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP99-01448R000402010001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP99-01448R000402010001-1
What comes out of this affair is very bad judgment, at the
very minimum.
REHM: Well, you talked earlier about the kinds of changes
that will need to take place at the CIA itself. What about the
relationship between the CIA and the Senate Intelligence or
Oversight Committees?
GOODMAN: Well, I think the Oversight Committee is going to
have to get more zealous. It's -- partly, it's the fault of the
CIA and Studeman's passive voice of things slipping under the rug,
rather than being swept under the rug. But you've never had the
Oversight Committee, to me, being rigorous enough in demanding
oversight, in demanding accountability and responsibility. So
there's going to have to be more energy on both sides of this fence
for the relationship to work.
REHM: In Howard County. Good morning, Leslie. You're on the
LESLIE: Yes, good morning. Diane, thank you very much. This
is wonderful. We really needed this.
And Jennifer, thank you so much for what you have done for all
of us Latin Americans who have been following the issues for so
long and have been so upset about the way the U.S. has responded.
The U.S. Government, I would say.
To me -- and I have three quick comments I would like to make.
The first one is that it is un-understandable to me, it's hard
to understand how an institution like the CIA continues to exist,
knowing, like we have for so many years, that it has been
responsible for the mining of harbors, like in Nicaragua; the
overthrowing of sovereign -- of democratically elected governments,
like in Chile, in Guatemala and so on. This, to me, reflects
something terribly wrong within the U.S. Government.
REHM: All right. Okay.
LESLIE: Okay.
And the one point that I want to bring up is that it bothers
me terribly, as a person from the Third World, that the U.S.
Government only moves when one of its citizens has died or has been
hurt. This doesn't take anything away from Jennifer. because she's
speaking for the voiceless. But the way the news are reflected and
presented, the U.S. Government only moves when its people get hurt.
It doesn't bother them that 150,000 or so has disappeared.
REHM: Leslie, I appreciate your call.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP99-01448R000402010001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP99-01448R000402010001-1
Ms. Harbury?
HARBURY: I also very much appreciate Leslie's call.
And I agree with you, Leslie. It hurts me very, very much to
think that my husband, who grew up starving on a coffee plantation,
starving and illiterate, was then able to spend 17 years under
bombing and gunfire, losing everyone that was close to him, and
then be tortured to death in a secret prison; and the only reason
anyone even knows his name is because I can stand up and hold his
photograph. I, a white person from the United States. Why is it
that, when no one would have even noticed in his own right?
That hurts me also. I agree with you.
REHM: Mr. Goodman, her earlier question: Why does the CIA
continue to need to exist and operate in the post-Cold War world?
GOODMAN: Well, I think you need an independent Central
Intelligence Agency to make assessments and estimates and
evaluations of international affairs. That must be done. The
problem to me is larger and its looking at American foreign policy
in South America, because there is a lot of behavior on the part of
the United States that consistent with colonial behavior. And the
CIA has grown up under this national security system that allows
colonial attitudes to dominate its policy in South America and in
Central America.
So, we have to make major changes in policy before we can make
major changes in the agency. The agency is only part of a much
larger problem,.
REHM: Do you think many more revelations will be forthcoming
here, in terms of both the Harbury -- her husband's case, as well
as that of Michael DeVine?
GOODMAN: Well, the Guatemala case is not unique. We saw this
in El Salvador and we've seen this in Honduras. So I would not be
surprised, once the CIA got into its files and looked at the work
of its informants and its agents overseas, that there was a lot of
knowledge of repressive practices and terrorism. That would not be
surprising to me.
REHM: Admiral Turner, what do you expect to be forthcoming
here in the next few months?
TURNER: I think there will be more disclosures. I think
what's happened here, Diane, is there are two functions in the CIA.
There's the intelligence function -- collection information and
analyzing it, interpreting it -- and then there's what we call
covert action, which is interfering in the events of other
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP99-01448R000402010001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP99-01448R000402010001-1
countries. And we've been talking largely about the latter today.
When the Reagan Administration came in 1981, they went wild
with covert actions, and we're now reaping the unfortunate results
of that. And I think we'll probably find, if the Senate and the
House Intelligence Committee dig into it, that there were more
activities in other Latin American countries under the name of
covert action that we really would not like to have had happen and
we don't want have continued today.
REHM: Former CIA Director Stansfield Turner; Melvin Goodman,
professor of security at the National War College and a former
senior analyst at the CIA; and Jennifer Harbury, widow of a slain
Guatemalan rebel leader.
Thank you all so much for joining me morning.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP99-01448R000402010001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22 : CIA-RDP99-O1448ROOO4O2O1OOO1-1
RADIO
NREr
701 W'I:ARD A/Eti = '=
I -
CnEVY CHASE, MD 2~c ' 5
[phone]
STAT
STAT
8M/,
..~., l-~HS
P)',ONE .
~ -656-4 68
Pages
(:nc:u;.^.; .:over) -?
FRCM~ RE?;,0,~ ,"S O'.;~AS..x;~~,? EYSL_"=~~r
1
.
~ N
W
~
-.TC: N '~ CUT F , F
ADVERTISJNG $ER`.` CE$
? Pr~rs~Mc.,,c,-- ..r.
D.
?VNR $rory.,,,~'.s
I. Cross
^~
P::S:IC RELATIONS SERVICES
'
.. a ~C. _ _f
J
\t'' -o" E' .4::! News
JJJ !1 TI 1P,G~eI In ,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22: CIA-RDP99-O1448ROOO4O2O1OOO1-1 'roar